US v. Joseph Shelton

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:11-cr-00397-WO-1. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999143839].. [12-4923]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4923

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH KENNARD SHELTON,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.
William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:11-cr-00397-WO-1)

Submitted:

June 6, 2013

Decided:

July 5, 2013

Before KING, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant.
Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Stephen T. Inman, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
A federal grand jury indicted Joseph Kennard Shelton
for bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006),
and armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d)
(2006).

Prior to trial, Shelton moved to suppress the evidence

seized the day of his arrest, asserting that the officers who
stopped him did not have reasonable suspicion to perform a Terry *
stop and frisk.

The district court denied his motion, and found

Shelton guilty of the offenses following a bench trial.

The

district court sentenced Shelton to a total of 156 months of
imprisonment and he now appeals.
On
erred

in

appeal,

denying

his

Shelton

Finding no error, we affirm.

argues

suppression

that

the

motion.

district

“In

court

reviewing

a

district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the
court’s

factual

findings

conclusions de novo.”

for

clear

a

and

its

legal

United States v. Cain, 524 F.3d 477, 481

(4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
denies

error,

defendant’s

suppression

When the district court
motion,

we

construe

evidence in the light most favorable to the government.

the

United

States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005).
“[A]n

officer

may,

consistent

with

the

Fourth

Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer
*

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

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has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity
is

afoot.”

Illinois

v.

Wardlow,

(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30).
reasonable

fear

articulable

for

his

suspicion

own

that

528

U.S.

119,

123

(2000)

“Moreover, if the officer has a
and

the

others’

safety

suspect

may

based

be

on

armed

an
and

presently dangerous, the officer may conduct a protective search
of, i.e., frisk, the outer layers of the suspect’s clothing for
weapons.”

United States v. Holmes, 376 F.3d 270, 275 (4th Cir.

2004) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The officer must have “at least a minimal level of
objective justification for making the stop” and “must be able
to

articulate

more

than

an

inchoate

suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.”

and

unparticularized

Wardlow, 528 U.S. at

123-24 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Courts

assess the legality of a Terry stop under the totality of the
circumstances,

giving

“due

weight

to

common

sense

judgments

reached by officers in light of their experience and training.”
United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004)
(citation omitted).

Applying these principles, we conclude that

the arresting officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Shelton
and frisk him for weapons.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
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legal
before

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contentions
the

court

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are

adequately

and

argument

presented

would

not

in
aid

the
the

materials
decisional

process.

AFFIRMED

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