Jorge Solomon-Membreno v. Eric Holder, Jr.
Filing
OPINION ATTACHMENT filed. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [13-1491]
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Crime and Violence in Central America:
A Development Challenge
2011
Sustainable Development Department and
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit
Latin America and the Caribbean Region
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Document of the World Bank
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................................................ I
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................II
I. THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM ..................................................................................................................... 1
I.1 WHO ARE THE VICTIMS OF CRIME IN CENTRAL AMERICA? ................................................................................... 3
II. THE COSTS OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE....................................................................................................... 4
II.1 THE DIRECT COSTS OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE ...................................................................................................... 4
II.2 THE GROWTH COSTS OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE .................................................................................................... 6
II.3 CRIME AND VIOLENCE AFFECT THE LEGITIMACY OF JUSTICE SECTOR INSTITUTIONS ........................................... 9
III. THE DRIVERS OF CRIME .............................................................................................................................. 11
III.1 DRUG TRAFFICKING ......................................................................................................................................... 12
III.2 YOUTH VIOLENCE AND GANGS ......................................................................................................................... 15
III.3 THE LEGACY OF THE REGION’S WARS AND THE AVAILABILITY OF FIREARMS ................................................... 19
III.4 ASSESSING THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS...................................................... 21
IV. POLICY OPTIONS ............................................................................................................................................ 22
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IV.1 PREVENTION PROGRAMS .................................................................................................................................. 24
IV.2 CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM ............................................................................................................................. 28
IV.3 REGIONAL APPROACHES .................................................................................................................................. 32
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report was prepared by Rodrigo Serrano-Berthet and Humberto Lopez. It summarizes the main
findings and key policy recommendations of a more detailed World Bank study entitled Volume II: Crime
and Violence in Central America (2010), which was produced by a team led by Bernice van Bronkhorst
and Gabriel Demombynes, and comprised David Varela, Milena Sanchez de Boado, Lorena Cohan,
Facundo Cuevas, Diana Hincapie, Lars Christian Moller, Tirza Rivera-Cira (all World Bank), and Abby
Cordova Guillen (Vanderbilt University), Jeffrey Miron (Harvard University), Tom Boerman and Lainie
Reisman (Washington Office on Latin America), Robert Muggah and Chris Stevenson (Small Arms
Survey, Geneva). Full acknowledgments of those who contributed to this research project appear in
Volume II.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Crime and violence are now a key development issue for Central American countries. In three nations—
El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras—crime rates are among the top five in Latin America. In the
region’s other three countries—Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Panama—crime and violence levels are
significantly lower, but a steady rise in crime rates in recent years has raised serious concern. There is
reason to worry. To put the magnitude of the problem in context, the entire population of Central America
is approximately the same as that of Spain, but while Spain registered 336 murders (i.e., fewer than one
per day) in 2006, Central America recorded 14,257 murders (i.e., almost 40 per day) in the same year.
Beyond the trauma and suffering of individual victims, crime and violence carry staggering economic
costs at the national level. Indeed, some experts estimate these costs at close to eight percent of regional
GDP if citizen security, law enforcement and health care are included. Crime and violence also drag down
economic growth, not just from the victims’ lost wages and labor, but by polluting the investment climate
and diverting scarce government resources to strengthen law enforcement rather than promote economic
activity. Estimates presented in this report suggest that a ten percent reduction in the violence levels of
those Central American countries with the highest murder rates could boost annual economic growth per
capita by as much as a full one percent. Crime and violence also weaken key institutions. Existing
evidence indicates that drug trafficking increases corruption levels in the criminal justice systems of some
Central American countries and tarnishes the legitimacy of state institutions in the public’s mind. On
average, victims of crime tend to: (i) have less trust in the criminal justice system; (ii) support taking the
law into their own hands in larger numbers; and (iii) believe less strongly that the rule of law should
always be respected.
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What is behind crime and violence in Central America? This report presents a detailed analysis of three
main drivers of crime in the region: drug trafficking, youth violence and gangs, and the availability of
firearms. It also examines weak justice institutions as a high risk factor for crime and violence. Our
research led us to conclude the following:
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Drug trafficking is both an important driver of homicide rates in Central America and the main
o. 1
single factor behind rising violence levels in the region. Just one example: hotspot drug
N
trafficking areas tend to experience crime at rates more than 100 percent higher than non-hotspot
areas. Clearly, reducing traffic in illegal drugs, or preventing it altogether, will be key in any
regional strategy to fight crime. This element is even more relevant in light of the magnitude of
drug flows through the region. An estimated 90 percent of the cocaine arriving into the US comes
through the Central America corridor. The associated financial flows are also enormous. The
value added of the Central America corridor’s cocaine flow could be close to five percent of the
regional GDP.
•
Youth violence and gangs are a critical concern in Central America today. Men between the ages
of 15 and 34 account for the overwhelming majority of homicide victims, and they also comprise
the membership of youth gangs. There are more than 900 gangs or maras operating in Central
America today, with an estimated 70,000 members. While gangs are doubtless a major
contributor to crime in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, the very limited evidence indicates
that they are responsible for only a minority share of violence; multiple sources suggest that
perhaps 15 percent of homicides are gang related. Furthermore, reliable data related to the role of
youth gangs in the narcotics trade are scarce. To address issues of youth and gang violence, in the
short run policy makers should borrow from the evidence-based toolkit of programs from other
regions, such as early childhood development and mentoring programs, interventions to increase
ii
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retention of high-risk youth in secondary schools, and opening schools after hours and on
weekends to offer activities to occupy youth’s free time.
•
Availability of firearms. Lengthy civil wars and increases of imported firearms in the years since
have left Central America awash in weapons. Separate studies indicate that some 4.5 million
small arms were in the region in 2007, the vast majority of them illegal. Because of this, firearms
all too often are used in violent crime. A 2008 study conducted in Guatemala by the Genevabased Small Arms Survey found that firearms were overwhelmingly present in reported incidents
of violent crime. Similar results were found in El Salvador.
•
Weak criminal justice institutions limit the efficacy of crime and violence punishment and
prevention. Institutional weaknesses result in a low percentage of crimes being solved and the
perpetrator being punished. For example, in Honduras 63,537 criminal complaints were filed in
2006; of these, 49,198 were referred for investigation and only 1,015 ended in a conviction. Even
so, underreporting is thought to be a major issue in Central America, due to citizens’ low level of
trust in justice sector institutions. Perhaps the most significant obstacle to evidence-based policy
making in the region is the lack of reliable statistics.
Clearly there is no quick and easy fix to Central America’s crime and violence problem. Rather, the
Bank’s analysis indicates policymakers will need to persevere because all indications are that the fight
against crime is likely to be long lasting. In addition, as the Colombian, and more recently, the Mexican,
experiences have shown, policymakers should be aware of the potential high costs of fighting crime when
governments target drug trafficking. Still, fighting crime must be very high on the development agendas
of all Central American countries.
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This report argues that successful strategies require ew along multiple fronts, combining prevention
i actions in the areas of drug trafficking and
and criminal justice reform, together with regional approaches
,v
firearms. It also argues that interventions 91 be evidence based, starting with a clear understanding of
should
4
the risk factors involved and ending with a careful evaluation of how any planned action might affect
-1of national crime reduction plans and the establishment of national
future options. In addition, the design
. 13
cross-sectoral crime commissions are important steps to coordinate the actions of different government
No
branches, ease cross-sectoral collaboration and prioritize resource allocation. Of equal importance is the
fact that national plans offer a vehicle for the involvement of civil society organizations, in which much
of the expertise in violence prevention and rehabilitation resides.
Preventive strategies can work. Existing evidence suggests that the most cost-effective prevention
programs focus on children and families; these include early childhood development, effective parenting
or school-based violence prevention programs. Since some of these programs may pay dividends only in
the medium to long term, they should be complemented by programs that can generate significant shortrun reductions in crime and violence. These include integrated citizen security approaches, particularly at
the local level, that combine modern methods of policing with preventive programs such as situational
crime prevention.
Prevention efforts need to be complemented by effective law enforcement. The required reforms are no
longer primarily legislative in nature because all six countries have advanced toward more transparent
adversarial criminal procedures. The second-generation reforms should instead help deliver on the
promises of previous reforms by: (i) strengthening key institutions and improving the quality and
timeliness of the services they provide to citizens; (ii) improving efficiency and effectiveness while
respecting due process and human rights; (iii) ensuring accountability and addressing corruption; (iv)
increasing inter-agency collaboration; and (v) improving access to justice, especially for poor and
disenfranchised groups. Specific interventions reviewed in the report include: information systems and
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performance indicators as a prerequisite to improve inter-institutional coordination and informationsharing mechanisms; an internal overhaul of court administration and case management to create rapidreaction, one-stop shops; the strengthening of entities that provide legal counseling to the poor and to
women; and the promotion of alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms and the implementation of
community policing programs. The poor reviews of the “mano dura” (“iron fist”) approach suggest
strongly that alternative courses of action should be explored, with due regard for human rights.
All this places the countries of Central America in a difficult situation. The drug war has already brought
extreme levels of violence and damaged criminal justice institutions. Options for dealing with the
tremendous flow of drugs through the region would appear to be limited. Radical changes in drug
policies— including the possible depenalization or decriminalization of some drugs as recommended by
the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy (2009)—are simply beyond the capacity of the
six nations and can only be contemplated within an international framework that includes the largest
producer and consumer countries.
Our analysis leads us to conclude that there are some preferable policy options available to Central
American countries with relation to drug trafficking:
•
Given the high levels of drug-related corruption in the criminal justice systems and the vast
resources of the traffickers, evidence suggests that directing more resources to drug enforcement
efforts is not likely to reduce violence in Central America. To the extent this approach is used, we
believe a regional, coordinated effort stands a greater chance of some success. To address drugrelated corruption and impunity, the Guatemalan experience with the International Commission
against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala,
CICIG) is worth considering as it provided a suitable channel to bring international investigative
expertise to Guatemala and has been very helpful in resolving high-profile cases.
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These two broad options are not
Devote resources to address domestic drug use through public health and harm reduction
programs, including greater investment in education campaigns, treatment for users, and drug use
prevention.
violence if they are devoted to crime prevention efforts and mitigating the damage from drugs. Within the
region, policies should focus on strengthening criminal justice systems, limiting the availability of
firearms, and providing meaningful alternatives to at-risk youth.
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I. THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM
Central America’s hopes for a rebirth following the region’s civil wars have been dimmed by
another plague: a torrent of crime and violence that first engulfed El Salvador, Honduras and
Guatemala and now threatens Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama. To grasp the magnitude of this
new wave of unrest, consider the following: Spain and Central America both have populations of
about 40 million people, yet Spain registered 336 murders in 2006 (i.e., fewer than one per day)
while Central America registered 14,257 (i.e., almost 40 per day).
Figure 1. Homicide Rates in Latin America and the
El Salvador has the highest homicide rate in Latin Caribbean (c. 2006)
America (58 per 100,000 inhabitants), and two
El Salvador
other Central American countries, Guatemala,
Venezuela
and Honduras with homicide rates of 45 and 43
Jamaica
Guatemala
per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively, are
Honduras
among the top five of the region. The homicide
Colombia
rate for Central America as a whole is 35.4 per
Brazil
100,000 inhabitants, compared to around 20 per
Ecuador
100,000 for all of Latin America.
Dominican Rep.
Paraguay
Haiti
Panama
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Costa Rica
43
37
26
18
16
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Nicaragua
Homicide rates remain low in Panama,
Nicaragua, and Costa Rica—about half that of
Latin America as a whole—but there is now
concern over increasing violence in these
countries as well. 1 These worries are
compounded by fears of contagion from their
three more violence-prone northern Central
American neighbors and the prospect that they
too could become havens for the drug
trafficking that drives the high crime rates in the
northern Central triangle.
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49
11
8
6
Peru
Argentina
5
Bolivia
5
Uruguay
4
Chile
2
0
20
40
60
80
Homicides per 100,000 Population
Admittedly, other measures of violent crime in Central America, such as robbery and burglary
rates or overall victimization rates, are far less dramatic than homicide rates. For example, data
from a victimization survey conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP),
reported in Figure 2, indicate that while Guatemala and El Salvador have robbery rates above the
Latin American regional average, those of the other four Central American countries are below
that average. Similarly, statistics for burglary indicate that all Central American countries come in
below the Latin American regional average. Four Central American countries also have overall
victimization rates (which measure crime without specifying its type) below the regional average
and the Central American countries with the worst statistics—El Salvador and Guatemala—are
not very far from the average (8th and 9th in the ranking), according to the LAPOP data.
