Millennium Inorganic Chemicals v. National Union Fire Insurance

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:09-cv-01893-ELH. [999299990]. [13-1194]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1194

MILLENNIUM INORGANIC
CHEMICALS LIMITED,

CHEMICALS

LTD.;

CRISTAL

INORGANIC

Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA; ACE
AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants - Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
Ellen L. Hollander, District Judge.
(1:09−cv−01893−ELH)

Argued:

December 12, 2013

Decided:

February 20, 2014

Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion.
Judge Agee wrote
the opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer joined. Judge Wynn wrote a
dissenting opinion.

ARGUED:
Charles
Glaston
Cole,
STEPTOE
&
JOHNSON,
LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellants.
Joseph Lanham Beavers, MILES
& STOCKBRIDGE P.C., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
ON
BRIEF: Jonathan D. Hacker, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP, Washington,
D.C., for Appellant ACE American Insurance Company.
Roger E.
Warin, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant
National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA.
John
C. Mezzacappa, Hilary M. Henkind, MOUND COTTON WOLLAN &

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GREENGRASS, New York, New York, for Appellants. Gary C. Duvall,
Jeffrey P. Reilly, John C. Celeste, MILES & STOCKBRIDGE P.C.,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

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AGEE, Circuit Judge:
National

Union

Fire

Insurance

Company

of

Pittsburgh,

PA

(“National Union”) and ACE American Insurance Co. (“ACE” and
together with National Union, the “Insurers”) appeal from the
district court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of
Millennium

Inorganic

Chemicals

Ltd.

and

Cristal

Inorganic

Chemicals Ltd. (collectively, “Millennium”). Millennium sued the
Insurers in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland,

contending

that

Millennium's

claim

interruption

provisions

policies

issued

for

by

the

the

Insurers

coverage
of

had

under

commercial

Insurers.

The

wrongfully

contingent
liability

district

denied

business
insurance

court

granted

partial summary judgment in favor of Millennium after concluding
that certain terms in the policies were ambiguous and that the
doctrine

of

contra

proferentem

therefore

applied.

For

the

reasons set forth below, we reverse the judgment of the district
court and remand for entry of summary judgment in favor of the
Insurers.

I
A

The Insurance Policy Provisions

In 2008, Millennium enlisted the help of Marsh USA, Inc.
(“Marsh”), an insurance brokerage firm, to secure a commercial
liability

insurance

policy

including
3

contingent

business

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interruption (“CBI”) insurance coverage. 1 Marsh solicited bids
from a number of insurers, including National Union and ACE,
seeking CBI coverage and outlining the coverage specifications
Millennium sought, specifically stating only that it required
coverage

“for

direct

suppliers/customers.”

(J.A.

1193.)

In

response, National Union's quote provided, “THERE SHALL BE NO
COVERAGE

FOR

INDIRECT

SUPPLIERS/RECIPIENTS.”

(J.A.

1209.)

ACE

also offered a quote, providing policy limits only for “direct”
suppliers. (J.A. 1217.)
Millennium

chose

to

purchase

its

commercial

coverage,

including the CBI endorsement, from National Union and ACE, each
of

which

would

bear

responsibility

for

50%

of

Millennium’s

covered losses, up to specified limits. As pertinent to the CBI
coverage,

National

“Binder”),

which

Union

issued

a

Binder

stated,

“THERE

SHALL

BE

of

Insurance

NO

COVERAGE

(a
FOR

INDIRECT SUPPLIERS/RECIPIENTS.” (J.A. 1289.) The National Union
Binder

also

provided

a

sublimit

on

liability

for

“DIRECT

CONTRIBUTING OR RECIPIENT PROPERTY(IES).” (J.A. 1287.) Likewise,

1

Generically, business interruption insurance coverage
protects the insured party against losses stemming from
unexpected interruptions of normal business operations resulting
from damage to property caused by a covered hazard. 11 Steven
Plitt et al., Couch on Insurance 3d § 167:9 (2013). A subset of
business interruption coverage, termed CBI coverage, protects
against business losses caused by damage to property not owned
by the insured party. Id. § 167:14. The only provision of the
policies at issue in this case concerns the CBI coverage.
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ACE

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issued

“‘Direct’

a

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Binder

Contingent

that
Time

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provided

a

Element[s].”

similar
(J.A.

sublimit

1305.)

on

Neither

Binder provided any coverage for “indirect” suppliers.
Shortly after issuing the Binders, National Union and ACE
separately issued policies to Millennium (the “Policies”) with
essentially identical terms. Each policy included an Endorsement
titled

“CONTINGENT

PROPERTY(IES)
1496.)

The

BUSINESS

ENDORSEMENT”
Endorsements

(the

INTERRUPTION

CONTRIBUTING

“Endorsements”).

insured

Millennium

(J.A.

against

1392,

certain

losses resulting from the disruption of the supply of materials
to

Millennium

caused

by

damage

to

certain

“contributing

properties.” 2 (J.A. 1392, 1496.) Specifically, Section C of the
Endorsements defined events of coverage as insurance
only against loss directly resulting from
necessary interruption of business conducted
on premises occupied by [Millennium], caused
by damage to or destruction of any of the
real or personal property described above
and
referred
to
as
CONTRIBUTING
2

