US v. Herbert Green

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 7:11-cr-00057-GEC-1. [999279326]. [12-4879]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4879

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
HERBERT GREEN,
Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke.
Glen E. Conrad, Chief
District Judge. (7:11-cr-00057-GEC-1)

Argued:

October 31, 2013

Decided:

January 17, 2014

Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion.
Judge Shedd wrote the opinion,
in which Judge Gregory and Judge Keenan joined.

ARGUED: Randy Virlin Cargill, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant.
Thomas Ernest
Booth, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.,
for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public
Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Roanoke,
Virginia, for Appellant.
Timothy J. Heaphy, United States
Attorney, Ashley B. Neese, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia; Mythili
Raman, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Denis J. McInerney,
Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,

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UNITED STATES
Appellee.

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DEPARTMENT

OF

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JUSTICE,

2

Washington,

D.C.,

for

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SHEDD, Circuit Judge:
A federal grand jury indicted Herbert Green on one count of
possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a
mixture
U.S.C.

or

substance

§§ 841(a)(1)

containing

and

cocaine,

(b)(1)(B).

in

Before

violation

trial,

Green

of

21

moved

twice to suppress the cocaine, arguing that the police seized it
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied
both motions, and Green entered a conditional plea of guilty to
the

charge

against

him,

preserving

the

right

to

appeal

the

district court’s denial of his suppression motions based on the
scope and duration of the stop and the reliability of the drugdetection dog. The district court sentenced Green to 200 months
in prison and 5 years of supervised release. For the reasons
stated below, we affirm the district court’s denial of Green’s
motions to suppress.
I.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review
the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its
legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531,
537 (4th Cir. 2013). We construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, as the prevailing party below. Id.
at 534. The district court found the following facts, which the
parties do not contest on appeal.

3

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On the morning of March 17, 2011, Virginia State Police
Trooper Daryl Johnson executed a traffic stop of Green’s vehicle
because the windows appeared to be excessively tinted and the
license
patrol

plate
car’s

Johnson

was

partially

blue

contacted

lights

obscured.

at

Trooper

Before

approximately

Brian

Dillon,

activating

10:07:58,

who

was

his

Trooper

driving

a

separate patrol car, and notified him of his location in case he
needed assistance.
At 10:08:35, Trooper Johnson approached Green’s vehicle and
asked him for his driver’s license and vehicle registration.
Trooper

Johnson

explained

that

Green’s

license

plate

was

partially obscured, in violation of Virginia law. He also asked
Green about the window tint; Green responded that the windows
were

already

tinted

when

he

bought

the

car.

Trooper

Johnson

later testified that Green appeared to be excessively nervous
and that the vehicle contained a strong odor of air freshener
and had a “lived-in look.”
At 10:10:30, Trooper Johnson asked Green to accompany him
to

the

patrol

car

so

he

could

check

Green’s

license

and

registration on his computer. Upon exiting the vehicle, Green
mentioned that his lawyer had advised him not to get out of his
car during traffic stops. Once inside the patrol car, Trooper
Johnson asked Green why he had a lawyer, and Green responded
that

he

was

in

the

entertainment
4

business.

During

this

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conversation, Trooper Johnson began checking Green’s license and
registration.
At 10:11:20, Trooper Johnson radioed Trooper Dillon, who
had parked some distance behind Trooper Johnson, and told him to
“come

on

up.”

itinerary.
driving

Trooper

Green

to

Johnson

responded

Pittsburgh

then

that

from

he

asked

Atlanta,

and

Green

his

where

about

his

passenger

were

they

been

had

performing shows. At 10:11:35, Trooper Johnson reiterated the
reasons for the traffic stop.
At 10:13, Trooper Johnson’s computer program responded to
his

inquiry,

notifying

him

of

a

concealed

weapons

permit

in

Green’s name and a protective order against him, both of which
alerted Trooper Johnson to potential officer safety issues. At
10:14, dispatch told Trooper Johnson that the concealed weapons
permit did not belong to Green but confirmed that Green had a
protective order against him. Trooper Johnson and Green had a
brief exchange about the protective order and the underlying
facts, and Trooper Johnson requested additional information from
dispatch. He again asked Green about his travel plans and the
identity of his passenger. Green explained that the passenger
was his recording artist and that they had been in Atlanta for
eight days.
Between 10:15 and 10:16, Trooper Johnson told Green that he
was

going

to

check

the

tint

on
5

the

vehicle's

windows.

