Robert Yates v. Municipal Mortgage & Equity

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:08-md-01961-MJG. [999310832]. [12-2496]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-2496
ROBERT YATES, MJG−08−269; ALAN S. BARRY, MJG−08−269; DAVID
YOUNG,
MJG−08−269;
CARLO
HORNSBY;
ED
FRIEDLANDER,
MJG−08−269; PAUL ENGEL, individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated MJG−08−292; WILLIAM D. FELIX;
DAVID KREMSER, on behalf of himself and on behalf of Elk
Meadow Investments, LLC; CHARLES W. DAMMEYER, on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
and
F. RICHARD MANSON, individually and on behalf of, all
others
similarly
situated
MJG−08−269;
GEETA
SHAILAM,
individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated
MJG−08−386; MICHAEL J. CIRRITO, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated MJG−08−476; JOHN J.
HUFNAGLE, individually and on behalf of all others
similarly
situated
MJG−08−579;
WILLIAM
JOHNSTON,
derivatively on behalf of Municipal Mortgage & Equity, LLC
MJG−08−670;
ROBERT
STAUB,
derivatively
on
behalf
of
Municipal Mortgage & Equity, LLC
MJG−08−802; THE MARY L.
KIESER TRUST, by Mary L. Kieser and Ralph F. Kieser,
Trustees, derivatively and on behalf of Nominal Defendant,
Municipal
Mortgage
&
Equity
LLC
MJG−08−805;
JUDITH
GREENBERG; JOSEPH S. GELMIS, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated MJG−08−2133; ARNOLD J. ROSS,
MJG−08−2133; TROY BROY; JULES ROTHAS, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated MJG−08−2134; NAOMI
RAPHAEL; FAFN/SLATER GROUP; KREMSER GROUP, MJG−08−269,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MUNICIPAL MORTGAGE & EQUITY, LLC; MELANIE M. LUNDQUIST;
MICHAEL L. FALCONE; MERRILL LYNCH PIERCE FENNER AND SMITH
INCORPORATED; RBC CAPITAL MARKETS, LLC.; MARK K. JOSEPH;

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CHARLES C. BAUM; EDDIE C. BROWN; ROBERT S. HILLMAN; DOUGLAS
A. MCGREGOR; ARTHUR S. MEHLMAN; FRED N. PRATT, JR.; RICHARD
O. BERNDT; WILLIAM S. HARRISON; DAVID KAY; CHARLES M.
PINCKNEY,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
GARY A. MENTESANA; BARBARA B. LUCAS; EARL W. COLE, III;
ANGELA B. BARONE,
Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
Marvin J. Garbis, Senior District
Judge. (1:08-md-01961-MJG)

Argued:

October 30, 2013

Decided:

March 7, 2014

Before DIAZ and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and Joseph F. ANDERSON,
Jr., United States District Judge for the District of South
Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Floyd and Judge Anderson joined.

ARGUED: David A.P. Brower, BROWER PIVEN, New York, New York, for
Appellants.
Mark Holland, New York, New York, William M. Jay,
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP, Washington, D.C.; Jason J. Mendro, GIBSON,
DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF:
Charles J. Piven, Yelena Trepetin, BROWER PRIVEN, Stevenson,
Maryland; Sherrie R. Savett, Barbara A. Podell, Eric Lechtzin,
BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Kim E.
Miller, KAHN SWICK & FOTI, LLC, New York, New York; Susan K.
Alexander, Andrew S. Love, ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP, San
Francisco, California, for Appellants.
Jonathan C. Dickey,
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, New York, New York, for Appellees
Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner and Smith Incorporated, and RBC
Capital Markets, LLC.
Mary K. Dulka, GOODWIN PROCTER LLP, New
York, New York; Anthony Candido, CLIFFORD CHANCE LLP, New York,
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New York; Stephen A. Goldberg, Ward B. Coe III, GALLAGHER
EVELIUS & JONES LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees
Municipal Mortgage & Equity, LLC, Mark K. Joseph, William S.
Harrison, Charles M. Pinckney, and David Kay.
William M.
Krulak, Jr., MILES & STOCKBRIDGE P.C., Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellees Charles C. Baum, Richard O. Berndt, Eddie C. Brown,
Robert S. Hillman, Douglas A. McGregor, Arthur S. Mehlman, and
Fred N. Pratt, Jr.
Charles O. Monk, II, Geoffrey M. Gamble,
SAUL EWING LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee Michael L.
Falcone.
David W.T. Daniels, RICHARDS KIBBE & ORBE LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee Melanie Lundquist.

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DIAZ, Circuit Judge:
This case involves claims that Municipal Mortgage & Equity
(“MuniMae” or the “Company”), and certain of its officers and
directors

(collectively,

the

federal securities laws. 1
class

representatives,

“MuniMae

defendants”),

violated

Plaintiffs, both individually and as
contend

that

the

MuniMae

defendants

committed securities fraud by (1) falsely representing that the
Company was in full compliance with a new accounting standard
enacted

in

2003;

and

(2)

concealing

correcting the accounting error.

the

substantial

cost

of

Plaintiffs allege that they

relied on the integrity of the market price of the Company’s
stock,

and

fraudulent

that,
conduct,

as

a

result

investors

of

paid

the
an

MuniMae

defendants’

artificially

inflated

price for MuniMae shares during the class period.
The
§§ 10(b)

district
and

20(a)

court
of

dismissed

the

plaintiffs’

Securities

Exchange

claims

under

Act

1934,

of

finding that the amended complaint failed to adequately plead
scienter, or wrongful intent.

The court also dismissed claims

under §§ 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933
relating

to

a

secondary

public

1

offering

(“SPO”).

The

court

Plaintiffs also sued Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. and RBC Capital Markets Corp., who served as lead
underwriters in a secondary public offering conducted by MuniMae
in 2005.

4

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found the § 11 claim time-barred by the applicable statute of
repose,

and

§ 12(a)(2)

that
claim.

plaintiffs
It

lacked

dismissed

standing
the

§ 15

to

bring

claim

the

because

plaintiffs failed to adequately plead a primary violation of the
Securities Act. 2
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.
In reviewing the district court's dismissal under Federal
Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

12(b)(6),

“we

allegations in the complaint as true.’”

‘accept

all

factual

Matrix Capital Mgmt.

Fund, LP v. BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 176 (4th Cir.
2009) (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551
U.S. 308, 322, (2007)).

And as did the district court, we take

judicial notice of the content of relevant SEC filings and other
publicly available documents included in the record.

See In re

PEC Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 418 F.3d 379, 390 & n.10 (4th
Cir. 2005).
2

The district court refused to dismiss three other claims
alleging violations of the Securities Act.
After some
procedural skirmishing not relevant to this appeal, the parties
filed a joint motion requesting that the district court certify
the dismissed claims as final pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b).
Finding no just reason for delay, the court
granted the motion.
We are satisfied that the district court
acted appropriately in certifying its order under Rule 54(b).
See Culosi v. Bullock, 596 F.3d 195, 203 (4th Cir. 2010).

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A.
The putative class period for this case spans from May 3,
2004, to January 29, 2008.

During that period, MuniMae was one

of the nation’s largest syndicators of low-income housing tax
credits

(“LIHTCs”).

developers
developers

of

low-income

cannot

services

Federal

take

companies,

tax

rental

advantage

like

law

provides

housing.
of

MuniMae,

LIHTCs

Because

these

credits,

organize

LIHTC

to
most

financial
investment

partnerships (“LIHTC Funds”) to pool and sell the credits to
investors.
MuniMae usually acted as the general partner of its LIHTC
Funds during the class period, and it received syndication and
asset

management

fees

for

organizing

and

maintaining

them.

Although its ownership share was generally low, ranging from
0.1% to 1.0%, it was typically larger than that of any single
investor.

Prior to 2003, MuniMae primarily treated these LIHTC

Funds as off balance sheet entities.
In 2003, the Financial Accounting Standards Board adopted
Financial
(“FIN

Accounting

46R”),

which

Standards

Board

addressed

the

Interpretation
financial

No.

46R

reporting

requirements of businesses with respect to off balance sheet

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FIN 46R defined a new category of entities called

Variable Interest Entities (“VIEs”).

Under FIN 46R, a company

must consolidate onto its financial statements the assets and
liabilities

of

a

VIE

if

the

company

is

its

“primary

beneficiary,” that is, if the company absorbs the majority of
the

risks

and

rewards

associated

with

the

VIE.

Before

the

adoption of this revised standard, a company was generally only
required

to

consolidate

financial

statements

if

it

had

a

majority voting interest in the entity.
The first quarter of 2004 was the first period for which
MuniMae

reported

compliance

with

FIN

46R.

The

Company

then

concluded that FIN 46R required it to consolidate some but not
all of its LIHTC Funds, which added a net $1.3 billion in assets
and

liabilities

remaining

to

the

unconsolidated

approximately

$970.3

Company’s
LIHTC

million

and

financial
Funds

statements.

had

net

liabilities

of

assets

The
of

approximately

$90.8 million.
Through

mid-2006,

MuniMae

continued

to

represent

its

compliance with FIN 46R in financial reports filed with the SEC.
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (“PwC”), MuniMae’s independent public
accountant, certified that those reports had been prepared in
3

The Board initially adopted FIN 46 in January 2003.
In
December 2003, it approved various amendments to FIN 46 and
released FIN 46R.

