US v. Harold Jackson
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:02-cr-00305-WDQ-1. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999125003].. [12-4607]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4607
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
HAROLD ELLIS JACKSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
William D. Quarles, Jr., District
Judge. (1:02-cr-00305-WDQ-1)
Submitted:
May 30, 2013
Decided:
June 7, 2013
Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed in part, affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Michael Lawlor, LAWLOR & ENGLERT, LLC, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, James G.
Warwick, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Harold Ellis Jackson appeals after pleading guilty to
bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (2006), and
challenges his 151-month sentence.
that
his
guilty
plea
was
not
On appeal, Jackson contends
knowing
and
voluntary
because,
since he was sentenced in 2003, the law has changed and two
convictions used to qualify him as a career offender are no
longer
valid
received
ineffective
permitted
felonies. 1
predicate
him
to
assistance
plead
offender designation.
guilty
He
of
also
counsel
and
argues
when
stipulate
that
his
to
he
counsel
the
career
We dismiss in part and affirm in part.
The Government moved to dismiss the appeal based on
the
waiver
agreement.
waive
of
appellate
rights
in
Jackson’s
written
plea
As part of the plea agreement, Jackson agreed to
his
right
to
“appeal
whatever
sentence
is
imposed,
including any issues that relate to the establishment of the
guideline
upward
range,
or
established
reserving
downward
at
only
departure
sentencing.”
In
the
right
from
the
the
plea
to
appeal
guideline
agreement,
from
an
range
Jackson
admitted that he is a career offender under Guideline Section
1
The appeal was delayed, and there have been 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 2255 (West Supp. 2012) proceedings.
The district court
granted Jackson’s § 2255 motion in part and permitted a belated
appeal on July 31, 2012.
2
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4B1.1, because he has previously been convicted of robbery with
a deadly weapon in 1995, battery in 1990, and robbery in 1985.
The
district
court
sentenced
Jackson
to
151
months’
imprisonment, at the low end of the Sentencing Guidelines range.
A criminal defendant may waive the right to appeal if
that
waiver
is
knowing
and
intelligent.
United
Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2007).
States
v.
Generally, if
the district court fully questions a defendant regarding the
waiver of his right to appeal during a plea colloquy performed
in accordance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, the waiver is both valid
and enforceable.
United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151
(4th Cir. 2005).
As we recently explained, “the law ordinarily
considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware
if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and
how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances—even
though
the
defendant
may
not
consequences of invoking it.”
know
the
specific
detailed
United States v. Thornsbury, 670
F.3d 532, 537 (4th Cir.) (internal alteration, quotation marks,
and
emphases
omitted),
cert.
denied,
133
S.
Ct.
196
(2012).
Whether a defendant validly waived his right to appeal is a
question of law we reviews de novo.
United States v. Blick, 408
F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005).
Jackson’s
counsel
did
not
contest
the
Government’s
assertions in the motion to dismiss that Jackson knowingly and
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voluntarily waived the right to appeal.
Jackson now contends
that
and
his
because
guilty
the
plea
was
Government,
not
knowingly
Jackson,
and
the
voluntarily
court
agreed that Jackson was a career offender.
that
his
Maryland
conviction
do
not
1990
battery
qualify
as
conviction
predicate
made
erroneously
Jackson contends
and
1985
offenses
robbery
under
U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (2002).
These arguments,
however, are within the scope of the waiver.
We conclude that
the record discloses that Jackson validly waived the right to
appeal his sentence.
The language of the appeal waiver is clear
and unambiguous.
However, Jackson contends that the waiver should now
be
considered
invalid
and
unenforceable
because
of
the
beneficial change in law brought about by the decision in United
States v. Gomez, 690 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2012) (if an offense has
disjunctive
elements
that
enumerate
multiple
categories
of
crimes, at least one of which requires proof of violent force
and one which does not, a federal sentencing court may only then
apply
the
modified
categorical
approach
and
look
beyond
a
statutory definition to a limited list of judicial records found
in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) and Shepard v.
United
States,
544
U.S.
13
(2005)).
Jackson
argues
that,
because the law has been clarified in his favor, the appeal
waiver is no longer valid.
He also contends that the appeal
4
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waiver does not bar a challenge to his conviction.
conviction
is
not
appellate
specifically
rights,
Jackson
included
does
challenging his conviction.
the
make
not
in
While the
waiver
any
of
arguments
Instead, he only challenges the
calculation of his sentence—something he explicitly waived, and
ineffective assistance related to that claim.
We reject Jackson’s challenge to the validity of the
waiver.
As
we
recently
Simmons-based 2
defendant’s
explained
challenge
in
to
concluding
his
career
that
a
offender
designation fell within the scope of an appeal waiver expressly
waiving
his
right
to
appeal
a
sentence
falling
within
the
advisory Guidelines range established at sentencing, “a party
cannot
ask
to
re-bargain
the
waiver
of
his
because of [post-plea] changes in the law.”
Copeland,
707
F.3d
quotation
marks
522,
and
529-30
ellipsis
(4th
right
to
appeal
United States v.
Cir.
omitted).
2013)
(internal
Accordingly,
we
determine that the appeal waiver is valid and enforceable as to
Jackson’s sentencing claim and dismiss the claim.
Next,
during
the
Jackson
plea
argues
that
negotiations
phase
counsel
by
was
ineffective
permitting
him
stipulate to the career offender designation.
to
He contends that
he was prejudiced because, without the stipulation, he would
2
United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011).
5
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have a Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months instead of 151 to 188
months.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel generally
are not cognizable on direct appeal.
F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 1997).
claims
are
United States v. King, 119
However, ineffective assistance
cognizable
establishes
conclusively
on
direct
appeal
ineffective
if
the
assistance.
record
Massaro
v.
United States, 538 U.S. 1690, 1693-94 (2003); United States v.
Richardson, 195 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999).
To
must
show
demonstrate
that
his
ineffective
“counsel’s
assistance,
representation
a
defendant
fell
below
an
objective standard of reasonableness,” and that the error was
“prejudicial to the defense” such that “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result
of
the
proceeding
would
have
been
different.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 692, 694 (1984).
Jackson contends that counsel should have raised a Shepard-based
challenge
Shepard
and
was
objected
not
to
decided
until
after Jackson was convicted.
it
is
undisputed
Therefore,
there
challenge,
and
Consequently,
that
was
the
there
all
no
the
career
2005,
enhancement.
approximately
two
years
At the time Jackson was sentenced,
his
reason
predicate
for
would
is
ineffective
conclusively on the record.
6
felonies
counsel
result
no
offender
not
have
to
qualified.
raise
been
assistance
such
a
different.
appearing
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We therefore grant in part the Government’s motion to
dismiss
the
appeal
and
dismiss
challenging Jackson’s sentence.
the
portion
of
the
appeal
We affirm the portion of the
appeal raising ineffective assistance of counsel.
We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately
presented
in
the
materials
before
the
court
and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART
7
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