Upon

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exiting

his

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patrol

car,

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Trooper

Johnson

spoke

with

Trooper

Dillon, who had arrived on the scene. At 10:16, Trooper Johnson
approached the front passenger window of Green’s vehicle and
spoke with the passenger. The passenger informed Trooper Johnson
that he had been in Atlanta with Green for two weeks, where he
performed as an R&B singer. During this conversation, Trooper
Johnson

measured

Virginia

law.

At

the

window

10:17,

tint

Trooper

and

found

Johnson

that

walked

it

violated

back

to

his

patrol car and told Green that the window tint was illegal.
Trooper Johnson then asked Green whether there were any illegal
drugs in the vehicle. Green stated that there were not, but
Trooper

Johnson

testified

that

Green

began

breathing

very

rapidly and appeared to be uncomfortable when Trooper Johnson
questioned him about illegal drugs. At 10:17:49, Trooper Johnson
requested a check of Green’s criminal history from dispatch.
At 10:18, Trooper Johnson asked Green if he had ever been
arrested.

Green

responded

that

he

had

“beat[en]

up

a

few

people,” and that he was arrested for narcotics in the 1980s.
Trooper

Johnson

Pittsburgh.

At

also

asked

10:18:46,

how

Trooper

long
Johnson

Green

had

reiterated

lived

in

that

the

window tint was illegal.
At 10:19, Trooper Johnson left his patrol car to speak with
Trooper Dillon, telling him that Green had “lawyered up” before
getting out of his car, that Green was “dirty,” and that Green
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had a “history” but would not tell Trooper Johnson about it. He
stated that he was checking Green’s criminal history and asked
Trooper Dillon to perform a free-air sniff of Green’s vehicle
using Trooper Dillon’s drug-detection dog, Bono.
At 10:19:42, Trooper Johnson told Green that Trooper Dillon
was going to conduct an exterior sweep of Green’s vehicle with
the dog and that he was waiting to hear back from dispatch about
the

protective

order.

Bono

alerted

to

the

vehicle’s

rear

passenger panel and completed the free-air sniff at 10:21. When
Trooper Johnson told Green that Bono had detected the presence
of narcotics, Green stated that he did not want anyone to search
the vehicle. Trooper Johnson explained that Bono’s alert gave
the officers probable cause for a search.
At 10:21:55, just after Bono completed the sniff, dispatch
informed Trooper Johnson that Green’s criminal history raised
multiple

officer

safety

issues

and

included

charges

for

homicide, carrying concealed weapons, robbery, kidnapping, and
terroristic threats. At 10:27:05, upon the arrival of a third
officer,

the

troopers

began

searching

the

vehicle.

They

discovered a duffle bag containing over one kilogram of cocaine
and approximately $7,000 in cash.
After a grand jury returned an indictment charging Green
with possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of
cocaine,

Green

moved

to

suppress
7

the

evidence

found

in

the

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vehicle, arguing that the traffic stop was unreasonable in its
scope

and

duration

and

that

the

delay

was

not

justified

by

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The district court
denied

Green’s

motion,

holding

that

Trooper

Johnson

did

not

unreasonably or unnecessarily prolong Green’s detention and that
Green was lawfully seized for the traffic violation at the time
the free-air sniff occurred. United States v. Green, 2011 WL
6439387, at *7 (W.D. Va. Dec. 21, 2011).
Green then filed a second motion to suppress, arguing that
Bono’s field performance was so poor that his positive alert did
not provide probable cause to search the vehicle. The district
court

denied

this

motion,

concluding

that

“the

record

is

sufficient to establish Bono’s reliability and, thus, that his
positive alert provided probable cause to search the defendant’s
vehicle.” United States v. Green, 2012 WL 2924055, at *5 (W.D.
Va. June 28, 2012). On appeal, Green argues that the district
court erred in denying both motions to suppress.
II.
Green argues that the district court erred in denying his
first motion to suppress because the scope and duration of the
detention
Amendment

were
rights.

unreasonable,
For

the

in

violation

following

contention.

