Paul Sartin v. McNair Law Firm PA

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:12-cv-00895-JFA. [999380759]. [13-1265]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1265

PAUL A. SARTIN, Independent Executor of the Estate of Peter
A.T. Sartin,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
and
PETER A.T. SARTIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
MCNAIR LAW FIRM PA,
Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District
Judge. (3:12-cv-00895-JFA)

Argued:

May 13, 2014

Decided:

June 23, 2014

Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion.
Judge Niemeyer wrote
opinion, in which Judge Gregory and Judge Floyd joined.

the

ARGUED: Ronald L. Richter, Jr., BLAND RICHTER, LLP, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant.
Robert E. Stepp, SOWELL GRAY
STEPP & LAFFITTE, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF:
Eric S. Bland, BLAND RICHTER, LLP, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. William H. Jordan, SOWELL GRAY STEPP &

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LAFFITTE, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

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NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
In a complex procedural context, we are called to construe
the proper scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a), which
authorizes

district

courts

to

correct

mistakes

found

in

judgments and orders.
Employing
revisited

two

that

Rule,

sanctions

the

South

orders

it

had

Plaintiffs” in a private civil action
indicating
apply

to

that
the

individually.

it

had

originally

plaintiffs’

Carolina

District

entered

Court

against

“the

more than a year earlier,
intended

attorney,

the

Peter

sanctions
A.T.

to

Sartin,

Accordingly, it entered a Rule 60(a) clarifying

order dated December 4, 2009, imposing the sanctions on Sartin.
Sartin hired McNair Law Firm PA (“the McNair Firm”) to represent
him

in

South

Carolina

and

to

appeal

the

district

court’s

clarifying order, but the McNair Firm filed the notice of appeal
two days late.

The appeal was thereafter voluntarily abandoned.

Sartin commenced this malpractice action against the McNair
Firm based on the late filing, and the district court (through a
district

judge

different

from

the

one

who

presided

over

the

earlier action) granted the Firm’s motion for summary judgment.
The court concluded that Sartin suffered no injury because of
the late notice of appeal, inasmuch as the district court in the
earlier

action

properly

employed

Rule

60(a)

to

clarify

its

sanctions orders and, therefore, Sartin would not have succeeded
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on his appeal of that order, even had the notice of appeal been
timely filed.
We agree and accordingly affirm.

I
In August 2006, California attorney Peter Sartin filed a
complaint

in

the

District

of

South

Carolina

on

behalf

of

Travelers Insurance Company, as subrogee of Commercial Metals
Company
Tamini

(“CMC”),

and

Transformatori,

CMC,

for

SRL,

its

and

uninsured

Southwest

losses,

Electric

against
Company,

demanding $17.7 million in damages arising from the failure of a
transformer in a CMC facility in South Carolina.

During the

course of that litigation, Sartin noticed depositions for 14
Tamini witnesses in Milan, Italy.

After deposing two, however,

Sartin unilaterally cancelled the remainder and left Milan.
Claiming that Sartin’s actions during the course of the two
depositions and his abandonment of the remainder amounted to
abusive

and

requesting

sanctionable
that

the

conduct,

court

impose

Tamini

filed

sanctions

a

motion

against

“the

Plaintiffs,” pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(c)
and 37(a).

At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion, the

court sharply rebuked Sartin for his behavior:
I thought the conduct of Mr. Sartin was totally
inappropriate.
And it was an egregious violation of
any type of discovery and I do feel that sanctions are
appropriate with regard to that.
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*

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*

*

And with regard to improperly limiting or terminating
depositions, I find that that is a serious, serious
issue. And after reviewing the video depositions that
were provided to the court and reviewing those, those
were very, very disturbing to me, because they appear
to be one of the most blatant cases of abuse of
depositions I have ever seen, and that kind of
behavior will not be tolerated in this district.
I don’t know what they do in Mr. Sartin’s district,
but we don’t do that out here.
You do not instruct
witnesses how to answer questions, you do not coach
witnesses, you do not arbitrarily just get up and
leave a deposition. That is totally inappropriate and
I think deserving of sanctions.
In the written order granting sanctions, dated October 17, 2007,
the court stated that it found “sanctions to be appropriate with
respect to what it consider[ed] to be egregious discovery abuse
by