The term “contributing properties” means “the insured’s
prime suppliers of materials, parts and services. If the insured
depends upon one or, at most, a few manufacturers or suppliers
for the bulk of materials and supplies necessary to conduct its
business operations, then these suppliers are said to be
contributing properties.” Insuring Real Property § 3.03[2]
(Stephen A. Cozen ed. 2013); (see J.A. 1707). Consistent with
this industry definition, the Endorsements define “contributing
property” by reference to the policy schedules, which state that
covered locations “must be direct suppliers of materials to
[Millennium’s] locations.” (J.A. 1392, 1496.) The parties in
this case use the term “contributing property” interchangeably
with the term “supplier.” (See, e.g., Response Br. 27 n.12.)
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PROPERTY(IES) and which is not operated by
[Millennium],
by
the
peril(s)
insured
against during the term of this Policy,
which wholly or partially prevents the
delivery of materials to [Millennium] or to
others for the account of [Millennium] and
results directly in a necessary interruption
of [Millennium’s] business.
(J.A. 1392, 1496.) “Contributing Properties” in Section C of the
Endorsements was thus defined by reference (“described above”)
to

the

preceding

Section

B,

which

establishes

that

only

a

“direct supplier of materials to the Insured's locations” can be
a “contributing property.” Section B provided a “SCHEDULE OF
LOCATION(S),” (the “Schedules”) in which Millennium could list
any

“contributing

property”

that

created

a

risk

of

business

interruption. (J.A. 1392, 1496.)
A

general

section

of

each

of

the

Policies

set

policy

sublimits and provided that any direct contributing properties
named in the Schedules were covered for $25 million, while any
unnamed

direct

contributing

properties

were

covered

for

$10

million. Millennium did not list any contributing properties on
the provided Schedules. The Endorsements also each contained a
loss-mitigation

provision

requiring

Millennium

to

“use

[its]

influence to induce the CONTRIBUTING PROPERTY(IES) to make use
of

any

available

other
in

machinery,
order

to

equipment,

resume

supplies

operations

materials to [Millennium].” (J.A. 1393, 1497.)

6

and

or

location

delivery

of

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B
Millennium

Millennium's Coverage Claim

was

in

the

business

of

processing

titanium

dioxide, a compound often used for its white pigmentation, at
its processing facility in Western Australia. The energy source
for

Millennium’s

titanium

dioxide

processing

operation

was

natural gas received through the Dampier-to-Bunbury Natural Gas
Pipeline (the “DB Pipeline”), Western Australia’s principal gas
transmission
contract

pipeline.

with

Alinta

Millennium
Sales

Pty

purchased

Ltd

the

(“Alinta”),

gas
a

under

retail

a

gas

supplier. Alinta purchased the gas it offered for sale from a
number

of

natural

gas

producers,

one

of

which

was

Apache

Corporation (“Apache”).
As a natural gas producer, Apache extracted and processed
natural gas from wells on Varanus Island, an island located off
the

coast

of

Western

Australia.

Once

Apache

processed

the

natural gas, it would inject the gas into the DB Pipeline, at
which

point

custody,

title,

and

risk

passed

from

Apache

to

Alinta. The natural gas received from Apache's facility then
comingled with that obtained from other producers, resulting in
an amorphous mix of gas in a single pipeline.
Apache has no ownership interest in the DB Pipeline and
does not own any downstream gas transmission or distribution
facilities. Alinta retains sole ownership of the gas once it
enters the DB Pipeline. Under Alinta’s end-user contract with
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Millennium, title to the gas passed to Millennium only at the
time of delivery, i.e., when the gas left the DB Pipeline and
was

delivered

to

Millennium’s

facility

by

way

of

a

separate

delivery line. Millennium’s contract for the purchase of natural
gas

was

solely

with

Alinta.

Millennium

had

no

contract

or

business relationship with Apache, and the contract with Alinta
made no reference to Apache. At the time period relevant to this
appeal, Apache produced about 20% of the natural gas that Alinta
sold.
On June 3, 2008, an explosion occurred at Apache’s Varanus
Island facility, causing its natural gas production to cease.
Apache notified Alinta that the explosion caused it to shut down
its

operations

and

that

there

would

be

no

gas

supply

from

Varanus Island until further notice. Alinta, in turn, sent a
notice of force majeure to Millennium and other customers. The
Australian

government

quickly

intervened

and

imposed

controls

prioritizing delivery of natural gas to domestic customers and
essential services. As a result, Millennium’s gas supply was
curtailed, and it was forced to shut down its titanium dioxide
manufacturing operations for a number of months.
Two days after the explosion, on June 5, 2008, Millennium
sent notice of claim letters to National Union and ACE, seeking
CBI coverage for its losses incurred when the titanium dioxide
facility

closed.

The

Insurers

investigated
8

Millennium’s

claim

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and provided a detailed report explaining the Australian gas
distribution system and concluding that Apache was not a direct
supplier

to

determined

Millennium.

there

was

As

no

a

consequence,

coverage

under

the

the

Insurers

Policies

for

Millennium’s claim, but invited Millennium to provide evidence
of

a

direct

relationship

between

Millennium

and

Apache

sufficient to establish policy coverage.
Millennium responded by asserting, inter alia, that Apache
was

a

direct

supplier

to

it

because

Alinta

provided

only

a

service, the delivery of natural gas, whereas Apache provided
the

actual

material

at

issue.

National

Union

reaffirmed

its

denial of Millennium’s claim, contending that Alinta, and not
Apache,

was

only

There

Millennium.

the

was

direct
no

supplier

further

of

natural

communication

gas

to

between

the

against

the

parties.