1
For example, victimization rates appear to have doubled in Costa Rica between 1997 and 2008.
1
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Figure 2. Robbery, Burglary and Victimization Rates in Latin America
Robbery rates
Burglary rates
15.6%
Ecuador
Haiti
12.0%
Haiti
10.6%
El Salvador
Brazil
7.3%
Bolivia
Honduras
Nicaragua
5.6%
Paraguay
5.6%
Costa Rica
4.1%
Panama
3.8%
Uruguay
3.5%
5.4%
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ie
4.6%
4.4%
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4.3%
149
Colombia
o.
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0
5
10
15
20
% of Adults Victimized by Armed Robbery in Past 12 Months
Nicaragua
Panama
4.0%
Jamaica
3.5%
Honduras
0
2
4
17%
16%
Brazil
Mexico
16%
Costa Rica
16%
Colombia
16%
15%
14%
14%
Honduras
Jamaica
6
8
10
% of Adults Victimed by House Burglary in Past 12 Months
Source: World Bank analysis of LAPOP data (2008).
2
8%
Panama
2.9%
19%
17%
Haiti
3.7%
19%
17%
Dominican Rep.
3.8%
Mexico
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Paraguay
5.5%
El Salvador
31
Guatemala
5.7%
Guatemala
5.0%
Jamaica
6.2%
Nicaragua
5.3%
Dominican Republic
Bolivia
Costa Rica
5.7%
21%
El Salvador
Venezuela
5.8%
Mexico
6.5%
Dominican Republic
6.1%
22%
Uruguay
Venezuela
6.5%
Ecuador
6.5%
Peru
22%
Brazil
8.0%
Colombia
7.3%
23%
Chile
Paraguay
8.6%
Chile
25%
Ecuador
7.4%
Chile
11.4%
Guatemala
Peru
8.4%
Bolivia
28%
Argentina
8.7%
Peru
12.1%
Argentina
9.0%
Uruguay
13.3%
Venezuela
Overall victimization rates
8%
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
% of Adults Victimized by Crime in Past 12 Months
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Despite the more positive robbery and victimization statistics, it is the high homicide rates that explain
why crime and violence are a key concern of the Central American population. Indeed, across all six
Central American countries, 71 percent of the adult population said they view crime as a major threat to
future well-being, and more than 50 percent believe high crime rates would justify a military coup.
I.1 Who are the victims of crime in Central America?
The answer to this question depends on how crime statistics are analyzed. For example, age is important.
In Central America, young people, particularly young men, comprise the bulk of both perpetrators and
victims of violence. A Nicaraguan study of 186 individuals arrested for murder in 2006 found that nearly
half were between the ages of 15 and 25. Similarly, for most countries in the region young men between
the ages of 15 and 34 comprise about 60 percent of all homicide victims. The exception is Costa Rica,
where this figure is above 40 percent.
The fact that the majority of homicides involve men as either victims or perpetrators should not diminish
the importance of violence against women. In fact, available information for Honduras and Nicaragua
indicates that about 17 to 19 percent of never-married women have experienced violence, 15 to 17 percent
have suffered violence at the hands of a family member or spouse/partner, and 12 to 14 percent have been
victimized by a spouse or live-in partner. Many incidents of domestic violence go unreported to
authorities, and in victimization surveys women are often reluctant to acknowledge abuse by a partner or
family member. Therefore, these figures probably understate the true extent of the problem.
Guatemala
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Figure 3. Homicide Rates by Subnational Areas
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El Salvador
Nicaragua
Panama
Costa Rica
Source: Cuevas and Demombynes (2009).
A second dimension of crime relates to its geographic distribution. Figure 3 shows that homicide numbers
in some areas of the northern Central American triangle approach 100 per 100,000 inhabitants, whereas in
Costa Rica and Panama to the south, it is hard to find an area that goes above 20 per 100,000 inhabitants.
Within countries, El Salvador and Honduras have no area with crime rates below 5 per 100,000
inhabitants. However, Guatemala does: homicides are highest around the capital, with high rates also a
3
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factor in the sparsely populated Petén region in the north. In Honduras, rates are highest along the
Atlantic coast, in the area around Tegucigalpa, and on the Guatemalan border. In the remaining countries,
homicides tend to be higher on the Atlantic coast.
Income levels are also a factor. An analysis of household data in Guatemala indicates that the probability
of being a crime victim increases with socioeconomic status; thus, in relative terms, crime affects the
affluent more than the poor. This applies regardless of the type of crime, although in relative terms the
affluent tend to be at greater risk of assault and robbery than their poorer counterparts. Well-off people
are ten times more likely to be assaulted than extremely poor people and three times more likely to be
assaulted as those who are marginally poor. There was a similar finding in Costa Rica, where the
probability of a household having at least one member victimized by crime increases with per capita
income, to the extent that a person in the highest quintile of the income distribution has a 36 percent
chance of falling victim to a violent crime—nearly twice the 20 percent probability rate for those in the
lowest quintile. However, the differences have narrowed over time. In 1997, a household in the top
quintile of income distribution was twice as likely to fall victim to a crime as a household in the bottom
quintile. That ratio for the two households fell to 1.8 in 2008. Although wealthier households have a
higher tendency to be targets of crime, Costa Rican data also reveal that poorer households appear to be
subject to more severe types of crime. Among affected households in the bottom quintile, three in ten had
suffered crimes of aggression, compared to just 20 percent for victimized households in the wealthiest
quintile.
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2are/several elements to the social
Because crime and violence affect people’s lives in many ways, 7/
there
costs of criminal activities. The most obvious are the physicald emotional costs to the victims, whether
and
e
individuals or businesses. Other direct costs to individuals and businesses include private security or the
e the
iandw institutional costs incurred by government for
need to alter homes, factories and other workplaces,
1, v
additional police and judicial procedures. Beyond these direct costs, the negative impact of crime and
9
violence on the investment climate-14 its own costs. The study by Alaimo et al. (2009) concluded that
carries
criminal activity lowers productivity and that businesses hit by crime have significantly lower sales per
. 13
worker than those unaffected by criminal activity. Given the key role of productivity for economic
o
growth, it should be Nsurprise that crime and violence reduce a nation’s GDP growth. Then there are the
no
II. THE COSTS OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE
less visible costs that are nearly impossible to measure, such as the erosion of public trust in the criminal
justice system, the increased support for vigilantism, and the conviction that authorities do not need to
respect the law when pursuing criminals, all of which accompany higher crime rates according to
available evidence. These issues are analyzed below.
II.1 The direct costs of crime and violence
One way to assess the direct costs of violence is the “accounting approach,” which identifies broad cost
categories related to losses and damages associated with crime and crime prevention activities, and then
attaches a dollar value to each of them to obtain a total figure. Although these estimates provide only a
rough approximation of the true costs, the exercise can be useful to: (i) summarize the many direct costs
of crime; (ii) provide a key input to assess the cost-effectiveness of crime-fighting interventions; and (iii)
measure the effectiveness of an intervention.
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Figure 4. The Health Costs of Crime and Violence
Value of Disability-Adjusted Life Years
1.99% of GDP
(US$271 million)
El Salvador
1.43% of GDP
(US$289 million)
Guatemala
1.31% of GDP
(US$61 million)
Honduras
1.2% of GDP
(US$25 billion)
All LAC
Nicaragua
Panama
Costa Rica
0.96% of GDP
(US$38 million)
0.63% of GDP
(US$76 million)
0.58% of GDP
(US$96 million)
The World Health Organization
(WHO) provides a technique to
compute the health costs associated
with crime and violence, called
“disability-adjusted life years lost” or
DALYs. DALYs quantify the effects
of threats to health, including disease
and violence, associated with any
given health condition in a particular
country. Thus, DALYs provide an
estimate of years of life lost due to
premature mortality and disability.
Once DALYs are computed, they can
be translated into dollar terms by
monetizing time in each country,
using, for example, annual GDP per
capita to value one DALY.
Against this background, Figure 4
shows the estimated value of DALYs
for the six Central American countries as well as the average for all of Latin America. The figure
indicates that for Central America as a whole, the health costs of crime and violence (as a percentage of
annual GDP) are similar to the average costs in Latin America. However, this is a source of little comfort
for the people of El Salvador, a country that has the second highest DALY costs in Latin America behind
Colombia, and ranks 12th worldwide. Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua rank 21st, 36th and 40th,
respectively, in the worldwide DALY ranking. At the other extreme, Panama and Costa Rica have the
lowest costs.
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Source: World Bank analysis based on LAPOP surveys (see Volume II).
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In the business sector, data collected in the 2006 Enterprise Surveys show that, excluding Costa Rica, the
total security-related costs and losses of Central American companies averaged 3.7 percent of sales
(Figure 5), a figure significantly higher than the 2.8 percent average for Latin America and the Caribbean
as a whole. Moreover, of those five countries, only Panama had criminal activity costs below the regional
average. In the other four, these costs range from 3.1 percent in Nicaragua to 4.5 percent in El Salvador
and Honduras, with Guatemala somewhat in between (3.9 percent). The high costs of crime in these
countries act as a drag on competitiveness, reduce profit margins, and can make the difference in whether
a company survives or fails.
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Figure 5. Firms’ Security Costs and Losses Due to Crime as a Percentage of Firm Sales,
2006
% of Firm Sales
5
4
4.5%
4.5%
Security Costs
3.9%
3.7%
Losses
3.1%
3
2.8%
2.5%
2
1
0
El
Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Panama
Salvador
5 CA
Countries
Latin
America
Source: World Bank analysis of 2006 Enterprise Surveys.
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In Guatemala, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has conducted detailed studies using
the accounting approach (UNDP 2006). Similarly, a report prepared for El Salvador’s National Security
Council (Acevedo 2008) applies the UNDP estimates along with data from a variety of sources to
generate comparable estimates for all Central American countries except Panama. The costs considered in
the Acevedo study are grouped in four categories: health costs, institutional costs, private security costs,
and material costs. Health costs include medical expenses, lost production due to death and injury, and the
costs of victims’ emotional suffering. Institutional costs cover added government spending on security
and the justice system. Private security costs include households and businesses. Material costs
encompass property losses suffered by individuals and businesses.
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The main results of theo.
accounting approach are summarized in Table 1. Overall, for the five countries
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included in the analysis (Panama was not covered in the Acevedo report), the economic cost of crime and
violence totals 7.7 percent of GDP. Costs to Guatemala equaled the regional average, while those for
Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador all exceeded 9 percent of GDP. Costa Rica’s costs were barely onethird of that percentage as a share of GDP, yet still significant at 3.6 percent. Health care costs, including
those for emotional suffering, were the largest single share of the added financial burden for all countries
surveyed, ranging from 1.5 percent of GDP in Costa Rica to 6.1 percent of GDP in El Salvador.
Institutional costs were estimated at between 1 percent of GDP for Costa Rica and Guatemala and 2.3
percent of GDP for Honduras. Combined security and material costs totaled between 1.1 percent of GDP
in Costa Rica and 3.8 percent of GDP in Nicaragua.
II.2 The growth costs of crime and violence
Beyond these direct costs, crime and violence significantly dampen the business investment climate,
skewing the calculations that shape opportunities and incentives for firms to invest productively, create
jobs and expand. Three main cost factors are included in the investment decision: (i) the potential losses
to criminal activity discussed above; (ii) the cost of diverting resources from productive (and hence
growth-enhancing) activities to crime prevention; and (iii) lost productivity resulting from crime-caused
fear, increased absenteeism or limitation of working hours to times of the day when workers are not
concerned with personal security. In World Bank Enterprise Surveys, crime tends to appear in all Central
American countries as one of the main constraints to productivity and growth. Table 2 shows the
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constraints mentioned frequently in these surveys as being “major” or “severe.” The results indicate that
in five of the six Central American countries (the exception is Costa Rica), crime appears among the top
five constraints.
