US v. Tiffany Jone
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:10-cr-00056-RLV-DSC-4 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999088607].. [12-4697]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4697
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
TIFFANY MAE JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville.
Richard L.
Voorhees, District Judge. (5:10-cr-00056-RLV-DSC-4)
Submitted:
March 29, 2013
Decided:
April 17, 2013
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Chiege O. Kalu Okwara, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, William M. Miller,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Tiffany
Mae
Jones
was
indicted
along
with
seven
co-defendants and charged with conspiracy to possess with intent
to
distribute
oxycodone,
as
well
as
two
substantive
counts,
including possession with intent to distribute oxycodone, and
possession with intent to distribute marijuana and aiding and
abetting the same.
Jones pleaded guilty to all three counts
without the benefit of a plea agreement.
The district court
granted a downward variance and sentenced Jones to thirty-three
months
of
imprisonment.
On
appeal,
Jones
challenges
the
district court’s calculation of drug quantity attributed to her
and contends that she should have received a mitigating role
reduction for having a minimal role in the offense.
Finding no
error, we affirm.
We review Jones’s sentence for reasonableness “under a
deferential
States,
abuse-of-discretion
552
U.S.
38,
41,
51
standard.”
(2007).
Gall
This
v.
United
review
entails
appellate consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of the sentence.
procedural
district
reasonableness,
court
properly
this
Id. at 51.
court
calculated
In determining
the
considers
whether
defendant’s
the
advisory
Sentencing Guidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to
argue
for
an
appropriate
sentence,
considered
the
18
U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006) factors, selected a sentence based on clearly
2
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erroneous
facts,
sentence.
Id. at 49-51.
If
error,
this
and
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the
sufficiently
sentence
is
free
reviews
it
for
court
explained
of
the
significant
substantive
selected
procedural
reasonableness,
“tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.”
at
51.
If
the
sentence
is
within
or
below
the
Id.
properly
calculated Guidelines range, the court applies a presumption on
appeal
that
States
v.
the
is
674
F.3d
sentence
Guidelines
Susi,
sentence
is
substantively
278,
289
(4th
entitled
reasonable.
United
Cir.
(below
to
2012)
presumption
of
reasonableness); United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212,
217 (4th Cir. 2010).
Such a presumption is rebutted only if the
defendant shows “that the sentence is unreasonable when measured
against the § 3553(a) factors.”
445
F.3d
375,
379
(4th
Cir.
United States v. Montes-Pineda,
2006)
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted).
Jones alleges that the district court erred in relying
on the testimony of her co-defendant, Amber Babb, in determining
drug
quantity
because
Babb’s
testimony
was
unreliable.
In
particular, she cites the inaccuracies regarding the time frame
that she could have distributed oxycodone pills in 2010 because
part of that year she was incarcerated.
The Government counters
that the court’s drug quantity finding was based on drug amounts
with which Jones was directly involved and not based entirely on
3
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Babb’s
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statements.
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Further,
the
Government
argues,
because
Jones was convicted of conspiracy to distribute any quantities
involved in the conspiracy that were reasonably foreseeable to
Jones were attributable.
We review the district court’s “drug quantity finding
for clear error.”
United States v. Kellam, 568 F.3d 125, 147
(4th Cir. 2009).
This deferential standard of review requires
reversal only if this court, upon review of the record as a
whole, “is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.”
242
(2001)
(internal
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234,
quotation
marks
omitted).
It
is
well
settled that, when determining the drug quantity to attribute to
a defendant convicted of a drug conspiracy, “the district court
may
attribute
to
the
defendant
the
total
amount
of
drugs
involved in the conspiracy, provided the drug quantities were
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant and are within the scope
of the conspiratorial agreement.”
United States v. Randall, 171
F.3d 195, 210 (4th Cir. 1999).
The district court’s approximation of drug weight was
based on amounts with which Jones was directly involved.
evidence
showed
that
Jones
participated
in
and
was
The
present
during trips to Florida to obtain oxycodone pills and that, in
addition to distributing pills herself, also discussed the North
Carolina
distribution
process
with
4
co-conspirator
Adam
Jones.
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There
was
court’s
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also
finding
involved.
sufficient
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regarding
evidence
the
to
support
number
of
the
district
oxycodone
pills
In addition to Babb’s testimony, there were specific
examples of Jones’s drug distribution activities described in
the presentence report and corroborated by statements from other
co-conspirators regarding Jones’s involvement.
Accordingly, Jones fails to establish any clear error
in
the
district
court’s
attributable to her.
calculation
of
the
drug
quantity
See Kellam, 568 F.3d at 147 (noting that
the district court’s drug quantity finding must be supported by
a preponderance of the evidence and concluding that testimony
received at trial and sentencing supported the court’s finding);
Randall, 171 F.3d at 210-11 (explaining that a defendant bears
the burden of establishing that information in the presentence
report the district court relied on in calculating the relevant
drug quantity is incorrect).
Jones also challenges the district court’s refusal to
apply a mitigating role adjustment, which we review for clear
error.
See United States v. Powell, 680 F.3d 350, 359 (4th Cir.
2012).
Pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.2
(2011),
a
district
court
may
decrease
a
defendant’s
offense
level upon finding that the defendant played a minor or minimal
role
in
the
offense.
In
light
of
the
evidence
previously
discussed, including Jones’s role in the conspiracy throughout
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its duration, controlled buys from Jones, her presence on doctor
shopping
trips
in
Florida,
and
her
discussions
about
the
conspiracy with Adam Jones and others, we conclude that Jones’s
role was “material or essential to committing the offense[s],”
United States v. Akinkoye, 185 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 1999)
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted),
and
determine
that
the
district court did not clearly err in refusing to apply the
adjustment.
We
therefore
conclude
that
the
district
sentence was reasonable and affirm the judgment.
court’s
We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately
presented
in
the
materials
before
the
court
and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
6
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