Sharon Bryant v. Carolyn Colvin

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:11-cv-03083-SKG Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999353207].. [13-1583]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1583

SHARON FAYE BRYANT,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant – Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
Susan K. Gauvey, Magistrate Judge.
(1:11-cv-03083-SKG)

Argued:

March 18, 2014

Decided:

May 9, 2014

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Marcia Ellen Anderson, LAW OFFICE OF MARCIA E. ANDERSON,
LLC, Mount Airy, Maryland, for Appellant.
David Nathaniel
Mervis, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney,
Alex S. Gordon, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Sharon Faye Bryant appeals an adverse ruling on her claim
for

disability

income.

insurance

benefits

and

supplemental

security

We hold that substantial evidence supports the denial

and affirm.

I.
On December 15, 2006, Bryant filed a claim for benefits
with

the

Commissioner

(“Commissioner”).
depression,

of

the

Social

Security

Administration

Bryant contended that she suffered from major

panic

disorder,

generalized

anxiety,

and

post-

traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) with a disability onset date
of June 2, 2006.

The Commissioner denied her claim initially

and on reconsideration.

An administrative law judge (“ALJ”)

likewise denied her claim and the Appeals Council denied her
request for review.
judgment

to

the

A federal magistrate judge granted summary

Commissioner

on

March

28,

2013,

and

Bryant

timely appealed.

II.
“This
denial

of

Court

is

benefits

authorized
under

42

to

review

U.S.C.A.

the

Commissioner’s

§ 405(g).”

Johnson

v.

Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

We “must uphold the factual findings of the
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[ALJ] if they are supported by substantial evidence and were
reached

through

application

of

the

correct

legal

standard.”

Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
undertake

to

determinations,
[ALJ].”
“The

reweigh
or

In applying this standard, “we do not

conflicting

substitute

our

evidence,
judgment

make
for

credibility
that

of

the

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Commissioner

disability claims.”

uses

Id.

a

five-step

process

to

evaluate

In sequence, the Commissioner asks

“whether the claimant: (1) worked during the alleged period of
disability; (2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an impairment
that met or equaled the requirements of a listed impairment; (4)
could return to her past relevant work; and (5) if not, could
perform any other work in the national economy.”

Id.

The

claimant bears the burden of proof in steps one through four and
the

burden

shifts

to

the

Commissioner

in

step

five.

Id.

Additionally, if the claimant’s disability can be determined at
any step, the inquiry need not continue.

Id.

The ALJ found under step one that Bryant was not engaged in
substantial gainful employment during the relevant time period.
Under step two, the ALJ determined that Bryant suffered from
bipolar disorder, PTSD, generalized anxiety disorder, borderline
personality disorder, and alcohol abuse disorder, and that these
impairments were “severe.”

However, the ALJ found under step
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three that Bryant’s conditions did not meet or equal the listed
impairments

under

the

applicable

regulations.

The

ALJ

then

calculated Bryant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), which
measured her ability to work despite her impairments.

Using

Bryant’s RFC, the ALJ determined under step four that she could
not return to any of her previous jobs but, under step five,
could perform jobs currently available in the national economy
and

thus

was

not

disabled

within

the

meaning

of

the

Social

Security Act.
Bryant argues that the ALJ erred by not considering “major
depressive

disorder”

improperly

as

evaluating

a

severe

evidence

impairment

of

Bryant’s

under

step

impairments

two,
under

step three, and failing to properly consider certain medical
reports when calculating her RFC.

We address each of these

arguments in turn.
A.
Bryant argues that the ALJ erred in not considering “major
depressive disorder” as a severe impairment under step two of
the disability claim determination process.
that

the

“severe

ALJ

determine

impairment”

“significantly

or

limits”

whether

the

claimant

“combination
the

claimant’s

ability to do basic work activities.”

This step requires

of

suffered

from

impairments”

“physical

or

a

that
mental

20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c).

Contrary to Bryant’s contention, her “major depressive disorder”
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was taken into account.

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The ALJ found that Bryant satisfied

this step of the disability claims process because she suffered
from five severe impairments, one of which was bipolar disorder.
The

magistrate

judge

noted

that,

medically

speaking,

a

“diagnosis of bipolar disorder is inclusive of the symptoms of
major depressive disorder and, therefore, the two disorders are
mutually exclusive.”
that

although

suffered

the

from

J.A. 22.

ALJ

“major

did

Furthermore, the record reveals

not

specifically

depressive

disorder,”

find
the

that

ALJ

Bryant

discussed

Bryant’s history of depression under steps two and three and
when

determining

her

RFC.

Thus,

we

find

no

merit

in

this

assignment of error.
B.
Bryant also contends that the ALJ erred under step three,
which requires the ALJ to compare the claimant’s conditions to
the

Listings

of

Impairment

(“Listings”)

to

determine

if

her

conditions are medically severe enough to warrant a presumption
of

disability.

Specifically,

Bryant

maintains

that

the

ALJ

erred under Listings 12.04 (Affective Disorders), 12.06 (Anxiety
Related Disorders), and 12.08 (Personality Disorders) for three
reasons:

first,

that

the

ALJ

wrongly

found

her

impairments

caused her “moderate” rather than “marked” limitations, second,
that the ALJ did not consider evidence that she had suffered
repeated

and

extended

episodes
5

of

decompensation

and,

third,

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that the ALJ incorrectly ruled that she was capable of working
outside her home.
First, Listings 12.04, 12.06, and 12.08 each contain an
identical
prove

“Paragraph

disability

by

B,”

which

showing,

provides

among

that

other

a

claimant

things,

any

two

may
of

these limitations: “(1) [m]arked restriction of activities of
daily living; or (2) [m]arked difficulties in maintaining social
functioning;

or

(3)

[m]arked

difficulties

in

maintaining

concentration, persistence, or pace; or (4) [r]epeated episodes
of decompensation, each of extended duration.”
Subpart P, App. 1.

