Tech Systems, Inc. v. Lovelen Pyle

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:12-cv-00374-GBL-JFA Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999701291].. [13-1359, 13-2098]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1359

TECH SYSTEMS, INC.,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LOVELEN PYLES,
Defendant – Appellant,
and
JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-10,
Defendants.

No. 13-2098

TECH SYSTEMS, INC.,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LOVELEN PYLES,
Defendant – Appellant,
and
JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-10,
Defendants.

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Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
Judge. (1:12-cv-00374-GBL-JFA)

Submitted:

October 27, 2015

Decided:

November 18, 2015

Before MOTZ and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Eric H. Zagrans, ZAGRANS LAW FIRM LLC, Cleveland, Ohio, for
Appellant.
Eric Scott Crusius, Stephen P. Ramaley, MILES &
STOCKBRIDGE P.C., Tysons Corner, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Lovelen Pyles appeals the district court’s orders denying
her motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 for judgment as a matter of
law and granting attorney’s fees in favor of Tech Systems, Inc.
(“TSI”).

Pyles asserts that the district court erred in denying

her motion as to violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012); the Electronic Communications
Privacy

Act,

18

fiduciary duty.
in

instructing

U.S.C.

§ 2701

(2012);

and

her

breach

of

She also contends that the district court erred
the

jury

on

punitive

TSI’s motion for attorney’s fees.

damages

and

in

granting

We affirm.

I.
“We review de novo the legal conclusions upon which the
district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law were
premised.”

Belk, Inc. v. Meyer Corp., U.S., 679 F.3d 146, 164

(4th Cir. 2012).

“If, viewing the facts in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, there is sufficient evidence
for a reasonable jury to have found in [the non-moving party’s]
favor, we are constrained to affirm the jury verdict.”

Lack v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 259 (4th Cir. 2001).
A.
“Although

the

CFAA

is

primarily

a

criminal

statute,

it

permits private parties to bring a cause of action to redress a
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violation

of

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the

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CFAA . . . .”

A.V.

ex

rel.

Vanderhye

iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 645 (4th Cir. 2009).

v.

The civil

suit may be brought in limited circumstances by “[a]ny person
who suffers damage or loss” as a result of a CFAA violation.
U.S.C. § 1030(g).

18

As relevant here, the violation must have

caused “loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period . . .
aggregating

at

least

§ 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I),

$5,000

(g).

A

in

value.”

person

18

violates

the

U.S.C.
CFAA

by

“intentionally access[ing] a computer without authorization or
exceed[ing]
information

authorized
from

§ 1030(a)(2)(C),

access,

any
or

and

thereby

obtain[ing] . . .

protected

computer,”

“intentionally

access[ing]

18
a

U.S.C.
protected

computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct,
caus[ing] damage and loss,” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(C).
This

court

narrowly

interprets

the

terms

authorization” and “exceeds authorized access.”

“without

WEC Carolina

Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2012).
“[A]n employee . . . accesses a computer ‘without authorization’
when [s]he gains admission to a computer without approval.”
at 204.

Id.

“[A]n employee ‘exceeds authorized access’ when [s]he

has approval to access a computer, but uses [her] access to
obtain or alter information that falls outside the bounds of
[her]

approved

access.”

Id.

“Notably,

4

neither

of

these

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definitions extends to the improper use of information validly
accessed.”

Id.

Pyles argues that the CFAA did not apply to her actions
during

her

employment

with

TSI

because

she,

as

the

human

resources director, had full access to the computer information.
Under the WEC Carolina framework, we disagree.

Pyles accessed

both the main computer network and financial servers without
authorization or in excess of her authority.
termination
email

of

her

account

authorization.
in

losses

employment,

and

Pyles

Additionally, upon

accessed

corporate

Blackberry

company-issued

her

without

Moreover, TSI demonstrated damage that resulted

from

Pyles’

actions.

Thus,

there

was

sufficient

evidence for a reasonable jury to have found in TSI’s favor.
B.
A

person

violates

the

ECPA

by:

“(1)

intentionally

access[ing] without authorization a facility through which an
electronic

communication

intentionally

exceed[ing]

service
an

is

provided;

authorization

to

or

(2)

access

that

facility; and thereby obtain[ing], alter[ing], or prevent[ing]
authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it
is in electronic storage in such system.”
Pyles

limits

her

ECPA

challenge

18 U.S.C. § 2701(a).
to

whether

she

acted

“without authorization” or “exceed[ed] [her] authorization” in

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accessing TSI’s computer system. *

Pyles contends not only that

TSI granted her permission to access the computer system, but
also that her actions did not go outside the bounds of that
permission.