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accordance

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with

generally

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accepted

(“GAAP”) for fiscal years 2004 and 2005.

accounting

principles

Between 2004 and 2006,

the Company also made a number of acquisitions and conducted
several offerings, including an SPO in February 2005.

At the

end of 2005, Melanie Lundquist replaced William Harrison as the
Company’s CFO.
On March 10, 2006, MuniMae announced that it was restating
its financial statements for the nine-month period ending on
September 30, 2005, as well as fiscal years 2002 through 2004.
The

restatement

corrected

certain

financial

that were unrelated to FIN 46R.

reporting

errors

MuniMae issued the restated

financial statements in June 2006.
In August, the Company disclosed that it had identified
“material

weaknesses

in

internal

controls

over

financial

reporting,” and that, as a result, it would be unable to “file
timely its second quarter 2006 Form 10-Q.”

J.A. 65.

A few

months later, on September 13, 2006, MuniMae announced that it
was again restating its financial statements for fiscal years
2003 through 2005, and for the first quarter of 2006.

The

Company initially informed investors that the second restatement
would

address

commitments

three

related

to

areas:

(1)

affordable

accounting

housing

for

projects;

equity
(2)

the

classification of cash flow from tax credit equity funds; and
(3)

accounting

for

syndication
8

fees.

About

a

month

later,

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MuniMae

disclosed

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that

it

had

“not

yet

reached

a

conclusion regarding the extent of the [second] restatement.”
J.A. 1120.
On

October

26,

2006,

MuniMae

announced

that

it

was

replacing PwC as the Company’s independent public accountant.
The Company stated--and PwC agreed--that for fiscal years 2004
and 2005, and through October 2006, “there were no disagreements
with PwC on any matter of accounting principles or practices,
financial statement disclosure or audit scope or procedure which
disagreements if not resolved to the satisfaction of PwC would
have caused them to make reference thereto in their reports on
[MuniMae’s] financial statements.”
Three

months

later,

the

J.A. 1120.
Company

reported

consecutive increase in its quarterly dividend.

its

40th

In the same

announcement, the Company revealed that the second restatement
would address accounting errors with respect to FIN 46R, and
that the Company would “be required to consolidate substantially
all of the low income housing tax credit equity funds it has
interests in.”

J.A. 1373.

On May 4, 2007, MuniMae disclosed that it would not be able
to

timely

dedication

file
of

its

10-K

significant

restatement efforts.”

for

2006

“[a]s

management

J.A. 1129.

a

result

resources

to

of

the
. . .

The Company noted that since

September 2006, it had identified additional material weaknesses
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its

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internal

controls

over

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financial

reporting,

including

with respect to its accounting of LIHTC Funds.
On

July

Navigant

10,

2007,

Consulting

restatement.

to

MuniMae
assist

announced
its

that

internal

it

had

auditors

hired

in

the

A month later, it disclosed more details about the

scope of the effort, noting that “there are approximately 92
people

currently

working

on

the

restatement,”

company employees and 72 consultants.”

including

J.A. 1145.

“20

Around the

same time, Lundquist resigned and Charles Pinckney replaced her
as CFO.
MuniMae

held

a

teleconference

further update investors.

on

November

8,

2007

to

The Company stated that management

planned to ask the Board to continue the Company’s longstanding
policy of increasing the dividend distribution every quarter,
although it warned that “it is possible that the dividend payout
ratio for the full fiscal year 2007 may exceed 100% of the
Company’s

net

cash

from

operations

due

to

incurred by the Company from the restatement.”

the

costs

J.A. 1155.

being
The

Company’s officers declined at that point to estimate the cost
of the second restatement, though they acknowledged the costs
were substantial.
On January 28, 2008, MuniMae announced that it was cutting
its quarterly dividend by 37%, from $0.525 to $0.33 per share.
The Company attributed the cut to “the cost of the Company’s
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ongoing restatement of its financial statements, the decision
. . . to conserve capital . . . given the current volatility in
the

credit

and

capital

markets,

and

the

desire

to

dedicate

additional capital to the high-growth Renewable Energy Finance
business.”

J.A. 1171.

At the same time, the Company stated

that it did “not believe the results of the restatement w[ould]
materially change the previously recorded cash balances of the
Company and its subsidiaries.”

Id.

Because the restatement

efforts were still ongoing, the Company also announced that it
anticipated

being

delisted

from

the

New

York

Stock

Exchange

because it could not meet a NYSE deadline for filing its 2006
Form 10-K.

The price of MuniMae shares dropped 46.57%, from

$17.20 per share on January 28, to $9.19 per share on January
29, on unusually heavy trading volume.
MuniMae provided further details to investors regarding the
second restatement during a January 29 conference call.
respect

to

FIN

46R,

the

Company

disclosed

that

it

With

had

to

consolidate 230 LIHTC Funds, which required it to review 6,000
separate

financial

statements.

Because

the

Company

had

no

automated process in place to review the accounting, this work
had to be done manually.

Acknowledging that these developments

were

Company’s

a

result

instance[,]”

CEO

of

the

Michael

Falcone

“mistakes

expressed

his

in

the

first

disappointment

and embarrassment over the “the amount of time and energy and
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effort[] it’s taking us to fix them.”
MuniMae

shares

dropped

an

J.A. 1196.

additional

22.416%,

The price of
to

$7.13

per

share, on January 30, again on unusually heavy trading volume.
On April 9, 2008, MuniMae disclosed that it spent $54.1 million
to complete the second restatement.
B.
Shareholders

filed

multiple

lawsuits

against

MuniMae,

certain of its officers and directors, and the lead underwriters
in the 2005 SPO, alleging violations of federal securities laws.
The actions were consolidated in the District of Maryland for
pretrial proceedings.

See In re Mun. Mortg. & Equity, LLC, Sec.

&

571

Derivative

Litig.,

F.

Supp.

2d

1373

(J.P.M.L.

2008).

Plaintiffs filed the operative Consolidated Amended Class Action
Complaint on December 5, 2008.
Applying the heightened pleading standards of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4,
the district court held that plaintiffs’ Exchange Act claims
failed because the amended complaint did not adequately plead
scienter.

See

In

re

Mun.

Mortg.

&

Equity,

LLC,

Sec.

Derivative Litig., 876 F. Supp. 2d 616, 647 (D. Md. 2012).
court

also

dismissed

respect to the SPO.

plaintiffs’

Securities

Act

The
with

It found the § 11 claim time-barred by the

statute of repose in § 13 of the Securities Act.
657.

claims

&

See id. at

It also concluded that Charles Dammeyer, the only named
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plaintiff asserting Securities Act claims with respect to the
SPO, lacked standing to bring a § 12(a)(2) claim, see id. at
661, and that the amended complaint failed to adequately plead
that the underwriter defendants were immediate sellers, see id.
at 662.
This appeal followed.

II.
A.
We

first

consider

the

district

court’s

dismissal

of

plaintiffs’ claims under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of

1934

and

SEC

Rule

10b-5

for

failing

to

adequately

plead

scienter.
The

purpose

of

the

Exchange

Act

and

its

accompanying

regulations is to ensure that companies disclose the information
necessary for investors to make informed investment decisions.
See Taylor v. First Union Corp. of S.C., 857 F.2d 240, 246 (4th
Cir. 1988).

Section 10(b) of the Act prohibits the use of “any

manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” in connection
with the sale of a security in violation of SEC rules.
U.S.C. § 78j(b).

See 15

Rule 10b-5 implements § 10(b) by making it

unlawful, in connection with the sale of a security:
(a) To employ
defraud,

any

device,

13

scheme,

or

artifice

to

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(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances
under
which
they
were
made,
not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.

The Supreme Court has recognized that

§ 10(b) provides an implied right of action for purchasers or
sellers of securities who have been injured by violations of the
statute.

See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta,

Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008).
In a typical § 10(b) action, a private plaintiff must prove
six elements:
the

“(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by

defendant;

(2)

misrepresentation

scienter;

or

(3)

omission

and

a
the

connection
purchase

between
or

sale

the
of

a

security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission;
(5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”
To

establish

defendant

acted

scienter,
with

deceive,

manipulate,

(internal

quotation

alleging

either

sufficient.
§ 10(b)

See

context,

“a
or

mental

state

or

reckless

act

At

severely

Capital,

must

576
is

551

the

at

that

that

the

intent

to

U.S.

pleading

reckless

F.3d
one

prove

embracing

Tellabs,

omitted).

intentional

a

plaintiff

defraud.”

marks

Matrix

a

Id.

“so

319

stage,

conduct

181.
is

at

In

is
the

highly

unreasonable and such an extreme departure from the standard of
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ordinary care as to present a danger of misleading the plaintiff
to the extent that the danger was either known to the defendant
or so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The PSLRA imposes a heightened pleading standard on fraud
allegations

in

private

securities

complaints.

See

Teachers’

Ret. Sys. of La. v. Hunter, 477 F.3d 162, 171-72 (4th Cir.
2007).