8

reasons,

of

his

Fourth

we

reject

this

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The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people
to

be

secure

against

in

their

unreasonable

persons,

searches

houses,

and

papers,

seizures.”

and

The

effects,

stop

of

a

vehicle by the police amounts to a seizure within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 80910 (1996).
A lawful traffic stop “begins when a vehicle is pulled over
for investigation of a traffic violation” and ends “when the
police have no further need to control the scene, and inform the
driver

and

passengers

they

are

free

to

leave.”

Arizona

v.

Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009). Because an ordinary traffic
stop

is

more

analogous

to

an

investigative

detention

than

a

custodial arrest, we analyze the propriety of a traffic stop
using the dual inquiry announced in the Supreme Court’s holding
in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968). United States v.
Rusher,

966

F.2d

868,

875

(4th

Cir.

1992).

Accordingly,

we

consider first whether the officer’s actions were justified at
their inception and second whether his subsequent actions were
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified
the stop. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
Because Green does not contest that the traffic stop in
this case was justified at its inception, we proceed directly to

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the second prong of the Terry analysis. 1 Green argues that the
14-minute period of detention between the initial stop and the
alert by the drug-detection dog was not reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances that justified the stop. Green cites
to our decision in United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498
(4th Cir. 2011), and argues that the scope and duration of the
detention

were

unreasonable

because

Trooper

Johnson

used

the

traffic stop to embark on an unlawful drug investigation.
In Digiovanni, a police officer initiated a traffic stop
after observing Digiovanni traveling too close to the car in
front

of

vehicle

him,

asked

Digiovanni

registration,

investigation

into

the

and

then

presence

for

his

driver’s

“embarked
of

drugs,

on

license
a

instead

and

sustained
of

either

completing the warning ticket or beginning the driver’s license

1

Because
“[o]bserving
a
traffic
violation
provides
sufficient justification for a police officer to detain the
offending vehicle for as long as it takes to perform the
traditional incidents of a routine traffic stop,” United States
v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2008), there is ample
support for the conclusion that this stop was justified at its
inception. Trooper Johnson testified that he first observed the
tinted windows on Green’s vehicle, which appeared to violate
Virginia law. He further explained that he noticed that the
license plate was partially obscured when he began to call the
plate into dispatch, but the illegally tinted windows alone were
sufficient to justify the stop. See Va. Code Ann. § 46.21052(C)(2) (“No sun-shading or tinting films may be applied or
affixed to the front side windows of any motor vehicle operated
on the highways of this Commonwealth that reduce total light
transmittance of such window to less than 50 percent[.]”).

10

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check.” Id. at 501-02, 509-10. The officer did not initiate the
driver’s license check until after he questioned Digiovanni for
approximately 10 minutes and returned to his patrol car to radio
for back-up assistance. Id. at 510. Approximately 15 minutes
into the stop, the officer returned Digiovanni’s license and
issued him a warning ticket. Id. The officer then immediately
returned

to

the

subject

of

drugs

and

requested

to

search

Digiovanni’s vehicle. Id. at 504, 510. We held that the search
violated Digiovanni’s Fourth Amendment rights because the record
made it “clear that at just about every turn [the officer] was
conducting a drug investigation instead of a traffic infraction
investigation. Indeed, the bulk of the encounter between [the
officer] and Digiovanni involved a drug investigation . . . .”
Id. at 510.
As

we

explained

in

Digiovanni,

a

traffic

stop

must

be

limited in both scope and duration. Id. at 507. With regard to
scope, the officer’s investigative methods should be “the least
intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the
officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.” Id. However,
questions unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop do not
necessarily

run

afoul

of

the

scope

component

of

the

Terry

inquiry. See id.
With regard to duration, we determine “whether the police
diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to
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confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it
was necessary to detain the defendant.” Id. (internal quotation
marks

omitted).

routine

Although

traffic

stop

the

maximum

cannot

be

acceptable

stated

length

with

of

a

mathematical

precision, Branch, 537 F.3d at 336, a stop may become unlawful
if

“it

is

prolonged

beyond

the

time

reasonably

required

to

complete [its] mission,” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407
(2005).

