Margarita Serna v. Eric Holder, Jr.

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:12-cv-00712-GBL-JFA Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999309940].. [13-1424]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1424

MARGARITA V. SERNA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
and
LINDA I. VALERINO; DORA M. ALVARADO; JEFFREY L. BOHN; TAM M.
WYATT,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., in his official capacity as United
States Attorney General,
Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
Judge. (1:12-cv-00712-GBL-JFA)

Argued:

January 29, 2014

Decided:

March 6, 2014

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Andrew Charles Simpson, ANDREW C. SIMPSON, P.C.,
Christiansted, Virgin Islands, for Appellant.
Antonia Marie
Konkoly, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: D.Z. Kaufman, KAUFMAN LAW

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GROUP, PLLC, Vienna, Virginia, for Appellant.
Kathleen M.
Kahoe, Acting United States Attorney, R. Joseph Sher, Deputy
Chief, Civil Division, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
A year after a partial dismissal order in her first Title
VII suit, Margarita Serna filed another one -- alleging similar
acts of wrongdoing, encompassing roughly the same time period,
and

advancing

related

legal

theories.

The

district

court

dismissed the suit, holding that its claims were precluded by
the final merits judgment in the first case.

We now affirm.

I.
Margarita Serna is a Deputy United States Marshal with the
U.S. Marshals Service (USMS).

In 2005, Serna filed an Equal

Employment

complaint

alleging

Opportunity

discrimination.

(EEO)
She

filed

against

additional

the

USMS,

complaints

in

2005, 2007, and 2009, alleging various forms of discrimination,
a hostile work environment, and retaliation.
In December 2009, Serna filed her first lawsuit, alleging
that the USMS violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
by retaliating against her for submitting EEO complaints.
amended the complaint in August 2010.

She

The complaint had a broad

scope, alleging discrimination and a hostile work environment,
as well as numerous acts of retaliation in the several years
following Serna’s 2005 and 2007 EEO complaints.
In

May

2011,

the

district

court

awarded

summary judgment on Serna’s retaliation claims.
3

the

government

In July 2011,

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Serna and the government signed a settlement agreement on her
remaining claims.

The agreement provided that Serna “agrees to

withdraw and quit for all time any and all claims, demands[,
etc.] . . . that

were

filed

in

this

case

or

could

have

been

filed against the Attorney General . . . and further agrees to
waive,

withdraw,

and/or

etc.] . . . against

the

quit

any

Attorney

and

all

claims,

demands[,

General . . . arising

out

of

transactions, occurrences or events which were, or could have
been, alleged or litigated in this case.”
the

agreement

provided

that

it

did

J.A. 59-60.
“not

affect

However,
[Serna’s]

participation as a plaintiff in the action captioned Linda I.
Valerino[] et[] al. v. Eric H. Holder, Jr.”

J.A. 60.

The Valerino class action was brought by Serna and four
other USMS employees while Serna’s first lawsuit was pending.
The Valerino suit proceeded to discovery on allegations that the
USMS

merit-selection

process

allowed

managers

to

discriminate

against employees on the basis of gender and retaliate against
them if they filed EEO complaints.

Serna was both an individual

plaintiff and a proposed class representative.
class-wide

claims,

Serna

made

discrimination and retaliation.

individual

In addition to
allegations

of

The district court ultimately

denied class certification and granted the government’s motion
for

judgment

on

the

pleadings.

4

It

directed

each

Valerino

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plaintiff

to

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file

an

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individual

complaint

containing

the

plaintiff’s individual claims within 21 days.
Serna timely filed her amended complaint in this case, her
second individual lawsuit, in July 2012.

The complaint in the

second lawsuit was based on alleged retaliation against Serna in
the USMS merit-selection system after Serna’s 2005 and later EEO
complaints, including in the 2009-2010 timeframe not explicitly
addressed

by

Specifically,

the

amended

Serna

complaint

alleged:

(1)

in

the

disparate

first

lawsuit.

treatment,

(2)

disparate impact, (3) a denial of a temporary duty assignment to
the USMS internal-affairs division, (4) a denial of a permanent
promotion to be Chief Deputy U.S. Marshal for the District of
Hawaii, and (5) a denial of promotion to Investigator in the
USMS Office of Inspections.
The

government

moved

to

dismiss

the

case

on

several

grounds, including that the settlement agreement in the first
lawsuit precluded the second lawsuit.

The parties held oral

argument, after which the government, in a sur-reply, argued
that Serna was also barred from bringing the second lawsuit by
the

final

claims

in

summary-judgment
the

first

suit.

order
The

dismissing
district

her

court

retaliation
agreed

that

Serna’s claims were independently barred by the final judgment

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as well as the settlement agreement in the first lawsuit. 1

Serna

now appeals.