The

complaint

must

“state

with

particularity

facts

giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with
the

required

state

of

mind”

with

allegedly violated the statute.

respect

to

each

act

that

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).

“[T]o

the extent a plaintiff alleges corporate fraud, the plaintiff
must allege facts that support a strong inference of scienter
with

respect

corporation.”

to

at

least

Matrix

one

Capital,

quotation marks omitted).

authorized
576

F.3d

at

agent
182

of

the

(internal

To allege fraud against an individual

defendant, the plaintiff must allege facts supporting a strong
inference of scienter as to that person.

See id.

Evaluating the strength of an inference is necessarily a
comparative inquiry.
inference

of

See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 326-27.

scienter

can

only

be

strong

. . .

when

“[A]n
it

is

weighed against the opposing inferences that may be drawn from
the

facts

in

their

entirety.”

Cozzarelli

Inc., 549 F.3d 618, 624 (4th Cir. 2008).
15

v.

Inspire

Pharm.

“A court must compare

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the malicious and innocent inferences cognizable from the facts
pled in the complaint, and only allow the complaint to survive a
motion to dismiss if the malicious inference is at least as
compelling as any opposing innocent inference.”

Zucco Partners,

LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 991 (9th Cir. 2009).
As applied here, “the question is whether the allegations
in the complaint, viewed in their totality and in light of all
the evidence in the record, allow us to draw a strong inference,
at

least

MuniMae

as

compelling

defendants

as

either

any

opposing

knowingly

or

inference,”

that

the

recklessly

defrauded

investors by (1) issuing false financial statements as to the
Company’s compliance with FIN 46R, and (2) concealing the cost
of correctly consolidating LIHTC Funds in accordance with that
standard.

See Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Ass’n of Co. v. Deloitte &

Touche LLP, 551 F.3d 305, 313 (4th Cir. 2009).

“If we find the

inference that defendants acted innocently, or even negligently,
more

compelling

than

the

inference

requisite scienter, we must affirm.”

that

they

acted

with

the

Id.

B.
1.
We begin by considering whether the facts alleged in the
amended complaint give rise to an inference of scienter and, if
so, the strength of that inference.
evaluate plaintiffs’

allegations
16

of

Although “we ultimately
scienter

holistically,

we

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only afford their allegations the inferential weight warranted
by context and common sense.”
Plaintiffs

rely

on

four

Matrix Capital, 576 F.3d at 183.

categories

of

allegations

as

to

scienter, to which we now turn.
a. Confidential Witness Statements
The

amended

complaint

incorporates

information

from three confidential witness (“CW”) statements.
complaint

chooses

sources,

it

to

must

rely

on

describe

facts
the

provided
sources

by

obtained
“When the

confidential

with

sufficient

particularity to support the probability that a person in the
position occupied by the source would possess the information
alleged or in the alternative provide some other evidence to
support their allegations.”
(internal

quotation

Teachers’ Ret., 477 F.3d at 174

marks

omitted).

“[O]missions

and

ambiguities count against” an inference of scienter because a
complaint’s

factual

particularity.

allegations

must

be

stated

with

Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 326; see also Institutional

Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 263 (3d Cir. 2009)
(noting

that

confidential

courts

should

sources

reliability).

We

confidential

witnesses

steeply

that

present

lack
the

before

discount

sufficient

allegations

assessing

scienter inferences they support.

17

allegations

the

of

indicia

from
of

each

of

the

strength

of

the

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i.
CW3

served

manager

in

attended

as

defendants.

Confidential Witness 3
a

MuniMae’s

accounting

Pg: 18 of 57

staff

accountant

Internal

meetings

According

to

Accounting

with

CW3,

and

several

MuniMae

later

a

project

Department.
of

CW3

the

individual

executives

considered

restating the Company’s financial statements for months prior to
the announcement of the first restatement, in March 2006.

CW3

also asserts that, at some point prior to the first restatement,
a PwC partner advised MuniMae to consolidate the remaining LIHTC
Funds,

but

certain

recommendation.

MuniMae

executives

disagreed

with

that

Specifically, “CW3’s bosses . . . argued with

PwC about how to classify the tax credit equity funds and how to
determine the percentage of ownership MuniMae held on each one.”
J.A. 84. 4
CW3 also states that the Company was “‘always’” in a state
of “‘some confusion and chaos’” as a result of MuniMae’s rapid
expansion.

J.A. 68.

and

staff

legal

was

As CW3 describes, the Company’s accounting
“bombarded

with

documentation”

as

the

Company expanded but lacked sufficient personnel to handle the
paper flow.

J.A. 68-69.

According to CW3, “the staff was

4

According to CW3, the PwC partner assigned to the MuniMae
account considered the Company’s audits to be “exceedingly
challenging” because MuniMae was a “‘high level, complex
company’ that required a sophisticated external auditing process
in order to comply with FIN 46.” J.A. 84.

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unprepared

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professionally

Pg: 19 of 57

for

the

complex

nature

of

accounting needed, particularly compliance with FIN 46R.”

the
J.A.

69.
ii.

Confidential Witness 2

CW2 served as an in-house certified public accountant from
late 2005 to April 2007.
Lundquist

and

MuniMae’s

CW2 reported directly to then-CFO

Chief

Accounting

Officer,

Greg

Thor.

CW2 asserts that by early 2006, Lundquist and Thor had concluded
that there were widespread problems with the accounting done
under former CFO Harrison.
among

other

According

things,

to

restatement),

CW2,

the

by

The problems led Thor to review,
Company’s

mid-2006

Lundquist

knew

(at
that

LIHTC
the

Fund

time

the

accounting.

of

the

primary

first

beneficiary

determinations for most LIHTC Funds were incorrect and that the
Funds should have been consolidated under FIN 46R.

CW2 also

asserts that Lundquist and Falcone were heavily involved in the
restatement

effort,

with

Falcone

receiving

“updates

regarding

the restatement at least on a weekly basis and sometimes on a
daily basis.”

J.A. 82.
iii. Confidential Witness 1

Finally, CW1 was the administrative assistant to MuniMae’s
head of Internal Audit, Angela Barone, from June 2004 to June
2007.

In

that

capacity,

CW1

attended

discuss progress on ongoing audit work.
19

regular

meetings

to

According to CW1, at

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some point, frustration with the progress of FIN 46R accounting
became

a

regular

subject

of

discussion

at

the

meetings,

and

Barone communicated that frustration to Lundquist and Falcone. 5
CW1 recounts that Falcone sent a memo to all MuniMae employees
in

Fall

2006

emphasizing

that

the

auditing

staff

would

be

focusing all of its energies on the second restatement.

The

memo made clear that the related audit work “should be made a
priority

and

excuses

regarding

delays

providing

Department with information would not be tolerated.”
iv.

the

Audit

J.A. 81.

Inferences from the CW Evidence

We conclude that the confidential witness statements permit
an inference that the MuniMae defendants knew, perhaps as early
as mid-2006, that the Company was not in compliance with FIN
46R,

despite

their

representations

to

the

contrary.

The

allegations are also consistent with the inference that these
defendants

knew--or

at

least

suspected--by

Fall

2006

that

consolidating the LIHTC Funds in accordance with FIN 46R would
be a difficult and costly undertaking.
Nonetheless, we agree with the district court that these
allegations
intent.

To

do

not

begin

support
with,

a

the

strong

inference

confidential

5

of

witnesses

wrongful
do

not

However, CW1 does not describe the nature of the
accountants’ frustration, nor is it clear precisely when these
discussions took place.

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expressly assert that the MuniMae defendants intentionally or
recklessly

failed

to

comply

with

GAAP

or

their

accounting policies during the class period.
also

generally

vague

and

conclusory

own

internal

The statements are

as

to

the

MuniMae

defendants’ state of mind.
As even the amended complaint concedes, MuniMae struggled
throughout the class period with what its own former accountant
described as difficult and complex accounting.

This complexity

was not helped by an accounting system that was in a constant
state of “‘confusion and chaos,’” J.A. 85, in no small part due
to the Company’s rapid expansion and inadequate staffing.

The

MuniMae defendants may well have been negligent in failing to
properly apply FIN 46R to their business in the first instance,
and

then

by

allowing

the

Company

resulting accounting tsunami.
not

support

a

powerful

and

to

be

overwhelmed

by

the

But plaintiffs’ allegations do
compelling

inference

that

these

defendants acted with wrongful intent or severe recklessness.
Cf. Zucco Partners, 552 F.3d at 1007 (“Although the allegations
in this case are legion . . . the facts alleged . . . point
towards

the

overwhelmed

conclusion
with

that

integrating

a

[the
large

defendant]
new

was

division

simply

into

its

existing business.”).
That MuniMae’s officers and outside auditor debated how to
account for the LIHTC Funds in light of FIN 46R does not compel
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an inference of wrongful intent.
is

that

there

was

an

honest

Pg: 22 of 57

The more plausible inference
disagreement

over

the

application of a challenging new accounting standard.
MuniMae

defendants

were

ultimately

support an inference of scienter.

wrong

is

not

proper

That the
enough

to

Cf. DSAM Global Value Fund v.

Altris Software, Inc., 288 F.3d 385, 390 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he
mere publication of inaccurate accounting figures, or a failure
to

follow

GAAP,

without

more,

does

not

establish

scienter.”

