US v. Anthony McClain
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:96-cr-00179-CMC-1. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998966496]. [12-4331]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4331
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY MCCLAIN, a/k/a Ice, a/k/a New York,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Orangeburg. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (5:96-cr-00179-CMC-1)
Submitted:
September 18, 2012
Decided:
October 24, 2012
Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John H. Hare, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Kimberly H.
Albro,
Research
and
Writing
Specialist,
Columbia,
South
Carolina, for Appellant.
Nancy Chastain Wicker, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Anthony McClain appeals the district court’s judgment
revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to twentyfour months’ imprisonment.
McClain’s attorney has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting
that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal.
McClain has
filed a pro se supplemental brief raising several issues.
Government did not file a brief.
We
review
a
The
We affirm.
district
court’s
judgment
revoking
supervised release and imposing a term of imprisonment for abuse
of discretion.
Cir. 1992).
United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th
To revoke supervised release, a district court need
only find a violation of a condition of supervised release by a
preponderance of the evidence.
McClain
had
no
objections
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006).
to
the
amended
violations
report.
According to the report, while on supervision, McClain tested
positive for a controlled substance four times, pled guilty to
assault and battery in the first degree and admitted that he
exchanged crack cocaine for sex.
We conclude that it was shown
by a preponderance of the evidence that McClain violated his
supervised
release.
court
not
did
abuse
Accordingly,
its
we
discretion
release.
2
find
by
that
the
revoking
district
supervised
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We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised
release
if
it
is
within
the
prescribed
statutory
range and not plainly unreasonable.
United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 439–40 (4th Cir. 2006).
We first consider whether
the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable.
at 438.
Id.
In this initial inquiry, we take a more deferential
posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion
than
reasonableness
review
for
guidelines
sentences.
United
States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007).
Only if
we find the sentence procedurally or substantively unreasonable
must we decide whether it is “plainly” so.
Id. at 657.
While a district court must consider the Chapter Seven
policy
statements
and
the
statutory
factors
applicable
to
revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006),
the court need not robotically tick through every subsection,
and ultimately, the court has broad discretion to revoke the
previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the
statutory maximum.
Id. at 656–57.
Moreover, while a district
court must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence, the
court
need
not
be
as
detailed
or
specific
when
imposing
a
revocation sentence as when imposing a post-conviction sentence.
United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).
We
have
reviewed
the
record
and
conclude
that
McClain’s sentence is within the prescribed range and is not
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plainly
unreasonable.
properly
considered
factors
in
At
the
imposing
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the
revocation
Guidelines
its
and
sentence,
hearing,
the
court
applicable
statutory
including
McClain’s
noncompliance and his very serious criminal record.
McClain argues that exchanging drugs for sex is not a
distribution
Distribution
substance.
offense.
includes
This
any
claim
actual
is
without
transfer
of
a
merit.
controlled
United States v. Washington, 41 F.3d 917, 919 (4th
Cir. 1994) (distribution includes sharing drugs with friends).
In McClain’s instance, he did more than share the crack cocaine;
he
gave
it
to
a
prostitute
in
exchange
for
sex.
Because
distribution of any amount of crack cocaine is a felony offense,
it was properly scored a Grade A violation.
See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(C); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.1. *
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal.
We
therefore
affirm
the
district
court’s
judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing,
of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States
*
McClain’s claim that his assault and battery conviction
was not a Grade A violation is moot. Assuming he is correct, he
still faced a Grade A violation by virtue of the drug
distribution charge.
Thus, because of the drug distribution
violation, his Chapter Seven Guidelines sentence was properly
determined to be twenty-four months.
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for further review.
If the client requests that a petition be
filed,
believes
but
counsel
that
such
a
petition
would
be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court at that time for
leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on the client.
dispense
with
oral
argument
because
the
facts
Finally, we
and
legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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