US v. Corey Hairston

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:11-cr-00071-CCE-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998977669].. [12-4268]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4268

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
COREY JERMAINE HAIRSTON,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:11-cr-00071-CCE-1)

Submitted:

October 24, 2012

Decided:

November 8, 2012

Before KEENAN, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Mireille P. Clough,
Assistant
Federal
Public
Defender,
Winston-Salem,
North
Carolina, for Appellant.
Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Sandra
J.
Hairston,
Assistant
United
States
Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Corey Jermaine Hairston pled guilty to distribution of
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006), and
received a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range of
ninety-two months’ imprisonment.

On appeal, Hairston argues the

district court unreasonably ran the federal sentence consecutive
to his undischarged state sentence rather than concurrent with
it.

We affirm.
At the time of his sentencing, Hairston was serving a

thirty-five-year

sentence

on

Virginia

state

convictions

for

second degree murder, felon in possession of a firearm, and use
of a firearm in connection with a felony.
argue

these

offenses

were

related

to

Hairston does not

the

instant

federal

offense.
We
deferential
States,

552

review

a

sentence

abuse-of-discretion
U.S.

38,

51

for

reasonableness

standard.

(2007).

A

Gall

is

procedurally

reasonable

a

v.

United

reasonableness

review

includes both procedural and substantive components.
sentence

under

where

the

Id.

district

A

court

committed no significant procedural errors, such as improperly
calculating the Guidelines range, failing to consider the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, or insufficiently explaining
the selected sentence.

United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832,

837–38 (4th Cir. 2010).

The substantive reasonableness of a
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sentence

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is

assessed

circumstances.
substantively

in

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light

of

the

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
unreasonable

if

the

totality

of

the

While a sentence may be

§

3553(a)

factors

do

not

support the sentence, “[r]eviewing courts must be mindful that,
regardless of ‘the individual case,’ the ‘deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard of review . . . applies to all sentencing
decisions.’”

United States v. Diosdado–Star, 630 F.3d 359, 366

(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2946 (2011) (citing Gall,
552 U.S. at 52).
properly

Moreover, a sentence that falls within a

calculated

reasonable.

Guidelines

range

is

presumptively

United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir.

2007).
Hairston

asserts

that

U.S.

Sentencing

Guidelines

Manual (“USSG”) § 5G1.3(c) (2011) compels a sentencing court to
construe the undischarged state offense as if it were a federal
offense and to compute a hybrid Guidelines range that would be
applicable to both offenses.

Cf. United States v. Hill, 59 F.3d

500, 503 (4th Cir. 1995).

However, the application notes to

USSG § 5G1.3(c) no longer advise such a procedure.
§ 5G1.3(c),
district

cmt.

court

Guidelines

range

n.3(A).
need
to

not

As

this

calculate

comport

with

court
a
the

has

See USSG

explained,

hypothetical
current

a

combined

version

of

§ 5G1.3(c).

United States v. Mosley, 200 F.3d 218, 224–25 (4th

Cir. 1999).

Instead, a district court’s discretion in imposing
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consecutive

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or

concurrent

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sentences

is

bounded

only

by

the

relevant factors that the current version of § 5G1.3(c) directs
the court to consider.

Id.

Those factors include the concerns

enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); the type and length of the
prior undischarged sentence; the time likely to be served before
release

on

the

undischarged

sentence;

and

the

fact

that

the

prior undischarged sentence may have been imposed in state court
rather than federal court.

See USSG § 5G1.3(c), cmt. n.3(A).

Section 5G1.3(c) first directs courts to consider the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
cmt. n.3(A).
Hairston’s

Here, the district court explicitly referred to

long

convictions,

See USSG § 5G1.3(c),

criminal

and

opined

record,
that

noting

the

need

the

to

murder

protect

weighed in favor of a consecutive sentence.

and

the

gun

public

The district court

further concluded that a sentence at the bottom of Hairston’s
Guidelines range adequately took into account the long sentence
he

is

serving

on

the

state

offense

and

a

“record

primarily but not exclusively of misdemeanors.”

otherwise

We conclude the

district court properly considered the relevant factors under
USSG § 5G1.3(c), and properly explained the sentence it imposed.
United

States

v.

Montes-Pineda,

445

F.3d

375,

380

(4th

Cir.

2006).
As this court has emphasized, “[a] district court’s
decision

to

impose

a

sentence
4

that

runs

concurrently

with,

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partially

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concurrently

with,

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or

consecutively

to

a

prior

undischarged term of imprisonment is constrained only by its
consideration

of

the

factors

mentioned

§ 5G1.3(c).”

Mosley, 200 F.3d at 223.

in

the

commentary

to

Because the district

court considered the factors listed in the commentary to USSG
§ 5G1.3(c) — including the guideposts referenced in § 3553(a) —
we

conclude

that

the

district

court

did

not

abuse

its

discretion in imposing a consecutive sentence in this case.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We

dispense

with

oral

argument

because

the

facts

and

legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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