Daphne Craddock v. Lincoln National Life Insuranc
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:12-cv-00684-CCE-LPA Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999155264].. [13-1123]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1123
Daphne M. Craddock,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
Lincoln National Life Insurance Company,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
LINCOLN NATIONAL CORPORATION; LINCOLN LIFE AND ANNUITY
DISTRIBUTORS, INC.; LINCOLN FINANCIAL INVESTMENT SERVICES
CORPORATION,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:12-cv-00684-CCE-LPA)
Submitted:
June 21, 2013
Decided:
July 22, 2013
Before DAVIS and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Norman B. Smith, SMITH, JAMES, ROWLETT & COHEN, LLP, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellant.
M. Robin Davis, Joshua M.
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Krasner, JACKSON LEWIS LLP, Cary, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant
Daphne
Craddock
appeals
the
district
court’s dismissal of her employment discrimination suit against
Defendant-Appellee
(“Lincoln”),
which
circumstances.
allegations
Employment
Lincoln
terminated
The
that
Act
National
her
district
Lincoln
(the
29
Insurance
employment
court
violated
“ADEA”),
Life
found
the
U.S.C.
under
that
Age
Company
disputed
Craddock’s
Discrimination
§§
621-634,
and
in
the
Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1210112213,
failed
to
state
a
claim
upon
which
relief
could
be
granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We vacate the judgment
and remand for further proceedings.
I.
Craddock
Pilot
Life
began
working
Insurance
for
Company
Lincoln’s
(“Pilot”),
predecessor
in
1969. 1
entity,
A
1980
automobile accident left her with a “massive brain injury,” and
rendered her unable to return to work for over a year. J.A. 40.
When
she
did
return
to
work
1
after
the
accident,
Pilot
The facts set out here are alleged in Craddock’s proposed
second amended complaint. As explained below, the district court
denied as futile Craddock’s motion to file the second amended
complaint, but considered the allegations therein when assessing
Lincoln’s motion to dismiss. We therefore view the second
amended complaint as the operative complaint in reviewing the
district court’s dismissal order. Given our remand for further
proceedings, the second amended complaint should be properly
docketed in the district court.
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accommodated her disabilities, apparently by assigning her to
perform filing and file maintenance, and to process mail. 2 Though
Craddock does not make clear if or how her resulting impairments
changed since the accident, at the time of her 2011 termination
they
included
ability
in
“short-term
reading
and
memory
writing,
impairment,
limited
somewhat
keyboard
limited
speed,
and
weakness of eye muscles.” J.A. 41.
Craddock alleges that around 2010, when Lincoln appointed a
new manager of the mail room, Lincoln “embarked . . . on a
strategy and scheme to bring about [her] discharge . . . on the
basis of either her disability or her age, or both.” J.A. 41-42.
Around this time, Craddock alleges, Lincoln “imposed on [her]
and
her
co-employees”
“quantity
standards”
“quality
of
91
standards”
percent.
of
J.A.
98
percent
43.
and
Craddock’s
“quality” performance was 97.4 percent, missing the minimum goal
by .6 percent, and her “quantity” performance was 77.84 percent,
missing the minimum goal by 13.16 percent. Id.
In May 2011 Craddock received an “oral warning” that she
had
been
making
mistakes,
and
in
June
2011
she
received
a
“written warning” that she needed to improve and become more
efficient.
J.A.
42.
Craddock
alleges
2
that
these
warnings
Craddock’s complaint is unclear as to whether these were
also her pre-accident job duties.
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“falsely claim[ed] that she had been making mistakes when in
fact she had not,” and “falsely stat[ed] that she needed to
improve
and
become
more
efficient,
when
in
fact
she
was
performing her job duties in an acceptably efficient manner . .
. .” J.A. 42. On July 26, 2011, Craddock received a “final
written warning” and was terminated that same day. Id. She was
59 years old at that time.