(quoting In re Software Toolworks, Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 627 (9th
Cir. 1994))).
As for CW2’s allegations regarding Lundquist’s knowledge of
the FIN 46R issues, they too fail to support a strong inference
that she--or anyone else--acted with fraudulent purpose.

Even

if, as plaintiffs allege, Lundquist began to suspect a problem
with the FIN 46R accounting at the time the first restatement
began in March 2006, we are not persuaded that she then hatched
a plot to defraud the investing public.
To the contrary, we are skeptical that Lundquist would sign
off on the first restatement in June 2006 without addressing FIN
46R issues, thus subjecting herself to SEC sanctions, if she
firmly believed then that the accounting was wrong.

A more

logical and compelling inference is that Lundquist and the other
MuniMae defendants were continuing to assess the scope of the
problem before deciding on an appropriate course of action.
22

We

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also find it significant that it was MuniMae’s management--and
not

some

outside

entity--that

ultimately

disclosed

that

the

Company would have to consolidate the remaining LIHTC Funds in
January 2007 (thus conceding the Company’s earlier error).
our

view,

defendants

this

disclosure

were

not

supports

acting

with

a

strong

scienter

“inference
but

rather

In
that
were

endeavoring in good faith to inform [the investing public].”
Matrix Capital, 576 F.3d at 189.
Finally,

we

recognize

that

the

Fall

2006

Falcone

memorandum, which noted that that the auditing staff intended to
focus all of its energies on the second restatement, supports an
inference that the MuniMae defendants could have more promptly
anticipated the substantial costs of addressing the Company’s
myriad accounting issues.

But that is a far cry from concluding

that Falcone and his fellow defendants resolved then to defraud
plaintiffs by hiding the true costs.
In our view, management’s subsequent disclosures tend to
negate an inference of fraudulent purpose.

In July and August

2007, the Company (1) announced the hiring of an independent
consultant to assist with the work of the second restatement,
(2) identified

the

large

number

of

personnel

working

on

the

accounting issues, and (3) expressed uncertainty as to the costs
of the effort going forward.

Although these disclosures were

perhaps not as timely or as fulsome as plaintiffs would have
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liked, they give rise to a more compelling inference that the
MuniMae defendants were attempting--even if imperfectly--to keep
the

investing

public

informed,

while

working

strenuously

to

correct the accounting errors they had discovered.
b. Red Flags
Plaintiffs contend that there were numerous red flags that
should

have

alerted

the

MuniMae

defendants

to

the

FIN

46R

accounting problems, and that their failure to timely identify
the problems demonstrates a reckless disregard for the accuracy
of the Company’s financial statements.
to:

Specifically, they point

(1) the need for and magnitude of multiple restatements,

which involved revising several years’ financial statements and
multiple accounting problems; (2) the frequency of accounting
meetings involving FIN 46R issues; (3) the high turnover of CFOs
during the class period; and (4) the firing of PwC.
Additionally,

plaintiffs

emphasize

that

the

individual

defendants were the Company’s most senior executives, and that
the LIHTC Funds represented a core operation of the Company.
Because

these

defendants

were

directly

responsible

for

the

Company’s financial statements--and many were heavily involved
in the second restatement--they must have known, or recklessly
failed to realize, that the Company was not in compliance with
FIN 46R.

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The presence of “red flags,” coupled with the “breadth and
gravity”

of

a

company’s

problems,

may

provide

“substantial

weight” to an inference that high level corporate agents “must
have been aware of the problems.”
at 183-85.

See Matrix Capital, 576 F.3d

The more significant the error the stronger the

inference it supports.

See id. at 184-85; see also In re Atlas

Worldwide Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 324 F. Supp. 2d 474, 48889 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“When a company is forced to restate its
previously issued financial statements, the mere fact that the
company

had

to

make

a

large

correction

is

some

evidence

of

scienter.”).
While

the

red

flags

alleged

in

the

complaint

are

not

insubstantial, they do not give rise to a strong inference of
scienter.
was

not

Fundamentally, the FIN 46R accounting error itself
especially

obvious,

at

Company’s financial bottom-line.

least

with

respect

to

the

In that regard, we note, as

did the district court, that MuniMae’s ownership interest in the
unconsolidated
cumulative

LIHTC

economic

adjustments--including
consolidation--was

a

Funds

was

impact
but
loss

of

not
of

one

percent

all
limited

of
to

approximately

25

or

less.

The

the

restatement

the

LIHTC

$44.9

Fund

million

in

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shareholders’ equity for fiscal year 2005. 6

For the same year,

MuniMae’s adjusted shareholders’ equity was approximately $723
million.

Thus, while the effort to complete the restatement

proved costly, the practical effect of proper consolidation on
the Company’s financial statements was relatively small.
The other potential warning signs also lend themselves to
benign interpretations.
meetings

as

a

sign

nefarious purpose.

of

We view the frequency of accounting
diligence

rather

than

evidence

of

a

Cf. Zucco Partners, 552 F.3d at 1000 (noting

that an allegation that top executives attended several meetings
to discuss the company’s financial affairs was not the kind of
particular evidence required to support a strong inference of
scienter).
A high turnover in CFOs can certainly raise suspicion, but
the facts alleged here mitigate any concern.

Harrison left the

Company in late 2005, well before any officer is alleged to have
known about the FIN 46R issues.

Lundquist resigned in July

2007, after the Company was required to perform two restatements
under her watch, the second of which entailed numerous delays
and

snowballing

costs.

While

6

Lundquist’s

resignation

is

The loss in shareholders’ equity specifically attributable
to consolidating the LIHTC Funds was $78.3 million, but gains in
other areas as a result of the restatement reduced the overall
impact of consolidation on the Company’s financial bottom-line.

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evidence of the substantial accounting challenges the Company
then faced, it does not compel an inference that she and the
other individual defendants were bent on committing fraud.
id. at
after

1002
the

(“Where

a

defendant

resignation

slightly

issues

corporation

occurs

a

See

before

or

restatement,

a

plaintiff must plead facts refuting the reasonable assumption
that the resignation occurred as a result of [the] restatement’s
issuance

itself

in

order

for

a

resignation

to

be

strongly

indicative of scienter.”).
Nor is PwC’s October 2006 departure particularly telling.
The

dismissal

of

an

accounting

restatement is not surprising.

firm

around

the

time

of

a

Cf. id. (concluding that the

resignation of the defendant’s independent public accountant did
not support a strong inference of scienter because the firm “had
just been partially responsible for the corporation’s failure to
adequately

control

its

especially

true

these

on

accounting
facts,

as

procedures”).
MuniMae

was

This
required

is
to

execute two restatements while PwC was serving as its auditor.
The fact that PwC alerted the Company to one of the many issues
the restatements ultimately addressed does not mean that the
MuniMae defendants were not justifiably dissatisfied with PwC’s
services generally.

Any inference of wrongful intent is further

weakened by the fact that PwC made clear in a letter to the SEC
that it had no disagreements with the Company on any matter of
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accounting

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principle

or

practice

Pg: 28 of 57

that

it

felt

obligated

to

report. 7
Finally,

and

in

accordance

with

several

of

our

sister

circuits, we reject plaintiffs’ contention that the individual
defendants

must

have

acted

intentionally

or

recklessly

with

respect to the FIN 46R accounting merely because (1) they were
senior executives, and (2) the LIHTC Funds represented a core
business of the Company.

See, e.g., In re Suprema Specialties,

Inc. Sec. Litig., 438 F.3d 256, 282 (3d Cir. 2006) (“A pleading
of scienter . . . may not rest on a bare inference that a
defendant must have had knowledge of the facts or must have
known of the fraud given his or her position in the company.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)), abrogated on other grounds
by Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322-23; Zucco Partners, 552 F.3d at 1000
(finding that “bare allegations” that officers must have have
had

knowledge

of

key

facts

relating

to

the

business’s

“core

operations” are rarely enough to support a strong inference of
scienter).

To be sure, such allegations are relevant to the

court’s holistic analysis of scienter.

7

But without additional

SEC regulations required MuniMae to file a statement
disclosing information about its dismissal of PwC as its
independent public accountant.
See 17 C.F.R. § 229.304(a)(1)(2). The regulations also required PwC to file a letter stating
whether MuniMae’s disclosures regarding the circumstances of its
dismissal were true. See id. § 229.304(a)(3).

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detailed

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allegations

Pg: 29 of 57

establishing

the

defendants’

actual

exposure to the accounting problem, the complaint falls short of
of the PSLRA’s particularity requirements.
c. Insider Trading
Plaintiffs also say that Company insiders were motivated to
conceal MuniMae’s accounting problems to improperly benefit from
insider trading.

Allegations of “personal financial gain may

weigh heavily in favor of a scienter inference.”

Tellabs, 551

U.S.

that

at

325.

However,

the

inferential

weight

may

be

attributed to any claim of motive must be evaluated in context.
See id. at 324.

Insider trading allegations will only support

an

scienter

inference

defendant’s

of

trading

were

“if

the

unusual

timing

or

and

amount

suspicious.”

of

a

Teachers’

Ret., 477 F.3d at 184 (internal quotation marks omitted).