II.
Under the doctrine of claim preclusion (often referred to
as res judicata), “a prior judgment bars the relitigation of
claims that were raised or could have been raised in the prior
litigation.”

Pittston Co. v. United States, 199 F.3d 694, 704

(4th Cir. 1999).
It

protects

Claim preclusion serves a variety of purposes.

litigants

against

conserves judicial resources.

repetitive

litigation,

confidence

inconsistent

results

in
and

final, settled outcomes.

it

See Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v.

Wilson, 519 F.3d 156, 161-62 (4th Cir. 2008).
increases

and

the

judicial

ensuring

that

More broadly, it

system
private

by

avoiding

disputes

have

18 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal

Practice and Procedure § 4403, at 23-24, 26-27 (2d ed. 2002).

1

Serna complains that the district court erred in
considering an argument raised by the government in a sur-reply
and independently taking judicial notice of the record in the
first lawsuit. However, Serna has had the opportunity to fully
brief this court on the relevant issues.
Thus, assuming
arguendo that the lower court procedurally erred in how it
addressed the first lawsuit’s claim-preclusive effects, remand
on that ground would be unnecessary.

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A prior claim precludes a later one if three conditions are
satisfied:
1) the prior judgment was final and on the merits,
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
accordance with the requirements of due process;
the parties are identical, or in privity, in the
actions; and, 3) the claims in the second matter
based upon the same cause of action involved in
earlier proceeding.

and
in
2)
two
are
the

Pittston, 199 F.3d at 704 (quoting In re Varat Enters., Inc., 81
F.3d

1310,

omitted).

1315

(4th

Cir.

1996))

(internal

quotation

marks

We review the district court’s application of claim

preclusion de novo.

Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345,

354 (4th Cir. 2004).
Here,

the

first

plainly satisfied.

two

elements

of

claim

preclusion

are

No one disputes that the first lawsuit ended

with a final judgment on the merits.

The district court granted

summary judgment to the government because no genuine issue of
material fact existed as to the merits of Serna’s Title VII
retaliation

claims.

In

addition,

the

parties’

voluntary

dismissal with prejudice following the settlement agreement “is
a valid, final judgment on the merits,” Kenny v. Quigg, 820 F.2d
665,

669

(4th

Cir.

1987),

and

thus

has

potential

claim-

preclusive effect to the extent intended by the parties, see
United States ex rel. May v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 737 F.3d 908,
913-14 (4th Cir. 2013).

As to the identity of the parties, both

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lawsuits involved Serna and the Attorney General as plaintiff
and defendant, respectively.
Only the third element -– whether the causes of action are
identical -- is thus at issue.

This inquiry turns on “whether

the claim presented in the new litigation ‘arises out of the
same transaction or series of transactions as the claim resolved
by the prior judgment.’”

Pittston, 199 F.3d 694 at 704 (quoting

Harnett v. Billman, 800 F.2d 1308, 1313 (4th Cir. 1986)).
expression

‘transaction’

‘connotes

a

natural

facts.’”

Id.

in

grouping

the
or

claim
common

preclusion
nucleus

of

“The

context
operative

(quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24

cmt. b (1982)).

Determining whether claims are based on the

same cause of action is a fact-bound and practical task, and
“[a]mong the factors to be considered . . . ‘are [the claims’]
relatedness in time, space, origin, or motivation, and whether,
taken

together,

purposes.’”

they

form

a

convenient

unit

for

trial

Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24

cmt. b.).
Of

particular

importance

to

this

case,

we

focus

on

the

“core of operative facts” for the plaintiff’s claims and causes
of actions, not the legal labels attached to them, when applying
the transactional approach to claim preclusion.

Pueschel, 369

F.3d at 355 (quoting In re Varat, 81 F.3d at 1316) (internal
quotation

marks

omitted).

“Were
8

we

to

focus

on

the

claims

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asserted in each suit, we would allow parties to frustrate the
goals of [claim preclusion] through artful pleading and claim
splitting given that ‘[a] single cause of action can manifest
itself into an outpouring of different claims, based variously
on federal statutes, state statutes, and the common law.’”

Id.

(quoting Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 924 F.2d 1161, 1166
(1st Cir. 1991)).
For

several

reasons,

we

are

persuaded

that

lawsuits were based on the same cause of action.
were similar in scope and subject matter.

Serna’s

First, they

Both suits concerned

the same type of wrongdoing: employment discrimination.
alleged

the

same

category

of

two

adverse-employment

retaliation after the filing of EEO complaints.

Both

action:

Both described

similar injuries: denial of promotion, transfer, and temporary
duty assignment.