C
In

July

Proceedings in the District Court

2009,

Millennium

filed

a

complaint

Insurers in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland,

invoking

the

court’s

diversity

jurisdiction. 3

Millennium requested a declaratory judgment regarding the rights
3

Millennium also asserted several claims against Marsh, but
voluntarily dismissed those claims pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Millennium’s claims
against Marsh are not at issue on appeal.
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and liabilities of the parties with respect to the Policies.
Further, Millennium asserted claims of breach of contract 4 and
failure to act in good faith pursuant to section 3-1701 of the
Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code.
After the close of discovery, Millennium moved for partial
summary judgment on its declaratory judgment claim, arguing that
the Policies unambiguously covered Millennium’s loss because the
Endorsements did not limit coverage to direct suppliers. The
Insurers

filed

Millennium’s

a

joint

declaratory

cross-motion
judgment

for
and

summary
bad

judgment

faith

on

claims,

contending that the Policies provided coverage only for direct
suppliers

and

that

Apache

was

not

a

direct

supplier

to

Millennium. The Insurers also argued that Millennium failed to
present any evidence in support of its bad faith claim.
The district court entered an order granting Millennium’s
motion

for

motion

partial

for

summary

summary
judgment

judgment,
with

denying

respect

to

the

Insurers’

Millennium’s

declaratory judgment claim, and granting the Insurers’ motion
with respect to Millennium’s bad faith claim. In an accompanying
opinion,

the

district

court

reviewed

4

and

interpreted

the

Millennium’s breach of contract claim was based upon the
Insurers’ refusal to cover Millennium’s CBI losses arising out
of the Varanus Island explosion, and Millennium asserts coverage
only under the Endorsements. Thus, Millennium’s breach of
contract claim must rise or fall with its coverage claim.
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Policies, 5 concluding that coverage under the Policies extended
only

to

“direct

contributing

properties.”

In

determining

the

meaning of the term “direct contributing property,” the district
court reviewed existing caselaw on CBI coverage.
The

district

court

concluded

that

“the

physical

relationship between the properties is as or more important than
the legal relationship between the properties’ owners.” (J.A.
1991.) The district court held that Millennium’s contract with
Alinta had “no effect on the physical realities of natural gas
supply

between

[Apache]

and

[Millennium]”

because,

although

Alinta took title to the gas when it traveled through the DB
Pipeline, Alinta “never [took] physical possession of the gas
and [had] no ‘property’ with which to do so.” (J.A. 1991.)

5

Finding that the Policies lacked choice of law provisions,
the district court applied a Maryland choice of law analysis to
determine which state’s law applied to the construction of the
Policies. See CACI Int’l, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 566 F.3d 150, 154 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that federal
courts exercising diversity jurisdiction “apply the choice of
law rules of the forum state”). Millennium argued in favor of
New Jersey law and the Insurers argued in favor of New York law.
The district court concluded that, under a lex loci analysis,
New York law would apply, but ultimately declined to reach a
decision, reasoning that there was no meaningful difference in
the common law regarding interpretation of insurance policies of
either state. We need not perform a choice of law analysis on
appeal because the parties now agree that there is no
substantive difference between the applicable laws of New York
and New Jersey with respect to the issues in this case, and each
party cites to both New York and New Jersey caselaw. We
therefore cite to the laws of both jurisdictions.
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The district court then observed that “the policies do not
define the term ‘direct,’” and concluded that “the term ‘direct’
is ambiguous here, in the context of an entity that provides a
direct physical supply of material to the insured, but has no
direct contractual relationship with the insured.” (J.A. 1993.)
Although the parties presented extrinsic evidence to establish
the meaning of "direct," the district court concluded that none
of that evidence “speaks to the specific meaning the parties
intended by the use of the word ‘direct.’” (J.A. 1994.) In order
to

resolve

doctrine

the

of

ambiguity,

contra

the

district

proferentem 6

in

court

favor

of

applied

the

Millennium.

Accordingly, the district court held that Apache qualified as a
“direct” supplier to Millennium and that Apache’s natural gas
production facility was a “direct contributing property” within
the

meaning

physically
Millennium’s

of

the

provided

Policies
a

premises,

direct
despite

“because
supply
the

of

fact

Apache’s
natural
that

facility
gas

Apache

to
and

Millennium had no direct contractual relationship.” (J.A. 1995.)

6

When a court determines that a provision in an insurance
contract is ambiguous and “extrinsic evidence does not yield a
conclusive answer as to the parties’ intent,” the rule of contra
proferentem provides that “where an insurer drafts a policy,
‘any ambiguity in [the] . . . policy should be resolved in favor
of the insured.’” Morgan Stanley Group Inc. v. New England Ins.
Co., 225 F.3d 270, 276 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting McCostis v. Home
Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 1994)).
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As an alternative holding, the district court opined that
the

Endorsements

also

provided

coverage

for

damage

to

contributing properties “‘which wholly or partially prevents the
delivery

of

materials

to

[Millennium]

or

to

others

for

the

account of [Millennium].’” (J.A. 1995.) The district court then
concluded that this provision was also ambiguous because it did
not explain “who must hold the ‘account of the Insured’—the one
who delivers, or the ‘others’ to whom delivery is made.” (J.A.
1998.)

Based

applied
phrase

the
[‘for

upon

this

doctrine
the

ambiguity,

of

contra

account

the

district

of’]

proferentem,
in

favor

of

court

again

construing
coverage

for

“the
the

insured,” Millennium. (J.A. 1998.)
After the district court granted Millennium’s motion for
partial summary judgment, the parties stipulated and agreed to
the entry of judgment in favor of Millennium in the amount of
$10,850,000,
Insurers

inclusive

expressly

of

pre-judgment

preserving

their

interest,

right

to

with

the

appeal

the

judgment. The district court then entered final judgment against
the Insurers in the stipulated amount, and the Insurers timely
appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II
We review a district court’s grant of a motion for summary
judgment de novo, construing all facts and reasonable inferences
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in favor of the non-moving party. Crockett v. Mission Hosp.,
Inc., 717 F.3d 348, 350 n.1, 354 (4th Cir. 2013).