The

reasonableness

of

a

stop

turns

on

whether

the

officer’s overall course of action, “viewed objectively and in
its totality, is reasonably directed toward the proper ends of
the stop.” Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 508.
During a routine traffic stop, an officer “may request a
driver’s license and vehicle registration, run a computer check,
and issue a citation.” Rusher, 966 F.2d at 876. An officer may
also conduct an exterior dog sniff of the vehicle, as long as it
is "performed within the time reasonably required to issue a
traffic citation." Branch, 537 F.3d at 335 (internal quotation
marks omitted). To prolong a traffic stop beyond the scope of a
routine stop, the officer must have either the driver’s consent
or

a

reasonable

However,

where

characterized

suspicion
a

as

delay
de

in

of

illegal

conducting

minimis

under

activity.
a
the

dog

Id.
sniff

totality

at
can
of

336.
be
the

circumstances, the delay does not violate the defendant’s Fourth

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Amendment rights. See United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210,
220 (4th Cir. 2008).
Applying
court

this

correctly

framework,

held

that

we

the

conclude
traffic

that
stop

the
at

district

issue

was

reasonable in scope and duration and that Green was lawfully
seized
After

for

a

traffic

initiating

violation

the

traffic

when

stop,

the

dog

Trooper

sniff

occurred.

Johnson

promptly

informed Green that it appeared his window tint and partially
obscured license plate violated Virginia law, and he asked Green
for

his

Johnson

driver’s
asked

license

Green

to

and

vehicle

accompany

him

registration.
to

the

patrol

Trooper
car

and

immediately began verifying the documents on his computer and
through

his

dispatcher.

While

waiting

approximately

three

minutes for a response, Trooper Johnson addressed the grounds
for the traffic stop and questioned Green about his travel plans
and his lawyer.
When dispatch informed Trooper Johnson that Green had a
protective

order

against

additional

information

him,

because,

Trooper

Johnson

as

explained

he

requested
at

the

suppression hearing, the existence of a protective order raises
officer safety concerns. 2 Trooper Johnson checked the window tint

2

Trooper Johnson’s computer program also informed him that
Green had a concealed weapons permit, but dispatch promptly
confirmed that the permit did not belong to Green. Although
(Continued)
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on Green’s vehicle and confirmed that it violated Virginia law
while

he

waited

for

a

response

about

the

protective

order.

Trooper Johnson did not immediately issue a citation, but rather
called

dispatch

and

requested

a

check

of

Green’s

criminal

history. Trooper Johnson then waited approximately four minutes
for a response. During that time, Bono completed the exterior
sniff of Green’s vehicle.
Trooper Johnson’s brief questioning about matters unrelated
to

the

traffic

violations

did

not

run

afoul

of

the

scope

component of Terry’s second prong. See Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333
(“An

officer’s

justification

for

inquiries
the

into

traffic

matters

stop . . .

unrelated
do

not

to

convert

the
the

encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as
those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the
stop.”);

Digiovanni,

650

F.3d

at

507.

Although

the

criminal

history check extended the duration of the traffic stop, the
totality of the circumstances demonstrates that Trooper Johnson
diligently pursued the purposes of the stop. See Digiovanni, 650
F.3d at 508.
Trooper Johnson requested the criminal history check out of
concern for officer safety. See id. (“The diligence calculus

concealed weapons permits do signal officer safety concerns, the
computer’s initial alert does not factor into our analysis.