Table 1. Total Economic Costs of Crime and Violence as Percentage of GDP
Type of Cost
Guatemala
El Salvador Honduras
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Millions of US$
Health costs
Medical attention
Lost production
Emotional damage
1281
69
521
691
1144
82
430
632
360
24
114
222
241
44
35
162
325
10
113
202
Institutional costs
Public security
Administration of justice
305
212
93
285
160
125
239
145
95
87
51
36
221
85
137
Private security costs
Households
Businesses
459
135
324
329
72
257
176
44
132
Material costs (transfers)
245
TOTAL
1, v
2291
9
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3 4.3%
o. 1
N
Health costs
Medical attention
Lost production
Emotional damage
d
we
2010
ie
253
22/
7/
110
014
2
885
124
31
93
150
38
113
78
94
529
791
As percentage of GDP
0.2%
1.8%
2.3%
6.1%
0.4%
2.3%
3.4%
3.9%
0.3%
1.2%
2.4%
4.5%
0.8%
0.7%
3.1%
1.5%
0.0%
0.5%
0.9%
Institutional costs
Public security
Administration of justice
1.0%
0.7%
0.3%
1.5%
0.9%
0.7%
2.6%
1.6%
1.0%
1.6%
1.0%
0.7%
1.0%
0.4%
0.6%
Private security costs
Households
Businesses
1.5%
0.5%
1.1%
1.8%
0.4%
1.4%
1.9%
0.5%
1.4%
2.3%
0.6%
1.8%
0.7%
0.2%
0.5%
Material costs (transfers)
0.8%
1.4%
1.2%
1.5%
0.4%
TOTAL
7.7%
10.8%
Source: Acevedo (2008).
Note: Panama was not included in the original analysis.
9.6%
10.0%
3.6%
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Table 2. Top Five Constraints to Productivity and Growth in Central America1/
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Access to finance
Crime
Corruption
Macroeconomic instability
Practices of informal competitors Electricity
Practices of informal competitors Access to finance
Macroeconomic instability
Corruption
Corruption
Practices of informal competitors
Tax rates
Macroeconomic instability
Crime
Honduras
Access to finance
Corruption
Crime
Macroeconomic instability
Practices of informal competitors
Nicaragua
Access to finance
Corruption
Macroeconomic instability
Practices of informal competitors
Crime
Panama
Electricity
Corruption
Crime
Tax rates
Macroeconomic instability
1/
The table reports the top five constraints to productivity and growth as identified by Central American firms in the
Bank’s Enterprise Surveys.
Source: Alaimo et al. (2009).
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Beyond boardroom perceptions, crime also appears in the statistical analysis of Alaimo et al. (2009) as
one of the main constraints to productivity and growth. The analysis relies on data from 10,000-plus Latin
American businesses to estimate a company’s productivity through measures such as sales per worker and
value added per worker as well as the investment climate, including the crime rate. Those projections
indicate that a 1 percent rise in corporate losses due to crime can trigger a drop in productivity ranging
from 5 to 10 percent, depending on a variety of other factors. This impact of crime on productivity makes
crime rates one of the most important factors in an econometric model that also explores the role of
investment climate attributes such as corruption, regulation, physical infrastructure, human capital or
access to finance.
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3-1
o. 1Policy Priorities to Improve Central America’s Productivity
Table 3. Top Three
N
1/
Costa Rica
Regulatory environment
Crime
Infrastructure
Honduras
Corporate governance
Regulatory environment
Crime
El Salvador
Regulatory environment
Corporate governance
Crime
Nicaragua
Corporate governance
Regulatory environment
Crime
Guatemala
Regulatory environment
Crime
Corporate governance
Panama
Regulatory environment
Crime
Technology
1/
The table reports the areas that would raise productivity the most if all investment climate attributes were to take
the value of the firm in the 75th percentile (same industry and firm size).
Source: Alaimo et al. (2009).
Moreover, when Alaimo et al. (2009) explored areas that policy makers need to address to improve the
region’s productivity, they found that crime concerns should be one of the top three priorities in all six
Central American countries (Table 3).
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Apart from crime’s impact on productivity, a World Bank study (World Bank 2006) projected how much
economic growth could increase if crime and violence were to decline. An econometric model was used
to simulate how a drop in crime would influence growth.
Increase in Annual Per Capita Income Growth
Figure 6: Potential Boost to Annual Economic Growth Rate from
Reducing Homicide Rate by 10%
1.2%
1.0%
1.0%
0.8%
0.7%
0.7%
0.6%
0.4%
0.3%
0.3%
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0.2%
0.0%
El Salvador Guatemala Honduras
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Nicaragua
Panama
Figure 6 shows the results of
these simulations. It indicates
that a reduction in violence
levels of countries with the
highest murder rates could
potentially produce very large
economic gains. For example,
the estimates imply that a 10
percent drop in the homicide
rate could boost per capita
annual income growth by a full
1.0 percent in El Salvador and
by 0.7 percent in Guatemala
and Honduras. If Nicaragua
and Panama achieved similar
cuts, their growth rate would
rise by 0.3 percent. Although
these estimates may exaggerate
the exact potential for growth,
they nonetheless indicate that
crime and violence do carry
significant costs in terms of
growth.
1,ofv sector institutions
9
II.3 Crime and violence affect the legitimacy justice
-14
A third cost of crime and violence involves changes in way crime victims—and those fearful of becoming
. 13
o
victims—view state N
institutions and how these changes can undermine good governance. The emotional
Source: World Bank (2006).
shock of being targeted, combined with first-hand experience of the criminal justice system or greater
awareness of negative media coverage about the inability of the institutions to cope with crime and
violence, all can erode an individual’s confidence in the way authorities and individual citizens confront
crime. Research set out in Figure 7 shows that, on average, crime victims: (i) have less trust in the
criminal justice system; (ii) are more likely to approve of taking the law into their own hands; and (iii)
believe less that the rule of law should always be respected. Most notably, these effects are greater in
countries with higher levels of violence. Indeed, in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, crime victims
are 6.5 percent more likely to approve of taking the law into their own hands and are 9 percent less likely
to believe that the rule of law should always be respected.
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Figure 7. Effect of Crime and Violence on Attitudes toward State Institutions in Latin America
Trust in criminal justice system
Approval of taking law in own hands Belief that authorities should respect rule of law
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
DR
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
-12 -11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
DR
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
,v
491
-1 0
0
Change in Index(Range: 0-100)
1
2
3
ed
iew
4
5
6
7
8
014
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7
9 10 11 12
Change in Index (Range: 0-100)
3-1
.1
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
DR
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
-12 -11 -10 -9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
Change in Index (Range: 0-100)
Source: Demombynes (2009). The figures show how attitudes change when a person is victimized, i.e., attitudes with regard to trust in the criminal justice
system, approval of taking the law in one’s own hands, and belief that authorities should respect the rule of law. Estimates are based on the coefficients on crime
victimization from country-specific regressions of the different indexes on crime victimization and a set of control variables. Regressions include fixed effects at
the sampling cluster level. Dependent variables are indexes with ranges from 0 to 100.
No
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The impact of crime and violence on the legitimacy of state institutions is particularly relevant in the
Central American context where governance (as measured by the World Bank’s Governance Indicators)
is already an issue of concern. For example, Nicaragua and Honduras fall in the lowest quintile of the
Indicator for Control of Corruption (Figure 8, Panel A). In Latin America, only Haiti, Venezuela and
Paraguay score lower. Similarly, when the focus is the Rule of Law, Guatemala is near the bottom 10
percent, while Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador are in the bottom third of the rankings. Even more
worrisome, governance indicators have declined in all four countries in recent years.
Figure 8. Governance Indicators in Central America1/
Panel A. Ranking (%) corruption and rule of law
Panel B. % of firms declaring to pay bribes
Control of corruption
Rule of Law
40
80
35
70
30
60
25
50
20
40
15
30
20
10
5
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/
10
0
0
NIC
HND
GTM
ELS
PAN
CRI
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HND
GTM
ELS
CRI
PAN
Panel A shows Central American country rankings on two of the World Bank Governance Indicators (100 is best
possible score) and Panel B shows the percentage of firms that declare paying bribes, according to the World Bank
Investment Climate Surveys.
Source: Governance indicators (2008) and Fajnzylber, Guasch and Lopez (2009).
491
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. 13
No
Similarly, the World Bank’s Investment Climate Surveys found that nearly one third of the companies
surveyed in Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador said they had paid bribes to do business, a
reality that lowers corporate productivity (Figure 8, Panel B). The exceptions to poor governance in
Central America are Costa Rica and Panama. They tend to have governance indicators that rank in the
upper half of the global sample and have the lowest percentage of companies reporting that they paid
bribes. Still, as noted above, their citizens and businesses are also concerned with the upward trends in
crime and violence and with how a significant increase could affect their countries’ institutions.
III. THE DRIVERS OF CRIME
This report analyzes the key drivers of crime and violence in Central America: drug trafficking, youth
violence and gangs, and the widespread availability of firearms. Drug trafficking stokes violence in
several ways, including fighting between and within trafficking organizations, and fighting between
traffickers and law enforcement officials, adding to the availability of firearms and weakening the
criminal justice system by diverting judicial resources or corrupting the criminal justice system itself.
Most perpetrators and victims of crime and violence are young people, mainly young men. The third main
contributing factor to criminal violence in the region is the legacy of armed conflict and the widespread
availability of firearms.
A detailed analysis of these factors is presented below.
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III.1 Drug trafficking
.
U.
S
Ho
nd
ur
as
G
ua
te
m
al
a
ta
Co
s
Ni
ca
ra
gu
a
Ri
ca
a
na
m
Pa
Co
lo
m
bi
a
Wholesale price per kilo (US$)
Figure 9. Price of Cocaine along Atlantic Coast
Central America is a pivotal transportation
route for drugs bound for the United States.
Although this traffic includes some marijuana
$35,000
and heroin produced in the region, cocaine
$30,500
$30,000
shipped from South America is the dominant
commodity. The United States Government
$25,000
estimates that 90 percent of all cocaine
entering the US (approximately 560 metric
$20,000
tons in 2007) comes through the Mexico–
$15,000
Central America corridor. Official seizure
$10,500
$13,000
figures show that 72 metric tons (13 percent)
$10,000
$6,500
were intercepted in Central America.
$4,000
$5,000
According to studies by the United Nations
$1,000
$2,500
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the
$0
dominance of the Central American transit
corridor is a phenomenon of the last two
decades. Until the early to mid-1990s, most
cocaine was shipped through the Caribbean
until greater law enforcement interdiction in
the Caribbean and the rise of the Mexican drug cartels drove traffickers to the Central America–Mexico
route (UNODC 2008).
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The wholesale value of cocaine as it moves north along the Atlantic coast route between Colombia and
the United States offers a lesson in the economics of the drug trade. Figure 9 shows the wholesale prices
of cocaine in the Central America corridor. It shows how the cost of a newly minted kilo of cocaine
begins at approximately US$1,000 on the Caribbean coast of Colombia; the cost rises sharply in value as
the cocaine passes through Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Honduras, reaching US$100,000. For
Central America, the money at stake in this trade is enormous. The 560 metric tons of cocaine shipped
through the region is equivalent to 14 grams for each of the 40 million people in Central America—an
amount that carries a street value in the United States of about US$2,300 2 or more than half the US$4,200
estimated 2009 per capita GDP of Honduras. Given such figures, the resources of traffickers are massive.
The value added to cocaine as it moves through the region is roughly 20 times Panama’s and Guatemala’s
combined 2007 defense budgets of US$364 million. It also dwarfs (by more than 100 times) the relatively
small US$65 million allocated by the United States under the Mérida Initiative to assist interdiction
efforts by Central American nations.
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Figure 10 shows the regional drug trafficking patterns, measured by the volume of drug seizures (cocaine
plus cannabis) measured in kilos per 100,000 people. Seizures are not an ideal measure because the
volume of seizures is as much a function of law enforcement efficiency as the volume of drugs trafficked.
However, high volumes of seizures in a particular area are at the very least an indicator of high-level
trafficking. The map below shows substantial variation both across and within countries in terms of
exposure to drug traffic. Panama stands out from the rest due both to its proximity to Colombia and to its
role as the point of entry to Central America. Within countries, seizures are generally greater closer to the
coasts.
2
This calculation is based on the US Drug Enforcement Agency’s report which indicated that the retail price of
cocaine in June 2007 was US$166.90/gram.
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Figure 10. Intensity of Drug Trafficking
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Source: Cuevas and Demombynes (2009)
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Anecdotal evidence indicates that drug use is prevalent among certain populations and in areas where
drug traffickers employ locals and pay them with drugs. However, surveys of drug use among secondary
school students—clearly a limited group that is not representative of the overall population—find very
low levels of drug use in Central America. Still, this does not prevent one of the most pervasive byproducts of the drug-trafficking industry: violence.