To

determine whether an insider’s sales were “unusual in scope” we
consider factors such as “the amount of profit made, the amount
of

stock

traded,

the

portion

of

number of insiders involved.”

stockholdings

sold,

or

the

In re Suprema Specialties, 438

F.3d at 277 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In

this

case,

the

overall

value

of

MuniMae

shares

sold

during the class period was higher than in previous years.

Six

Company insiders sold 470,210 shares for a total of $12,004,901
in gross proceeds during the class period, as compared to the
sale of 298,002 shares and $7,139,835 in gross proceeds between
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June 1998 and the beginning of the class period.

These numbers

are certainly consistent with an inference that the insiders who
traded during the class period had a motive to commit fraud.
Nonetheless, the inference that the trades were innocent is
stronger.

The number of insiders who traded during the class

period is relatively small, and plaintiffs do not allege that
the insiders timed the sales to take advantage of any particular
disclosure.
deficient

Cf.

a

Teachers’

complaint

Ret.,

that,

among

477

F.3d

other

at

184

things,

(finding

failed

to

“allege that defendants timed their sales to profit from any
particular disclosures”).
Nor is the extent of any insiders’ divestiture particularly
alarming.

Former CFO Harrison sold 78% of his shares in early

December 2004, but that was well before plaintiffs say that any
officer of the Company knew that the FIN 46R accounting was
flawed.

Board Chairman Mark Joseph sold approximately 37% of

his shares between late April 2005 and early June 2006.
these

sales

announcement

coincided
of

the

with

first

the

lead-up

restatement.

to

the

However,

Some of
Company’s

the

sales

occurred at fairly regular intervals and amounts compared to
earlier periods.

CEO Falcone sold just over 28% of his holdings

during the class period, with the bulk of the sales occurring in
2004 and mid-2005.

Falcone sold shares twice in early 2006, but

the volume of the trades was not unusual.
30

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defendants’ trading strikes us as suspicious.
(finding

insider

sales

of

92%,

100%,

and

Cf. id. at 185

82%

of

defendants’

holdings “unremarkable” in context).
The

fact

that

Falcone

and

Joseph

traded

MuniMae

shares

under non-discretionary Rule 10b5-1 plans further weakens any
inference of fraudulent purpose.

Under Rule 10b5-1, corporate

insiders can set up trading plans to sell company shares at
predetermined times and amounts to avoid accusations of illegal
insider trading.
is

an

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c) (stating that it

affirmative

defense

in

insider

trading

cases

that

the

defendant’s purchases or sales were made pursuant to a “written
plan for trading securities”); see also Cent. Laborers’ Pension
Fund v. Integrated Elec. Servs. Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 554 n.4 (5th
Cir. 2007) (explaining that a 10b5-1 trading plan can give rise
to

an

inference

that

the

sales

were

not

suspicious);

In

re

Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1427-28 (9th Cir.
1994) (same).
Joseph’s

Rule

10b5-1

plan

does

less

to

shield

him

from

suspicion because he instituted the plan in March 2005, after
the start of the class period.
plan

in

2003.

Nonetheless,

By contrast, Falcone created his
Joseph

entered

the

plan

a

year

before the complaint alleges that any officer at MuniMae knew
the FIN 46R accounting was wrong, and the amended complaint does
not

allege

that

Joseph

traded
31

outside

of

the

plan.

Thus,

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Joseph

the
from

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Rule

10b5-1

suspicion,

plan

it

Pg: 32 of 57

does

does

not

mitigate

completely
any

immunize

inference

of

improper motive surrounding his sales.
An

additional

problem

with

the

allegations

of

insider

trading relates to the length of the putative class period.

The

plaintiffs have chosen an inordinately long period of 44 months.
See Teachers’ Ret., 477 F.3d at 185 (describing a 46-month class
period as “exceedingly long”); see also In re Vantive Corp. Sec.
Litig., 283 F.3d 1079, 1092 (9th Cir. 2002) (characterizing a
class period of 15 months as “unusually long”), abrogation on
other grounds recognized by South Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger,
542 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2008).

In our view, alleging such a

lengthy class period makes it difficult to infer intent from the
mere fact of a stock sale, as it is not unusual for insiders to
trade at some point during their tenure with a company.

See

Teachers’ Ret., 477 F.3d at 185.
d. Other Allegations of Motive
Plaintiffs proffer a number of general business motivations
from which they would have us infer fraud.

They contend that

MuniMae wanted to artificially inflate the price of its shares
to

attract

investors,

fund

corporate

acquisitions,

avoid

default on loan covenants, and obtain favorable loan terms.
decline,

however,

to

infer

common to every company.

fraud

from

financial

a
We

motivations

See Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Grp.,
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Inc.,

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353

repeatedly

Filed: 03/07/2014

F.3d

338,

rejected

352

these

Pg: 33 of 57

(4th

Cir.

types

of

2003)

(“[C]ourts

generalized

have

motives--which

are shared by all companies--as insufficient to plead scienter
under the PSLRA.”).
Although
acquisitions

MuniMae
during

the

conducted
class

numerous

period,

offerings

very

little

of

and
this

activity occurred after any officer is alleged to have known
that the FIN 46R accounting was flawed.

It is true that the

Company was aware that consolidating LIHTC Funds could affect
its debt covenants, as the initial consolidation in 2004 would
have caused it to default on at least two debt covenants.

But

MuniMae disclosed that fact, and it was also able to negotiate
waivers on each covenant to avoid default.

In short, nothing

about

MuniMae’s

the

specific

facts

alleged

render

general

business motivations particularly suspicious.
e. Class Period Disclosures
For their part, the MuniMae defendants assert that their
class period disclosures rebut any inference of scienter.
is

appropriate

to

consider

such

disclosures,

which

in

“It
some

contexts will indicate that the defendants were acting in good
faith, but in other contexts will indicate that the defendants
had knowledge of operational risks (suggesting a lack of good
faith).”

Matrix Capital, 576 F.3d at 185.

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We believe MuniMae made several relevant disclosures during
the class period.

In announcing its first restatement on March

10, 2006, MuniMae also alerted investors to the fact that the
Company

suffered

from

“material

weaknesses

financial reporting process.”

J.A. 821.

material

identified,

weaknesses

were

then

related

to

the

Although only a few
the

Company

warned

that management might “identify additional material weaknesses”
as part of the restatement.

Id.

Over the next two years, the Company repeatedly disclosed
newly

discovered

material

weaknesses,

and

might

identify

additional

problems

that

remedial efforts ineffective.

reiterated
would

that

render

it
its

The fact that MuniMae continued

to update investors about newly discovered weaknesses tends to
negate an inference that the defendants acted with an intent to
defraud.

Cf. Matrix Capital, 187 F.3d at 187 (“A disclosure

that meaningfully alerts investors to the risk that financial
information is not accurate may suggest that the individuals
responsible for the disclosure did not knowingly (or perhaps not
even

recklessly)

misstate

the

underlying

financial

information.”).
MuniMae also attempted to update investors regarding the
escalating cost of the second restatement.

Although the initial

announcement in September 2006 identified only a few areas for
restatement, the Company announced in October that it had not
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determined

its

full

Pg: 35 of 57

scope.

In

May

2007,

the

Company

disclosed that it was unable to timely file its annual Form 10-K
for fiscal year 2006 because of the “dedication of significant
management resources to these restatement efforts.”

J.A. 1129.

On July 10, 2007, the Company announced that it had retained
Navigant Consulting to assist in the restatement efforts.
telephone

conference

with

investors

the

following

In a

month,

the

Company noted that, given the scope of the restatement, it had
to “bring new and unbudgeted resources online quickly.”
1145.

Finally,

informed

at

investors

a

November

that

both

8

teleconference,

the

magnitude

restatement would be “very significant.”

and

the
cost

J.A.

Company
of

the

J.A. 1157.

To be sure, the import of some of MuniMae’s disclosures was
moderated

by

information

the

in

press

fact

that

releases

it

occasionally

headlined

with

buried

favorable

the
news.

Nonetheless, MuniMae repeatedly noted the need to restate its
financials, the deficiency in its internal controls, and the
fact that the restatement would require the Company to commit
resources far greater than initially anticipated.
Not only do these disclosures bolster the inference that
the

MuniMae

defendants

acted

in

good

faith,

but

they

also

strengthen the inference that these defendants only realized the
FIN 46R accounting problems--and the cost of fixing them--over
time.
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2.
After evaluating the inferential weight owed to plaintiffs’
allegations of corporate fraud in light of context and common
sense,

we

regard

the

must

consider

inference

that

“whether

a

reasonable

defendants

knowingly

person
or

would

recklessly

misstated or omitted material information at least as strong as
the

inference

that

[the

MuniMae

defendants]

negligent with respect to those statements.”
576 F.3d at 187.
holistically,

were

merely

Matrix Capital,

To that end, we must evaluate the complaint

recognizing

that

“allegations

of

scienter

that

would not independently create a strong inference of scienter
might

compliment

[sic]

each

other

to

create

sufficient strength to satisfy the PSLRA.”

an

inference

of

Id. at 187-88.

Considered holistically, we conclude that plaintiffs have
not satisfied their burden under the PSLRA.