Plaintiffs.”

plaintiffs’

In

discovery,

addition
the

court

to

imposing

ordered

orders

limiting

“Plaintiffs”

to

pay

Tamini’s “costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees,” in amounts to
be determined after further submissions.
Following the issuance of the October 17, 2007 sanctions
order, Travelers and CMC retained the firm of Nelson Mullins
Riley

&

Scarborough

LLP,

in

lieu

of

Sartin,

to

assume

responsibility for the presentation of their case to the court.
After

receiving

Tamini’s

submissions

on

its

costs,

expenses, and attorneys’ fees, which exceeded $1 million, the
district

court

conducted

a

hearing

5

on

April

25,

2008,

and

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concluded that “an appropriate sanction to compensate Tamini and
sanction the Plaintiffs for the numerous events that took place
culminating with the trip to Milan, Italy . . . is $750,000.”
The court rejected as a sanction Tamini’s motion to dismiss the
case.
fees

The court also ordered the plaintiffs to pay attorneys’
and

expenses

in

the

amount

of

$201,881.72

incurred

in

seeking to reopen or to re-depose the plaintiffs’ witnesses as a
result of the abuses in Italy.
Through their new counsel, Travelers and CMC filed a motion
to clarify, modify, and amend the sanctions orders pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), noting that the district
court had “assessed such sanctions solely against the Plaintiffs
without considering whether . . . such sanctions should more
properly

be

assessed

instead

against

counsel, Peter A. T. Sartin.”
court

defer

the

payment

the

Plaintiffs’

former

The motion requested that the

of

all

sanctions

until

after

the

completion of trial on the merits so that an evidentiary hearing
could be conducted for the purpose of allocating the sanctions
among

Sartin,

Travelers,

and

CMC.

Summarily

and

without

explanation, the court denied the motion.
In October 2008, the parties settled the case, with the
defendants paying Travelers and CMC $5.5 million.

As part of

the

appeal

settlement,

the

parties

waived

sanctions orders.
6

the

right

to

the

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Sartin thereafter commenced an action against Travelers and
CMC

in

Texas

state

court

to

recover

his

attorneys’

fees.

Travelers and CMC filed a counterclaim, seeking to hold Sartin
responsible

for

both

the

sanctions

and

attorneys’ fees they paid Nelson Mullins.

the

$2

million

in

In a summary judgment

motion filed in the Texas action, Sartin alleged that Travelers
and CMC “ha[d] no evidence to prove that any of the $951,881.72
in sanctions” assessed by the South Carolina District Court in
the

Tamini

attorneys’

case
fees

“included
submitted

any
by

of

Tamini

the

costs,

pursuant

expenses,
to

the

and

Court’s

Order dated October 17, 2007, or, if so, which of those costs,
expenses, or attorneys’ fees were for which of the specific acts
or failures to act by [Sartin] that allegedly were negligent.”
To clarify the responsibility for sanctions, Travelers and
CMC returned to the South Carolina District Court in September
2009 and filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(a) to have the court clarify its “intent in its [October 17,
2007, and April 25, 2008] sanctions rulings.”

Specifically, the

motion “request[ed] clarification as to whether any portion of
the

sanctions

that

[the

South

Carolina]

Court

issued

was

a

sanction for conduct that occurred after the Court’s written
order of October 17, 2007,” when Nelson Mullins was representing
the plaintiffs.

Sartin hired the McNair Firm to represent him

in opposing the motion of Travelers and CMC for clarification.
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After
court

conducting

(through

sanctions

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the

orders)

a

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hearing

on

the

same

district

judge

acted

pursuant

to

motion,
who

had

Federal

the

district

entered

Rule

of

the

Civil

Procedure 60(a) and entered an order dated December 4, 2009,
granting the motion of Travelers and CMC to clarify the original
sanctions orders.

The court found that “[a]ll conduct that led

to the $951,881.72 sanction occurred prior to the October 17,
2007 order, while Sartin was counsel of record for Plaintiffs.”
The court further clarified that “[t]he entire monetary sanction
was for Sartin’s discovery abuses.”