1, v
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-1
3specific to Central America on the links between drugs and violence,
Although there is little evidence
o.of1 on the issue itself. Goldstein’s influential formulation (1985) cites
there is a substantialN
body literature
three possible ways in which illicit drugs can generate violence: (i) violence triggered by the effects of a
drug on the user; (ii) violence undertaken to generate money to purchase drugs (economic–compulsive);
and (iii) violence associated with disputes over drug territory, drug debts and other issues related to the
drug trade (systemic).
According to MacCoun, Kilmer, and Reuter’s review (2003), the “prevailing view about
psychopharmacological...violence is that it is rare and attributable mostly to alcohol rather than illicit
drugs.” The same review also concludes that, with the exception of heroin addicts, “economic–
compulsive criminality is relatively rare.” That leaves only the third category—systemic violence
associated with the business of drugs—as the main explanation for the drugs–violence connection. Both
psychopharmacological and economic–compulsive connections are associated with drug consumption,
while systemic links are tied chiefly to trafficking. Given the lack of any evidence that drug consumption
has jumped in Central America as the region has become one of the world’s major drug transport
corridors, these systemic links are almost certainly behind the drugs–violence connection.
Systemic ties between drugs and violence fall into a number of subcategories.
•
Between trafficking organizations. Drug traffickers have no access to the courts or other legal
mechanisms. They cannot use the legal system to adjudicate commercial disputes such as
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nonpayment of debts. They cannot sue for product liability, nor can sellers use the courts to
enforce payment. Rival groups cannot use advertising to compete for market share and thus they
wage violent turf battles instead. Because of all this, disagreements between drug traffickers are
more likely to be resolved with violence. It seems likely that at least a portion of the murders in
Central America are linked to such disagreements because so much of the region’s trafficking
involves the transfer of narcotics between Colombian and Mexican organizations.
•
Within drug trafficking organizations. Because they are black-market organizations, drug
cartels do not establish formal structures within the law. For example, they cannot report
employees for misuse of company funds or property without risking prosecution themselves.
Consequently, power relationships are by nature informal. Within such a system, violence is often
the disciplinary tool of choice for organization leaders and can also be a path to upward mobility
within the organization. Although it is extremely difficult to gauge, we suggest that this accounts
for at least some of the homicides in the region.
•
Diversion of criminal justice resources or corruption of the criminal justice system itself.
Many researchers have noted that, even in a perfectly functioning criminal justice system, drug
trafficking can indirectly increase violence if criminal justice resources are diverted to anti-drug
efforts in a way that reduces the system’s ability to handle non-drug crime. In countries hard hit
by drug trafficking, the damage can be more severe. Where drug trafficking corrupts the criminal
justice system by buying off senior government officials, police, judges and prosecutors, the
system’s ability to effectively handle non-drug crime can be crippled, leading to higher levels of
crime and violence not associated with drugs. Furthermore, traffickers who have already
corrupted the justice system through payoffs or threats to the authorities so they no longer fear
prosecution may be more likely to use violence to settle disputes unrelated to trafficking.
Although direct evidence is not available, we believe this channel accounts for a large portion of
the drugs–violence connection in the region. There is evidence that corruption is a significant
problem in the police and criminal justice systems of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, and
has undoubtedly restricted the authorities’ ability to confront violence. The establishment of the
International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión Internacional Contra la
Impunidad en Guatemala, CICIG) reflects the inability of regular state authorities to handle
investigations against powerful interests entrenched in government. In a study conducted on
public insecurity in Central America and Mexico, as part of the Americas Barometer Insights
Series 2009 (Cruz 2009), the perception that local police are involved in crime (47.7 percent of
respondents believed they were) appeared as the third most important contributor to feelings of
insecurity, after drug trafficking and the presence of gangs.
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•
The spread of guns. If trafficking brings more firearms or heavier weapons into an area, their
availability can facilitate violence, whether or not that violence is related to the drug trade.
Research in the United States has suggested that violence was prevalent around the period of the
US crack epidemic because the trade fueled demand for firearms (Blumstein 2000; Blumstein and
Cork 1996; Cork 1999). The Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy highlighted
this linkage: “The relationship between homicide, firearms, and drug commerce is central. Drugs
finance the purchase of firearms, which sustain gang wars for control of territories and
trafficking.”
•
Enforcement of prohibition. Enforcement of anti-drug laws involves arresting people, seizing
drugs, and conducting other activities that carry with them the risk of a violent confrontation
between law enforcement agents and suspected drug law violators.
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III.2 Youth violence and gangs
Youth violence is a critical concern in Central America, especially the problem of youth gangs, which are
perceived as a main driver of violent crime in the region. However, youth violence extends beyond youth
gangs alone. Although gangs have been blamed for a range of violent crimes, there has been little
empirical analysis of gangs, and reliable data on the role of youth gangs in the narcotics trade is scarce.
While the number of deportees in Central America has skyrocketed since 2002, evidence to tie criminal
deportees with youth gangs is scant, suggesting a weaker link than generally portrayed.
Youth, mainly young men, comprise the bulk of both victims and perpetrators of violence in Central
America. Data from Nicaragua (2006) show that nearly half of those arrested in connection with homicide
were between the ages of 15 and 25. In El Salvador (2000), positively identified perpetrators of violent
crimes were mostly young men with a peak age of 23. Young men are also the principal victims of
homicides: in all six Central American countries, about 30 percent of all homicide victims were males
between the ages of 15 and 34.
The two major gangs in Central America, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) and 18th Street, have their roots
in the US. Beginning in the early 1980s, nearly a million Central Americans fled to the US to escape the
violence and hardship of civil conflict in the region. Living in poverty and marginalized by other groups,
a small percentage became involved with gangs. Some joined 18th Street, a primarily Mexican gang
established many years prior to the wave of Central American immigration, while others formed MS13.
During the mid-1990s, many Central Americans, including some gang members, were deported to their
countries of birth, where some became involved in criminal activity and replicated the 18th Street and
MS13 gangs. Over time, high-profile acts of violence brought gangs into the public view. Governments
responded by implementing a variety of mano dura policies that emphasized repression and law
enforcement and minimized prevention, rehabilitation and social reintegration of gang members.
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3-1Number of Gangs
Gang Members
o. 1
36,000
112
N
Table 4. Estimates of Gang Membership by Country
Country
Honduras
Guatemala
El Salvador
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Panama
Belize
Total
14,000
10,500
4,500
2,660
1,385
100
69,145
434
4
268
6
94
2
920
Source: Central American and Caribbean Commission of
Police Chiefs
However, reliable analysis of the gang
phenomenon has been hampered by everchanging, often arbitrary, definitions of
“gang,” “gang member,” and “gang crime.”
Given this confusion, it is not surprising that
there is little agreement on how many gang
members there are in the region. Estimates
range from about 10,000 to over 300,000
members, with the most commonly accepted
estimates at around 70,000 (Table 4). Of that
total, the vast majority are in El Salvador,
Guatemala and Honduras.
Data on gangs as instigators of violence in Central America also vary wildly, often depending on the
country and the institution collecting the data. This all underlines the need for improved data collection on
gangs, not only within but also across countries. However, where reliable information does exist, it casts
doubt on the perception that youth gangs are responsible for the majority of crime and violence. There are
also are a number of case studies that can be used to gain a better understanding of the role played by
gangs.
Table 5, which includes data collected by El Salvador’s Institute of Legal Medicine, depicts the
established motives for homicides in El Salvador between 2003 and 2006, during which no more than
13.4 percent of total homicides were attributed to gangs. Among homicides for which motives could be
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identified, gang crime represented a minority. Many murders were classified simply as “common crime,”
while nearly 60 percent of homicides recorded in 2005 were listed as having “unknown motives.”
Collectively, this suggests the need to qualify claims that gang-related crimes were a minority among total
crimes, given the possibility that at least some of those crimes with no known motive could be gangrelated. About one quarter of those crimes recorded in 2006 with known motives were gang related.
Table 5: Motives for Murder in El Salvador
Motive
2003
2004
2005
Common crime
23.3%
57.4%
33.7%
2006
18.2%
Gang Crime
Unknown
Others
10.7%
59.1%
12%
8%
28.9%
5.7%
9.9%
48.4%
8%
13.4%
59%
4.3%
Source: Institute of Legal Medicine, El Salvador
Guatemala is another case in which data paint a mixed picture on the overall contribution of gangs to
violent crimes. For example, during a month in which the number of homicides was especially high,
police statistics attributed only 14 percent of them to gangs. Moreover, the majority of murders during
that period occurred in areas where gang presence was minimal, but where the presence of organized
crime and drug trafficking was high (Lara 2006). Additional data from Guatemala on the number of gang
members in prison and why they were there, suggest that gang members might not be as violent as the
public believes. Data from the Guatemalan penitentiary system indicate that gang members accounted for
5.8 percent of the total number of arrestees in June 2006, a figure suggesting that others are behind the
high levels of violence in Guatemala. Furthermore, 2004 data from the Guatemalan National Police
showed that drugs were the primary reason for arrests of gang members (23 percent), followed by robbery
(20.4 percent). Homicides caused gang member detentions in only 1.8 percent of cases.
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However, other data from Guatemala suggest that gangs might play a larger role in violence. A study
conducted by the Office of the Attorney General for Human Rights (Procuradoría de Derechos
Humanos), which analyzed the causes of death for youth aged 25 and under for the period of July 2002
through August 2003, found that 27.4 percent of these deaths were caused by gang-member attacks on
non-gang youths (Ranum IUDOP 3). The study showed that in total, gangs were responsible for about one
third of all deaths covered by the research, including those between gang members and from gang
members leaving their gang. Although deaths caused by gangs accounted for 27.4 percent of all deaths of
those under age 25, common criminal acts accounted for a marginally higher percentage of deaths of this
age group: 28.5 percent (Ranum IUDOP). Again, data are ambiguous about gang involvement in these
criminal acts, further reducing clarity on the issue.
Honduras is a third country with information on the role of gangs. Data collected by Casa Alianza (an
international NGO dedicated to the rehabilitation of children in Mexico, Nicaragua and Honduras) in
order to track youth homicides suggest that gangs were responsible for about 15 percent of Honduran
murders in 2006 (Casa Alianza 2006). Honduran police data also showed that less than 5 percent of all
crime is committed by people under age 18, a demographic group comprising a significant share of
overall gang membership. According to an exhaustive international study, Save the Children UK found
that 90 percent of children in legal trouble are involved in property offenses, not person-to-person crimes.
Furthermore, reliable data on youth gangs in the narcotics trade are virtually nonexistent. Still, there is a
perception that gangs have become increasingly involved in drug trafficking and dealing over the past
3
Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública de la Universidad Centroamericana (University Institute for Public
Opinion of the Central American University).
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decade. It is believed that gangs provide local security or conduct small-time street selling for Mexican
and Colombian cartels. Gangs do not appear to be involved in the large-scale movement of drugs,
although some reports suggest that leaders of local drug organizations are often ex-gang members who
have “graduated.” There are also suggestions that involvement in drug trafficking has made gangs more
violent.
Qualitative studies of Central American gangs suggest that they are mainly involved in small-scale,
localized crime and delinquency, such as petty theft and muggings, which are typically carried out by
individual gang members. However, there is evidence that the maras in El Salvador, Guatemala and
Honduras are involved in the extortion of protection money from local businesses and from buses and
taxis as they go through gang-controlled territories. Such practices create a climate of fear in their
communities. Gangs have also been involved in a limited number of cases of extreme violence. While
such incidents do not necessarily raise homicide rates in a dramatic manner, they do help strengthen the
stereotype and generate fear (Muggah and Stevenson 2008).
Despite the mix of data presented above, the overall perception among Central American citizens remains
that youth gang members are primarily responsible for crime. In Central American capitals and their
surrounding areas in 2008, between 16 and 36 percent of the population felt that their neighborhoods were
greatly affected by gangs (Table 6). Similarly, in the World Bank’s 2003 Enterprise Surveys, business
managers estimated that gangs were responsible for about a quarter of violent crime affecting their
businesses. In El Salvador, the figure was 27 percent, in Honduras 28 percent, and Nicaragua 25 percent.
Only in Guatemala was the figure substantially higher at 67 percent. These survey results showed that in
El Salvador, small businesses felt especially vulnerable to maras, with gangs believed to be responsible
for 46 percent of crimes against micro-enterprises, 37 percent of crimes against small firms, 19 percent of
crimes against medium-size firms, and 18 percent of crimes against large firms.