We accept as fact

that management regularly discussed FIN 46R compliance issues,
even

before

the

first

restatement,

and

that

by

mid-2006,

at

least Lundquist had determined that the Company’s LIHTC Fund
accounting was flawed.

We know that PwC recommended that the

Company reconsider its LIHTC Fund accounting prior to the first
restatement, but that at least some MuniMae officers disagreed.
We acknowledge that in the fall of 2006, the Company recognized
that correcting various accounting errors would be a management
focus for some time.

We accept that the MuniMae defendants had
36

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financial

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motivations--albeit

Pg: 37 of 57

universal

ones--to

disclosing the need to consolidate the LIHTC Funds.

avoid

And we know

that MuniMae suffered from material weaknesses in its internal
controls that, among other things, could have alerted management
to problems with the FIN 46R accounting.
While this mosaic supports an inference of scienter, we
find more compelling the inference that the MuniMae defendants
were,

at

most,

negligent.

In

2004,

MuniMae

was

faced

with

applying a challenging new accounting standard to its rapidly
expanding business, requiring the Company to determine whether
and how to consolidate a number of LIHTC Funds that previously
were

not

on

the

Company’s

financial

statements.

MuniMae's

management mistakenly--and perhaps negligently--failed to have
sufficient accounting controls and processes in place to meet
this

challenge,

which,

together

with

other

accounting

errors

over the course of 2004 and 2005, required the Company to twice
restate
cost.

its

financial

accounting

statements

at

a

substantial

In our view, the facts alleged point more convincingly to

an inference that MuniMae was simply in over its head.
Although

some

officers

may

have

believed

that

MuniMae’s

accounting was flawed by mid-2006, the evidence suggests that
others, at least initially, disagreed.

This makes it difficult

to

intentionally,

infer

that

the

MuniMae

defendants

or

even

recklessly, misrepresented the state of the Company’s financial
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affairs.
F.3d

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See Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540

1049,

1069

(9th

Cir.

2008)

(finding

insufficient

allegations that “point only to disagreement and questioning”
within the Company about a particular accounting practice).

And

even if some senior officers had concluded by mid-2006 that the
FIN 46R accounting was wrong, that does not establish that they
acted

with

fraudulent

purpose

to

conceal

the

problems

until

January 2007.
The strength of the inference with respect to MuniMae’s
knowledge of the costs of the second restatement is even weaker
on the facts alleged.

We think it more plausible that the

Company simply had not reached a conclusion with respect to FIN
46R until after it began the second restatement, and that the
MuniMae defendants only gradually became aware of the expense as
it was incurred.
The

Company’s

officers

successive

attempted

to

internal weaknesses.

keep

disclosures

investors

suggest

updated

that

about

its

MuniMae’s

The pattern of disclosures also suggests

that management only gradually awakened to the magnitude of the
Company’s accounting problems and the cost of fixing them.

That

the Company’s accounting department during the early part of the
class

period

initially,
challenge

was

chronically

professionally
before

it,

understaffed

unprepared

strengthens
38

the

for

and,
the

inference

at

least

accounting
that

final

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decisions regarding the FIN 46R accounting remained unresolved
until late 2006.
On

the

facts

alleged,

the

inference

that

the

MuniMae

defendants were negligent in discharging their duties may well
be compelling.

But that is not enough to survive a motion to

dismiss in this context.

See Pub. Emps.’ Ret., 551 F.3d at 313.

We hold that the district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs
claims under the PSLRA for failing to adequately plead scienter. 8

III.
We turn next to plaintiffs’ Securities Act claims.

The

“basic purpose” of the Securities Act of 1933 is “to provide
greater
Herman

protection
&

MacLean

to
v.

purchasers

of

Huddleston,

registered

securities.”

459

U.S.

383

375,

(1983).

Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) prohibit the use of materially false or
misleading
and

statements

prospectuses,

77l(a)(2).

or

omissions

respectively.

in
See

registration
15

U.S.C.

statements
§ 77k(a);

In contrast to Exchange Act requirements, “scienter

8

The district court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims
against the MuniMae officers under § 20(a) of the Exchange Act.
That provision imposes liability on each person who “controls
any person liable under any provision of this chapter or of any
rule or regulation thereunder.”
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a).
Section
20(a) liability is derivative of § 10(b). Because the complaint
is legally insufficient with respect to the § 10(b) claim, the
§ 20(a) claim must also fail.
See, e.g., Matrix Capital, 576
F.3d at 192.

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is not an element of a violation” of either section.

Newcome v.

Esrey, 862 F.2d 1099, 1106 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
The

amended

complaint

alleges

that

defendants 9

certain

violated §§ 11 and 12(a)(2) because the registration statement
and

prospectus

for

the

2005

SPO

incorporated

by

materially misleading statements and omissions.
the

registration

statement

incorporated

by

reference

For example,
reference

the

Company’s quarterly reports from the second and third quarters
of 2004, which represented that MuniMae was in compliance with
FIN 46R.

See J.A. 1461.

The February 2, 2005, prospectus

supplement expressly represented that MuniMae was in compliance
with

FIN

46R.

However,

it

also

noted

that

“[d]ue

to

the

complexity of FIN 46R . . . we cannot assure you that further
changes in our financial statements will not be required with
respect to the application of FIN 46R.”

J.A. 1578.

The district court found the § 11 claim time-barred by the
Securities Act’s statute of repose and dismissed the § 12(a)(2)
claim for lack of standing.

We address each issue in turn.

9

The § 11 SPO claim is
defendants and the underwriter
claims is alleged against the
defendants.

40

brought against the MuniMae
defendants.
The § 12(a)(2)
Company and the underwriter

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A.
1.
Section

13

of

statute of repose.

the

Securities

Act

contains

See 15 U.S.C. § 77m.

a

three-year

It provides:

In no event shall any such action be brought to
enforce a liability created under [§ 11 or § 12(a)(1)]
of this title more than three years after the security
was bona fide offered to the public . . . .
15 U.S.C. § 77m.
The statute does not define the term “bona fide offered to
the public,” and neither the Supreme Court nor this circuit has
determined

the

meaning

of

the

phrase.

The

district

court

applied the rule accepted by the majority of courts and found
that the statute of repose began to run on the date the SEC
declared

MuniMae’s

January 14, 2005.

registration

statement

effective,

i.e.,

Because the original complaint in this action

was not filed until February 1, 2008, the court concluded that
the § 11 claim was two-weeks late.

See In re Mun. Mortg. &

Equity, 576 F.2d at 655-57.
On

appeal,

plaintiffs’

arguments

are

threefold.

First,

applying a combination of dictionary and statutory definitions,
they say that a bona fide offering occurs only when securities
are offered “for value” in a manner capable of acceptance, and
in a way that is open and visible.

Under this interpretation,

the repose period began to run, at the earliest, on February 2,

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2005,

Doc: 84

that

pricing

Filed: 03/07/2014

is,

the

commenced.

when

MuniMae

securities,

issued

or

Alternatively,

Pg: 42 of 57

on

a

prospectus

February

plaintiffs

3,

suggest

supplement

when
the

the

SPO

securities

were not bona fide offered until February 8, the last date of
the SPO.
rule

is

effective

Finally, plaintiffs argue that, even if the general
that
date

the
of

statute
the

of

repose

registration

begins

to

statement,

we

run

on

the

should

not

apply that rule in this case because there was a significant
delay between the effective date and the commencement of the
offering.
Both the MuniMae and underwriter defendants respond that
the effective date of the SPO registration statement constituted
the bona fide offering date because it is the date on which all
barriers to sale were removed.
case

law

defines

the

They also emphasize that most

effective

date

of

the

registration

statement as the bona fide offering.
2.
The meaning of “bona fide offered to the public” in § 13’s
statute of repose is a question of statutory interpretation that
we review de novo.

See P. Stolz Family P’ship L.P. v. Daum, 355

F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 2004).
We begin by considering whether the language at issue has a
plain and unambiguous meaning.
718

F.3d

377,

382

(4th

See United States v. Ashford,

Cir.

2013).

42

At

first

blush,

the

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plaintiffs’ principal position is appealing.

In ordinary usage,

“bona fide” often means (as plaintiffs urge) “genuine.”

See

Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 237 (2d ed. 2001);
see also Black’s Law Dictionary 199 (9th ed. 2009) (“Sincere;
genuine”).

But it can also mean “made . . . in good faith” and

“without deception or fraud.”

Random House Webster’s Unabridged

Dictionary 237; see also Black’s Law Dictionary 199 (“Made in
good faith; without fraud or deceit”).
courts
fide”

and
in

intended
offering.”
Joel

authorities

context,
to

have

they

considered

have

distinguish

a

concluded

true

To the extent other
the

meaning

that

offering

of

Congress

from

a

“bona
simply

“simulated

See P. Stolz, 355 F.3d at 99; see also 1 Louis Loss,

Seligman

&

Troy

Paredes,

Securities

Regulation

§ 2-B-

6(g)(i), at 773 & n.355 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing the dealer
exemption under § 4(3)(A) of the Securities Act, which also uses
the term “bona fide offered to the public”).
The meaning of the word “offer” is no more certain.