III
When interpreting insurance contracts, courts first look to
the plain language of the provision at issue. See Fed. Ins. Co.
v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 965 N.E.2d 934, 935 (N.Y. 2012);
Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 948
A.2d

1285,

1289

(N.J.

2008).

If

the

plain

language

of

the

provision is clear, “that is the end of the inquiry.” Chubb
Custom, 948 A.2d at 1289.
Beginning with the plain language of the Policies, as the
district court found and Millennium concedes, the Endorsements
provided

coverage

properties.”
ambiguous

only

Millennium

because

it

with

respect

argues

that

could

refer

to

“direct

the

term

either

to

contributing
“direct”
the

is

legal

relationship between the contributing property and the insured
or the physical relationship between those parties. We find the
term “direct” to be clear as used in the Policies and without
ambiguity.
The term “direct” is defined as “proceeding from one point
to another in time or space without deviation or interruption,”
“transmitted
“operating

back
or

and

guided

forth

without

without
14

an

digression

intermediary,”
or

or

obstruction.”

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Webster’s
Apache

Filed: 02/20/2014

Third

to

be

Millennium,

it

New

International

considered
must

Pg: 15 of 34

a

have

Dictionary

direct

supplied

640.

contributing
Millennium

Thus,

for

property

with

to

materials

necessary to the operation of its business “without deviation or
interruption” from “an intermediary.” 7 Id.
On the undisputed facts of this case, neither Apache nor
Apache’s

facilities

“direct

contributing

not

dispute

that

it

on

Varanus

Island

property”

of

received

its

can

be

Millennium.
gas

from

considered

Millennium

Alinta,

and

a

does
that

Alinta—and not Apache—had the sole ability to control the amount
of gas directed to Millennium, to determine the rate at which
Millennium would be charged for that gas, and even to shut the
gas off completely. Indeed, Millennium concedes that it has no
legal relationship, direct or otherwise, with Apache.
7

Our colleague in dissent argues that the term "direct" is
ambiguous as used in the Policies because the dictionary
contains another definition for the term, "from the source or
the original without interruption or diversion." See Webster's
Third New International Dictionary 640. However, the definition
cited to in the dissent is the adverbial definition of the term
"direct," even though the term is clearly used as an adjective
in
the
operative
policy
phrase,
"direct
contributing
properties." Regardless, the phrase "without interruption or
diversion" as used in the adverbial definition of the term
"direct" has the same meaning as the phrase "without digression
or
obstruction"
as
used
in
the
adjectival
definition,
demonstrating that the term "direct" has a single clear,
unambiguous meaning. Even using the phrase selected by the
dissent, it is unambiguous that there is no "direct" transfer of
gas from Apache to Millennium because of the unescapable fact of
the "interruption or diversion" by the presence of Alinta and
the DB Pipeline as interrupting intermediaries.
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Millennium also does not dispute that it received its gas
by way of the DB Pipeline, and that the DB Pipeline is neither
owned nor operated by Apache. Nor does Millennium dispute that
Apache relinquished both legal title and physical control over
the gas once it entered the DB Pipeline. In fact, Millennium
concedes

that

Apache

had

no

control

over

whether

Millennium

received its gas and that, due to commingling, Millennium could
not

demonstrate

originated

how

with

much,

Apache.

if

any,

Thus,

of

neither

the

gas

Apache

it

received

nor

Apache’s

facilities had a direct physical relationship with Millennium.
Whatever the relationship between Apache and Millennium, it
was clearly interrupted by “an intermediary,” Alinta, who took
full

physical

control

indistinguishable

of

Apache’s

commingled

gas

gas

before

delivering

to

Millennium.

That

relationship was also interrupted by an intervening step, the
physical insertion of the gas into the DB Pipeline, at which
point Apache relinquished all physical control over that gas.
Under any view of the relevant facts, Apache can therefore be
only an indirect contributing property to Millennium, coverage
of which is not included in the terms of the Policies. 8

8

The Insurers failed to argue in their briefing that the
Binders, which stated directly that “THERE SHALL BE NO COVERAGE
FOR
INDIRECT
SUPPLIERS/RECIPIENTS,”
J.A.
1289,
were
the
operative documents at the time of the explosion on Varanus
Island. Had the Insurers properly made that argument before this
(Continued)
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Having
Policies,
property

Filed: 02/20/2014

concluded

Apache
to

that,

on

Pg: 17 of 34

the

plain

cannot

be

considered

Millennium,

we

consider

a

language

direct

Millennium’s

of

the

contributing
alternative

argument that it could also receive coverage under the “for the
account of” clause of the Endorsements. Millennium’s alternative
contention fails for the same reason as its primary argument.
Under the plain language of the Policies, coverage is triggered
only

by

damage

to

or

destruction

of

direct

contributing

properties. Because Apache is at most an indirect supplier to
Millennium, there can be no coverage under any reading of the
“for the account of” clause. Therefore, Millennium presents no
plausible reading of the Policies under which it could receive
coverage for its CBI losses. 9

IV
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is reversed, and we remand the case to the district court
for entry of summary judgment in favor of the Insurers.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Court, that language would also demonstrate that Millennium had
no coverage on the facts of this case.
9
As we find no basis for coverage of Millennium’s CBI
losses under the Endorsements, Millennium’s breach of contract
claim, as pleaded, also must fail.
17

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Pg: 18 of 34

WYNN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
On

June

3,

2008,

a

massive

explosion

at

a

natural

gas

production facility on Varanus Island, Australia disrupted the
availability

of

natural

gas

throughout

Western

Australia.