14

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includes

an

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examination

Pg: 15 of 21

of . . . whether

the

unrelated

questioning was conducted out of concern for officer safety.”).
He did not learn that Green had a protective order against him
until after he made the initial inquiry into Green’s driver’s
license and vehicle registration, and he requested the criminal
history check before receiving additional information about the
protective

order.

Further,

Trooper

Johnson

testified

that

Green’s demeanor and behavior throughout the traffic stop in
conjunction

with

the

protective

order

raised

concerns

about

officer safety. Given these facts, Trooper Johnson did not act
unreasonably or unnecessarily prolong Green’s detention.
Finally, the criminal history check added just four minutes
to the traffic stop. Under the circumstances, we are convinced
that such a delay, at most, amounted to a de minimis intrusion
on

Green’s

liberty

interest

and

thus

did

not

constitute

a

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. See Farrior, 535 F.3d
at

220. We

therefore

hold

that

the

district

court

correctly

denied Green’s first suppression motion.
III.
Green also argues that the district court erred in denying
his second suppression motion because Bono’s track record in the
field is not sufficiently reliable for his positive alert to
provide

probable

cause

to

search

Green’s

following reasons, we reject this contention.
15

vehicle.

For

the

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Probable

cause

is

“a

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flexible,

common-sense

standard.”

Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (plurality opinion). It
requires only that “the facts available to the officer would
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that certain
items may be contraband . . . or useful as evidence of a crime;
it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or
more likely true than false.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). Probable cause to conduct a search based on
a drug-detection dog’s alert exists when the totality of the
circumstances, “viewed through the lens of common sense, would
make

a

reasonably

prudent

person

think

that

a

search

would

reveal contraband or evidence of a crime.” Florida v. Harris,
133 S. Ct. 1050, 1058 (2013).
After the district court denied Green’s second suppression
motion, the Supreme Court in Harris addressed how courts should
determine whether an alert from a drug-detection dog provides
probable

cause

to

search

a

vehicle

when

the

defendant

has

challenged the dog’s reliability. 133 S. Ct. at 1053. In that
case,

Harris

moved

to

suppress

evidence

found

in

his

truck

during a search based on a drug-detection dog’s alert, arguing
that the dog was unreliable and thus his alert did not give the
officer

probable

cause.

Id.

at

1054.

Harris

argued

that

the

alert by the dog was unreliable because on both occasions that
the dog alerted on his vehicle, the officers were unable to find
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any substances that the dog was trained to detect. Id. at 105859.

The

Court

rejected

Harris’

contention,

holding

that

“evidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance in a certification
or

training

trust

his

program

alert,”

can

and

itself

based

provide

on

this

sufficient

evidence,

“a

reason

to

court

can

presume (subject to any conflicting evidence offered) that the
dog’s alert provides probable cause to search.” Id. at 1057. The
Court explained:
If a dog on patrol fails to alert to a car containing
drugs, the mistake usually will go undetected because
the officer will not initiate a search. Field data
thus may not capture a dog’s false negatives.
Conversely (and more relevant here), if the dog alerts
to a car in which the officer finds no narcotics, the
dog may not have made a mistake at all. The dog may
have detected substances that were too well hidden or
present in quantities too small for the officer to
locate. Or the dog may have smelled the residual odor
of drugs previously in the vehicle or on the driver’s
person. Field data thus may markedly overstate a dog’s
real false positives. By contrast, those inaccuracies—
in either direction—do not taint records of a dog’s
performance in standard training and certification
settings. There, the designers of an assessment know
where drugs are hidden and where they are not—and so
where a dog should alert and where he should not.
Id. at 1056-57. Based on this reasoning, the Court held that “in
most

cases,”

a

drug-detection

dog’s

field

performance

has

“relatively limited import” and that the better measure of a
dog’s

reliability

comes

from

his

testing environments. Id.