The Listings define “marked” as “more than

moderate but less than extreme.”
evidence

and

20 C.F.R. § 404,

determined

that

Id.

Bryant

The ALJ evaluated the

suffered

only

“moderate”

restrictions because she could, among other things, take care of
her personal needs around her house, run short errands on her
own,

and

focus

newspaper.

while

watching

the

news

and

reading

the

We decline to disturb the ALJ’s finding that Bryant

failed to prove her disability under Paragraph B because it is
supported by substantial evidence.
Second, Listing 12.04 provides an alternative basis for a
claimant

to

claimant

to

prove
prove

disability,
that

she

part

suffered

of

“[r]epeated

decompensation, each of extended duration.”
decompensation”

are

defined

as
6

which

Id.

“exacerbations

requires
episodes

the
of

“Episodes of
or

temporary

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increases in symptoms or signs accompanied by a loss of adaptive
functioning,

as

manifested

by

difficulties

in

performing

activities of daily living, maintaining social relationships, or
maintaining

concentration,

persistence,

or

pace.”

Id.

To

qualify as “repeated” and of “extended duration,” the claimant
must suffer “three episodes within 1 year, or an average of once
every 4 months, each lasting for at least 2 weeks.”

Id.

The ALJ found that Bryant had experienced only one to two
episodes

surrounding

her

hospitalization

suicidal thoughts and alcohol abuse.

in

June

2006

for

Bryant argues that the ALJ

should have considered a change in her medication that happened
in early 2007.

But while episodes of decompensation may be

inferred from “significant alteration in medication,” id., the
ALJ properly declined to analyze Bryant’s change in medication
because it did not result in any exacerbation of her symptoms.
Bryant

also

contends

that

the

ALJ

erred

by

failing

to

consider a series of hospitalizations that allegedly occurred
before the onset of her impairments.

The record contains bare

statements that Bryant had been hospitalized on prior occasions,
but no details about them.

It was undoubtedly the ALJ’s duty to

consider these statements.

Cook v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 1168, 1173

(4th Cir. 1986).
was

disabled

However, Bryant bore the burden of proving she

under

step

three,

and

she

did

not

offer

any

specific evidence about the alleged hospital stays nor did she
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request that the ALJ seek such evidence.

Furthermore, even if

the ALJ had obtained records from the past hospitalizations,
they occurred far enough before the onset of her impairments to
be

of

limited

already

relevance

contained

to

Bryant’s

her

claim.

medical

Indeed,

records

from

the
as

record

early

as

December 2004, two full years before she filed her claim.
Lastly,

Listing

12.06

contains

an

alternate

provision

allowing a claimant to prove disability if she suffers from,
among

other

things,

a

“complete

inability

independently outside the area of [her] home.”
Subpart P, App. 1.

to

function

20 C.F.R. § 404,

After reviewing the evidence, the ALJ found

that Bryant’s impairments were not so severe.

We agree because

the record shows that Bryant could perform limited activities
outside of her home, such as running short errands on her own,
and we thus decline to overturn the ALJ’s finding.
In sum, we uphold the ALJ’s finding that Bryant was not
disabled under step three because her impairments did not meet
or equal any of the Listings.
C.
Finally, Bryant challenges the ALJ’s determination of her
RFC.

When determining a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ considers all

of her impairments, even if they are not “severe,” and reviews
“all of the relevant medical and other evidence.”
§ 404.1545(a).

20 C.F.R.

In Bryant’s case, the ALJ evaluated numerous
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medical reports, including those written by Bryant’s treating
physician, Dr. Gergana Dimitrova, as well as two state agency
consultants.

Dr. Dimitrova’s report in July 2007 contained a

Psychiatric Note that stated Bryant “continues to not be able to
work due to her paranoia and her depression.”

J.A. 29-30.

The

ALJ could not determine whether that statement was made by Dr.
Dimitrova

or

Bryant

herself

and

found

that,

regardless,

the

statement was too ambiguous to provide a useful assessment of
the

activities

impairments.

Bryant
Thus,

could
the

ALJ

or

could

gave

not

Dr.

perform

given

Dimitrova’s

her

statement

“little weight.”
The magistrate judge found that, because Dr. Dimitrova was
Bryant’s

treating

§ 404.1527(c)(2)

physician,
by

not

the

giving

ALJ
her

erred

under

statement

20

more

C.F.R.
weight.

However, the magistrate judge found that the error was harmless
because Dr. Dimitrova’s opinions were thoroughly evaluated by
the ALJ, were discussed by the two state agency consultants in
their

reports,

evidence.

and

were

consistent

with

the

other

medical

The magistrate judge also found that the ALJ erred by

failing to discuss a report written by consultative examiner Dr.
Jethalal Harkhani in February 2007.
(obligating
receive).
Harkhani’s

ALJs

to

“evaluate

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)

every

medical

opinion”

they

The ALJ found this error harmless as well because Dr.
report

was

discussed
9

by

the

two

state

agency

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consultants and was consistent with the medical evidence on the
record.

We likewise find the ALJ errors harmless and affirm the

ALJ’s determination of Bryant’s RFC.

III.
It is the ALJ’s responsibility to find the facts and weigh
the evidence.

We decline to overrule those determinations in

this case because substantial evidence supports them.

AFFIRMED

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