Appellant Millennium’s supply of natural gas ceased later that
same day, requiring it to shut down operations at its titanium
dioxide production facilities, and resulting in over $10 million
in damages.

The sole question we must decide is whether the

contingent business interruption endorsements of the insurance
contracts between Millennium and Appellees National Union and
ACE

(together,

the

“Insurers”)

require

the

latter

to

cover

Millennium’s losses.
Although

the

interpretation

of

majority
the

opinion

disputed

provides

portions

of

a

reasonable

the

insurance

policies, the district court articulated an equally reasonable
alternate interpretation.
‘susceptible

of

Abdul-Baki,

976

two

reasonable

F.2d

189,

policies to be ambiguous.
evaluate

the

parties’

intent

extrinsic
in

Because “no writing is unambiguous if
interpretations[,]’”

192

(4th

Cir.

1992),

Atalla

I

find

v.
the

Like the district court, I would thus
evidence

drafting

the

for

an

ambiguous

indication
policy

of

the

provisions.

And like the district court, I would find that none of the
proffered evidence reveals that intent.

It follows that I would

affirm the district court’s decision to apply the doctrine of
18

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contra

Filed: 02/20/2014

proferentem

Millennium

and

to

against

Pg: 19 of 34

resolve
the

the

ambiguity

Insurers.

in

favor

Accordingly,

I

of
must

respectfully dissent.

I
A
For the policy year at issue, 2008–09, Millennium obtained
insurance

coverage

through

its

broker,

Marsh.

Millennium’s

coverage consisted of “master policies” issued by National Union
and ACE and local policies issued by Australian companies.

The

master policies covered Millennium for up to $450 million per
occurrence

in

responsibility
provisions

aggregate
for

are

50%

for

losses,
of

any

contingent

with

each

covered
business

insurer

loss.

The

bearing
disputed

interruption

(“CBI”)

coverage, which is “a relatively recent development in insurance
law[.]”

Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. ABM Indus., Inc., 397 F.3d 158,

168 (2d Cir. 2005).
CBI

coverage

“protects

against

the

loss

of

prospective

earnings because of the interruption of the insured’s business
caused by an insured peril to property that the insured does not
own, operate, or control.”

CII Carbon, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Union

Fire Ins. Co. of La., Inc., 918 So. 2d 1060, 1061 n.1 (La. Ct.
App. 2005).

CBI coverage is distinct from “[r]egular business

interruption

insurance[,

which]
19

replaces

profits

lost

as

a

Appeal: 13-1194

result

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of

Filed: 02/20/2014

physical

damages

to

Pg: 20 of 34

the

insured’s”

own

property.

Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 243 F.3d
369, 371 (7th Cir. 2001).
Endorsement 8 of each of Millennium’s master policies sets
forth the CBI coverage.

The relevant portion of Endorsement 8

reads as follows:
CONTINGENT BUSINESS INTERRUPTION
CONTRIBUTING PROPERTY(IES)
(Not Operated By The Insured)
A.

AMOUNT OF INSURANCE:

$(As
per
declarations)
Only
against
loss
directly resulting from necessary interruption of
business
conducted
on
premises
occupied
by
the
insured, caused by damage to or destruction of any of
the real or personal property described below and
referred to as CONTRIBUTING PROPERTY(IES) and which is
not operated by the Insured, by the peril(s) insured
against during the term of this Policy, which wholly
or partially prevents the delivery of materials to the
Insured or to others for the account of the Insured
and results directly in a necessary interruption of
the Insured’s business.
B.

SCHEDULE OF LOCATION(S):

The following locations must be direct suppliers of
materials to the Insured’s locations or coverage is
deemed to be void:
CONTINGENT
LOCATION NO.
CONTRIBUTING PROPERTY
LIMIT OF LIABILITY
DIRECT ONLY

1

AS STATED IN
DECLARATIONS 1

The most significant difference between the National Union
and the ACE Endorsements is that the ACE policy contains the
phrases “DIRECT ONLY” and “AS STATED IN DECLARATIONS” as shown
(Continued)
20

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C.

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Pg: 21 of 34

COVERAGE:

Subject to all terms, conditions and stipulations of
the Policy to which this endorsement is attached, not
in conflict herewith, this Policy is extended to cover
only against loss directly resulting from necessary
interruption
of
business
conducted
on
premises
occupied by the Insured, caused by damage to or
destruction of any of the real or personal property
described above and referred to as CONTRIBUTING
PROPERTY(IES) and which is not operated by the
Insured, by the peril(s) insured against during the
term of this Policy, which wholly or partially
prevents the delivery of materials to the Insured or
to others for the account of the Insured and results
directly in a necessary interruption of the Insured’s
business.
J.A. 336, 450
The

value

Declarations

of

$25,000,000

of
the

for

the

CBI

master

locations

coverage
policies.

that

is

set

The

Millennium

forth

coverage
has

in
limit

named

in

the
is
the

policy, whereas the coverage limit is $10,000,000 for locations
that are not named or listed in the policy.
refer

to

both

named

and

unnamed

CONTRIBUTING OR RECIPIENT PROPERTY(IES).”

The Declarations

locations

as

“DIRECT

J.A. 303, 416.

B
The

salient

straightforward

and

facts

giving

rise

to

undisputed.

At

all

this

suit

relevant

are

times,

here. The National Union policy, by contrast, contains nothing
in the columns shown above.
21

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Millennium was in the business of producing titanium dioxide, a
white pigment used in a variety of applications including paints
and plastics.

Millennium operated two interdependent factories

near Bunbury, Australia, which relied primarily on natural gas
for

energy.