Finally, the court stated

that “[i]t was the court’s intent that Sartin, individually, be
assessed monetary sanctions based upon his conduct during the
course of his representation.”
individually,

should

be

It therefore held that “Sartin,

assessed

monetary

sanctions

in

the

amount of $951,881.72.”
On behalf of Sartin, the McNair Firm appealed the district
court’s Rule 60(a) clarification order, but it filed the notice
of appeal two days late.

The Firm filed a motion requesting

that the district court approve the late filing of the appeal,
which the court denied.

The Firm then filed a second appeal

from the order denying its motion to file an out-of-time appeal
and from the court’s earlier Rule 60(a) clarification order.
Although this court heard arguments on the two appeals, it never
issued an opinion because Sartin, Travelers, and CMC settled the
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with

mutual

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releases,

and

Sartin

instructed

the

McNair Firm to dismiss the two appeals taken with respect to the
Rule 60(a) clarification order.
Sartin then commenced this action against the McNair Firm,
alleging legal malpractice.

He claimed that the McNair Firm’s

failure to file a timely notice of appeal in the earlier action
was a proximate cause of his failure to recover attorneys’ fees
against Travelers and CMC in the Texas case.

The district court

(through a different district judge) granted the McNair Firm’s
motion for summary judgment by order dated December 5, 2012,
holding that Sartin had suffered no injury as a result of the
Firm’s
Circuit

failure

to

file

a

timely

would

not

have

reversed

appeal
[the

because

district

“the

Fourth

court’s

Rule

60(a)] Clarification Order” entered in the earlier case.
This appeal followed. 1

II
The parties agree on the legal framework for this case.

In

order for Sartin to succeed on his legal malpractice claim, he
must show that the McNair Firm’s failure to timely appeal the
Rule 60(a) clarification order in the earlier action caused his
injury.

See Argoe v. Three Rivers Behavioral Ctr. & Psychiatric

1

Sartin died at the end of 2012, and the executor of his
estate is prosecuting this appeal. For clarity, we continue to
refer to the appellant as Sartin.
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697

S.E.2d

551,

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555

(S.C.

2010).

This

requires

showing that the McNair Firm’s negligence was a “but for” cause
of the injury.

See Eadie v. Krause, 671 S.E.2d 389, 393 (S.C.

Ct. App. 2008) (“Proximate cause requires proof of causation in
fact

and

legal

cause.

Causation

in

fact

is

proved

by

establishing the plaintiff’s injury would not have occurred ‘but
for’

the

defendant’s

negligence”

(citation

omitted)).

Accordingly, Sartin “must show [that he] most probably would
have been successful in the underlying suit if [the McNair Firm]
had

not

committed

Carpenter,

492

the

S.E.2d

alleged
55,

58

malpractice.”
(S.C.

1997).

Summer
The

v.

relevant

question, therefore, is whether Sartin’s original appeal to the
Fourth Circuit from the Rule 60(a) clarification order would
have been successful had the notice of appeal been timely filed.
Sartin
order

was

contends
not

that

the

authorized

by

erroneously entered.
application”

that

district
Rule

court’s

60(a)

and

clarification
therefore

was

He argues that Rule 60(a) has a “limited

only

allows

courts

“to

clarify

de

minimis

clerical mistakes such as typographical errors, or to fill-in
gaps in a judgment,” and no clerical mistake was involved in the
entry of the sanctions orders.

Thus, he argues, the district

court exceeded the scope of its Rule 60(a) authority by imposing
sanctions on him individually.

In addition, Sartin contends

that “there [was] nothing remotely ambiguous or vague about [the
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sanctions orders]” because they were issued exclusively against
“Plaintiffs” and there was no indication that the court intended
to sanction him.

Accordingly, Sartin maintains that his appeal

of the court’s Rule 60(a) clarification order would have been
successful had it been timely filed.
The McNair Firm argues, to the contrary, that the district
court acted within its discretion in issuing the clarification
order.

It contends that “Rule 60(a) is broader than Sartin

argues” in that it allows a court to clarify its earlier order
to conform with its intent at the time it issued the order.

In

short, it claims that “the district court’s original intent is
controlling.”

Under

this

standard,

it

argues

that

“the

uncontroverted evidence establishes that [the district court’s]
original intent in issuing [its] sanctions order was to sanction
Sartin individually.”

