US v. Harold Jackson

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UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:02-cr-00305-WDQ-1. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999125003].. [12-4607]

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Appeal: 12-4607 Doc: 37 Filed: 06/07/2013 Pg: 1 of 7 UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4607 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. HAROLD ELLIS JACKSON, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge. (1:02-cr-00305-WDQ-1) Submitted: May 30, 2013 Decided: June 7, 2013 Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. Dismissed in part, affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion. Michael Lawlor, LAWLOR & ENGLERT, LLC, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, James G. Warwick, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Appeal: 12-4607 Doc: 37 Filed: 06/07/2013 Pg: 2 of 7 PER CURIAM: Harold Ellis Jackson appeals after pleading guilty to bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (2006), and challenges his 151-month sentence. that his guilty plea was not On appeal, Jackson contends knowing and voluntary because, since he was sentenced in 2003, the law has changed and two convictions used to qualify him as a career offender are no longer valid received ineffective permitted felonies. 1 predicate him to assistance plead offender designation. guilty He of also counsel and argues when stipulate that his to he counsel the career We dismiss in part and affirm in part. The Government moved to dismiss the appeal based on the waiver agreement. waive of appellate rights in Jackson’s written plea As part of the plea agreement, Jackson agreed to his right to “appeal whatever sentence is imposed, including any issues that relate to the establishment of the guideline upward range, or established reserving downward at only departure sentencing.” In the right from the the plea to appeal guideline agreement, from an range Jackson admitted that he is a career offender under Guideline Section 1 The appeal was delayed, and there have been 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2012) proceedings. The district court granted Jackson’s § 2255 motion in part and permitted a belated appeal on July 31, 2012. 2 Appeal: 12-4607 Doc: 37 Filed: 06/07/2013 Pg: 3 of 7 4B1.1, because he has previously been convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon in 1995, battery in 1990, and robbery in 1985. The district court sentenced Jackson to 151 months’ imprisonment, at the low end of the Sentencing Guidelines range. A criminal defendant may waive the right to appeal if that waiver is knowing and intelligent. United Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2007). States v. Generally, if the district court fully questions a defendant regarding the waiver of his right to appeal during a plea colloquy performed in accordance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, the waiver is both valid and enforceable. United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005). As we recently explained, “the law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances—even though the defendant may not consequences of invoking it.” know the specific detailed United States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th Cir.) (internal alteration, quotation marks, and emphases omitted), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 196 (2012). Whether a defendant validly waived his right to appeal is a question of law we reviews de novo. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005). Jackson’s counsel did not contest the Government’s assertions in the motion to dismiss that Jackson knowingly and 3 Appeal: 12-4607 Doc: 37 Filed: 06/07/2013 Pg: 4 of 7 voluntarily waived the right to appeal. Jackson now contends that and his because guilty the plea was Government, not knowingly Jackson, and the voluntarily court agreed that Jackson was a career offender. that his Maryland conviction do not 1990 battery qualify as conviction predicate made erroneously Jackson contends and 1985 offenses robbery under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (2002). These arguments, however, are within the scope of the waiver. We conclude that the record discloses that Jackson validly waived the right to appeal his sentence. The language of the appeal waiver is clear and unambiguous. However, Jackson contends that the waiver should now be considered invalid and unenforceable because of the beneficial change in law brought about by the decision in United States v. Gomez, 690 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2012) (if an offense has disjunctive elements that enumerate multiple categories of crimes, at least one of which requires proof of violent force and one which does not, a federal sentencing court may only then apply the modified categorical approach and look beyond a statutory definition to a limited list of judicial records found in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) and Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005)). Jackson argues that, because the law has been clarified in his favor, the appeal waiver is no longer valid. He also contends that the appeal 4 Appeal: 12-4607 Doc: 37 Filed: 06/07/2013 Pg: 5 of 7 waiver does not bar a challenge to his conviction. conviction is not appellate specifically rights, Jackson included does challenging his conviction. the make not in While the waiver any of arguments Instead, he only challenges the calculation of his sentence—something he explicitly waived, and ineffective assistance related to that claim. We reject Jackson’s challenge to the validity of the waiver. As we recently Simmons-based 2 defendant’s explained challenge in to concluding his career that a offender designation fell within the scope of an appeal waiver expressly waiving his right to appeal a sentence falling within the advisory Guidelines range established at sentencing, “a party cannot ask to re-bargain the waiver of his because of [post-plea] changes in the law.” Copeland, 707 F.3d quotation marks 522, and 529-30 ellipsis (4th right to appeal United States v. Cir. omitted). 2013) (internal Accordingly, we determine that the appeal waiver is valid and enforceable as to Jackson’s sentencing claim and dismiss the claim. Next, during the Jackson plea argues that negotiations phase counsel by was ineffective permitting him stipulate to the career offender designation. to He contends that he was prejudiced because, without the stipulation, he would 2 United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011). 5 Appeal: 12-4607 Doc: 37 Filed: 06/07/2013 Pg: 6 of 7 have a Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months instead of 151 to 188 months. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel generally are not cognizable on direct appeal. F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 1997). claims are United States v. King, 119 However, ineffective assistance cognizable establishes conclusively on direct appeal ineffective if the assistance. record Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 1690, 1693-94 (2003); United States v. Richardson, 195 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999). To must show demonstrate that his ineffective “counsel’s assistance, representation a defendant fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and that the error was “prejudicial to the defense” such that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 692, 694 (1984). Jackson contends that counsel should have raised a Shepard-based challenge Shepard and was objected not to decided until after Jackson was convicted. it is undisputed Therefore, there challenge, and Consequently, that was the there all no the career 2005, enhancement. approximately two years At the time Jackson was sentenced, his reason predicate for would is ineffective conclusively on the record. 6 felonies counsel result no offender not have to qualified. raise been assistance such a different. appearing Appeal: 12-4607 Doc: 37 Filed: 06/07/2013 Pg: 7 of 7 We therefore grant in part the Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal and dismiss challenging Jackson’s sentence. the portion of the appeal We affirm the portion of the appeal raising ineffective assistance of counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART 7

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