US v. Bradley Wein
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:11-cr-00161-HEH-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999089547].. [12-4489]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4489
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BRADLEY DOUGLAS WEIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond.
Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:11-cr-00161-HEH-1)
Submitted:
March 27, 2013
Before AGEE and
Circuit Judge.
FLOYD,
Decided:
Circuit
Judges,
and
April 18, 2013
HAMILTON,
Senior
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Amy L. Austin,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Michael C.
Moore, Assistant United States Attorney, Charles A. Quagliato,
Special Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM
Bradley Douglas Wein appeals his conviction by a jury
of obstruction of an official proceeding, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) (2006).
On appeal, Wein argues that the
district court erred in admitting credit card account records
into evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), the business records
exception
to
the
hearsay
rule.
Wein
also
argues
that
the
district court erred in denying his Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion
for judgment of acquittal.
We affirm.
We review the district court’s decision regarding the
admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion and will not
find an abuse unless a decision is “arbitrary and irrational.”
United
States
v.
Cloud,
680
F.3d
396
(4th
Cir.)
(internal
quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 218 (2012).
The hearsay rule does not prohibit the admission of a record
“if[] (A) the record was made at or near the time by . . .
someone with knowledge; (B) the record was kept in the course of
a regularly conducted activity of a business . . . ; [and] (C)
making
Fed.
the
R.
Evid.
established
Fed.
R.
record
by
Evid.
was
a
803(6).
“the
regular
The
custodian
803(6)(D).
practice
nature
or
of
another
Further,
the
of
the
that
activity.”
record
qualified
business
may
be
witness.”
record
is
admissible so long as “neither the source of information nor the
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or
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circumstances
trustworthiness.”
Wein
discretion
manager
in
for
qualified
of
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preparation
indicate
a
lack
of
Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)(E).
contends
finding
credit
witness
account records.
that
that
card
to
lay
the
district
Valerie
fraud
the
court
Dunagin,
with
Bank
foundation
an
of
abused
investigative
America,
for
its
the
was
credit
a
card
However, Dunagin testified that she had worked
with similar records throughout her nineteen-year career at Bank
of
America.
Additionally,
Dunagin
described
in
detail
the
manner in which the records were prepared and testified that
Bank of America kept and relied upon the records in its regular
course of business.
Wein
asserts
that
Dunagin,
as
a
Bank
of
America
employee, could not be considered a qualified witness for the
credit card account records created by FIA Card Services.
We
find this argument unavailing because Dunagin testified that she
was familiar with the records created by FIA Card Services, that
the records were maintained in the same manner as the records
created
by
currently
Bank
owned
of
by
America,
Bank
of
and
that
America.
FIA
Card
Services
See
United
States
is
v.
Duncan, 919 F.2d 981, 986 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding “there is no
requirement that the records be created by the business having
custody of them”).
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Further, contrary to Wein’s contentions, Dunagin was
not required to create the records or speak to the individuals
who created the records.
See United States v. Dominguez, 835
F.2d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that “‘qualified witness’
need not have personally participated in the creation of the
document,
Wein
nor
also
know
who
incorrectly
actually
asserts
recorded
that
the
Dunagin
information”).
was
required
to
confirm the accuracy of the records in order to be a qualified
witness.
witness
See Duncan, 919 F.2d at 986 (holding that qualified
need
accuracy”).
did
not
not
“be
able
to
personally
attest
to
.
.
.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court
abuse
its
discretion
in
finding
that
Dunagin
was
a
qualified witness.
Next, Wein argues on appeal that the method by which
the credit card account records were prepared indicates that the
records were untrustworthy.
Specifically, Wein contends there
was no testimony regarding the accuracy or completeness of the
comments describing customer service phone calls in the records,
which
were
entered
by
customer
shorthand during the calls.
service
representatives
in
We conclude that this argument does
not affect the admissibility of the records and is directed to
the weight of the evidence.
Price
Enters.,
(rejecting
claim
Inc.,
that
636
See Am. Int’l Pictures, Inc. v.
F.2d
business
4
933,
record
935
(4th
lacked
Cir.
1980)
trustworthiness
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because
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objection
admissibility).
was
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directed
to
weight
of
evidence,
not
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting the credit card account records in
to evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).