As

commonly used, “offer” can mean both “to present for acceptance
or

rejection”

consideration.”
Dictionary 1344.

and

also
See

to

“propose

Random

House

or

put

Webster’s

forward

for

Unabridged

Section 2(a)(3) of the Securities Act defines

“offer” to “include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or
solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a
security, for value.”

15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3).
43

But we think it

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unlikely

that

offered”

in

Congress

§ 13

to

intended

be

“offer” in § 2(a)(3).

Pg: 44 of 57

the

meaning

coterminous

with

of

the

“bona

fide

definition

of

See Morse v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &

Co., 445 F. Supp. 619, 622 (S.D.N.Y 1977) (“The term ‘bona fide
offered to the public’ is a term of art and one not necessarily
synonymous

with

the

full

breadth

of

the

statutory

term

‘offer.’”).
Because we believe the statutory language is susceptible to
more than one meaning, we look beyond the statute for guidance.
The

Second

Circuit’s

opinion

in

P.

Stolz

is

the

leading

authority on the term “bona fide offered to the public” in § 13.
The question in that case was the meaning of that phrase in the
context of unregistered securities.

But the court examined a

number of cases involving registered securities and determined
that “the date of registration has been treated as the date that
starts the running of the repose period.”

P. Stolz, 355 F.3d at

99.
A majority of courts have followed the P. Stolz guidance,
see, e.g., Armstrong v. Am. Pallet Leasing Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d
827, 868 (N.D. Iowa 2009); In re Metro. Sec. Litig., 2010 WL
537740, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 8, 2010); In re Countrywide Fin.
Corp. Sec. Litig., 2009 WL 943271, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6,
2009),

and

congressional

we

agree

purpose.

that

this

Section 11
44

approach
is

best

violated

reflects
when

a

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registration statement containing misleading information becomes
effective.

See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a); 17 J. William Hicks, Civil

Liabilities: Enforcement & Litigation Under the 1933 Act § 4:57
(2013).
as

the

Using the effective date of the registration statement
bona

defendant’s

fide

offering

liability

to

date

the

logically

statutory

links

a

violation.

putative
See

Fed.

Hous. Fin. Agency v. UBS Ams., Inc., 2012 WL 2400263, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2012) (recognizing that courts have accepted
the effective date as the repose trigger on the ground that “the
registration statement includes the information upon which the
Section 11 claim is predicated--the alleged falsehood”).
Using

the

effective

date

is

also

purpose of statutes of repose generally.

consistent

with

the

Such statutes provide

“a fixed date readily determinable by the defendant . . . rather
than

a

date

plaintiff.”

determined

by

the

personal

circumstances

of

the

Caviness v. Derand Res. Corp., 983 F.2d 1295, 1300

n.7 (4th Cir. 1993); see also City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret.
Sys.

v.

MBIA,

Inc.,

637

F.3d

169,

176

(2d

Cir.

2011)

(contrasting a statute of repose, which “begins to run from the
defendant’s

violation,”

with

a

statute

of

limitations,

which

“cannot begin to run until the plaintiff’s claim has accrued”). 10

10

Although we do not rely on the legislative history, we
note that it is not inconsistent with our conclusion. In 1954,
Congress amended numerous provisions of the federal securities
(Continued)
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Plaintiffs object to this view of the statute, pointing to
§ 4(3) of the Securities Act, which also uses the term “bona
fide

offered

to

That

provision

the

public.”

exempts

See

certain

15

dealer

U.S.C.

§ 77d(a)(3)(B).

transactions

from

the

prospectus delivery requirement, and it applies “prior to the
expiration

of

forty

days

after

the

effective

date

of

such

registration statement or prior to the expiration of forty days
after

the

first

date

upon

offered to the public.”

which

the

security

was

See id. (emphasis added).

bona

fide

Plaintiffs

say that this language demonstrates that “the date on which a
security is ‘bona fide offered to the public’ can be entirely
distinct

from

the

declared effective.”

date

on

which

a

registration

statement

is

Appellants’ Br. at 24.

laws, including the Investment Company Act of 1940. See Act of
August 10, 1954, ch. 667, tit. IV, § 402, 68 Stat. 683, 689
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24).
Congress amended
the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq., among
other things, to permit investment companies engaged in
continuous offerings to file amendments to existing registration
statements instead of filing a new one.
See S. Rep. No. 831037, at 21 (1954).
Both the House and Senate Reports accompanying the
amendments equate the effective date of the registration
statement with the bona fide offering.
See H.R. Rep. No. 831542, at 30 (1954) (“[A] dealer . . . need not use a prospectus
in connection with a transaction in a security after the
expiration of 1 year from the first date on which the security
was bona fide offered to the public, which, in most cases, means
approximately
1
year
after
the
effective
date
of
the
registration statement.”); S. Rep. No. 83-1037, at 20 (same).

46

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But
provides

the
that

Filed: 03/07/2014

fact

that

a

the

bona

fide

Pg: 47 of 57

different
offer

section
and

of

the

registration

statute
can

be

distinct events does not inexorably mean that they always will
be.

Cf. In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 903 F. Supp. 2d

152, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“To be sure, the phrase bona fide
offered

to

circumstances

the

public,

in

which

recognizes
stock

that

covered

there
by

an

will

be

effective

registration statement has not genuinely been offered to the
public, in which case the commencement of the repose period may
begin

later

than

the

effective

date

of

the

registration

statement.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In “the vast majority of offerings” the bona fide offering
to the public “will be the effective date of the registration
statement.”

17

Hicks,

Civil

Liabilities

§ 4:77.

The

only

exceptions would arise in the context of delayed or continuous
offerings in which information that is fundamental to assessing
the value of a particular offering is not disclosed until after
the registration statement becomes effective.

See id.; see also

UBS Ams., Inc., 2012 WL 2400263, at *2. 11

11

At the time of the 2005 SPO, the SEC did not consider the
pricing information MuniMae filed in its prospectus supplement
the kind of fundamental information that would merit exceptional
treatment.
See 17 C.F.R. § 229.512(a)(1)(2004); In re Lehman
Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 903 F. Supp. 2d at 171.

47

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Plaintiffs

argue

Pg: 48 of 57

nonetheless

that

we

should

not

accept

registration as the triggering event here, even if, as a general
rule, the two coincide.

They say that using the effective date

of the registration statement is only appropriate in cases where
there

is

virtually

no

delay

between

commencement of the public offering.

registration

and

the

By contrast, the 2005 SPO

was a shelf offering, and there was a two-week delay between the
effective date and the commencement of the offering.
did

not

file

a

prospectus

supplement

announcing

MuniMae
that

the

registration statement was effective until February 1, and it
only

priced

the

securities

on

February

2.

On

these

facts,

plaintiffs argue, the securities were not genuinely offered to
the public on January 14.
We disagree.

The general rule that the statute of repose

begins to run on the effective date has been repeatedly applied
in the context of delayed offerings.

See, e.g., In re Adelphia

Commc'ns Corp. Sec. & Derivative Litig., 2005 WL 1679540, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2005) (“Even where registered securities are
offered

pursuant

to

a

less

typical

delayed

offering,

the

limitations period runs from the date of either the registration
statement or the [post-effective] amendment . . . .”), adhered
to on reconsideration, 2005 WL 1882281 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005);
see also UBS Ams., Inc., 2012 WL 2400263, at *2-3 (recognizing
that that the general rule will apply in shelf offerings when
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the registration statement contains the misleading information
on which the § 11 claim is predicated).
This

is

not

the

disclosure--rather
the

allegedly

complaint

unusual

than

false

directly

or

the

case

which

registration

misleading

avers

in

that

a

post-effective

statement--contained

information.
the

The

registration

amended

statement

declared effective on January 14 contained or incorporated by
reference the misleading statements to which plaintiffs object. 12
Under these circumstances, we are comfortable concluding that
MuniMae’s exposure began on the effective date.
The

two-week

gap

between

the

effective

date

commencement of the SPO does not alter our analysis.

and

the

The fact

that plaintiffs did not know that the registration statement was
effective as of January 14 is of no consequence for statute of
repose purposes.
allows

for

no

circumstances.”);

See Caviness, 983 F.2d at 1300 (“[Section] 13
qualification
see

also

emanating
P.

Stolz,

from
355

the
F.3d

claimant’s
at

102-03

(explaining that a statute of repose begins to run “even if the
plaintiff has not yet, or could not yet have, discovered that
she has a cause of action”).

Moreover, the SEC has sanctioned a

12

By contrast, the prospectus supplement filed on February
2, which priced the securities, contained a rather unambiguous
warning that MuniMae’s FIN 46R accounting might be incorrect.
See J.A. 1578.

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delay of up to fifteen business days between registration and
the

commencement

offerings.

of

sale

in

the

context

of

non-delayed

See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.430A(a)(3), 229.512(a).

Thus,

the thirteen-day gap here hardly strikes us as abusive.
In sum, we hold that securities will generally be bona fide
offered

to

registration

the

public

statement

on

the

date

effective.

the

SEC

Applying

declares

this

the

holding,

we

conclude that MuniMae bona fide offered securities to the public
on

January

relates

14,

back

to

2005.
the

Plaintiffs’
original

amended

complaint

filed

complaint,
on

which

February

1,

2008, is thus time-barred under § 13’s statute of repose.
B.
1.
We turn finally to the amended complaint’s § 12(a)(2) claim
against MuniMae and the underwriter defendants with respect to
the 2005 SPO.