Millennium

Like

many

purchased

its

businesses
natural

gas

in
from

Western
a

Australia,

supplier

aggregator, rather than directly from a producer.

or

an

Millennium

had a natural gas supply contract with one such entity, Alinta
Sales Pty Ltd. (“Alinta”).
Alinta
producers

obtained

in

the

Western

gas

that

Australia,

it

resold

including

from

Apache

multiple

Corporation

(“Apache”), which supplied at least 20% of the gas that Alinta
bought and resold.

Pursuant to the agreement between Alinta and

Apache, Alinta took title to Apache’s gas when the gas entered a
major

Western

Dampier

to

Australian

Bunbury

gas

Natural

transmission
Gas

Pipeline

line

known

as

(“Pipeline”).

the
The

Pipeline is a government-regulated common carrier owned by third
parties who charge pipeline users a fee based on the distance
their gas travels.

After the gas leaves the Pipeline, it is

transported to end users via a network of distribution lines.
Alinta consumes a small amount of the natural gas that it
purchases for its own operations.

And although it takes title

to the gas, it never physically possesses the gas that it sells
to its customers because it does not own the transmission or
22

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distribution facilities. 2

Pg: 23 of 34

Indeed, because the gas molecules are

commingled as soon as they enter the Pipeline, it is impossible
to tell either the source or the owner of any given molecule at
any

given

time.

Notwithstanding

the

impossibility

of

determining the source or the ownership of any particular gas
molecule, the title to a specified volume of gas passed from
Alinta

to

Millennium

at

the

inlet

point

of

Millennium’s

production facilities.
On June 3, 2008, a massive explosion and fire occurred at
Apache’s production facilities on Varanus Island, off the coast
of Western Australia.
20%

to

30%

of

the

The explosion caused the interruption of
natural

gas

supply

in

Western

Australia.

Apache immediately issued a notice of force majeure to Alinta,
and Alinta immediately issued the same to Millennium.

Shortly

thereafter, Millennium notified the Insurers of its claim of
lost business income through its broker, Marsh.
agree

that

the

damages

total

$10,850,000,

but

The parties
the

Insurers

denied Millennium’s claim because “[t]here is no direct supply
of gas between [Millennium] and Apache.”
2

J.A. 760.

The Insurers seem to dispute Millennium’s statement that
Alinta never took physical possession of the gas.
But they
offer no evidence to establish that the gas that they purchased
ever made its way into a vessel that was owned or controlled by
Alinta.
The Insurers merely reassert that Alinta owned the
title to the gas after it was injected into the Pipeline, a fact
that is neither disputed nor probative of whether Alinta
physically possessed the gas.
23

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Pg: 24 of 34

C
On

July

17,

2009,

Millennium

filed

this

suit

alleging,

among other things, declaratory relief, breach of contract, and
bad

faith.

After

a

lengthy

discovery

process

and

the

presentation of a “virtual cornucopia of extrinsic evidence,”
Millennium Inorganic Chems. v. Nat’l Union, 893 F. Supp. 2d 715,
736

(D.

Md.

2012),

the

parties

submitted

cross

motions

for

summary judgment.
In a well-reasoned opinion, the district court analyzed the
language of the policies and determined that multiple reasonable
interpretations

existed

Endorsement 8.
evidence

and

for

two

disputed

provisions

in

The district court then analyzed the extrinsic
found

that

“none

of

it

presents

a

dispute

of

material fact for a fact finder to resolve[] because none of the
extrinsic
intent

evidence

was

at

established.”
of

contra

sheds

the

Id.

light

time

that

what
the

the

parties’

Master

Policies

mutual
were

The district court thus applied the doctrine

proferentem

to

by

Millennium

on

that

holding

resolve

the

“Apache’s

ambiguity
natural

in

gas

favor

of

production

facility was a ‘direct contributing property’ to Millennium’s
Bunbury Operations, . . . because Apache’s facility physically
provided

a

direct

supply

of

natural

gas

to

Millennium’s

premises, despite the fact that Apache and Millennium had no
direct contractual relationship.”
24

Id. at 737.

The district

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court

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conducted

a

similar

Pg: 25 of 34

analysis

and

reached

the

same

conclusion as to the second disputed phrase in Endorsement 8,
“for the account of the Insured.”

See id. at 737–39.

The district court granted Millennium’s motion for partial
summary judgment regarding its declaratory judgment claim and
granted

the

Insurers’

motion

for

Millennium’s bad faith claim.

summary

judgment

regarding

The parties jointly moved for

entry of judgment, which the district court granted on January
11, 2013.

The Insurers appealed.

II
The
Jersey

parties
law

contracts.

initially

governs
Like

the
the

disputed

whether

interpretation
district

of

court,

difference between the two states’ laws.

New

I

York

their

or

New

insurance

perceive

little

See Millennium, 893 F.

Supp. 2d at 728.
In both states:

Insurance contracts are to be interpreted

according to their “plain and ordinary meaning.”

Voorhees v.

Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1260 (N.J. 1992).

See

also Fieldston Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Hermitage Ins. Co.,
Inc., 945 N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (N.Y. 2011) (“In resolving insurance
disputes,

we

first

look

to

the

language

of

the

applicable

policies.

If the plain language of the policy is determinative,

we cannot rewrite the agreement by disregarding that language.”)
25

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Filed: 02/20/2014

(citations omitted).
susceptible

to

Pg: 26 of 34

But “[i]f the terms of the contract are

at

least

two

reasonable

interpretations, an ambiguity exists.”

alternative

Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v.