Craddock
makes
several
additional
allegations
to
support
her claims. First, she alleges that Lincoln trained all nondisabled
and
younger
employees
in
her
department
to
use
a
scanner, and though she repeatedly requested that training (as
she believes she could have performed scanning work despite her
disabilities), Lincoln refused to provide it. Several positions
at
Lincoln
involving
scanner
operation
were
available,
and
Craddock says she could have been reassigned to those positions.
Second, she alleges that when she started receiving warnings,
she requested reassignment to other jobs at Lincoln that she
believed she could adequately perform, but was told she could
not do so for six months (a period that had not expired by the
time she was discharged). Finally, she alleges that after her
discharge,
she
sought
to
be
rehired
by
Lincoln,
but
that
Lincoln’s human resources personnel told her she could not work
again for Lincoln, whether as a temporary or permanent employee.
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On June 5, 2012, Craddock sued Lincoln in North Carolina
state
court,
alleging
violations
of
the
ADEA
and
the
ADA.
Lincoln removed the action to the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina. Lincoln then filed a
motion to dismiss Craddock’s complaint for failure to state a
claim. Craddock filed an amended complaint, and Lincoln filed
another motion to dismiss. Craddock then filed a second amended
complaint. In response, Lincoln filed a motion to strike the
second
amended
complaint.
On
January
11,
2013,
the
district
court entered an order granting Lincoln’s motion to dismiss and
denying as futile Craddock’s motion to
amend.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of Lincoln’s
motion
to
dismiss.
CGM,
LLC
v.
BellSouth
Telecommunications,
Inc., 664 F.3d 46, 51 (4th Cir. 2011). Like the district court,
we must assume all well-pled facts to be true, and draw all
reasonable inferences in Craddock’s favor. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd.
v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009).
However, “legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, and
bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement fail to
constitute well-pled facts for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes.” Id. at
255 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The
“‘[f]actual
allegations
must
be
enough
to
raise
a
right
to
relief above the speculative level’ and have ‘enough facts to
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state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Wahi v.
Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615 n.26 (4th
Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555, 570 (2007)).
III.
We turn first to Craddock’s ADEA claim. The ADEA forbids an
employer
“to
fail
or
refuse
to
hire
or
to
discharge
any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment,
because
of
such
individual’s
age.”
29
U.S.C.
§
623(a)(1).
The district court concluded that though “[t]he allegations
in
the
Second
affirmatively
employer’s
J.A. 56.
Amended
show
that
legitimate
Complaint
Ms.
are
Craddock
expectations
when
detailed,
was
she
[they]
not
meeting
her
was
terminated.”
Accordingly, the court held that Craddock had failed
to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the
ADEA.
We are not persuaded that Craddock pled herself out of the
very claim she sought to assert. The district court based its
conclusion on a misreading of Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court
precedent. The court quoted Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics
Management,
Inc.,
proposition
that
354
to
F.3d
277
demonstrate
7
(4th
a
Cir.
prima
2004),
facie
case
for
the
of
age
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discrimination at the pleading stage, a plaintiff must show that
“‘(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered
adverse employment action; (3) she was performing her job duties
at a level that met her employer’s legitimate expectations at
the time of the adverse employment action; and (4) the position
remained open or was filled by similarly qualified applicants
outside the protected class.’” J.A. 56 (quoting Hill, 354 F.3d
at 285). But that test is an evidentiary standard under the
“pretext” framework set out by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411
U.S.
792
Swierkiewicz
(1973),
v.
and
Sorema
is
“not
N.A.,
a
534
pleading
U.S.
requirement.”
506,
510
(2002).
Crucially, Hill applied the test at the summary judgment stage - a fact the district court did not recognize.
In Swierkiewicz, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that
“the
requirements
for
establishing
a
McDonnell
Douglas
also
apply
to
the
plaintiffs
must
satisfy
in
order
to
prima
facie
pleading
survive
case
under
standard
a
motion
that
to
dismiss.” 534 U.S. at 511. This is at least in part because “if
a
plaintiff
is
able
to
produce
direct
evidence
of
discrimination, he may prevail without proving all the elements
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of a prima facie case,” which is an indirect method of proof.
