Alvera Lewis v. University of Maryland, Baltim

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:12-cv-00298-SAG Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999153205].. [13-1051]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1051

ALVERA E. LEWIS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, BALTIMORE,
Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
Stephanie A. Gallagher, Magistrate
Judge. (1:12-cv-00298-SAG)

Submitted:

June 6, 2013

Decided:

July 18, 2013

Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John B. Stolarz, THE STOLARZ LAW FIRM, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellant.
Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General of Maryland,
Katherine D. Bainbridge, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Appellant

Alvera

Lewis

sued

her

former

employer,

the

University of Maryland, Baltimore (“the University”), alleging
disability, race, and gender discrimination in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“the ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101
et

seq.,

the

Family

and

Medical

Leave

Act

(“the

FMLA”),

29

U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., and four provisions of the Maryland Fair
Employment

Practices

Act

Gov’t § 20-601 et. seq.

(“the

FEPA”),

Md.

Code

Ann.,

State

After dismissing Lewis’s federal claims

as barred by Maryland’s sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment, the district court denied Lewis’s motion to remand
the case to state court, granted summary judgment in favor of
the

University

cross-motion

on

for

Lewis’s
summary

state

claims,

judgment

on

and

her

denied
claim

Lewis’s

that

the

University failed to accommodate her disability in violation of
the FEPA.

Lewis now appeals, and we affirm. ∗

Lewis underwent knee surgery in May 2010.
complications

necessitated

a

multi-week

When surgical

rehabilitation,

requested and received leave under the FMLA.

she

The University

informed Lewis in June 2010, by certified letter, that her FMLA
∗

On appeal, Lewis does not challenge the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on her state race and gender
discrimination claims, nor does she contest the district court’s
conclusion that Maryland’s sovereign immunity precludes her ADA
and FMLA claims.

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leave would expire on July 8, 2010.

Lewis did not request

additional leave or inform the University that she was able to
return to work.

When Lewis did not return to work on July 9,

2010, the University terminated her for job abandonment.

Lewis

then initiated this action against the University.
After

its

grant

of

summary

judgment

in

favor

of

the

University on Lewis’s federal claims under the ADA and the FMLA,
the

district

court

determined

that

the

balance

of

factors

weighed in favor of exercising supplemental jurisdiction over
Lewis’s state claims.

In particular, the district court found

that

patterned

because

Maryland

its

reasonable

accommodation

requirement on federal Department of Health and Human Services
regulations

implementing

the

Rehabilitation

Act,

29

U.S.C.

§

794, and because the dispositive issues had been fully briefed,
“considerations

of

convenience

and

judicial

economy

weigh

strongly in favor of an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.”
Lewis

v.

Univ.

of

Md.,

Balt.,

1:12-cv-00298-SAG,

2012

WL

5193820, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 18, 2012).
Addressing

Lewis’s

state

law

claims

that

the

University

failed to accommodate her disability and discriminated against
her on the basis of disability, the district court reasoned that
Lewis was not a “qualified individual with a disability,” and
therefore

could

not

discrimination claim.

recover

on

Id. at *4.
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either

her

accommodation

or

A “qualified individual” is

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one who “[w]ith or without reasonable accommodation can perform
the essential functions of the job in question.”
14.03.02.02(B)(10).
function

of

Md. Code Regs.

Because attendance at work is an essential

Lewis’s

job

and

evidence,

including

Lewis’s

own

testimony, indicated that she had not been approved to return to
work on July 8, 2010, the district court concluded that Lewis
was not a “qualified individual” at the time of her termination.
On appeal, Lewis contests the district court’s decision to
retain supplemental jurisdiction over her state discrimination
claims, as well as its conclusion that she was not a “qualified
individual

with

a

disability”,

particularly

in

light

of

the

passage of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), Pub. L. No.
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3559, which has been incorporated into
Maryland law, see Meade v. Shangri-La P’ship, 36 A.3d 483, 48990 (Md. 2012).
After

thorough

review

of

the

record,

the

briefs

of

the

parties, and the controlling law, we affirm on the basis of the
careful opinion of the district court.
court’s

“wide”

discretion

over

Considering the district

whether

or

not

to

retain

jurisdiction over state claims, we find no abuse of discretion
in the district court’s decision here.
F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995).

Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58

We agree with that court’s

judgment that we need not reach the question of whether Lewis
had a disability under the FEPA.
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We dispense with oral argument

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because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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