US v. John Foster

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UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:09-cr-00017-JPJ-PMS-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999106076].. [12-4619]

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Appeal: 12-4619 Doc: 45 Filed: 05/13/2013 Pg: 1 of 4 UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4619 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JOHN JOEL FOSTER, a/k/a Jack Foster, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap. James P. Jones, District Judge. (2:09-cr-00017-JPJ-PMS-1) Submitted: May 3, 2013 Before AGEE and Circuit Judge. WYNN, Decided: Circuit Judges, and May 13, 2013 HAMILTON, Senior Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Rhonda Lee Overstreet, OVERSTREET SLOAN, PLLC, Bedford, Virginia, for Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, Ashley B. Neese, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Appeal: 12-4619 Doc: 45 Filed: 05/13/2013 Pg: 2 of 4 PER CURIAM: After the district court concluded that two of John Joel Foster’s three previous felony convictions were not violent felonies for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. agreed § with 924(e)(1) the (2006), the Government, Government ruling that appealed. Foster’s We prior convictions “necessarily . . . qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA,” States v. and remanded Foster, 662 the F.3d case 291, Supreme Court denied certiorari. for 297 resentencing. (4th United Cir. 2011). * The Foster v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 207 (2012). On remand, the district court sentenced Foster to the fifteen-year mandatory minimum required by the ACCA. Foster now appeals his fifteen-year sentence, alleging that both we and the district court erred in concluding, under the modified categorical approach, that his prior convictions were violent felonies for purposes of the ACCA. As the Government observes, the mandate rule precluded the district court from addressing the argument that Foster now raises. The mandate rule is “a specific application of the law * Foster petitioned for rehearing en banc but narrowly failed to persuade a majority of this court’s active judges to vote in favor of rehearing. His petition was, as a result, denied. United States v. Foster, 674 F.3d 391, 391 (4th Cir. 2012). 2 Appeal: 12-4619 of Doc: 45 the appeal. case Filed: 05/13/2013 doctrine” to Pg: 3 of 4 cases on remand following an Volvo Trademark Holding Aktiebolaget v. Clark Mach. Co., 510 F.3d 474, 481 (4th Cir. 2007). It “compels compliance on remand with the dictates of a superior court and forecloses relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly decided by the appellate court.” Cir. 1993). convictions United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Here, were of course, “necessarily” ACCA therefore applied. we ruled violent that Foster’s felonies and Foster, 662 F.3d at 297. prior that the Because the proper characterization of Foster’s previous convictions was not an issue remanded to the district court, the district court had no authority to revisit that determination. Foster’s current appellate arguments therefore attack the district court for a ruling that it has not made. To the extent that Foster urges us to revisit our earlier decision, the panel’s holding “became, for all practical purposes, the law of the case” when the Supreme Court denied certiorari. United States v. Fulks, 683 F.3d 512, 521 (4th Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, 2012) (Nos. 12-8364, 12A248). U.S.L.W. (U.S. Nov. 21, And “as a practical matter, once the decision of an appellate court establishes the law of the case, it must be followed in all subsequent proceedings in the same case in the trial court or on a later appeal.” United States v. Aramony, 166 F.3d 655, 661 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal 3 Appeal: 12-4619 Doc: 45 Filed: 05/13/2013 Pg: 4 of 4 quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). In other words, “the doctrine of law of the case restricts a court to legal decisions it has made on the same issues in the same case.” MacDonald v. Moose, 710 F.3d 154, 161 n.10 (4th Cir. 2013). We are not persuaded that exceptional circumstances warrant sidestepping the usual operation of the doctrine in this See United States v. Pileggi, 703 F.3d 675, 682-83 (4th case. Cir. 2013); Aramony, 166 F.3d at 661. See also Sejman v. Warner-Lambert Co., 845 F.2d 66, 69 (4th Cir. 1988) (“Clearly, courts could not perform their duties satisfactorily and efficiently if a question once considered and decided were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent appeal.” (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted)). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. legal before We dispense with oral argument because the facts and contentions this court are adequately and argument presented would not in aid the the materials decisional process. AFFIRMED 4

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