We disagree.

Authorization is a matter of permission and dependent on
its

scope,

properly

not

used.

on

whether

See

WEC

information

Carolina,

687

validly

accessed

F.3d

204.

at

was

Here,

although Pyles was permitted to use TSI’s email to carry out her
duties as human resources manager, she was not authorized to
access

the

server

through

manner she did here.

which

the

email

functioned

in

the

Additionally, her authorization to access

the Blackberry terminated with her employment.

Thus, there was

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to have found in TSI’s
favor.

II.
In Virginia, to establish a breach of fiduciary duty, a
plaintiff
duty,

must

(2) the

resulted

from

show

that

defendant
the

(1) the
breached

breach.

defendant
that

duty,

Informatics

*

owed
and

a

fiduciary

(3) damages

Applications

Grp.,

Accordingly, Pyles has abandoned any challenge related to
the other elements of her ECPA violation.
Fed. R. App. P.
28(a)(8)(A); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6
(4th Cir. 1999).

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Inc. v. Shkolnikov, 836 F. Supp. 2d 400, 424 (E.D. Va. 2011).
“[A]n employee . . . owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty to [her]
employer during [her] employment.”
Partners,

LLC,

576

S.E.2d

752,

Williams v. Dominion Tech.

757

(Va.

2003).

This

duty

“prohibits the employee from acting in a manner adverse to his
employer’s interest.”

Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co. of Richmond v.

DePew, 440 S.E.2d 918, 921 (Va. 1994).

Moreover, “termination

does not automatically free a[n] . . . employee from his or her
fiduciary obligations” if the action was “founded on information
gained during the relationship.”
634

S.E.2d

737,

744

(Va.

Today Homes, Inc. v. Williams,

2006)

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).
Pyles concedes that she owed TSI a fiduciary duty under
Virginia law.

She asserts that the district court improperly

denied her motion to strike the breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim
because, she argues, the information she revealed was not the
kind

that

would

give

an

advantage

to

a

competing

business.

Nevertheless, the record reveals that she breached her duty by
acting

in

disregarding

bad

faith

TSI’s

with

interests

resulting in damages to TSI.

confidential
in

accessing

information
the

email

and

by

server,

Accordingly, the district court

properly rejected this claim.

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III.
Finally,
instructions

Pyles

challenges

allowing

for

the

punitive

attorney’s fees in TSI’s favor.

district

damages

and

court’s
its

jury

award

of

It is a “settled rule” that we

will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal
absent “fundamental error or a denial of fundamental justice.”
In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 285 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

“Fundamental error is more limited

than the plain error standard that [this Court] appl[ies] in
criminal cases.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Thus,

this court has used the plain error standard “as something of an
intermediate step in a civil case.”

Id. at 286.

“[W]hen a

party in a civil case fails to meet the plain-error standard, we
can

say

with

confidence

fundamental error.”

that

[s]he

has

not

established

Id.

To establish plain error, Pyles must show that:
was

an

error,

(2)

the

error

was

affected her substantial rights.
F.3d

941,

showing,

954

“we

(4th

retain

Cir.

and

(3) the

error

United States v. Robinson, 627

2010).

discretion

plain,

(1) there

to

Even

if

Pyles

deny

relief;

makes

plain

this

errors

should only be corrected where not doing so would result in a
miscarriage of justice or would otherwise seriously affect the
fairness,

integrity

or

public

8

reputation

of

judicial

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proceedings.”

Id.

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(alterations,

citation,

and

internal

quotation marks omitted).
We have refused to undertake plain error review, however,
where

a

party

“failed

to

make

anywhere in its briefs . . . :
district

court

fundamentally

or

its

most

essential

argument

it never contended that the
even

plainly

erred.”

In

re

Under Seal, 749 F.3d at 292; see Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d
126,

132

(4th

Cir.

2015)

(refusing

plain

error

review

where

appellant failed to assert that elements of such review were
satisfied).
claims.

Failing to argue either, Pyles has abandoned these

Moreover, Pyles’ jurisdictional argument is meritless

because the court properly exercised subject-matter jurisdiction
over

her

federal

and

state-law

claims

pursuant

to

28

U.S.C.

§ 1331 (2012) (federal question), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2012)
(supplemental jurisdiction).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders.
dispense

with

contentions

are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

We

and

legal

materials

before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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