US v. Lamont Harri
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:01-cr-00261-7 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999053404].. [12-4686]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4686
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
LAMONT VAN HARRIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston.
Thomas E. Johnston,
District Judge. (2:01-cr-00261-7)
Submitted:
February 26, 2013
Decided:
February 28, 2013
Before MOTZ, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
L. Thompson Price, HOLROYD & YOST, Charleston, West Virginia,
for Appellant. Joshua Clarke Hanks, Assistant United States
Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Lamont
Van
Harris
appeals
the
district
court’s
judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to
twenty-four months’ imprisonment.
Harris’s attorney has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
asserting that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but
questioning whether the district court erred in finding that the
petition to revoke supervised release was timely filed.
pro
se
supplemental
brief,
Harris
contends
that
he
In his
did
not
violate the conditions of supervised release based on criminal
activity.
The Government did not file a brief.
For the reasons
that follow, we affirm.
Harris
filed
a
motion
to
dismiss
the
petition
to
revoke supervised release as being filed outside the three-year
supervised release period.
The total time that elapsed between
Harris’s initial release and the petition was three years, eight
months, and fifteen days.
In order for the petition to be
timely, eight months and fifteen days of that period must be
excluded or tolled.
We conclude that the district court did not
err in calculating and applying the fugitive tolling doctrine to
Harris’s circumstances and finding the petition timely filed.
See
United
States
v.
Buchanan,
2011).
2
638
F.3d
448,
461
(4th
Cir.
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We
review
a
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district
court’s
judgment
revoking
supervised release and imposing a term of imprisonment for abuse
of discretion.
Cir. 1999).
United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th
To revoke supervised release, a district court need
only find a violation of a condition of supervised release by a
preponderance of the evidence.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006);
United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992).
Because the standard of proof for a supervised release violation
is
less
than
district
that
court
may
required
find
for
that
a
the
criminal
defendant
conviction,
has
the
violated
a
condition of his supervised release based on its own finding of
new
criminal
criminal
conduct,
charges
even
the
defendant
from
arising
if
the
same
charges against him are dropped.
is
acquitted
conduct,
or
if
on
the
United States v. Stephenson,
928 F.2d 728, 732 (6th Cir. 1991); see also United States v.
Jolibois,
294
F.3d
1110,
1114
(9th
Cir.
2002)
(violation
of
terms of supervised release is determined based on defendant’s
conduct and may be found whether defendant was ever convicted of
any particular offense).
Harris argues in his pro se supplemental brief that he
is innocent of the conduct supporting the petition.
because
the
court
was
permitted
to
rely
upon
the
However,
federal
conviction for felon in possession of a firearm, we conclude
that the violations were supported by a preponderance of the
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evidence and Harris’s supervised release was properly revoked.
See Copley, 978 F.2d at 831; Jolibois, 294 F.3d at 1114.
Although
Harris
does
not
assign
any
error
to
or
otherwise challenge the twenty-four-month sentence he received,
because
this
case
is
before
us
pursuant
to
Anders,
we
have
reviewed the sentence and conclude that it is procedurally and
substantively
reasonable.
The
sentence
is
not
plainly
unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm Harris’s sentence.
United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438–40 (4th Cir. 2006).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal.
We
therefore
affirm
the
district
court’s
judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Harris, in writing, of
his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review.
If Harris requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court at that time for leave to
withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Harris.
We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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