And both involved the 2005-2008 period during

which much of the alleged retaliation occurred.
Second, the language of the amended complaint in the first
lawsuit encompassed, at least in part, Serna’s allegations in
her second suit.

Serna broadly alleged retaliation “designed to

punish [her] for seeking redress for the violation of her civil
rights.”

J.A. 148.

She repeatedly characterized the list of

adverse employment actions against her as “without limitation.”
J.A. 137, 139.

The injuries Serna identified as a result of the

retaliations included “lost promotions . . . and future lost
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promotions,” J.A. 148, and the wrongdoing she described was not
limited to her immediate supervisors, but rather extended to
USMS management practices more broadly.
Given that one of the purposes of claim preclusion is to
encourage plaintiffs to bring all related claims in the same
lawsuit, it is relevant to our inquiry that Serna could have
brought in her first lawsuit all the claims she alleged in her
second.

As

employment

the

actions

district
Serna

court
alleged

found,
in

her

all

of

second

the

adverse

lawsuit

had

likely come to pass prior to the filing of the amended complaint
in her first lawsuit in August 2010, and certainly before she
and

the

2011.

government

voluntarily

dismissed

the

case

in

August

Although Serna protests that, prior to discovery in the

Valerino case and the outcome of her Freedom of Information Act
requests, she did not have the information necessary to support
the allegations in the second lawsuit, her lack of knowledge of
a

potential

claim

does

not

determine

the

claim-preclusion

inquiry; what matters is that the claim itself existed at the
time of the first lawsuit.

See Harnett, 800 F.2d at 1313; see

also Keith v. Aldridge, 900 F.2d 736, 740 n.5 (4th Cir. 1990)
(“For [claim preclusion] purposes, . . . it is the existence of
the claim, not awareness of it, that controls.”).

In addition,

although Serna argues that confidentiality issues in the first
lawsuit made it impracticable to include her later claims, she
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never attempted to bring those claims in the earlier suit and
test whether they could not in fact be litigated there.
To be sure, the two complaints do not literally allege the
exact same thing.

Serna is correct that the “gist” of her first

lawsuit was the conduct of her immediate supervisors, Br. of
Appellant at 12, whereas the second lawsuit alleged systemic
problems with the USMS’s merit-selection process.

And while the

language of the amended complaint in the first suit was limited
to that of individual Title VII violations, the complaint in the
second suit described statistical disparities in treatment and
impact,

as

activity.

well

as

patterns

and

practices

of

retaliatory

As explained above, however, the legal labels used in

the complaints do not govern the claim-preclusion inquiry; what
matters is that the causes of action in the two lawsuits were
the

same.

between

Thus,

the

whatever

differences

two

lawsuits

do

not

of

emphasis

suffice

to

may

exist

defeat

claim

preclusion, which is intended to prevent the sort of dribbling
of

claims

from

earlier

lawsuits

to

later

ones

that

occurred

here.
Finally, there is the issue of the settlement agreement,
which, as noted above, has claim-preclusive effect to the extent
contemplated
government
scope.

by

take

the

terms

markedly

of

the

different

agreement.
views

of

Serna
the

and

the

agreement’s

The government points to the language that precludes
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“any and all claims, demands[, etc.] . . . against the Attorney
General . . . arising out of transactions, occurrences or events
which were, or could have been, alleged or litigated in this
case.”

Serna, by contrast, notes that the agreement explicitly

does “not affect [Serna’]s participation as a plaintiff in the
action captioned Linda I. Valerino[] et[] al. v. Eric H. Holder
Jr.”

Serna argues that the claims in her second lawsuit were

simply

the

individual

claims

she

raised

as

a

proposed

class

representative in the Valerino class action and that, since her
individual claims were necessary for her to participate as a
class representative, the settlement agreement could not have
been intended to preclude those claims.
While a sufficiently clear agreement between the parties
could

have

operated

as

a

waiver

of

any

defense

of

claim

preclusion arising out of the first lawsuit, the intention of
the parties in executing this particular settlement agreement is
too murky.

Thus, the ordinary principles of claim preclusion

apply,

the

and

affirmative

defense

remained

defendant was able to assert successfully.

one

that

the

See Keith, 900 F.2d

at 741 (“If the parties intended to foreclose through agreement
litigation of a claim, assertion of that claim in a later suit,
whether

or

precluded.

not

formally

presented

in

the

earlier

action,

is

Claim preclusion will not apply, however, if the

parties intended to settle only one part of a single claim and
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intended to leave another part open for future litigation.”)
(citation omitted).

III.
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

we

hold

that

Serna’s

second

lawsuit was barred by the claim-preclusive effects of her first
one.

The district court’s judgment is therefore affirmed.
AFFIRMED

13