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Table 6: Percentage of Residents who Say their
1,byv
Gangs
49 Area Size
3-1 Large Medium Small Rural
Country
Capital City
Guatemala
0.22
0.10
-0.04
o. 1 0.24
El Salvador N
0.21
0.08
0.08
0.04
0.05
1/
Honduras
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Panama
0.21
0.36
0.16
0.16
0.19
0.14
-0.23
0.10
0.08
-0.05
0.03
0.03
0.11
0.06
0.03
0.04
0.06
0.04
1/
The table reports the share of residents who say their neighborhoods are greatly affected by
gangs, according to victimization surveys.
Source: Bank staff analysis of data from the 2008 Latin America Public Opinion Project surveys.
To design appropriate policies and interventions to address youth and gang violence, it is necessary to
understand why certain youth become involved in criminal and violent behavior—actions that sometimes
lead to gang membership—in the first place. In order to do this, we utilized the Ecological Risk Model,
which identifies four levels of factors that can influence whether or not a young person becomes engaged
in criminal and violent behavior: societal, community, relationship/interpersonal, and individual. A
summary of these risk factors for Central America is presented in Box 1.
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Box 1: Central American Risk Factors for Youth and Gang Violence
Societal
• Culture of violence: A system of norms, values, and attitudes that enables, fosters and legitimizes the
use of violence in interpersonal relationships (i.e., physical discipline of children, violence against
women, etc.).
• Poverty and income inequality: Although correlated with risky behaviors such as dropping out of
school (a risk factor for youth violence), no causal relationship exists between poverty and violence.
However, relative deprivation in LAC is correlated with higher homicide rates.
• Rapid and uncontrolled urbanization: Patterns of victimization in LAC have shown that cities whose
population had experienced growth spurts also experienced a greater degree of violence as a result of
disorganization and poor urban planning. Deteriorated public spaces have also been associated with
gang presence and victimization of residents.
• Youth unemployment and inactivity: Youth unemployment is associated with a higher probability of
youth engaging in risky behavior, including crime and violence. Youth inactivity rates (youth who are
not in school or are unemployed) are often much higher than youth unemployment rates.
• Migration: Evidence shows that school-going youth who feel close to their parents have lower
substance abuse rates and participate less in violence and risky sexual activity. It has also been
demonstrated that children who feel close to their families are about 10 percent less likely to engage in
risk-taking behavior such as violence, smoking, alcohol and drug abuse, and risky sexual activity. This
is particularly relevant given the trend in the last decade of one or both parents migrating to the US.
• Drug trafficking: Drugs and violence are linked in three main ways: (i) the altered state generated by
drug use can produce violent behavior and a loss of control; (ii) drug abuse generates physical and
psychological dependence, which often leads young people to become involved in criminal activities as
a means of supporting their drug addictions; and (iii) gang member participation in drug networks and
organized crime.
Community
• Low secondary school enrollment, completion and attainment rates: Juvenile delinquency is
correlated with lower levels of education due to the low cost that engaging in criminal behavior has for
these young people, the absence of positive social influences from mentors and peers, and from
delinquency being the best income alternative for a young person without any marketable skills.
• School violence: While schools have been proven to serve as an important protective factor in the lives
of at-risk youth, they can also teach violence through corporal punishment by teachers and through
violence between students.
• Availability of firearms: The number of firearms in circulation has a direct effect on the ability of
those at risk of violence to obtain guns, whether from legitimate sources or illegal firearms sales.
Relationship/Interpersonal
• Household poverty: Poverty within a household can cause one or both parents to migrate for better job
opportunities or to be absent from the home for many hours, or can drive the younger family members
to bring additional income into the home, causing some youth to engage in the illegal drug trade.
• Dysfunctional families: Children and youth who experience or observe violent behavior in the home
are more likely to engage in violent behavior themselves.
• Peers who are gang members: Studies show that relationships established with peers who are gang
members or juveniles with criminal records typically have a significant impact on a young person’s
decision to join a gang. Unlike the families of these young persons, peers can offer solidarity, respect,
and sometimes even access to money.
Individual
• Alcohol abuse: Alcohol can increase the likelihood of youth violence by reducing self-control and the
ability to process incoming information and assess risk, by increasing emotional liability and
impulsiveness, and by increasing the likelihood that a young person will resort to violence.
• Lack of identity: Many young people join gangs due to the absence of positive role models both at
home and in their communities, and to being socially excluded (from education and employment
opportunities).
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III.3 The legacy of the region’s wars and the availability of firearms
An explanation sometimes heard for the extraordinary levels of violence in Central America has to do
with the legacy of the region’s wars. Although the empirical analysis presented in the next section shows
no specific evidence for this argument, the wars (along with other factors such as drug trafficking) may
have played a role in the widespread availability of firearms, which is a well-known risk factor for crime
and violence.
Since the 1960s, large parts of Central America have been periodically engulfed in armed conflict (Figure
11). In Guatemala, communities in the north and northwest parts of the country were more exposed to
violence: areas such as Quiche, Chimaltenango and Baja Verapaz. In El Salvador, the central and northern
zones, including Chalatenango, Cuscatlán, were the hardest hit. Zones in the northwest of Nicaragua, such
as Nueva Segovia, were the most affected by the war with the contras. It is estimated that approximately
200,000 people died as a direct consequence of the Guatemalan civil war, which lasted from the early
1960s through 1996, with the most severe period beginning in the early 1980s. In El Salvador, the conflict
unfolded from 1980 to 1992, taking the lives of around 75,000 people. The Nicaraguan conflict, which
occurred during the 1980s, claimed 38,000 lives and is estimated to have caused about US$17 billion in
lost infrastructure and a death toll of 38,000 people.
Figure 11. Intensity of Armed Conflict in Central America
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Source: Cuevas and Demombynes (2009)
There are two main hypotheses on how the region’s conflicts may be contributing to higher crime levels.
According the first hypothesis, war may have created a culture of violence among the population,
breeding a tendency to rely on violence to fix problems. Beyond this, it may be that victims tend to
retaliate in kind or take justice into their own hands. For example, in Guatemala it is not uncommon to
hear of a suspected criminal being caught in flagrante delicto (i.e., “in the act”) and then being lynched by
a mob, sometimes even for petty crime.
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The second hypothesis is that recent armed conflict may contribute to higher violence levels through the
transfer of firearms and munitions into the region. In 2007, about 4.5 million legal and illegal small
firearms were circulating in Central America (Table 7); the great majority of them are illegally owned.
For example, Guatemala reported just over 147,000 legally owned civilian firearms but estimated a total
number of nearly 2 million in circulation. Similarly, Honduras counted about 133,000 registered firearms,
but the number of total firearms actually in the country is estimated at close to 600,000. In Central
America as a whole, there is estimated to be about one weapon for every ten people, ranging from a low
of 2.8 per 100 people in Costa Rica to nearly 16 per 100 people in Guatemala.
Certainly not all firearms in circulation can be traced back to the armed conflict. Between 2000 and
2006—several years after the last of Central America’s civil wars had ended—arms imports increased in
all six Central American countries. In Guatemala, for example, the value of imported firearms nearly
tripled from about US$3 million to US$8 million during this period. Costa Rica experienced a similar
jump from under US$1 million to more than US$3 million. Firearms imported to the region included
revolvers, pistols, hunting rifles, shotguns, AK-47 assault rifles, M-16s, rocket launchers, hand grenades
and semi-automatic rifles, according to official customs data. A thriving illegal trade in firearms
associated with the drug trade is believed to have fueled at least part of this increase. As drugs flow north
into Mexico and the United States, firearms flow south.
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Table 7: Firearms Owned by Civilians in Central America,
2007
Country
Registered
Estimated
Guns per 100 people
Costa Rica
43,241
115,000
2.8
El Salvador
198,000
450,000
7.0
Guatemala
147,581
1,950,000
15.8
Honduras
133,185
450,000
6.2
Nicaragua
NA
385,000
7.0
Panama
96,600
525,600
5.4
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3-1
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N
Recent spikes of violence
Sources: Karp 2008; Arias Foundation 2005.
firearms, resulting in higher mortality levels. Indeed, firearms are used in most murders in Central
America. Figure 12 shows the breakdown by weapon linked to murders in Guatemala and El Salvador.
The patterns are remarkably similar: in both countries, firearms were used for 80 percent of killings.
A 2008 victimization survey in Guatemala conducted by the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey
spotlighted a range of similar trends. Firearms were overwhelmingly present in all reported incidents of
violent crime. In addition, 31 percent of those participating in the survey said they owned some kind of
firearm; a third of them said they had handguns. Of those who did not own a gun, 16 percent said they
would like to own one.
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Figure 12. Weapons Used for Homicide
El Salvador 2006
Guatemala 2004–2007
Bladed
Weapons
Bladed
Weapons
Strangling
Strangling
Blunt Objects
Blunt Objects
Other
Lynching or
Explosion
Firearms
Firearms
Sources: Institute of Legal Medicine for El Salvador; National Police for Guatemala
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III.4 Assessing the relative importance of alternative explanations
Up to this point we have identified factors that drive crime in Central America but have made no attempt
to assess the relative importance of each. This information is critical to shape effective policy responses
or, at the very least, to prioritize interventions on the basis of potential impact.
d7
e
A recent study by Cuevas and Demombynes (2009) constructed an econometric model of crime levels
iew a drug-trafficking warm- or hotspot on the
using data that included: (i) whether the particular region was
1, v
basis of the volume of drug seizures (cocaine plus cannabis) measured in kilos per 100,000 population;
49
(ii) census information on two demographic variables likely to be risk factors for high levels of youth
-1and women in the population and the share of female-headed
violence: the share of young 3
. 1 men on the level of past armed conflict within each country, classifying
households; (iii) a qualitative variable
No
areas by low, moderate, severe and very severe incidence; and (iv) a set of controls that included years of
4
education, income per capita, inequality indexes, employment statistics, and urban population. Detailed
results of the regressions appear in Volume II of this report, but the main findings include the following:
•
Drug trafficking is an important driver of homicide rates. Within any one country, controlling for
other factors, drug-trafficking hotspots have murder rates more than double those in areas of low
trafficking intensity.
•
Areas at high risk for youth violence based on demographic characteristics experience higher
levels of murder. Specifically, areas with a larger percentage of young men between the ages of
15 and 34 have higher homicide rates. Areas with large numbers of female-headed households, in
which young men are less likely to be monitored, also suffer higher murder rates.
•
There is no significant link within countries between the incidence of past armed conflict and
current homicide rates. Areas that were hotspots for armed conflict in the past are not
4
The cutoffs were established by examining the distributions and noting that there is a certain discontinuity around 100. Under
this approach, 18 percent of the localities are in the first category of no seizures, 63 percent in the second (between 0 and 100
kilos per 100,000 population), and 19 percent in the third (above 100 kilos).
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experiencing higher levels of violence today. Some experts argue that the effects of past armed
conflicts are nationwide, not location specific, noting, for example, that civil war damaged the
capacity of criminal justice institutions in the country as a whole or generated a large stock of
guns that today are bought and sold across the country. However, broader evidence does not
suggest that the region’s high levels of violence are principally a legacy of armed conflict.
Fragmentary data for Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua from the late 1960s—well before
armed conflict and political violence had reached intense levels—show that murder rates were
already high then, exceeding 20 per 100,000. Cruz (2003) also shows that El Salvador
experienced more than 900 killings in 1959, equal to a homicide rate of nearly 30 per 100,000.
All this points toward a simple conclusion: drug trafficking is quantitatively far more important than the
other risk factors for violence identified in the study. Figure 13 illustrates this. It simulates the potential
impact of an increase in the proxy values of crime determinants labeled significant in Table 8. For
example, a 10 percent increase in female-headed households would lead to a 1 percent increase in the
homicide rate. Similarly, a 10 percent rise in the population share of 15- to 34-year-olds would lead to an
increase in the homicide rate of about 9 percent. At the other extreme, a jump in narcotics trafficking
large enough to make an area a drug traffic hotspot would produce a 111 percent increase in the homicide
rate.
Figure 13: Key Risk Factors for Homicide in Central America
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% increase in the homicide rate associated with ...
Increase of 10% in
households headed by women
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Increase of 10% in
population of men ages 15 -34
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1%
9%
Drug trafficking "hot spot"
vs. zone with little trafficking
111%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
Source: Cuevas and Demombynes (2009).
Note: Figures shown are selected coefficients from regressions of log homicide rates at the subnational level on explanatory
variables. All coefficients shown are significant at the 5% level and are robust to specifications controlling for the other
demographic characteristics, the incidence organized armed conflict, employment, education, income and urban/rural divisions.