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 948 A.2d 1285, 1289 (N.J. 2008).
See Mostow v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 668 N.E.2d 392, 394 (N.Y.
1996) (“Because the policy may be reasonably interpreted in two
conflicting manners, its terms are ambiguous.”).
If a provision is ambiguous, “a court may look to extrinsic
evidence as an aid to interpretation.”

Chubb, 948 A.2d at 1289.

See Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 780 N.E.2d 166, 170
(N.Y. 2002) (“Extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent may be
considered only if the agreement is ambiguous, which is an issue
of

law

for

the

courts

to

decide.”).

Extrinsic

evidence

is

relevant only if it sheds light on the parties’ intent at the
time of contracting.

Newin Corp. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.,

467 N.E.2d 887, 889 (N.Y. 1984).
the

parties’

intent

turns

on

And if a determination as to
“the

credibility

of

extrinsic

evidence[,]” “such determination is to be made by the jury.”
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Wesolowski, 305 N.E.2d 907,
909 (N.Y. 1973).
In
extrinsic

the

absence

evidence,

of

clear

courts

must

policy
rely

language
on

or

additional

relevant
rules

of

contract interpretation to apply the terms of an ambiguously
worded provision to the facts at hand.
26

“[C]overage provisions

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are to be read broadly, exclusions are to be read narrowly,
potential ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the insured,
and the policy is to be read in a manner that fulfills the
insured’s reasonable expectations.”

Selective Ins. Co. of Am.

v. Hudson East Pain Mgmt. Osteopathic Medicine, 46 A.3d 1272,
1277 (N.J. 2012).

See Westview Assocs. v. Guaranty Nat’l Ins.

Co., 740 N.E.2d 220, 223 (N.Y. 2000) (“If the language of the
policy is doubtful or uncertain in its meaning, any ambiguity
must

be

resolved

insurer.”)

in

favor

(citation

of

the

omitted).

insured

“When

an

and

against

insurance

the

carrier

drafts an ambiguously worded provision and attempts to limit its
liability

by

relying

on

against the carrier.”

it,

we

will

construe

the

language

Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mancuso,

715 N.E.2d 107, 112 (N.Y. 1999).
“It

has

long

been

the

rule

contractual

instrument

will

against

party

prepared

the

who

be

that

resolved
or

ambiguities
contra

presented

it.”

in

a

proferentem,
151

West

Assocs. v. Printsiples Fabric Corp., 460 N.E.2d 1344, 1345 (N.Y.
1984).

When

construing

an

ambiguous

policy,

“courts

should

consider whether more precise language by the insurer, had such
language been included in the policy, ‘would have put the matter
beyond reasonable question.’”

Gibson v. Callaghan, 730 A.2d

1278, 1282 (N.J. 1999) (quoting Mazzilli v. Accident & Cas. Ins.
Co., 170 A.2d 800, 803 (N.J. 1961)).
27

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In

short,

Filed: 02/20/2014

these

cases

Pg: 28 of 34

convincingly

show

that

little difference between the two states’ laws.

there

is

But to the

extent that applicable New York and New Jersey law differ, it is
with respect to contra proferentem.

Whereas New York seems to

use the doctrine anytime a contract is not jointly drafted, New
Jersey seems to require unequal bargaining power before it will
favor an insured.

Compare Taylor v. U.S. Cas. Co., 199 N.E.

620, 622 (N.Y. 1936) with Chubb, 948 A.2d at 1294 and Pacifico
v. Pacifico, 920 A.2d 73, 78 (N.J. 2007).
Here, this is a distinction without a difference.

Although

Millennium is a sophisticated commercial entity and employed a
broker

to

obtain

its

policies,

bargaining power with the Insurers.

it

did

not

possess

equal

Therefore, even under New

Jersey law, contra proferentem would still be available.

But

were it necessary to choose between New York and New Jersey law,
I

would

apply

New

York

law

district court articulated.

for

the

same

reasons

that

the

Millennium, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 727

(conducting a lex loci analysis and determining that New York
law would apply because both policies were countersigned by the
Insurers in New York).

28

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Pg: 29 of 34

III
A
Turning now to the Insurers’ appeal, summary judgment shall
be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

We review the

district court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo.
See Henson v. Liggett Group, Inc., 61 F.3d 270, 274 (4th Cir.
1995).
Where, as here, the district court considered cross motions
for summary judgment, we “must review each motion separately on
its

own

merits

to

determine

whether

deserves judgment as a matter of law.”

either

of

the

parties

Rossignol v. Voorhaar,

316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted).

In

considering each motion, we “resolve all factual disputes and
any competing, rational inferences in the light most favorable
to

the

party

opposing

that

motion.”

Id.

(quotation

marks

omitted).

B
The majority opinion outlines a reasonable interpretation
of the disputed portions of Endorsement 8.

For example, the

majority opinion provides a dictionary definition of “direct”
and concludes that under its chosen definition, “neither Apache
29

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Pg: 30 of 34

nor Apache’s facilities on Varanus Island can be considered a
‘direct contributing property’ of Millennium.”

Ante at 15.

The problem for the majority opinion’s reasoning is that
other equally reasonable alternative explanations exist.

For

example, an alternate definition for “direct” can be found on
the

same

page

of

the

same

dictionary

as

that

cited

in

the

majority opinion, yet it supports the conclusion that Apache was
indeed a direct contributing property.
is

also

without

defined

as

interruption

being
or

“from

diversion.”

International Dictionary 640.
“Regardless
contracted

of

whether

directly

the

source

or

the

Webster’s

original

Third

New

As stated by the district court:

Millennium

with

Specifically, “direct”

Apache,

contracted
the

with

pressurized

Alinta
natural

or
gas

still would flow directly from Apache’s facility through the
[Pipeline] to Millennium’s Bunbury Operations by operation of .
. . the law of physics.”

