Jeffrey Atkins v. Eric Holder

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 4:10-cv-01296-JMC. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999132064].. [12-2418]

Appeal: 12-2418

Doc: 27

Filed: 06/18/2013

Pg: 1 of 8

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-2418

JEFFREY ATKINS,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
ERIC HOLDER, Attorney General, Federal Bureau of Prisons,
Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence.
J. Michelle Childs, District
Judge. (4:10-cv-01296-JMC)

Submitted:

May 28, 2013

Decided:

June 18, 2013

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James Lewis Mann Cromer, James Paul Porter, J. LEWIS CROMER &
ASSOCIATES, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Barbara M. Bowens,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Appeal: 12-2418

Doc: 27

Filed: 06/18/2013

Pg: 2 of 8

PER CURIAM:
Jeffrey

Atkins

appeals

the

district

court’s

order

granting summary judgment to the Defendant on his claims for
disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, racial
discrimination

and

retaliation

under

Title

VII,

and

age

discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. *
Prior to his termination, Atkins was a correctional counselor
with

the

Bureau

of

Prisons.

Atkins

suffered

from

polyarthropathy of the right knee and degenerative disc disease
in

his

back.

All

of

Atkins’

doctors

imposed

significant

restrictions on his physical activity and concluded that his
restrictions were permanent.

On appeal, Atkins challenges the

district court’s disposition of his disability discrimination,
racial discrimination, and retaliation claims.
We

review

the

district

court’s

We affirm.
grant

of

summary

judgment de novo, viewing the facts and drawing all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 119 (4th
Cir. 2011).

Summary judgment is properly granted “if the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

*

The district court remanded a breach of contract claim to
state court following the resolution of the federal law claims.

2

Appeal: 12-2418

Doc: 27

Filed: 06/18/2013

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
evidence

presents

a

Pg: 3 of 8

The relevant inquiry is “whether the
sufficient

disagreement

to

require

submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.”

Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).
Atkins first contends that he was terminated from his
position

because

Rehabilitation

of

Act.

his

disability,

Section

504

of

in
the

violation

of

the

Rehabilitation

Act

provides, in relevant part: “No otherwise qualified individual
with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his
disability” be subject to discrimination with regard to federal
employment.

29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006).

In order to establish a

violation of the Rehabilitation Act for disparate treatment, a
plaintiff must prove: “(1) that he has a disability; (2) that he
is

otherwise

qualified

for

the

employment

or

benefit

in

question; and (3) that he was excluded from the employment or
benefit

due

disability.”

to

discrimination

solely

on

the

basis

of

the

Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261,

1265 (4th Cir. 1995).
There is no dispute that Atkins was disabled at the
time of his termination.

However, we conclude that the district

court did not err when it held that Atkins was not otherwise
qualified for his position.

Only persons who are “qualified”

for the position in question may state a claim for disability
3

Appeal: 12-2418

Doc: 27

Filed: 06/18/2013

discrimination.

Tyndall

v.

Pg: 4 of 8

National

Educ.

Centers,

Inc.

of

California, 31 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 1994) (claim under ADA).
A “qualified individual with a disability” is “an individual
with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation,
can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires.”
(2006).

42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)

See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2012).

At the time of

his termination, Atkins was under several medical restrictions
that significantly curtailed the time he was allowed to walk or
stand.

Prior to being barred from the institution, Atkins was

assisted by two metal canes with forearm braces and stated that
he

was

afraid

for

his

safety.

Because

the

correctional

counselor position was a law enforcement position that required
Atkins

to

physically

restrain

and

control

inmates,

and

no

accommodation could be made to alleviate his restrictions, we
conclude

that

Atkins

did

not

make

a

prima

facie

claim

for

disability discrimination.
Next, Atkins argues that the district court erred by
granting summary judgment on his Title VII racial discrimination
claim.