IV. POLICY OPTIONS
The preceding section reviewed the main factors behind crime and violence in Central America. Due to
the complexity of both the problem and its principal causes, it is not surprising that there is no magic
bullet to end the crisis. In fact, a main conclusion of this report is that no quick and easy fix is ready to be
implemented. Rather, our analysis tells us that the fight against violent crime in Central America is
nothing less than a generational challenge. It is likely to be long lasting and will require policy makers to
be inventive, courageous, diligent and, above all, determined. As the lessons of Colombia and Mexico
have taught us, the costs of fighting crime can be huge when governments take on the drug trade. Despite
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this risk, fighting crime is—and must remain—a crucial ingredient on the development agendas of
Central American countries because the stakes are so high.
Successful crime-fighting strategies elsewhere offer some hints for Central America. One common thread
of these earlier successes is action across a broad front. This demands an inclusive coalition of agencies
and individuals across governments as well as civil society. Law enforcement and prevention efforts, on
their own, simply will not work. Mobilizing support for such an ambitious approach may require a
national crime reduction plan, which some Central American countries already have but others do not. It
also requires the establishment of a national crime coordinating body, possibly a high-level commission
or council, with strong leadership and political backing at the highest levels. Although not easy to create,
such a group is essential to coordinate different government branches and supervise ambitious
collaboration across traditional bureaucratic fault lines. The criminal justice sector, including the
judiciary, prosecutors, public defenders, police and prisons, must all be strengthened by executive branch
initiatives on crime prevention, alternative dispute resolution, education, poverty reduction and youth
development. National plans must also offer a way to involve civil society organizations, in which much
of the expertise in violence prevention resides.
Another common denominator of successful interventions is that they begin with a clear-headed diagnosis
of violence types and risk factors, and end with a careful evaluation of an intervention’s potential impact
that in turn helps shape future policy. In summary, successful strategies are anchored in facts and
evidence. Good policy making to reduce crime and violence does not happen by accident. It flows from
good analysis, hard work and the capacity to adapt strategies. With these elements in mind, we structure
the alternatives available to policy makers along three broad lines of action: (i) prevention programs; (ii)
criminal justice sector reform to improve the law enforcement strategy; and (iii) regional and international
approaches.
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Box 2. Crime and Violence Prevention Components in Bank-Financed Integrated Slum Upgrading
Operations: Honduras Barrio–Ciudad Project
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The World Bank is supporting local crime and violence prevention in Honduras through a specific project
component of the Barrio–Ciudad Project. The component seeks to leverage the ongoing infrastructure and social
investments and to mainstream crime prevention at the local level, in order to strengthen the overall project. In short,
it combines urban renewal with a citizen security focus at the local level.
The component focuses squarely on the reduction of the high levels of homicide, youth violence and associated risk
factors present in the participating barrios and municipalities. The synergies created between infrastructure
provision, upgrading and situational prevention on the one hand, and community-based “social prevention” activities
on the other hand, are especially important. The overall objective is a broad-based intervention at the neighborhood
level that is closely coordinated with other donor, governmental and non-governmental programs in these
neighborhoods that address crime and violence and their associated risk factors. The component has five parts:
•
Diagnostics: Crime and violence mapping of micro areas using police statistics and, where possible,
Geographic Information Systems (GIS); the victimization section of baseline surveys; and communitybased and situational diagnostics.
•
Situational Prevention: Measures, such as the Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED)
methodology and urban renewal that reduce opportunities for particular crime and violence problems. This
method is included in infrastructure work through the training of architects, engineers and other technical
staff. It also includes the planning and installation of social infrastructure, such as community centers,
playing fields and public lighting. This methodology is quite new in the LAC region but has been
successfully piloted in countries such as Chile, Brazil and Colombia.
•
Social Prevention: Support of immediate mitigation and conflict-resolution activities in addition to other
preventive and capacity-enhancement interventions that have a medium- and long-term impact on levels of
public safety. In particular, financial support for a menu of initiatives in four broad categories tailored to
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the specific needs of each community: (1) mediation and conflict resolution; (2) alternative livelihoods and
skills development; (3) family support services; and (4) youth education and recreation.
•
•
Community and Municipal Liaison Officers: The role of these technical experts in community organization,
crime and violence prevention, and urban development is to strengthen municipal capacity, and at the
neighborhood level to carry out community-based diagnostics; formulate participatory community and
municipal safety plans and strategies; liaise and coordinate with other relevant agencies and associations, in
particular with Community Safety Councils and the police; coordinate closely with those designing
infrastructure to ensure the integration of CPTED principles; identify and work with at-risk youth in the
community; organize and mobilize the community around the concept of safety though community
campaigns (e.g., community clean-up/painting days, community safety festival, etc.); and initiate additional
projects such as a summer camp for at-risk youth.
Monitoring and Evaluation Component: Evaluations of the components have been designed and will be
carried out. Although evaluation data from these Bank-financed projects are not yet available, similar
community-based integrated interventions have yielded dramatic results.
IV.1 Prevention programs
A broad menu of prevention programs is available to Central American policy makers. In practice,
governments should seek to design an integrated, comprehensive, holistic and cross-sectoral prevention
strategy. Specifically, programs should: (i) combine policies directed toward individual and community
risks, but should reinforce them with policies to modify structural conditions that can lead to criminal and
violent behavior, such as quality and coverage of education, job and training opportunities, as well as
judicial and police reform; (ii) link with the community in which the young person lives; (iii) respond
directly to the risk and protective factors present in the young person’s life; (iv) be a joint effort between
community assistance organizations and police; (v) incorporate the families of young people being
targeted, because a strong family is proven to be one of the strongest shields against youth violence; and
(vi) improve the socioeconomic situation of high-risk families.
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Early childhood development (ECD) programs. Investing in ECD programs, particularly those targeted
N
Examples of programs on this front include:
toward poor families, has been one of the most cost-effective ways to reduce risk behaviors among youth.
Evidence from around the world shows that these programs, which traditionally include health care,
nutrition supplementation, mental stimulation, educational activities, and parenting training, improve
human capital outcomes over the long term, including educational achievement, health and nutrition, and
also reduce risky behaviors, such as crime and violence, domestic abuse and substance abuse. The
inclusion of effective parenting training (see next paragraph) in ECD programs has been singled out in
evaluations as one of the most important factors in reducing youth violence.
Effective parenting programs. Parent training promotes positive, healthy and protective parent–child
interactions that can reduce domestic violence, the extent to which young people associate with
delinquent peers, alcohol and substance abuse, arrests, and school dropouts. It also reduces tobacco,
alcohol and drug use, anger, alienation, aggression, delinquency and misconduct. The most consistent
findings in the prevention of youth violence and delinquency stress the value of family interventions from
birth through adolescence. For example, nurse home-visitation programs have been shown to improve
parenting skills and reduce child aggression. Programs for older children and their families that help
parents reduce negative parenting and coercive interactions have also been found to lower child
aggression and delinquency. Another approach to family interventions includes teaching parenting skills
to young people before they become parents. Creating effective parenting programs is a challenge in any
society, but it is especially difficult in much of Central America, where economic stress and migration all
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too often result in parental absenteeism. These realities must be acknowledged and programs must be
adjusted to take these factors into account. Precisely because the family is under such stress in Central
America, parenting programs merit added attention and resources.
Programs to increase secondary school access and completion. Policies and programs to encourage
secondary school enrollment and completion are critical. Evidence shows that secondary school
completion is one of the most important preventive investments a country can make in at-risk youth, both
in terms of improving their education and in reducing nearly all kinds of risky behavior, including crime
and violence. School failure and dropout are risk factors for youth violence and delinquency. Young
people who stay connected to school are less likely to exhibit disruptive and violent behavior, carry or use
a weapon, or experiment with illegal substances. From the perspective of the youth crime and violence
problem, it is important to address the considerable gap remaining in secondary education coverage for
poor urban communities. It is also critical to ensure high-quality teaching and curricular relevance,
including programs to develop generic life skills and strengthen the connection between school and work.
Other measures include improving school quality and relevance, increasing parental involvement, and
offering incentives to families of at-risk youth to send them to school, possibly through conditional cash
transfer programs either to the family or the youths themselves.
School-based violence prevention programs: Evidence shows that violence prevention programs are
highly effective ways to reduce risky behavior. Schools are ideal places to socialize young people and
develop their resistance to crime and violence. The school curriculum throughout the primary and
secondary cycles should promote the development of responsible citizens, offer anti-violence and riskprevention programs as well as alternative mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of common conflicts.
Children should be taught to respect themselves, to understand risks that flow from their own behavior or
that of others, to identify and resist gangs and bullying, and to understand the rationale for social norms
such as respect for others’ lives and property. School-based violence prevention programs are so
successful because they can target young people according to their ages, experiences and culture.
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Development of specialized agencies for dealing with young offenders, with a focus on rehabilitation
and providing second chances to young offenders. Higher recidivism rates are associated with harsh
prison conditions as well as with incarcerating young people alongside adults. For this reason, most
countries have special courts and probation agencies that provide second-chance opportunities to juvenile
delinquents before incarcerating them. A key element of this approach is the introduction of graduated
sentences for first-time and minor repeat offenders. These sentences typically include two components: (i)
a community accountability board composed of juvenile court personnel, probation officers and/or citizen
volunteers, who meet with offenders to assign penalties for their offenses and monitor and enforce a socalled diversion agreement that keeps a young offender out of court and out of jail; and (ii) graduated
consequences if a youth fails to comply with the requirements of the community accountability board.
These graduated sanctions must be designed to fit a variety of offenses and should include a range of
alternatives, including incarceration.
Reduction in the availability and use of firearms. Youth crime and violence are linked with rises in
lethal crimes and violence committed with firearms. When more firearms are in circulation, it becomes
easier to obtain them illegally, by-passing restrictive legal requirements. Limiting the supply of firearms
reduces the number of deaths and injuries caused by them. This can be done through laws against gun
trafficking coupled with targeted enforcement to reduce the quantity of firearms. Policies and programs
that involve aggressive patrolling in high-crime neighborhoods to arrest youth who carry guns illegally
have shown some success in the US.
Safe neighborhood programs or place-specific prevention: Safe neighborhood programs can modify
the physical environments in which young people act and interact in ways that are likely to prevent young
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people from engaging in risky behavior, particularly in “hotspot” neighborhoods. Studies have shown that
safe neighborhood programs increase the public’s perception of safety and the image of police, both of
which are essential to address the underlying causes of youth violence (see, for example, Buvinic,
Morrison and Orlando 2003). These programs can include the installation of street lighting, the removal
of high fences that provide cover to criminals, and the rehabilitation and re-appropriation of community
public spaces. Ideally, they are combined with targeted social prevention activities as well as community
policing programs, such as those listed below. A study of gangs and social capital conducted in El
Salvador, for example, showed that gangs thrive in neighborhoods and communities where poverty has
eroded social services or eliminated them completely, where the streets are in poor condition, and where
public and community infrastructure is run-down, dirty or abandoned.
Municipal ordinances to increase the price and reduce the availability and use of alcohol. Policies
that reduce young people’s access to alcohol can help keep them from breaking the law. For example,
alcohol is a known contributing factor to trouble, including homicide and suicide, for young people in the
Latin American region. Policy options include increasing alcohol taxes, tightening sales restrictions,
including controls on hours of operation, density, and location of sales outlets, as well as imposing a
minimum age for purchasing alcohol. A key factor here, however, is the credibility of the threat of
sanctions on merchants who violate regulations. The most effective sanctions include progressive
penalties that begin with warnings and escalate to fines, the firing of individuals, the closing of
establishments, and the imprisonment of violators. Tax increases and sales restrictions should be
implemented at the same time in order to have the maximum possible impact on youth alcohol
consumption.
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Documentation campaigns in marginal communities. Citizen /
7 documentation campaigns are an
effective way to reduce social exclusion. Many gang d
members belong to an “underclass” of
e
undocumented individuals who are effectively excluded from a wide range of social rights. A birth
iew in society. When citizens can prove their
certificate is a recognition by the state of a child’s membership
1, v
identity, they become entitled to basic services and rights that underpin their ability to remain healthy,
9
receive an education, stay safe and earn a living.