Accordingly, the McNair Firm maintains

that Sartin’s appeal of the court’s Rule 60(a) clarification
order would not have been successful had the appeal been timely
noticed.
The

issue

thus

presented

is

whether

Rule

60(a)

is

sufficiently broad to have authorized the district court in the
earlier case to give effect to its original intent to impose
sanctions on Sartin, individually, even though the change was
not the correction of a clerical mistake.

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) authorizes a court to
“correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight
or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other
part

of

the

record.”

The

Rule

gives

the

district

court

discretionary authority, and a court of appeal’s review is for
abuse of discretion.

See Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp. v. F/V

Site Clearance I, 275 F. App’x 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam) (citing Kocher v. Dow Chem. Co., 132 F.3d 1225, 1229
(8th Cir. 1997)).

Discretion, such as Rule 60(a) confers, may

be abused “by an exercise that is flawed by erroneous factual or
legal premises.”

James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir.

1993).
Clearly,

Rule

60(a)

allows,

as

Sartin

notes,

courts

to

perform mechanical adjustments to judgments, such as correcting
transcription errors and miscalculations.

In the same vein, the

Rule is properly utilized “‘to perform a completely ministerial
task’ (such as ‘making a judgment more specific in the face of
an

original

omission’).”

Caterpillar,

275

F.

App’x

at

204

(quoting Kosnoski v. Howley, 33 F.3d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 1994)).
And we have cautioned that a court may not employ Rule 60(a) to
reconsider

a

matter

that

has

already

been

decided.

As

explained:
The basic distinction between clerical mistakes and
mistakes that cannot be corrected pursuant to Rule
60(a) is that the former consist of blunders in
12

we

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execution whereas the latter consist of instances
where the court changes its mind, either because it
made a legal or factual mistake in making its original
determination, or because on second thought it has
decided to exercise its discretion in a manner
different from the way it was exercised in the
original determination.
Rhodes v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 548 F. App’x 857, 859-60 (4th
Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting In re Walter, 282 F.3d 434, 440
(6th Cir. 2002)); accord Rivera v. PNS Stores, Inc., 647 F.3d
188, 194 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Clerical mistakes, inaccuracies of
transcription, inadvertent omissions, and errors in mathematical
calculation are within Rule 60(a)’s scope; missteps involving
substantive legal reasoning are not” (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted)).
But,

contrary

to

Sartin’s

argument,

Rule

60(a)

is

not

confined just to fixing typographical and other clerical errors.
The Rule’s text also authorizes a court to correct “a mistake
arising from oversight or omission.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a).

Such a mistake occurs when there is an inconsistency between the
text of an order or judgment and the district court’s intent
when it entered the order or judgment.
oversight
that

or

omission”

obfuscates

the

also

court’s

includes
original

A “mistake arising from
an

unintended
intent.

ambiguity

Rule

60(a)

authorizes a district court to correct either such mistake to
conform the text with its original intent.

See Garamendi v.

Henin, 683 F.3d 1069, 1079 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Rule 60(a) allows
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for clarification and explanation, consistent with the intent of
the

original

judgment,

even

in

the

absence

of

ambiguity,

if

necessary for enforcement” (emphasis added)); Rivera, 647 F.3d
at 195 (“A district court’s authority under Rule 60(a) is also
limited

to

making

corrections

that

are

consistent

with

the

court’s intent at the time it entered the judgment” (emphasis
added)); Agro Dutch Indus. Ltd. v. United States, 589 F.3d 1187,
1192 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Courts enjoy broad discretion to correct
clerical errors in previously issued orders in order to conform
the

record

to

the

intentions

of

the

court

and

the

parties”

(emphasis added)); Walter, 282 F.3d at 441 (“[A] court properly
acts under Rule 60(a) when it is necessary to ‘correct mistakes
or oversights that cause the judgment to fail to reflect what
was intended at the time of trial’” (emphasis added) (quoting
Vaughter v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 817 F.2d 685, 689 (11th
Cir. 1987))); Burton v. Johnson, 975 F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir.
1992) (“A District Court is not limited under Rule 60(a) to the
correction
omission.

