US v. Matthew Mason

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:08-cr-00030-JPB-JES-2,3:11-cv-00060-JPB-JES. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [998868447]. Mailed to: Matthew Mason. [12-6101]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-6101

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MATTHEW QUINN MASON, a/k/a Q,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. John Preston Bailey,
Chief District Judge.
(3:08-cr-00030-JPB-JES-2; 3:11-cv-00060JPB-JES)

Submitted:

May 29, 2012

Decided:

June 5, 2012

Before WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Matthew Quinn Mason, Appellant Pro Se.
John Castle Parr,
Michael D. Stein, Assistant United States Attorneys, Wheeling,
West Virginia, Erin K. Reisenweber, Assistant United States
Attorney, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Matthew

Quinn

Mason

seeks

to

appeal

the

district

court’s order adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation to
deny his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2011) motion to vacate,
set aside, or correct his federal sentence.

For the reasons

discussed below, we find that the district court’s procedural
conclusion
debatable

is

debatable

constitutional

and

that

Mason’s

claims.

motion

Accordingly,

states
we

grant

two
a

certificate of appealability, vacate the district court’s order,
and remand this case for further proceedings.

I.
Following

a

jury

trial,

Mason

was

convicted

of

conspiracy to retaliate against a witness, retaliation against a
witness, damaging the property of another in retaliation for
testimony, and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 18
U.S.C.A. § 1513(a)(1)(A), (b)(1), (f) (West Supp. 2012) and 18
U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
imprisonment

on

Mason was sentenced to ninety-five months’

each

count,

to

be

served

concurrently.

affirmed Mason’s convictions and sentence on appeal.

We

See United

States v. Mason, 374 F. App’x 411 (4th Cir. 2010).
Mason

timely

filed

his

§ 2255

motion,

raising

a

multitude of grounds for his claim of ineffective assistance of
trial

counsel

and

other

issues.
2

After

receiving

the

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Government’s response to the motion, Mason replied, supplying
the facts and context necessary to frame his claims.

The matter

was referred to a magistrate judge, who recommended that the
district court deny the motion in its entirety.

The magistrate

judge’s report and recommendation advised Mason of his duty to
file timely written objections and warned Mason that the failure
to do so would result in a waiver of his right to appeal a
judgment based on the recommendation.
Mason, however, did not object.
thus

reviewed

the

report

for

clear

The district court

error

and

found

none.

Accordingly, the district court denied the § 2255 motion for the
reasons set forth in the magistrate judge’s report.
Mason

timely

noted

certificate of appealability.

an

appeal

and

requested

a

In this pleading, Mason asserted

that he was in the special housing unit during the objections
period,

that

“no

paperwork

was

given

to

[him]

during

this

period,” and, therefore, he had “no opportunity to object” to
(E.R. 718). 1

the magistrate judge’s report.

court for leave to file late objections.

Mason asked the

The district court

denied a certificate of appealability without discussing Mason’s

1

Citations to the “E.R.” refer to exhibits located in the
compiled electronic record in this case.

3

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proffered reason for his failure to object or his request for
leave to file late objections.
In his informal brief in this court, Mason reiterates
that he did not object to the magistrate judge’s report because
he was housed in administrative segregation and lacked access to
his legal papers.

Mason does not assign error to any aspect of

the magistrate judge’s report.

II.
An appeal may not be taken to this court from the
final order in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 unless a
circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability
(“COA”).

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2006).

Where, as here, a

district court denies a § 2255 motion on a procedural ground, a
COA will not issue unless the movant demonstrates both that (1)
any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are
debatable

or

wrong

and

(2)

the

debatable constitutional question.

original

motion

raises

a

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

473, 484-85 (2000).
Each component of the COA inquiry is mandatory, and a
court may dispose of the application if it is clear from the
record that a showing on either prong is lacking.

Id. at 485.

A showing that there was an error in denying the motion on a
procedural ground is insufficient, absent a showing that the
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underlying motion makes a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.

Accord Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 358

(7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1046
(9th Cir. 2000).
It is well established that a litigant who fails to
timely object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law is not entitled to de novo review of the
magistrate

judge’s

determinations,

28

U.S.C.A.

§ 636(b)(1)(B)

(West 2006 & Supp. 2011), and waives his right to appeal the
district court’s order based on that recommendation.

Wells v.

Shriners Hosp., 109 F.3d 198, 201 (4th Cir. 1997).

However,

this is a prudential rule, not a jurisdictional requirement,
United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 93-94 (4th Cir. 1984),
and the Supreme Court permits the courts of appeals to exercise
their discretion to permit appellate review, notwithstanding any
waiver, where the “interests of justice” are served.

Thomas v.

Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985).
Here, the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation
advised Mason of his obligation to object, as well as of the
consequences of a failure to do so.