Id. 3
That leaves the question of whether the allegations in the
second amended complaint state a claim to relief under the ADEA
that is plausible on its face. Though it is a close question,
drawing all reasonable inferences in Craddock’s favor (as we
must), we conclude that they do.
Two
First,
of
Craddock’s
Craddock
alleges
allegations
that
support
Lincoln
this
trained
conclusion.
all
younger
employees in her department to use a scanner, but despite her
requests
did
not
train
her.
Second,
Craddock
alleges
that
Lincoln’s human resources personnel told her she could not work
again for Lincoln, whether as a temporary or permanent employee.
J.A. 45-46. Lincoln may well have neglected to train Craddock,
and
refused
permissible
to
consider
reasons.
But
rehiring
the
her,
inference
based
that
on
one
Lincoln
or
more
did
so
because of Craddock’s age may also be reasonably drawn from the
3
In Twombly, the Court later “explicitly overruled” the
standard that a court may dismiss a complaint for failure to
state a claim only if it is clear that no relief could be
granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent
with the allegations. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192
n.1 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63). But
Twombly did not alter the Swierkiewicz rule that a plaintiff
need not set out the elements of a prima facie case for an
indirect method of proof in order to survive a motion to
dismiss.
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facts alleged. This suffices to allow her ADEA claim to survive
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
IV.
We turn next to Craddock’s ADA claim. “The ADA prohibits
discrimination against ‘a qualified individual on the basis of
disability.’” Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437,
443 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). To plead a
claim of disability discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff
must allege that (1) she had a disability as defined in the ADA;
(2) she was a “qualified individual,” i.e., able to perform the
essential
functions
accommodation;
and
of
her
job
with
(3)
her
employer
or
took
without
an
reasonable
adverse
action
against her on account of her disability. Id.
The district court first concluded that neither Craddock’s
amended complaint nor the second amended complaint provided “any
factual allegations to support [the] conclusory statement” that
she was fired on the basis of her disability. J.A. 57. In the
court’s view, such allegations could have included “allegations
of
negative
“allegations
comments
of
made
harassment
about
or
people
bias
with
related
disabilities,”
to
[Craddock’s]
disability,” or “circumstantial facts supporting an inference of
bias against disabled people.” Id. Second, the court concluded
that the second amended complaint itself “establish[ed] that she
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was not qualified for her position, . . . and the only suggested
accommodation
--
that
the
employer
tolerate
the
level
of
mistakes -- is not reasonable.” Id. The court thus held that
Craddock failed to state a viable ADA claim.
We
disagree.
Drawing
all
reasonable
inferences
in
Craddock’s favor, we conclude that the second amended complaint
states
a
plausible
claim
to
relief
under
the
ADA.
As
noted
above, Craddock alleges that all non-disabled employees in her
department
scanning)
received
that
she
a
form
of
did
not,
that
training
she
(i.e.,
could
regarding
have
performed
scanning work, and that scanning positions were available. She
also
alleges
that
Lincoln
refused
to
consider
rehiring
her.
These allegations render plausible Craddock’s claim that she was
discharged on the basis of disability, and that Lincoln failed
to reasonably accommodate her disability.
It
is
true
accommodations
suggestions
are
that
that
not
several
of
Craddock’s
accommodations
Lincoln
at
tolerate
performance
lower
all,
proposed
but
rather
regarding
quality and quantity. But Craddock also alleges that she could
have performed other duties such as scanning, and that several
scanning positions were available. The ADA expressly recognizes
“reassignment
to
a
vacant
position”
as
a
reasonable
accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). In short, like the age
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claim, the disability claim is not susceptible of resolution on
the pleadings.
V.
For the reasons set forth, we vacate the judgment of the
district
court
and
remand
for
further
proceedings
consistent
with this opinion. Of course, we express no view as to the
ultimate
merits
of
Craddock’s
claims.
We
dispense
with
oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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