of

clerical

mistakes

arising

from

oversight

or

Rather, a district court may also invoke Rule 60(a)

to resolve an ambiguity in its original order to more clearly
reflect its contemporaneous intent and ensure that the court’s
purpose is fully implemented” (emphasis added)).
In sum, the scope of a court’s authority under Rule 60(a)
to make corrections to an order or judgment is circumscribed by
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the court’s intent when it issued the order or judgment.
the

court’s

original

intent

“may

be

ascertained

And

through

consideration of contemporaneous documents, such as a memorandum
opinion

or

transcript,

and

by

the

presiding

subsequent statements regarding his intent.”

judge’s

own

Rhodes, 548 F.

App’x at 860; accord Rivera, 647 F.3d at 197 (“‘[A] judge’s own
subsequent statements of his intent’ are reliable evidence in
the Rule 60(a) context” (alteration in original) (quoting In re
Jee, 799 F.2d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 1986))).
Here, the district court’s intent at the time it issued the
sanctions orders was manifested both by what the court later
stated about its intent and by contemporaneous documents.

In

the Rule 60(a) clarification order, the court stated, “It was
the

court’s

intent

that

Sartin,

individually,

be

assessed

monetary sanctions based upon his conduct during the course of
his representation.”
is reliable evidence.
And

the

The court’s statement about its own intent
See Rivera, 647 F.3d at 197.

contemporaneous

court’s statement.

evidence

strongly

supports

the

During the hearing when the district court

first considered whether to impose sanctions, the court focused
entirely

on

the

conduct

of

Sartin

without

complicity or fault on the part of his clients.
example:

15

suggesting

any

It stated, for

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I thought the conduct of Mr. Sartin was totally
inappropriate.
And it was an egregious violation of
any type of discovery and I do feel that sanctions are
appropriate with regard to that.
*

*

*

I don’t know what they do in Mr. Sartin’s district,
but we don’t do that out here.
You do not instruct
witnesses how to answer questions, you do not coach
witnesses, you do not arbitrarily just get up and
leave a deposition. That is totally inappropriate and
I think deserving of sanctions.
(Emphasis added).

Moreover, the conduct that drew the court’s

ire -- Sartin’s handling of discovery -- was not the type of
conduct in which Sartin’s clients would typically participate.
Indeed, Sartin has pointed to no evidence in the record -- and
we can find none -- suggesting that the court was concerned
about

any

conduct

of

Sartin’s

clients.

The

contemporaneous

evidence thus supports the court’s later statement that it had
always intended to sanction Sartin individually. 2

See Sanchez v.

2

Indeed, during the hearing on the Rule 60(a) motion to
clarify the sanctions orders, the district court repeatedly made
this point, speaking for instance to Sartin’s counsel:
Court:

Let me just ask you this question.
In my
October [17] order I made the statement that
the conduct of Mr. Sartin [was] totally
inappropriate, it was an egregious violation
of any type of discovery and I did feel that
sanctions [were] appropriate with regard to
that, and specific reference to Mr. Sartin’s
conduct, and I was referencing the Italy
depositions. What about that is not clear as
to what my intent was?

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City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
that the district court had the authority to correct a prior
judgment

under

Rule

60(a)

since

there

was

no

reason

in

the

record to doubt the district judge’s statements of his prior
intent).
To

be

sure,

the

text

of

the

district

court’s

orders imposed sanctions only on “Plaintiffs.”

sanctions

But this mistake

can perhaps be explained by the fact that Tamini’s motion, which
only

requested

sanctions

conflated

Sartin

explained

that

“Mr.

providing

any

notice

“Plaintiffs

and

rendered

his

against
clients.

Sartin
to

“Plaintiffs,”
For

inexplicably

Tamini”

[Tamini’s

but

example,
left

later

preparation]

frequently
the

[Italy]

motion
without

complained
an

that

extraordinary

waste of time and resources by inexplicably and without notice
leaving Italy.”

(Emphasis added).

In granting the sanctions

motion, the court likewise focused on “Plaintiffs” generally.
Nevertheless, the record indicates that the court’s exclusive
motivation for imposing sanctions was the personal conduct of
Sartin himself in conducting discovery.