17

performance

in

controlled

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The

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Court

explained

that

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a

defendant

may

challenge

the

government’s evidence of a dog’s reliability by, for example,
contesting the adequacy of the drug-detection certification or
training program or examining how the dog or handler performed
in the program. Id. at 1057. The Court also stated that evidence
of the dog’s or handler’s previous performance in the field “may
sometimes be relevant,” but it warned against “inferring too
much from the failure of a dog’s alert to lead to drugs.” Id. at
1057, 1059. In Harris, the State introduced substantial evidence
of

the

drug-detection

dog’s

training

and

his

proficiency

in

finding drugs. Id. at 1058. Harris responded only that the dog’s
field performance showed that his alert was unreliable. See id.
The Court held that because the State had “produced proof from
controlled settings that a dog performs reliably in detecting
drugs,”

and

Harris

had

failed

to

undermine

that

showing

by

challenging some aspect of the dog’s training, the officer had
probable cause to search the defendant’s truck. Id. at 1058-59.
Applying

this

framework,

we

conclude

that

the

district

court correctly held that Bono was sufficiently reliable and
that his positive alert provided probable cause for the search
of

Green’s

vehicle.

Green

presented

Bono’s

field

performance

reports, which showed that drugs were found only 22 of the 85
times that Bono had alerted in the field before his alert on
Green’s vehicle. He argues that, based on this success rate in
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the field of 25.88%, no reasonably prudent person would think
that a search based on Bono’s alert would reveal contraband or
evidence of a crime. Although the field performance reports show
that Bono’s alert in an uncontrolled environment does not always
result in the discovery of drugs, the district court found that
Bono’s success rate rises from 25.88 to 43% after factoring in
the cases in which Bono’s alert did not lead to the discovery of
drugs but

officers

found

direct

evidence

that

drugs

or

drug

users had recently been in the vehicle. 3 Moreover, the district
court correctly determined that, when taking Bono’s training and
certification record into account, the record is sufficient to
establish Bono’s reliability.
As in Harris, the government presented extensive evidence
of

Bono’s

reliable

performance

in

training

and

certification

programs, and Green has not introduced any evidence to undermine

3

Green argues that these false positives should not be
considered because the probable cause inquiry focuses on the
presence of drugs, not the mere odor of drugs. He contends that
when a drug-detection dog alerts and no drugs are found, that
dog has not predicted the presence of drugs. But Green
misapprehends the concept of probable cause. The calculus of
probable cause deals with the possibility, not the guarantee, of
criminal conduct. The presence of drug odors is certainly
relevant to that issue. Moreover, the Supreme Court explained in
Harris that “[a] well-trained drug-detection dog should alert to
such [residual] odors; his response to them might appear a
mistake, but in fact it is not.” 133 S. Ct. at 1059. These false
positive cases are correctly factored into Bono’s success rate
because he alerted to the odor of drugs as he was trained.

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that showing. Trooper Dillon, Bono’s handler, began working with
Bono

in

2007,

when

the

pair

completed

a

thirteen-week

drug-

detection course at the Virginia State Police training academy.
After completing the course, Bono passed a certification test
before going out into the field with Trooper Dillon. To keep
their certification current, Trooper Dillon and Bono complete
four hours of training each week and 20 hours of in-service
training each month. The pair has been recertified as a team
every year since 2007, and Bono has maintained a 100% success
rate

in

controlled

testing

environments.

Trooper

Dillon

testified that in controlled testing Bono has never failed and
has only alerted on vehicles containing drugs or the odor of
drugs.
The government also presented testimony from Senior Trooper
Sydney Scott Settle, a canine trainer for the Virginia State
Police, who confirmed that Bono has passed all of his annual
certification tests. Settle testified, based on his experience
training Bono, that Bono is a reliable drug-detection dog.
When

considering

Bono’s

field

performance

records

in

conjunction with his degree of training, his performance during
training and recertification exercises, and his evaluations by
Troopers Dillon and Settle, the totality of the circumstances
establish

Bono’s

government

has

reliability
established

in

detecting

Bono’s
20

drugs.

reliability

and

Because

the

Green

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failed to undermine that showing, we agree with the district
court that Troopers Johnson and Dillon had probable cause to
search Green’s vehicle. Accordingly, we hold that the district
court correctly denied Green’s second motion to suppress.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
AFFIRMED

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