Wein
also
argues
that
the
district
court
denying his Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal.
erred
We review
de novo the district court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion.
States
v.
Penniegraft,
641
F.3d
denied, 132 S. Ct. 564 (2011).
566,
571
(4th
in
United
Cir.),
cert.
We will uphold a conviction in
the face of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence “if
there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to
the Government, to support it.”
F.3d
210,
244
(4th
brackets omitted).
Cir.
evidence
or
2008)
United States v. Abu Ali, 528
(internal
quotation
marks
and
In conducting this review, we will not weigh
review
witness
credibility.
United
States
v.
Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 245 (4th Cir. 2007).
Wein
establishing
argues
that
district court.
he
that
there
submitted
a
was
insufficient
fraudulent
letter
evidence
to
the
However, the Government presented evidence that
Wein fabricated a letter to his former client, advising her of
the settlement of her outstanding credit card debt on several
accounts.
The Government presented further evidence that Wein
provided this letter, along with other documents, to his defense
counsel and claimed that it provided him with a complete defense
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to the indictment charging him with mail fraud and aggravated
identity theft, charges on which the jury ultimately found him
not guilty.
Wein’s counsel subsequently attached the fraudulent
letter to a motion to dismiss.
Additionally, Wein’s computer
forensics expert testified that the time and date stamps of the
electronic version of the letter could be manipulated and that
he could not testify as to whether the file was manipulated
during an eleven-month period when Wein was aware that he may
face
charges.
Accordingly,
we
conclude
that
there
was
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude
that Wein was responsible for the submission of a fraudulent
letter to the court.
Wein’s argument that there was insufficient evidence
to establish that he acted with corrupt intent because it was
his defense counsel who attached the fraudulent letter to the
motion to dismiss is unavailing.
A defendant acts corruptly
where he “act[s] with the purpose of wrongfully impeding the due
administration of justice.”
United States v. Matthews, 505 F.3d
698, 706 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and emphasis
omitted).
The jury could infer Wein’s corrupt intent by the
fact that he fabricated the letter and gave it to his defense
counsel, claiming that it provided him with a complete defense
to the pending charges of mail fraud and aggravated identity
theft.
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Finally, Wein argues that there was no nexus between
the fraudulent letter and the criminal proceeding against him.
“To
satisfy
[the
nexus]
requirement,
the
defendant’s
conduct
must ‘have a relationship in time, causation, or logic with the
judicial proceedings.’”
United States v. Reich, 479 F.3d 179,
185 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S.
593, 599 (1995)); see also United States v. Johnson, 553 F.
Supp. 2d 582, 626 (E.D. Va. 2008).
We conclude that Wein has
failed to show that the evidence was insufficient to establish a
nexus between his actions and obstruction of the proceeding.
Wein’s fraudulent letter was attached in a motion to
dismiss the charges of mail fraud and aggravated identity theft,
and thus, there is a clear, logical relationship between his
conduct and the judicial proceeding.
Wein’s argument that the
subject matter of the fraudulent letter had nothing to do with
the
arguments
raised
in
his
motion
to
dismiss
is
unavailing
because it ignores that the fraudulent letter was nevertheless
presented
to
the
court.
Moreover,
Wein’s
argument
that
the
fraudulent letter lacked a relationship in time to his use of
his
former
analysis
client’s
only
credit
requires
there
fails
be
a
because
the
relationship
nexus
in
time
between the fraudulent letter and the court proceeding.
See
Reich, 479 F.3d at 179.
that
cards
Finally, Wein argues that, because the
jury found him not guilty of mail fraud and aggravated identity
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there
was
those charges.
no
nexus
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between
the
fraudulent
letter
and
However, we must not consider the jury’s verdict
on other counts when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.
See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67 (1984) (holding
that sufficiency of evidence “review should be independent of
the
jury’s
determination
insufficient”).
that
evidence
on
another
count
was
We therefore conclude that there was sufficient
evidence from which a reasonable juror could find Wein guilty of
obstruction of an official proceeding.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We
dispense
contentions
with
are
oral
argument
adequately
because
presented
in
the
facts
and
the
materials
legal
before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
8
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