Section 12(a)(2) provides that any person who

“offers or sells a security . . . by means of a prospectus or
oral communication” containing a materially false statement or
material

omission

“shall

be

liable

purchasing such security from him.”

. . .

to

the

person

15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2).

The amended complaint alleges that named plaintiff Dammeyer
“purchased MuniMae’s common stock pursuant and/or traceable to
the SPO Registration Statement and Prospectus dated February 2,
2005.”

J.A.

89.

It

incorporates
50

by

reference

Dammeyer’s

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confirmation slip for the shares.

The slip shows that Dammeyer

purchased 600 shares of MuniMae stock at $26.32 per share on
February 3, 2005, and that he received those shares on February
8, 2005.

The slip also bears the logo of RBC Dain Rauscher and

includes the phrase “PROS UNDER SEP COVER.”
The

district

confirmation
standing.

court

slip

found

the

insufficient

J.A. 1606.

amended

to

complaint

establish

and

Dammeyer’s

It found Dammeyer’s claim that he purchased stock

“pursuant and/or traceable to” the SPO documents conclusory, and
the confirmation slip lacking in “supporting details to make a
plausible claim that Dammeyer purchased directly in the SPO.”
In re Mun. Mortg. & Equity, LLC, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 660.
On

appeal,

plaintiffs

contend

that

the

district

court

improperly failed to consider the confirmation slip referenced
in the complaint, and that the slip, when properly considered,
supplies the necessary details to support a plausible allegation
of standing.

Defendants respond that Dammeyer would have said

that he purchased his shares directly in the SPO if he actually
did.

Moreover, they claim that the details of the confirmation

slip

show

that

Dammeyer

purchased

his

securities

the

amended

on

the

secondary market and not in the SPO.
2.
We

review

the

plausibility

of

complaint’s

standing allegations de novo under the pleading requirements of
51

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Rule 8(a).

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See In re Century Aluminum Co. Sec. Litig., 729 F.3d

1104, 1107-09 (9th Cir. 2013) (reviewing the plausibility of a
complaint’s standing allegations with respect to a § 11 claim).
It is not enough for the amended complaint to allege facts,
which,

accepted

possibility

that

allegations

must

as

true,

Dammeyer
also

are

merely

purchased

render

such

consistent

shares
a

in

with

the

SPO;

the

the

conclusion

plausible.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
To establish standing under § 12(a)(2), a plaintiff must
allege

that

he

purchased

shares

from

“[a]ny

person”

who

“offer[ed] or s[old] a security . . . by means of a prospectus.”
15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2).

In Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561

(1995), the Supreme Court interpreted the prospectus requirement
of § 12(a)(2), and concluded that, because “prospectus” is a
term

of

art

referring

to

a

specific

document

in

a

public

offering, sales made pursuant to private contracts are not made
by means of a prospectus.

See id. at 580-84.

Thus, § 12(a)(2)

liability is “limited to public offerings,” and purchasers in
the secondary market may not sue.

Id. at 578; see also In re

CitiGroup Inc. Bond Litig., 723 F. Supp. 2d 568, 585 (S.D.N.Y.
2010)

(“[A]

plaintiff

seeking

redress

pursuant

to

Section

12(a)(2) must establish that it purchased the security directly
from defendants through the public offering at issue.”).

52

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A

number

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of

district

Pg: 53 of 57

courts

have

concluded

that

the

“pursuant and/or traceable to” language employed in the amended
complaint is insufficient to establish standing for § 12(a)(2)
purposes.

See, e.g., Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. Merrill

Lynch & Co., 714 F. Supp. 2d 475, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re
Wells Fargo Mortg.-Backed Certificate Litig., 712 F. Supp. 2d
958, 966 (N.D. Cal. 2010); In re Sterling Foster & Co., Inc.,
Sec. Litig., 222 F. Supp. 2d 216, 245-46 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).

The

general tenor of these opinions is that plaintiffs should plead
that

they

offering,

directly
and

that

purchased
a

securities
to

failure

in

implies

do

so

the

relevant
that

the

securities were in fact purchased on the secondary market.

See,

e.g., In re Sterling Foster, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 245.
The First Circuit has held that alleging that a plaintiff
purchased

securities

“pursuant

and/or

traceable

to”

a

public

offering can be sufficient if coupled with additional supportive
facts.
Asset

See Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Nomura
Acceptance

(finding

the

Corp.,

632

terminology

F.3d

762,

sufficient

776

(1st

2011)

coupled

when

Cir.

with

allegations that plaintiffs “‘acquired’” securities “‘from’” the
defendants and that the defendants “‘promoted and sold’” the
securities to the plaintiffs).
We

agree

that

language--coupled

using

with

the

“pursuant

sufficient
53

and/or

supporting

traceable

facts--can

to”
give

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a

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plausible

circumstances.

Pg: 54 of 57

inference

of

standing

in

certain

Here, however, we find the amended complaint and

confirmation slip insufficient to make plaintiffs’ allegations
of standing plausible.

Though not dispositive, the plaintiffs’

coy choice of words gives us some pause.

And we do not find the

additional supporting facts sufficient to push the claim into
the realm of plausibility.
To be sure, the amended complaint alleges a number of facts
consistent

with

the

possibility

shares directly in the SPO.

that

Dammeyer

purchased

his

For example, the complaint alleges

that Dammeyer purchased 600 common shares of MuniMae stock on
February 3, 2005, and, according to the amended complaint, the
SPO

occurred

“[o]n

or

about

February

2,

2005,”

J.A.

233.

Although these dates of purchase are close, they do not directly
coincide.
More

helpful

to

plaintiffs,

the

confirmation

slip

shows

that the settlement date for Dammeyer’s securities was February
8, see J.A. 1606, which coincides with the date the prospectus
supplement
delivery,

states
see

that

J.A.

SPO

1557.

shares
These

would

be

supporting

irrelevant, but they are also not sufficient.

available
facts

are

for
not

Cf. In re Century

Aluminum, 729 F.3d at 1107-08 (finding similar evidence about
pricing

and

sale

dates

insufficient

in

the

where standing requirements are more relaxed).
54

context

of

§ 11,

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Plaintiffs emphasize the fact that the confirmation slip
bears

the

notation

prospectus

under

Gustafson,

513

[§ 12(a)(2)]
distribute

“PROS

separate
U.S.

cannot

the

UNDER

at

cover.
571

attach

prospectus

SEP

COVER,”

See

J.A.

(“[T]he

unless

1606;

liability

there

. . . .”).

which

is

an

However,

means

see

also

imposed

by

obligation

to

as

defendants

note, RBC is both a registered broker-dealer and an underwriter,
and

under

prospectus

SEC
to

§§ 77d(a)(3),

regulations,
Dammeyer
77e(b)

in

it

may

either

(prospectus

have

had

capacity.
delivery

to
See

deliver
15

a

U.S.C.

requirement);

17

C.F.R. § 230.174 (obligations of broker-dealers to comply with
prospectus delivery requirements).

Without more, that notation

is merely consistent with the claim that Dammeyer purchased his
shares directly in the SPO. 13
The

plausibility

of

defendants is even weaker.

the

claim

against

the

underwriter

The confirmation slip provides no

support for the contention that Dammeyer purchased his shares
from Merrill Lynch.
not much better.

With respect to RBC, the allegations are

The attached confirmation slip bears the logo

13

We also note that the complaint alleges that the SPO
offered shares “priced at $26.51.”
J.A. 111.
But Dammeyer’s
purchase price was $26.32 per share.
J.A. 1606.
And, in
contrast to Plumbers’ Union, there are no allegations that
defendants specifically promoted the securities or solicited
Dammeyer’s purchase.

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of “RBC Dain Rauscher.”
the

designated

Pg: 56 of 57

However, RBC Capital Markets Corp. was

underwriter

for

the

SPO.

See

J.A.

1590.

Dammeyer does not allege that these were the same entity as of
2005,

or

that

they

should

be

treated

as

such

for

liability

purposes.
At best, the allegations are merely consistent with the
possibility that Dammeyer purchased his securities in the SPO.
The “pursuant and/or traceable to” language of the complaint is
conclusory,
sufficient

and

the

“factual

confirmation
enhancement”

slip
to

does

support

not
a

provide

“reasonable

inference that the defendant[s are] liable for the misconduct
alleged.”

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

In this circumstance, the complaint “stops short of

the line between possibility and plausibility.”
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).

See Bell Atl.
Accordingly, we

agree with the district court that Dammeyer did not adequately
allege standing to bring a § 12(a)(2) claim. 14

14

Dammeyer also brings an SPO-based claim under § 15 of the
Securities Act, which imposes derivative liability on certain
“control persons” for primary violations of the Act.
See 15
U.S.C. § 77o.
We dismiss the § 15 claim because the complaint
fails to state a claim under the predicate Securities Act
provisions. See Greenhouse v. MCG Capital Corp., 392 F.3d 650,
656 n.7 (4th Cir. 2004).

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IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
AFFIRMED

57