A plaintiff pursuing a Title VII discrimination claim

may either offer direct evidence of discrimination or, using
indirect
that

was

evidence,
adopted

may
by

rely

the

on

the

Supreme

burden-shifting

Court

in

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
4

framework

McDonnell

Douglas

Under the latter

Appeal: 12-2418

Doc: 27

Filed: 06/18/2013

Pg: 5 of 8

standard, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing
a prima facie case.

See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981).

Because Atkins offered no

direct evidence of discrimination, his claim is appropriately
analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title
VII, a

plaintiff

must

show

that:

(1)

he

was

a

member

of

a

protected group; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action;
(3) he was performing his job satisfactorily at the time of the
adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees
outside

his

protected

class

were

treated

more

favorably.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; White v. BFI Waste Servs.,
LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2004).

Where a plaintiff makes

a showing sufficient to support a prima facie case, the burden
shifts

to

the

nondiscriminatory

defendant
reason

for

to

articulate

the

adverse

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.

a

legitimate,

employment

action.

If the employer produces a

legitimate reason for the action, the burden once again shifts
to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s rationale is a
pretext for discrimination.

Id. at 804-05.

The plaintiff can

prove pretext by showing that the defendant’s “explanation is
unworthy

of

circumstantial

credence
evidence

or

by

offering

sufficiently

5

other

probative

forms
of

.

of
.

.

Appeal: 12-2418

Doc: 27

Filed: 06/18/2013

discrimination.”

Pg: 6 of 8

Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 336 (4th Cir.

2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court determined that Atkins had failed
to establish a prima facie case because he could not show that
similarly situated employees were treated more favorably than
he.

We

conclude

restricted

the

individuals

that

scope

who

of

shared

the

district

Atkins’

should

comparators

potential

court

to

immediate

not
only

supervisor

have
those
while

ignoring the fact that the warden of the institution made the
final
Hosp.,

decision
964

to

F.2d

terminate
577,

583

Atkins.
(6th

Cir.

See
1992)

Mitchell

v.

(holding

Toledo

that

to

establish a prima facie case, an employee generally must show
that his comparator was subject to action by the same supervisor
or decision-maker).

Because we also recognize that a dispute

exists in the record as to whether Atkins’ proffered comparators
had permanent disabilities, we proceed to assess Atkins’ claim
that the Defendant’s legitimate reason for terminating him was
pretextual.

The Defendant contends that Atkins was terminated

because he was unable to perform his duties as a result of his
medical condition.

For the reasons stated above, we hold that

Atkins has not provided sufficient evidence to label this belief
as mere pretext for racial discrimination.
Lastly, Atkins alleges that the Defendant terminated
him in retaliation for filing an EEO complaint.
6

A plaintiff may

Appeal: 12-2418

Doc: 27

Filed: 06/18/2013

Pg: 7 of 8

establish a prima facie case of retaliation by demonstrating
that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) the defendant
took an adverse action against him; and (3) there was a causal
connection between the first two elements.
380 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2004).

Price v. Thompson,

If a prima facie case is

established, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a
legitimate, non-retaliatory basis for the action.

Id.

Once

this burden is met, the plaintiff must show by a preponderance
of the evidence that the proffered reasons are pretextual.

Id.

Atkins satisfies the first two prongs of the prima
facie case.

However, he did not establish a causal connection

between his EEO complaint and his termination.

Atkins did not

receive notice that he would be terminated until four months
after

he

filed

termination

was

his

EEO

complaint.

not

temporally

very

Therefore,
close

to

because

his

his

protected

activity, Atkins must show other relevant evidence to support
causation.

See Lettieri v. Equant Inc., 478 F.3d 640, 650 (4th

Cir. 2007).

We conclude that Atkins has not made this showing,

and therefore the district court did not err when it held that
Atkins failed to state a prima facie case for retaliation.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order.
dispense

with

oral

argument

because

7

the

facts

and

We

legal

Appeal: 12-2418

Doc: 27

Filed: 06/18/2013

Pg: 8 of 8

contentions are adequately presented in the material before this
court and argument will not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

8