Thus, notwithstanding

the

“Plaintiffs”

district

court’s

use

of

the

term

in

its

sanctions orders, we conclude that the court’s later statement

Counsel

for Sartin:
Honor.

Nothing

17

that

I

know

of,

Your

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it

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had

always

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intended

to

impose

sanctions

on

the

plaintiffs’ attorney is supported by the record.
To hold otherwise, we note, would call into question the
veracity of a declaration made by the district court about its
own intent.

In order to find the district court’s explanation

of its intent suspect, the contrary evidence would have to be
especially clear.

In the record before us, it is not.

At bottom, we conclude that the district court’s original
intent

was

to

impose

sanctions

on

Sartin

individually

and,

therefore, that the court did not abuse its discretion in giving
effect to that intent in its Rule 60(a) clarification order.
Because we conclude that the district court in the earlier case
properly employed Rule 60(a), we affirm the district court’s
conclusion in this case that the McNair Firm’s failure to appeal
the

earlier

Rule

60(a)

clarification

order

caused

Sartin

no

injury.

III
Sartin’s other arguments require less discussion.
First, he contends that the district court’s issuance of
its

Rule

60(a)

clarification

order

was

improper

because

the

matter had already been litigated pursuant to the earlier Rule
54(b) motion of Travelers and CMC to allocate sanctions, which
the

court

summarily

denied.

Sartin

18

argues

that

“Rule

60(a)

Appeal: 13-1265

cannot

Doc: 28

be

Filed: 06/23/2014

used

adjudicated.”

to

revisit

a

Pg: 19 of 20

matter

that

has

already

been

The district court’s Rule 54(b) ruling, however,

did not conclude, either explicitly or implicitly, that Sartin
should not be liable for sanctions.
no explanation.

The ruling itself contained

Moreover, its context and the record do not

supply an explanation.

We do note, however, that the Rule 54(b)

motion requested not only an allocation of the sanctions but
also a delay of payment to Tamini until after the trial on the
merits

of

the

case.

determined

not

to

Travelers,

and

CMC

The

delay

district
payments

squabbled

over

court
to

could

Tamini

allocation.

simply

while
As

have

Sartin,
such,

we

cannot conclude that the court’s Rule 54(b) ruling evinced an
intent

to

spare

Sartin

from

sanctions.

We

therefore

reject

Sartin’s argument that the district court’s denial of the Rule
54(b) motion barred the court from later issuing its Rule 60(a)
clarification order.
Sartin

also

contends

that

the

district

court

lacked

jurisdiction to issue its Rule 60(a) clarification order because
that litigation had been finally dismissed over a year before it
issued the order.

The case was dismissed on October 20, 2008,

and the Rule 60(a) clarification order was issued on December 4,
2009.

But Sartin properly concedes that “Rule 60(a) . . . has

no time limit.”

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) (“The court may

correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight
19

Appeal: 13-1265

Doc: 28

Filed: 06/23/2014

Pg: 20 of 20

or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other
part of the record” (emphasis added)); Scola v. Boat Frances,
R., Inc., 618 F.2d 147, 152 (1st Cir. 1980) (“Under Rule 60(a) a
clerical

mistake

in

a

judgment

or

other

error

arising

from

oversight or omission may be corrected by the court ‘at any
time’”).
not

The Rule would lose much of its vitality if it were

available

to

correct

mistakes

in

final

judgments,

and

nothing in the language of the Rule suggests such a limitation.
Courts have frequently issued Rule 60(a) clarifications after
litigation has been finally concluded.

See, e.g., Rivera, 647

F.3d at 191 (affirming a correction of summary judgment from
“with

prejudice”

to

“without

prejudice”);

United

States

v.

Mansion House Ctr. North Redevelopment Co., 855 F.2d 524, 527
(8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (rejecting the argument that Rule
60(a)

“was

not

intended

to

permit

the

reopening

of

a

final

judgment”); Jackson v. Jackson, 276 F.2d 501, 502-03 (D.C. Cir.
1960) (affirming an adjustment of child support five years after
the original judgment).

As such, we conclude that the district

court had jurisdiction to enter its Rule 60(a) clarification
order.
For the reasons given, we affirm the summary judgment of
the district court.

AFFIRMED
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