Millennium, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 735

(quotation marks omitted). 3

3

The majority opinion takes issue with the definition cited
above, noting that it is “the adverbial definition of the term
‘direct,’ even though the term is clearly used as an adjective
in the operative policy phrase, ‘direct contributing property.’”
Ante at 15 n.7.
But the issue here is not whether the term
“direct” is an adverb that modifies the word “contributing” or
an adjective that modifies the term “contributing property.”
Nor is the issue a question of which of the over 200 available
dictionaries we should selectively choose to find the definition
that satisfies our own interpretation of the policies.
See,
e.g.,
OED
Online,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/53293?rskey
(Continued)
30

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Pg: 31 of 34

Moreover, no evidence suggests that Alinta has the ability
to divert natural gas once it is injected into the Pipeline.

In

fact,

or

because

distribution

it

does

lines

not

through

own

any

which

of

the

the

transmission

natural

gas

flows,

the

evidence indicates that Alinta has just as much physical control
over the gas as does Apache, which is to say, none.

Because the

policies do not describe the nature of the direct relationship
required for something to be a “direct contributing property,” I
find

this

to

be

sufficient

for

Millennium

to

withstand

the

Insurers’ motion for summary judgment.
In

fact,

language

of

and

as

explained

Endorsement

8

is

relationships

between

physical

relationships

between

people

the

words

by

the

district

written

in

properties
and

terms

the

of

the

than

the

First,

the

rather

entities.

“CONTRIBUTING

court,

Endorsement

uses

subtitle.”

Second, Section “B” limits coverage to “locations”

that must be direct suppliers.
attributable

to

damage

or

PROPERTY(IES)

for

a

Third, Section “C” covers losses

destruction

of

“real

or

personal

=x0vIbu&result=2&isAdvanced=false (last visited Feb. 06, 2014)
(defining the adjectival form of “direct” as “[s]traight,
undeviating in course; not circuitous or crooked”) and Oxford
Dictionaries
Online,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/
definition/american_english/direct?q=direct (last visited Feb.
6, 2014) (defining the adjectival form of “direct” as “extending
or moving from one place to another by the shortest way without
changing direction or stopping”).

31

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Pg: 32 of 34

property . . . not operated by the Insured . . . .”

All of this

“suggests that the physical relationship between the properties
is as or more important than the legal relationship between the
properties’ owners.”

Millennium, 893 F. Supp. at 735.

Additionally, the fact that it is impossible to trace any
of the gas molecules to Apache is of no import in determining
whether

a

physical

Millennium.

relationship

existed

between

Apache

and

If it mattered where each molecule came from or

which molecule belonged to whom, Alinta would have no way of
knowing

that

it

actually

owned

transferred to its customers.

any

of

the

gas

that

it

The Insurers’ arguments regarding

the gas molecules are simply a red herring.

C
To

be

sure,

reasonable

alternate

interpretations

contested provisions of Endorsement 8 exist.

of

the

As I noted above,

the majority opinion provides one such reasonable interpretation
for each provision.
See

Millennium,

district

court

interpretation

893

The district court provides a few more.
F.

noted
of

the

Supp.
that
Master

2d

at

“[i]t

736.
is

Policies

not
to

For
an

example,

the

unreasonable

conclude

that,

by

providing only ‘direct’ CBI coverage, the Insurers sought to
limit their exposure to situations in which the insured lacked
the kind of influence over a contributing property that comes
32

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Doc: 47

Filed: 02/20/2014

with contractual privity.”

Pg: 33 of 34

Millennium, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 736.

But, as with the other reasonable interpretations, “the Master
Policies

do

not

language

of

district

court

say

the

this

policies
also

expressly[,]”

cannot

explained

id.

resolve

that

the

the

and

the

plain

ambiguity.

“for

the

account

The
of

clause” was ambiguous because the policies fail to name a party
who must hold the account, and one could reasonably conclude
that either Apache or Alinta could “hold the ‘account of the
Insured’” to trigger coverage.
can

conclude

from

this

recitation

is

that

the

interpretations
ambiguous.

Id. at 739.

See

unambiguous

Atalla,

if

976

of

language
F.2d

at

susceptible

The only thing we

competing
of

192

of

the

reasonable

policies

is

writing

is

(“[N]o
two

reasonable

interpretations[.]”) (quotation marks omitted).
I

would,

therefore,

proceed

to

analyze

the

extrinsic

evidence submitted by the parties.

Although the record in this

case

I

is

court’s

nearly

2,200

conclusion

pages

that

long,

none

of

agree

the

with

extrinsic

the

district

evidence

is

admissible because none of it provides evidence of the parties’
intent at the time the provisions of Endorsement 8 were drafted.
See Millennium, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 737, 739.
Because

none

of

the

extrinsic

evidence

is

relevant

or

admissible, there is nothing for a jury to consider, and it is
“the

responsibility

of

the

court
33

to

interpret

written

Appeal: 13-1194

Doc: 47

instruments.”
omitted).

Filed: 02/20/2014

Pg: 34 of 34

Wesolowski, 305 N.E.2d at 909 (internal citation

We must, therefore, rely on well-settled rules of

contract interpretation to decide the case.
Here, the district court applied the doctrine of contra
proferentem

to

construe

the

ambiguous

policies

in

favor

of

Millennium and against the Insurers, and it granted Millennium’s
motion

for

partial

judgment claim.

summary

judgment

as

to

its

declaratory

Millennium, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 739.

I agree

with the district court, and I would, therefore, affirm.

For

this and the other reasons discussed above, I must respectfully
dissent.

34