US v. Ronald Atkin

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:11-cr-00228-JAB-1. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998993582].. [12-4208]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4208

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RONALD ATKINS,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (1:11-cr-00228-JAB-1)

Submitted:

October 22, 2012

Decided:

December 3, 2012

Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Mireille P.
Clough, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Anand
P.
Ramaswamy,
Assistant
United
States
Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Ronald Atkins appeals his conviction and thirty-seven
month sentence imposed following his conditional guilty plea to
travelling in interstate commerce and failing to register or
update

a

registration

as

required

by

the

Sex

Offender

Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2250(a)

(2006).

Atkins

argues

that

his

charge

was

adjudicated in an improper venue and that Congress, in enacting
SORNA, violated the non-delegation doctrine, the Ex Post Facto
Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Administrative Procedure
Act

(“APA”),

5

U.S.C.

§ 553

(2006).

For

the

reasons

that

follow, we reject these arguments and affirm.
Atkins first argues that the district court erred in
denying

his

motion

to

dismiss

the

indictment

or

to

grant

a

change of venue because the District of Maryland, in which he
was

required

prosecution.

to

register,

is

the

proper

venue

for

his

We review de novo a district court’s denial of a

motion to dismiss an indictment based purely on legal grounds.
United States v. Hatcher, 560 F.3d 222, 224 (4th Cir. 2009).

We

also review the district court’s venue determination de novo.
United States v. Wilson, 262 F.3d 305, 320 (4th Cir. 2001).
Venue lies in the state and district where the offense
was “committed.”
Crim.

P.

18.

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; Fed. R.
Where

an

offense
2

is

“committed”

is

to

be

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determined with reference to the criminal act proscribed by the
statute.

Johnston v. United States, 351 U.S. 215, 220 (1956).

If the statute does not provide explicit guidance, the location
of the offense for venue purposes “must be determined from the
nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts
constituting it.”

United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703

(1946).
A convicted sex offender’s act of interstate travel
both “serve[s] as a jurisdictional predicate for § 2250, [and]
is also . . . the very conduct at which Congress took aim” in
enacting the statute.
Ct. 2229, 2240 (2010).

Carr v. United States, __ U.S. __, 130 S.
Atkins’s offense necessarily involved

more than one district because it required interstate travel
between North Carolina and Maryland.

In this situation, venue

is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (2006), which provides that
“any offense against the United States begun in one district and
completed in another, or committed in more than one district,
may be . . . prosecuted in any district in which such offense
was begun, continued, or completed.”
Atkins’s offense commenced when he moved from North
Carolina,

which

Maryland,

and

Maryland.

42

gave

was

rise

to

completed

U.S.C.

his
when

§ 16913(c)

obligation

to

register

in

he

to

register

in

failed

(2006).

Because

Atkins’s

offense began when he moved from the Middle District of North
3

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Carolina, venue was proper.

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See United States v. Howell, 552

F.3d 709, 717-18 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that venue over a
§ 2250 violation was proper in the district from which defendant
moved, based in part on the commencement of the offense in that
district); United States v. Leach, 639 F.3d 769, 771-72 (7th
Cir. 2011) (same).

Accordingly, Atkins’s venue challenge is

without merit.
Atkins also challenges the district court’s rejection
of

his

motion

grounds.

to

dismiss

Properly

reviewed de novo.

the

preserved

indictment

on

constitutional

constitutional

claims

also

are

United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 266 (4th

Cir. 2009).
“The non-delegation doctrine is based on the principle
of preserving the separation of powers between the coordinate
branches

of

government.”

United

1202, 1212 (11th Cir. 2009).
to

another

branch

of

States

v.

Ambert,

561

F.3d

Congress’s delegation of authority

government

does

not

offend

the

non-delegation doctrine as long as Congress has delineated an
“intelligible principle” guiding the exercise of that authority.
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409
(1928).

Even

a

general

legislative

directive

is

a

constitutionally sufficient “intelligible principle” so long as
Congress
agency

“clearly
which

is

delineates
to

apply

the
it,
4

general
and

the

policy,

the

boundaries

of

public
this

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delegated authority.”

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Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,

372-73 (1989).
Atkins
principle

guiding

discretion.
in

contends

published

decisions.

the

that

Attorney

there

is

General’s

no

intelligible

exercise

of

his

Although this court has not addressed this argument
authority,

we

have

rejected

it

in

unpublished

See United States v. Clark, No. 11-5098, 2012 WL

2109246 (4th Cir. June 12, 2012), petition for cert. filed, __
U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. Aug. 30, 2012) (No. 12-6067); United States v.
Rogers, 468 F. App’x 359, 361-62 (4th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-5099)
(argued but unpublished), cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __ (U.S. Oct.
1, 2012) (No. 11-10450); United States v. Stewart, 461 F. App’x
349, 351-52 (4th Cir.) (Nos. 11-4420/4471) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 2446 (2012); United States v. Burns, 418 F.
App’x

209,

unpublished).

213

(4th

Cir.

2011)

(No.

09-4909)

(argued

but

Additionally, circuits that have considered the

issue have dismissed this claim.

See, e.g., United States v.

Guzman, 591 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3487
(2010); United States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d 254, 264 (5th Cir.
2009); Ambert, 561 F.3d at 1213-14.
authorities,

we

likewise

reject

Based on these persuasive
Atkins’s

non-delegation

challenge.
Atkins

further

challenges

SORNA

under

Facto Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the APA.
5

the

Ex

Post

However, Atkins

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concedes

that

these

decision

in

2009).

Because

United

issues
States

“a

panel

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are

v.

foreclosed

Gould,

of

this

568

by

F.3d

court

this
459

cannot

court’s

(4th

Cir.

overrule,

explicitly or implicitly, the precedent set by a prior panel of
this court,” United States v. Rivers, 595 F.3d 558, 564 n.3 (4th
Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted), we
hold that Atkins’s challenges on these grounds must fail.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court.
legal
before

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
contentions
the

court

are

adequately

and

argument

presented

would

not

in
aid

the
the

materials
decisional

process.
AFFIRMED

6