-14
. 13 Tackling gangs through community interventions
Box 3.o
N APREDE:
The Association for Crime Prevention (Asociación para la Prevención del Delito, APREDE) is an independent
NGO working to prevent gang involvement in violent areas of Guatemala City. The group’s primary activities
include:
a) Popular education. Youth who cannot take classes in a traditional school can study in APREDE and be certified
by the NGO CEIBA (validated by the Ministry of Education);
b) Life-skills development through sports and arts;
c) Skills training in information technology, baking, graphic design, machine repair and maintenance, English as a
second language, and management.
d) Psycho-social assistance to children and youth, using social workers from the University of San Carlos;
e) Job search support and follow-up through APREDE’S social workers;
f) Development of crime prevention strategies and campaigns through alliances with civil society, public and private
sector organizations.
Source: Emilio Goubaud, Director of APREDE, November 2007
Additional policies that have not been as widely evaluated as those discussed above, but for which
existing evidence suggests that they have a positive impact, include the following:
Remedial and second-chance education. Special attention needs to be given to children at risk of
dropping out of school, either because they are doing poorly in class or are skipping classes, through
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remedial classes and after-school homework support groups. For those who do drop out of formal
education and face the prospect of a dead-end career and the temptation of crime, “second-chance
programs” (often most effectively provided through NGOs) should be developed to offer the opportunity
to achieve high-school equivalency, which increases their chances of entering the labor market and
earning higher wages. Second-chance education can also provide many intangible benefits to young
people, such as improved social and interaction skills, increased confidence, and self-esteem. Although
there are few rigorous evaluations of these types of programs, the evidence that does exist suggests that
they come with high rates of return and relatively low costs.
Comprehensive job training programs. Studies indicate that comprehensive job training programs help
increase youth employment, particularly in developing countries. Research shows that a range of support
is needed to teach at-risk youth how to behave in the workplace and help them move from being socially
excluded to becoming active members of society. Comprehensive programs go beyond technical training
to focus on developing a young person’s skills as a worker by providing him or her with a wide range of
support, including general skills, life skills, job search and placement assistance, and self-employment
services.
Life-skills training. Knowledge of life skills reduces the risk of drug use and risky sexual behavior,
improves anger management and academic performance, and enhances social judgment. In the US, young
people who are given life-skills training in high school tend to be more productive and make smoother
transitions into a job or higher education. In addition, schools can also be used to prevent school-based
violence (i.e., between peers, teacher–student), help prevent domestic violence, and provide parenting
training.
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Youth-friendly spaces, mentoring and youth service programs. Some research has shown that the
construction of community centers does not affect youth behavior, but that constructive youth activities
which are supervised by a caring adult can have a positive impact on young people, helping them perform
better in school and in life. On the other hand, young people who are not supervised during after-school
hours are more likely to use alcohol, drugs and tobacco, and to engage in criminal and other risky
behavior. They also do poorly in school or drop out of school completely. Mentoring programs that
include the attention of a caring adult, can serve as strong protective factors for at-risk youth, particularly
for those who lack positive adult role models in their homes. Studies have shown that young people who
volunteer for youth service are half as less likely to abuse drugs and alcohol, to engage in delinquent
behavior, or to drop out of school.
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Box 4. Nicaragua’s Citizen Security Program
This program focuses on four areas, based on a preventive approach and employing integrated, multisectoral and
participatory initiatives that complement one another:
a)
Institutional strengthening, especially of the Interior Ministry (Ministerio de Gobernación, MIGOB), the
authority responsible for policies related to citizen security;
b) Integration and strengthening of juvenile violence prevention services, using a cross-sectoral prevention model
at the municipal level;
c) Expansion and consolidation of the community policing program initiative;
d) A public information program to encourage inclusion of the topic within the social agenda and to educate the
public on the need for values and standards in order to have social harmony;
e) Government implementing agency: MIGOB.
Source: Belikow, Juan, “Inventory of Crime and Violence Programs in Central America,” 2009.
IV.2 Criminal justice reform
Effective criminal law enforcement is a key element in the region’s strategy to fight crime. Evidence
suggests that recent increases in crime and violence in the region have exacerbated some existing
institutional weaknesses, from the lack of inter-institutional coordination to overlapping functions, and
have created others (e.g., drug-related corruption). It all signals the need for further reform of the criminal
justice sector.
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It is important to recognize that the justice sectors of Central America have progressed significantly since
the end of the civil conflicts of the 1980s. Nevertheless, problems persist. We believe policy
recommendations for the justice sector should focus on improving institutional performance and stressing
cooperation, particularly coordination between institutions based on best practices in other Latin
American countries and beyond. The criminal justice sector is the set of institutions involved in rulebased conflict resolution and enforcement, such as courts, ministries of justice, police, prosecutors, public
defenders, corrections officers and ombudsmen, as well as nonpublic institutions, such as bar
associations, legal clinics, traditional and other non-state dispute-resolution mechanisms.
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The idea of mano dura became a key ingredient of some Central American government strategies against
crime and violence over the last five to ten years. It was an approach that called for toughening criminal
codes by identifying new offenses, increasing prison terms, or encouraging judges to apply maximum
penalties. However, this mano dura legislation appears to have a limited impact on reducing crime and
violence. It also often contradicted principles of international human rights treaties that the countries had
ratified. Although the results varied from country to country, from a regional point of view there is no
evidence that these mano dura reforms have reduced crime rates, increased the efficiency of justice sector
institutions, or improved the public perception of criminal justice institutions. One possible reason for
this: excesses in implementing mano dura may have resulted in lower public trust in the criminal justice
sector.
In contrast, other reforms have shown some results but have fallen short of the very high expectations
generated at their inception. The passing of more transparent, accusatorial or “mixed” criminal procedure
codes based on oral procedures, which provide an increased role for prosecutors, strengthen public
defense and introduce alternative sentencing mechanisms, is considered a significant step forward.
Constitutional minimums for the judiciary’s budget to ensure judicial independence, the establishment of
public defense services for the poor, disenfranchised victim protection, and more transparent mechanisms
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for the selection, promotion and discipline of judges, are also positive developments. Collectively, these
reforms constitute a major achievement. If effectively implemented and funded, they could result in
significant improvement to the rule of law, including the efficiency and effectiveness of criminal justice
institutions.
So far, delays in implementation have added to the already significant challenges of reforming justice
sector institutions following years of civil conflict. Indeed, only a comprehensive strategy on crime and
violence issues can bring together the various institutions active in crime prevention, control, punishment
and rehabilitation. Accordingly, recommendations in this area are structured around seven main pillars: (i)
performance-based management for criminal justice institutions; (ii) optimization of court administration
and case management through the introduction of quality control and robust monitoring systems based on
performance indicators; (iii) accountability of individuals working in criminal justice, enhanced with
modern human resources tools; (iv) transparency of criminal justice institutions reinforced by citizens’
oversight projects; (v) robust legal counseling for the poor and disenfranchised, (vi) effective attention to,
and protection of, crime victims; and (vii) communication strategies both to engage internal and external
stakeholders and better inform the public.
The introduction of purely normative reforms was not enough and a new generation of more
comprehensive changes to these institutions needs to commence. To meet citizens’ expectations of
efficient, effective and fair criminal justice systems, countries will have to act on several fronts. One is the
need to improve coordination and information-sharing mechanisms among institutions to facilitate rapid
and effective reaction while protecting due process and human rights guarantees. Another key measure
should be the adoption of cost-effective information and communication systems for tasks including the
gathering and dissemination of statistics and other information at each step in the process in different
agencies. Based on this information, the focus of policing and prosecution should be adjusted toward
highest-impact cases. Clearly, a prerequisite for all this is the development of quality-control systems and
performance indicators that provide important mechanisms to improve diagnosis, track system outputs,
monitor reform programs, and rationalize resources. Countries need to tailor this recommendation to their
own financing capabilities and priorities. Although fully integrated information systems may not be
feasible in the short term, steps can be taken gradually to enhance inter-institutional coordination and
information sharing.
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To ensure that due process and human rights guarantees shape the criminal justice processes, institutions
should refer to national and international standards to make certain that pre-trial detention and other
criminal justice processes meet national and international human rights standards. For example, juveniles
should be kept separate from adult offenders, and violent convicted criminals should be separated from
nonviolent suspects who are awaiting trial. Support for civil society oversight of the due process/human
rights compliance of criminal justice institutions (observatorios de justicia penal and veedurías de
justicia) is critical while the reforms are still at an initial stage.
A second element is court administration and case management, which can be improved with changes to
the case-handling process. The reduction of case disposition times of the Guatemalan and Costa Rican
pilots in rapid-reaction one-stop shops (24-hour and “in flagrante delicto” courts) is encouraging,
especially because it was achieved with full respect for due process guarantees. It shows that coordination
among police forces, judges, prosecutors and public defenders operating in the same office (one-stop
shops) can be effective. These one-stop shops appear to meet the public demands for quick responses to
address the rising wave of crime and violence. In meeting these challenges, it is important to identify
“best practices” and to dare to introduce new technologies. These include the use of ISO (International
Organization for Standardization) 9001 to certify service standards in the judiciary and ensure minimum
standards, the establishment of virtual courtrooms to meet additional demand, and the development of
electronic notification systems among judiciaries, the Public Ministry, public defenders’ offices and the
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national police. The use of a common digital file that circulates through all institutions involved in the
process is also important to maintain coordination.
A well-functioning adversarial judicial system requires a balance between those advocating for the state’s
interests and those of the accused. It implies sufficient resources for defendants. Steps to strengthen
publicly funded public defense systems in Central America should include providing access to counsel,
ensuring due process, broadening the coverage of current services and enhancing the professional
development of public defenders, especially oral trial skills and human rights issues. Efforts should also
be made to expand and strengthen publicly funded and alternative defense services, such as the legal
clinics (consultorios jurídicos) operated by law schools and civil society organizations. Central American
countries also need an updated inventory of the numerous legal clinics to ascertain their capabilities and
agree on priority assistance areas. A well-structured network of these alternative legal defense providers
would facilitate information exchange, referral services and litigation support.
An important area for improvement is the protection of victims. New criminal procedure codes include
provisions that establish an important role for victims in the criminal procedures and have increased
interest in this issue in Latin America. The creation of victims’ assistance centers, administered jointly by
the judiciaries and government ministries, is fundamental in violence hotspots. Such centers would
provide legal, social and psychological assistance to victims of violent crimes, arrange for their protection
if necessary, provide an interpreter when needed, and keep the victims updated on the status of their
cases. The new Centers for Assistance to Victims of Violent Crimes in the prosecutors’ office of the
Judicial Center for Paloquemao and Bucaramanga in Colombia are examples worth studying for possible
use in Central America.
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It is also important to strengthen the accountability of individuals working
/
by reforming internal disciplinary procedures and using modern human resources tools to select qualified
d 7 of human resource management
e
personnel. Criteria for hiring, selection and promotion, improvement
iewof attitudinal change among personnel of all
capabilities, monitoring of ethical behavior, promotion
v
levels, and in-service learning programs are1,
typical performance-enhancing tools not seen consistently in
49
Central American countries. There should also be increased autonomy for independent agencies such as
-1The development of specific career paths for professional and
judicial councils and ombudsmen.
. 13
administrative personnel is critical to build efficient, modern techniques and measure individual and
o
group performance. N is also a need to institute performance-based management tools in the criminal
There
justice sector for the police, judiciary, attorneys general and public defenders, and to develop resultsbased budgets, performance contracts and performance ratings for individuals and groups. Selection,
promotion and disciplinary processes must be competitive and transparent. Such human resources tools
are critical to attract qualified professionals and build solid human capital in key agencies. These
professionals will add to the overall quality of governance and make criminal justice a more attractive
career path for the most talented university graduates.
Facing the corruption issue is a critical element of accountability within the criminal justice sector. This
requires measures to establish or strengthen coordination among internal affairs units, financial
intelligence units and other accountability offices such as ombudsmen’s offices and judicial councils. This
coordination effort should be sufficiently funded and granted ample discretion. It is also necessary for
judges and other key justice-sector officials to declare their financial assets. Judicial decisions should be
made publicly available promptly after legal processes conclude in order to facilitate public scrutiny.
Citizens’ oversight groups should be supported as a useful tool to increase the transparency of criminal
justice institutions and strengthen respect for human rights and due process. They also generate valuable
data to complement the perceptions data provided by national and regional surveys such as Americas
Barometer, Latinobarometer, UNDP indicators, etc.
Alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms can play an important complementary role, although they
should not be seen as taking the place of formal criminal procedures. Youth mediation and reconciliation
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programs, as well as the establishment of peace centers (Centros de Convivencia), justice houses,
municipal mediation and reconciliation centers, judicial facilitators and mobile justice of the peace courts
are all successful initiatives in Latin America. They have created spaces where the community has
additional access to conflict resolution, especially for the poor and disadvantaged. These programs also
promote good citizenship, peaceful coexistence and amicable conflict resolution. Each has two basic
elements: access to justice, and community participation. The municipal mediation centers and the mobile
justice of the peace courts in Honduras, the centers for the administration of justice in Guatemala, and the
judicial facilitators in Nicaragua are also valuable experiments that deserve to be studied and adapted to
the particular circumstances of each country. All contribute to building more peaceful communities.
