US v. Hope Jackson-Forsythe

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:11-cr-00202-2 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998991345].. [12-4425, 12-4430]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4425

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
HOPE LANITA JACKSON-FORSYTHE,
Defendant - Appellant.

No. 12-4430

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
EDWARDO MANUELL FORSYTHE,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Huntington.
Robert C. Chambers,
District Judge. (3:11-cr-00202-2; 3:11-cr-00202-1)

Submitted:

November 20, 2012

Decided:

November 29, 2012

Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louie T. Price, HOLROYD & YOST, Charleston, West Virginia; John
A. Proctor, PROCTOR LAW OFFICES, PLLC, Huntington, West
Virginia, for Appellants.
R. Booth Goodwin, II, United States
Attorney, R. Gregory McVey, Assistant United States Attorney,
Huntington, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

2

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PER CURIAM:
Hope

Lanita

Jackson-Forsythe

(“Hope”)

and

Edwardo

Manuell Forsythe appeal their convictions, entered pursuant to
their conditional guilty pleas to an indictment charging them
each

with

one

count

of

possession

with

intent

to

distribute

oxycodone and oxymorphone, and aiding and abetting each other in
that offense, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006) and
18

U.S.C.

§

2

(2006).

On

appeal,
their

district

court’s

denial

of

evidence

obtained

from

their

Appellants
joint

vehicle

and

challenge

motion
their

to

the

suppress

hotel

room.

Finding no error, we affirm.
In considering the district court’s denial of a motion
to

suppress,

“[w]e

review

the

district

court’s

legal

determinations de novo and its factual determinations for clear
error.”
2010).

United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586, 589 (4th Cir.
When the district court has denied a suppression motion,

“we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government.”

Id.

“We particularly defer to a district court’s

credibility determinations, for it is the role of the district
court to observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a
pre-trial motion to suppress.”
F.3d

210,

232

(4th

Cir.

United States v. Abu Ali, 528

2008)

omitted).

3

(internal

quotation

marks

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Appellants

first

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challenge

the

traffic

stop

and

evidence seized during the subsequent search of their vehicle.
Consistent

with

conduct

brief

a

reasonable,
afoot.”

the

Fourth

Amendment,

investigatory

articulable

stop

suspicion

a

“when

that

the

officer

officer

criminal

may

has

activity

a
is

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).
requires

police

an

officer

to

have

“a

Reasonable suspicion

particularized

and

objective

basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing” based on “the totality of
the circumstances.”

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273

(2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Officers may “draw

on

training

their

own

experience

and

specialized

to

make

inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information
available to them that might well elude an untrained person.”
Id.

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).

With

the

above

standards in mind, and upon review of the record, we conclude
that the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the
officers

had

reasonable

suspicion

to

believe

that

a

drug

transaction had occurred in Appellants’ vehicle, justifying the
traffic stop.
Turning to the vehicle search and seizure of evidence,
Appellants contend that the warrantless search of Hope’s purse,
which was inside the vehicle, and her subsequent non-Mirandized
questioning ran afoul of the Constitution.
4

Appellants ignore

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that “[t]here is a well-established exception to [the warrant]
requirement

.

.

exception,

‘[i]f

.
a

for
car

automobile

is

readily

searches.

mobile

this

probable

and

Under

cause

exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment
. .

.

permits

police

to

search

the

vehicle

without

more.’”

Kelly, 592 F.3d at 589 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S.
938,

940

(1996)

(citation

omitted)).

Moreover,

“it

is

well

settled that a positive alert from a drug detection dog, in and
of itself, provides probable cause to search a vehicle.” 1
States

v.

Branch,

537

F.3d

328,

340

n.2

(4th

United

Cir.

2008)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Therefore, once the canine

positively

of

alerted

to

the

presence

drugs

in

the

vehicle,

officers had probable cause to search the passenger compartment,
including Hope’s purse.

See Kelly, 592 F.3d at 589-90 (“[O]nce

police have probable cause, they may search ‘every part of the
vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the
search.’”) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825
(1982) (citation omitted)).
Appellants

next

contend

that

the

police

violated

Hope’s Miranda 2 rights by questioning her following the vehicle
1

Appellants do not challenge the canine sniff of the
vehicle, nor do they dispute that the canine positively
indicated the presence of drugs in the vehicle.
2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

5

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search.

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“[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a

person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or
its functional equivalent,” which includes “any words or actions
on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant
to

arrest

and

custody)

that

the

police

should

know

are

reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect.”

Rhode

Island

(footnote omitted).

v.

Innis,

446

U.S.

291,

301

(1980)

We conclude that the detective’s simple

inquiry as to whether Appellants were staying at a particular
hotel cannot be construed as “reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating

response.”

Thus,

we

conclude

that

Hope’s

statement was not elicited in violation of her Miranda rights.
Finally,
hotel

room

and

Appellants
the

challenge

seizure

of

the

search

evidence

found

of

their

therein.

Appellants’ “fruit of the poisonous tree” argument is meritless
in light of our resolution of their challenges to the vehicle
search and seizure and Hope’s questioning.

Appellants’ second

argument, that police illegally searched their hotel room and
seized items prior to issuance of the search warrant, also is
meritless.
Warrantless searches “‘are per se unreasonable under
the

Fourth

Amendment—subject

only

to

a

few

established and well-delineated exceptions.’”
Bush,

404

F.3d

263,

275

(4th

Cir.
6

2005)

specifically

United States v.

(quoting

Mincey

v.

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Arizona,

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437

U.S.

385,

390

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(1978)).

The

independent

source

doctrine and the inevitable discovery doctrine are two distinct
exceptions to the exclusionary rule. 3

See Nix v. Williams, 467

U.S. 431, 443-44 (1984) (discussing doctrines).
discovery

doctrine

allows

admission

of

The inevitable

evidence

“[i]f

the

prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been
discovered

by

lawful

means.”

Id.

at

444.

Even

if

police

illegally searched Appellants’ hotel room and seized evidence
prior to the issuance of the search warrant, the district court
properly

found

that

the

evidence

inevitably

would

have

been

lawfully discovered and seized during execution of the search
warrant, which Appellants concede was valid.

Thus, this claim

is meritless.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgments.
We

dispense

contentions

with
are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the

facts

and

the

materials

legal
before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
3

While the district
apparent that the court
doctrine to find that the
Thus, we need not consider
source doctrine.

court discuss both doctrines, it is
relied on the inevitable discovery
hotel room evidence was admissible.
the applicability of the independent

7