Dewey Teel v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Motion disposition in opinion--denying Motion to dismiss appeal [999215188-2] Originating case number: 5:11-cv-00005-FPS Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999219863].. [12-2406]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-2406
DEWEY TEEL; GAY TEEL,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
CHESAPEAKE APPALACHIA, LLC,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Wheeling.
Frederick P. Stamp,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (5:11-cv-00005-FPS)
Submitted:
September 30, 2013
Decided:
October 17, 2013
Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Isak J. Howell, LAW OFFICE OF ISAK HOWELL, Lewisburg, West
Virginia; Joseph M. Lovett, Lewisburg, West Virginia, for
Appellants.
Timothy M. Miller, Joseph K. Merical, ROBINSON &
MCELWEE, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Dewey and Gay Teel (collectively the Teels) appeal the
district court’s order granting summary judgment to Chesapeake
Appalachia, LLC (Chesapeake), on their claim of trespass under
West Virginia common law arising from Chesapeake’s construction
of natural gas wells on a portion of the Teels’ property. ∗
issues
the
Teels
raise
are
indistinguishable
from
those
The
we
recently considered in Whiteman v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC,
__
F.3d
__,
2013
WL
4734969
(4th
Cir.
Sept.
4,
2013).
We
affirm.
Whiteman explained that “a claim for trespass under
West Virginia common law can only lie if one’s entry upon the
land
of
another—or
another—is
4734969,
without
at
*3
one’s
leaving
lawful
(internal
a
thing
authority.”
quotation
upon
the
Whiteman,
marks
land
of
2013
WL
omitted).
In
situations, like here, where a property’s surface and mineral
estates
have
language
in
been
the
severed,
severance
and
deed,
in
the
the
absence
lawful
of
authority
contrary
of
the
mineral estate owner to enter and burden the surface estate is
implied and limited to activities that are reasonably necessary
for the exploitation of the mineral rights.
∗
Id. at *4-*7.
The
The Teels voluntarily dismissed the remainder of their
claims with prejudice.
2
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reasonable
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necessity
analysis
Pg: 3 of 4
is
fact-specific,
and
“what
is
necessary is a fluid concept that must be determined on a case
by case basis.”
owner
seeks
to
Id. at *4.
use
the
Accordingly, when a mineral estate
corresponding
surface
estate
to
facilitate mineral extraction, “it must be demonstrated . . .
that the [use] is reasonably necessary for the extraction of the
mineral” and does not substantially burden the surface estate.
Id. at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Where, as here,
the surface owner claims trespass based on the mineral estate
owner’s activities, the burden is on the surface owner to show a
lack of reasonable necessity or a substantial burden.
Id. at
*7-*8.
As
a
threshold
matter,
the
Teels
argue
that
the
district court erred by examining Chesapeake’s activities only
for reasonableness.
As in Whiteman, however, we conclude that
the district court applied the correct standard and did not err
in looking to relevant case law from courts in other districts.
Id. at *9-*10 & n.17.
Similarly, there is no merit in the
Teels’ suggestion that the district court improperly examined
West
Virginia
statutes
and
regulations
to
inform
itself
regarding the practices of the state’s oil and gas industry and,
thereby, the reasonable necessity of Chesapeake’s actions.
at *10.
3
Id.
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Turning to the sufficiency of the Teels’ evidence to
survive summary judgment, we conclude that Whiteman controls.
As
in
Whiteman,
the
Teels’
generalized
evidence
regarding
Chesapeake’s mining operations in dissimilar locations and at
times subsequent to the events at issue here does not satisfy
the fact-intensive and case-specific inquiry into the reasonable
necessity of Chesapeake’s actions on the Teels’ property.
at
*8-*9.
plausibly
The
Teels
suggesting
also
that
have
failed
Chesapeake’s
substantial burden on their property.
to
muster
operations
Id.
evidence
impose
a
Id. at *8.
Accordingly, we affirm the award of summary judgment
to Chesapeake.
the appeal.
We deny as moot Chesapeake’s motion to dismiss
We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before
this
Court
and
argument
would
not
aid
the
decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
4
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