Box 5. Justice Houses and Peace Centers in Colombia
A Justice House is a community center where neighbors find traditional and nontraditional justice services to resolve
conflicts. Formal judicial authorities are present, but alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms are also available,
including those based on Afro-Colombian or indigenous traditions. Other social services may be available for
children and women. Currently, there are more than 50 Justice Houses in Colombia in urban and rural areas
(especially in those areas impacted by conflict).
The Peace Centers (Centros de Convivencia) are spaces where the community has access to justice, with programs
that promote citizenship values, peaceful coexistence and amicable conflict resolution. In the past six years, they
have been very effective in Colombia, a country with high rates of crime and violence. The first Peace Center
opened in December 2002 in Barrancabermeja, one of the most violent areas in Bogotá. Now there are 15
throughout Colombia. They have three basic elements: access to justice, education through games, and community
participation. They are equipped with a library and an educational play room (ludoteca). They have open spaces for
community work focused on issues including youth gangs, youth crime, community and mediation. They mainly
play a preventive role against crime, but also house local justice-sector representatives such as police inspectors and
family conciliators (Comisarías de Familia).
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Community participation in policing activities and public outreach has also proved successful in local
settings. Community policing is more responsive and accountable to local communities, creating bonds of
trust and reliance, increasing crime reporting, and reducing police abuses. Successful community policing
programs can revitalize police forces and increase the public’s sense of safety regarding their
environment. Several experiments in this type of community participation in Latin America have led to
reductions in crime and violence indicators and improvements in citizens’ perceptions of security. These
initiatives have several common elements, including: (a) surveys, town meetings or other forums to
identify problems and priorities; (b) police-sponsored neighborhood or block watches, and business watch
programs; (c) crime prevention newsletters and other crime education programs for the public; (d) small
local police stations in target neighborhoods; (e) civilian volunteer liaison with community police; (f)
police foot patrols; (g) increased attention to minor offenses that are major annoyances to local residents;
(h) the creation of educational and recreational spaces for youth, (i) the permanent assignment of police
officers to neighborhoods; (j) increased educational requirements for police forces; and (k) the
reassignment of certain management tasks from police personnel to civilian personnel.
Community policing is only one tool in a broader toolkit of local citizen security strategies that can
include specific actions to address street crime, gangs and petty theft. These include: (a) public
information campaigns for awareness-raising about security issues within the community, and community
involvement in the design and implementation of the security strategies; and (b) increased focus on
preventive measures before at-risk youth are lured into illegal activities. These steps should be taken in
partnership with civil society groups that are active in the community and provide suitable training and
employment opportunities. Some international actors specializing in the sector can play a major role in
these programs (e.g., UNODC, Habitat).
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Finally, one-stop shops are a critical tool to increase efficiency and provide access to reformed justicesector institutions, especially by providing timely dispute resolution. They accomplish two things: (i) they
close the gap between institutions and citizens through mechanisms such as family police stations
designed to provide immediate services to women and children in cases involving intrafamily violence or
child support; and (ii) they provide special services for vulnerable groups through mechanisms such as
mobile and 24-hour courts, houses/centers of justice that facilitate coordination among executive/judiciary
agencies that provide prevention/rehabilitation services, alternative dispute resolution, public defense,
legal aid and victim assistance services.
IV.3 Regional approaches
Many issues facing Central America transcend national boundaries and require a coordinated regional
response. But existing levels of collaboration may not be sufficient, particularly considering that drug
trafficking and the availability of firearms have a supranational dimension. This adds a level of
complexity to the policy debate because actions taken in one country are likely to affect other countries.
Therefore, no strategy can hope to succeed without regional coordination. The two areas where regional
approaches are particularly critical are firearms and drug trafficking.
Drug trafficking
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Central America can be fairly characterized as an innocent bystander in the drug trade. The region is a
conduit, a transit corridor that neither produces nor consumes significant amounts of cocaine. In addition,
the trade is mostly controlled by Colombian and Mexican cartels. To date, government policies have
emphasized interdiction to combat trafficking. But even if increased interdiction succeeds, increased
enforcement will merely increase the price and with it the resources available to traffickers. With more
cash in hand, traffickers are better equipped to bribe criminal justice officials and purchase weapons. The
experiences of Mexico and Colombia, the historical record in the United States, and economic theory all
suggest that an escalation of interdiction efforts—on a scale that Central American governments could not
mount even with help from abroad—would most likely increase levels of violence without diminishing
the capacities of drug traffickers.
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All this places the countries of Central America in a difficult situation. The drug war has already brought
extreme levels of violence and damaged criminal justice institutions. Options for dealing with the
tremendous flow of drugs through the region would appear limited. Radical changes in drug policies –
including the possible depenalization or decriminalization of some drugs as recommended by the Latin
American Commission on Drugs and Democracy (2009) – are simply beyond the capacity of the six
nations and can only be contemplated within an international framework that includes the largest producer
and consumer countries.
Our analysis leads us to conclude that there are some preferable options available to Central American
countries with relation to drug trafficking:
•
Given the high levels of drug-related corruption in the criminal justice systems and the vast
resources of the traffickers, evidence suggests that directing more resources to drug enforcement
efforts is not likely to reduce violence in Central America. To the extent that this approach is
used, we believe a regional, coordinated effort stands a greater chance of some success. To
address drug-related corruption and impunity, the Guatemalan experience with CICIG is worth
considering as it provided a suitable channel to bring international investigative expertise to
Guatemala and has been very helpful in resolving high profile cases.
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Devote resources to address domestic drug use through public health and harm reduction
programs, including greater investment in education campaigns, treatment for users, and drug use
prevention.
Box 6. Addressing Impunity in Guatemala
Issues of impunity, extrajudicial executions and the deprivation of liberty without due process are major challenges
to the rule of law throughout much of the developing world. Central America is no exception. Indeed, a number of
ad hoc international commissions and special rapporteurs address these issues throughout the region. One prominent
effort is the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad
en Guatemala, CICIG). It was created in December 2006 at the request of the Guatemalan Government and began
functioning in January 2008 with two objectives: (i) to support, strengthen and assist Guatemala’s State institutions
in investigating and prosecuting crimes allegedly committed by illegal security forces and clandestine security
organizations; and (ii) to establish mechanisms and procedures to protect Guatemalans’ fundamental rights,
including those rights guaranteed by international conventions to which Guatemala is a party. Passage by the
Guatemalan Congress of the agreement establishing the CICIG was the result of the strong political will of the
Government, private sector and civil society. Funding is provided by various donors, including private funds for the
Commission’s two-year mandate, an extension of which was recently endorsed by President Colom.
Illegal security groups and clandestine organizations in Guatemala have direct links to state agencies and are thus
able to block judicial action against them, resulting in impunity. CICIG works with the Public Ministry and other
justice-sector institutions to “investigate and dismantle violent criminal organizations believed responsible for the
widespread crime and the paralysis in the country’s justice system.” CICIG is headed by a commissioner appointed
by the UN Secretary-General. The agreement stipulates that CICIG may join any criminal proceeding as an ad hoc
prosecutor (querellante adhesivo) but also provides technical assistance to national justice sector agencies to
strengthen their capacity.
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In less than a year and a half, partly as a result of CICIG’s work with state agencies, 1,700 people have been
iew and the deputy director of national policy; 10
expelled from the police force, including 50 senior officials
,v
prosecutors had been asked to leave and the 1
Attorney General has been replaced. However, the fight against
9
impunity in Guatemala remains a daunting task, exemplified by the low homicide conviction rate. For example,
-14 in Guatemala yet there have been only 40 convictions from the
from 2005 to 2007, 1,960 women 3 murdered
were
840 cases tried so far. The remaining 1,120 cases have not yet gone to trial.
.1
No Colom recently announced three initiatives that could help advance the fight
In addition to the CICIG, President
against impunity. He announced a presidential anti-impunity committee, a panel to review and declassify
Guatemalan army archives from 1960 to 1996, and the creation of an elite US-trained anti-drug force.
Firearms
Due to widespread concern about homicide rates and the role that firearms play in homicides, Central
American countries have participated in international and national arms control initiatives. In addition to
being full members of the United Nations, all countries in the region have signed the UN Convention
against Transnational Organised Crime (2000) and its Protocol against the Manufacturing of and Illicit
Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition (2001). They have also all
participated in the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) since 2001. Parallel efforts to address the trade, transfer
and misuse of small arms are also taking place at the regional level. For example, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama have ratified the Organization of American States (OAS)
Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition,
Explosives and other Related Material (CIFTA 1997).
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A range of institutions and instruments have also been established in the region to convert declarations
into deeds, including the Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America (Tratado Marco
de Seguridad Democrática en Centroamerica) in 1995. All Central American countries are members the
Central American Integration System (Sistema de Integración Centroamericana, SICA). Through this
mechanism, countries have endorsed the Guatemala Declaration for a Region Free of Corruption (2006)
and the Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers since 2005. The Code of Conduct, in particular, calls on all
parties to strengthen licensing controls, end transfers to countries that might use weapons to commit
human rights violations, and ensure responsible transfers and respect for international humanitarian and
human rights and sustainable development. All six Central American countries also have firearms
legislation that provides some aspect of normative and regulatory controls on weapons ownership,
firearms registration, use and movement, with various revisions and amendments to improve these laws.
In general, though, national implementation and enforcement of gun laws remain sporadic and need
improvement. At the same time, it is important to note that the firearms issue in Central America, from
the point of view of Central American countries, transcends regional and national boundaries. No
regional strategy in these areas can hope to succeed without significant support from the US. Recently,
however, there is increasing recognition in the US that strategies to interdict the flow of drugs from south
to north must be supported by greater efforts to restrict the flow of illegal weapons in the reverse
direction.
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Policies and programs that reduce the availability and use of firearms can also reduce violent crimes. As
noted above, the number of firearms in circulation has a direct effect on the ability of those persons at risk
of violence to obtain guns, whether from legitimate sources or illegal firearms sales (secondary markets).
Below is an overview of the main types of gun control measures:
•
•
•
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Legislative efforts: can increase sentences for crimes committed with a firearm or for carrying or
iew category of firearms (e.g., banning assault
selling illegal firearms; regulate the design or
1, v
weapons); and regulate firearms transactions by introducing strict dealer licensing requirements,
9
compulsory licensing for all14
- firearms, mandatory background checks and waiting periods. This
Supply-side tactics: 13target enforcement operations that disrupt illegal firearms sales.
. can
may include strengthening enforcement patrols in high-crime neighborhoods, using undercover
No
police to pose as potential gun buyers, and implementing gun buy-back programs.
Combined approaches: can employ legislative action together with supply-side tactics. This
appears to be the most promising approach.
Although the impact of firearms legislation has been mixed, combining laws with government action and
supply-side tactics has shown promise, particularly as part of broader “second-generation” initiatives.
Establishing a coordinated national, state and local data collection system is a critical starting point for
any firearms strategy. This database can be used to track firearms-related injuries and deaths, to monitor
the impact of firearms legislation and supply-side interventions, and to make any necessary policy
changes. To be successful, restrictive firearms legislation must also include awareness campaigns to
explain, promote and garner public support for the legislation.
Training for the police and other justice sector institutions in implementing the new procedures is also
important. Government and legislative-led firearm interventions are only as strong as the police’s ability
to enforce them. Success depends on the police’s ability to develop close partnerships with community
leaders as well as to develop solid intelligence-based policing and proactive crime prevention. Effective
firearms regulation requires cooperation among all levels of government, law enforcement agencies,
business, the media and citizens. It also requires regional information and intelligence cooperation.
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Overall, recent experiences with combined and second-generation approaches, such as the introduction of
gun amnesties, community-driven weapons controls, awareness-raising and sensitization, and advocacy,
suggest that the availability of firearms can be reduced in Central America.
In the end, however, gun ownership is closely linked to the drug trade. Within an environment that drives
the demand for weapons, reducing gun ownership is difficult. A long-term, sustained reduction in the
demand for guns will hinge on progress in combating drug trafficking, reducing the flow of illegal guns
from the US, and changing the cultural factors that increase young men’s demand for weapons.
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