The report was sent to

Mason, via certified mail, at the proper correctional facility,
and the facility received the report.

However, in his request

for a COA from the district court, Mason advanced a facially

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viable excuse for his failure to object.

This contention is

unaddressed in the record.
Given
Mason’s

the

proffered

district

excuse

court’s

for

his

silence

failure

to

in

the

face
we

object,

of
are

constrained to hold that the district court’s resolution of this
pivotal procedural issue is debatable.

Accordingly, we will

proceed to the second prong of the COA inquiry — whether the
underlying motion presents a debatable constitutional claim.

III.
Mason’s § 2255 motion raised multiple grounds for his
claim

that

his

trial

attorney,

Lary

Garrett,

provided

constitutionally deficient representation, in violation of the
Sixth Amendment.
burden

of

To succeed on this claim, Mason bears the

showing

constitutionally

deficient

was prejudicial.

demonstrate

objective
professional

(1)
and

counsel’s

(2)

such

performance

deficient

was

performance

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-

88, 691-92 (1984).
must

that

To satisfy the first Strickland prong, Mason
that

standard
norms.”

counsel’s
of
Id.

performance

“reasonableness
at

688.

To

fell

under
satisfy

below

an

prevailing
the

second

Strickland prong, Mason must do more than establish that any
unprofessional errors by counsel “had some conceivable effect on
the outcome of the [trial.]”

Id. at 693.
6

Indeed, he must

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demonstrate “that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for

counsel’s

unprofessional

errors,

proceeding would have been different.”
We
ineffective

conclude

that

assistance

of

two

of

counsel

the

result

of

the

Id. at 694.
the

grounds

claim

have

for

Mason’s

arguable

merit.

First is Mason’s contention that Garrett failed to investigate
evidence that would have impeached the Government’s key witness,
Darryl Clinkscale, the victim of the retaliatory conduct.
the

heart

of

this

issue

is

Clinkscale’s

testimony

At

regarding

three jailhouse interactions between himself and Mason, which
was

offered

by

the

Government

“to

prove

[Mason’s]

criminal

intent and motive to participate in the conspiracy to retaliate
against Mr. Clinkscale.”
The

(E.R. 147).

magistrate

judge

recommended

denying

relief

on

this ground because Mason had not specified “what counsel could
have

obtained”

had

he

impeachment evidence.
this

proposed

more

thoroughly

(E.R. 696).

conclusion.

In

his

investigated

potential

The record, however, belies
reply

to

the

Government’s

response, Mason clearly asserted that, had Garrett investigated
the matter, he would have discovered that Mason was not housed
in the jail’s general population at the time of the alleged
jailhouse interactions between himself and Clinkscale.

If true,

this would have plainly impeached Clinkscale’s testimony, which
was critical to the Government’s case.
7

Based on the record

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presently available and because of the crucial role Clinkscale’s
testimony played in satisfying the Government’s burden of proof,
we conclude that this is a debatable claim of the denial of a
constitutional right.

See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,

336 (2003); Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85.
Finally,

we

find

debatable

Mason’s

contention

that

Garrett failed to convey to him the Government’s plea offer(s).
In his proposed disposition of this ground, the magistrate judge
framed Mason’s claim as being that Garrett did not convey a dayof-trial

plea

magistrate
entirely

offer,

judge
on

a

which

Mason

recommended

letter

from

would

Garrett

accepted.

relief,

denying

have

though,

dated

August

14,

The
based
2008.

Mason’s trial commenced on October 27, 2008.
It is impossible to evaluate whether the August 14
letter actually conveyed the then-available plea offer, as the
Government contends, or whether it simply offered a generalized
discussion of Mason’s sentencing exposure, as Mason contends,
because the letter is not part of the record.

And while it is

not entirely clear from the record, if indeed Mason contends
that

the

Government

made

multiple

plea

offers

that

were

not

communicated to him, 2 particularly one on the day of trial, then

2

We note that the Government did not definitively state
whether there were multiple plea offers.

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exclusive reliance on the August 14 letter would be insufficient
to defeat this claim.

These uncertainties, coupled with the

Supreme Court’s recent decision in Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct.
1399, 1408 (2012), holding that “defense counsel has the duty to
communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea
on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused,”
and that counsel’s failure to so communicate that offer amounted
to constitutionally deficient performance, compel our conclusion
that

this

too

is

a

debatable

claim

of

the

denial

of

a

constitutional right.
For

these

reasons,

appealability,

vacate

the

this

further

case

for

we

district

grant

a

court’s

proceedings.

On

certificate

order,

remand,

and

the

of

remand

district

court should address Mason’s contention regarding his failure to
object

and

make

any

factual

findings

necessary

to

resolve

whether to allow Mason to file objections out of time.
dispense

with

oral

argument

because

the

facts

and

We
legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED

9