US v. Mark Haine
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:11-cr-00019-JPB-DJJ-1. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998971982]. [12-4387]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4387
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARK DANIEL HAINES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. John Preston Bailey,
Chief District Judge. (3:11-cr-00019-JPB-DJJ-1)
Submitted:
October 19, 2012
Decided:
November 1, 2012
Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Nicholas J. Compton, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Kristen
M. Leddy, Research and Writing Specialist, Martinsburg, West
Virginia, for Appellant.
William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United
States Attorney, Paul T. Camilletti, Assistant United States
Attorney, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Mark
Daniel
Haines
appeals
his
225-month
sentence
following a guilty plea to bank robbery, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006).
district
court
agreement;
(2)
On appeal, Haines argues that: (1) the
erroneously
the
rejected
district
court
the
parties’
erroneously
first
denied
plea
Haines’
motion to continue sentencing and reassign the case to another
judge; and (3) the district court committed procedural error in
calculating Haines’ criminal history category and utilizing an
extended
Guidelines
table.
Finding
no
reversible
error,
we
affirm.
We review the rejection of a guilty plea for abuse of
discretion.
United States v. Midgett, 488 F.3d 288, 297 (4th
Cir. 2007).
“[A] district court is not obliged to accept a
particular plea agreement between the government and an accused,
as it always has the authority to either accept or reject any
agreement.”
2011).
United States v. Lewis, 633 F.3d 262, 270 (4th Cir.
In the case of a binding agreement under Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11(c)(1)(C), a “court may accept the [plea] agreement, reject
it,
or
defer
a
decision
presentence report.”
On
abused
its
until
the
court
has
reviewed
the
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(3)(A).
appeal,
Haines
discretion
in
asserts
rejecting
that
the
the
first
district
plea
court
agreement
because the time lapse between the preparation and review of the
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presentence
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investigation
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report
and
the
court’s
decision
to
reject the plea agreement was “unreasonably long and unfair.”
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in
rejecting
Haines’
initial
plea
agreement.
If
the
court
chooses to reject a plea agreement, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(5)
requires that the court, in open court, inform the parties that
the plea is being rejected, give the defendant an opportunity to
withdraw the plea, and advise the defendant that the case may be
disposed
of
agreement.
less
favorably
Accordingly,
than
although
anticipated
Haines
by
claims
the
plea
that
the
district court unreasonably delayed in informing the parties of
its
decision
to
reject
the
plea
agreement,
the
sentencing
hearing was the court’s first opportunity to address the parties
in open court, as required by Rule 11(c)(5) when rejecting a
plea agreement.
The court fulfilled the requirements of Rule
11(c)(5), and allowed Haines to withdraw his plea.
A district court’s denial of a motion for continuance
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
297.
“[B]road
matters
of
discretion
continuances;
must
only
be
an
Midgett, 488 F.3d at
granted
trial
unreasoning
and
courts
on
arbitrary
‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable
request for delay’ violates the right to assistance of counsel.”
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983).
the
district
court
did
not
abuse
3
its
We conclude that
discretion
in
denying
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Haines’ motion to continue sentencing and reassign the case to
another district court judge, as the case had been then pending
for more than one year and the court’s prior involvement with
the case was significant.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
abuse of discretion standard.
38, 47, 51 (2007).
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
In determining the procedural reasonableness
of a sentence, this court considers whether the district court
properly calculated the Guidelines range, treated the Guidelines
as advisory, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors,
analyzed
any
sufficiently
arguments
explained
presented
the
by
selected
the
parties,
sentence.
Id.
at
and
51.
Haines preserved his claim of error “by drawing arguments from
§ 3553
for
imposed.”
2010).
a
sentence
different
than
the
one
ultimately
United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 578 (4th Cir.
Therefore, any error must lead to reversal, “unless we
conclude that the error was harmless.”
We
conclude
that
the
Id. at 581.
district
court
did
not
procedurally err in imposing a within-Guidelines sentence of 225
months’ imprisonment.
Haines maintains that the district court
failed to resolve all of his objections to his criminal history
and impermissibly extrapolated the Guidelines in rejecting the
parties’ initial plea agreement.
Although the court emphasized
Haines’ significant criminal history in rejecting the first plea
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agreement, indicating that Haines’ criminal history score would
yield
a
category
XVI
criminal
history
by
extrapolating
the
Guidelines, the court did not upwardly depart from the advisory
Guidelines
range
in
imposing
Haines’
ultimate
sentence.
Moreover, Haines does not dispute the court’s conclusion that
resolution
of
his
objections
history category of VI.
would
not
alter
his
criminal
Our careful review of the record thus
persuades us that the court properly calculated the advisory
Guidelines range, and imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of
225 months’ imprisonment.
Accordingly, the sentence was not
procedurally unreasonable.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
dispense
with
oral
argument
because
the
facts
and
We
legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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