Isidoro Rodriguez v. Jane Doe

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Motion disposition in opinion--denying Motion for other relief [999141724-2]; denying Motion to strike [999132480-2]; denying Motion to disqualify/recuse judge [999121995-2] Originating case number: 3:12-cv-00663-JAG Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999256791]. Mailed to: appellant. [13-1638]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1638

ISIDORO RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JANE DOE, Member of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary
Board ("Board"), sued as individual of an unauthorized
entity; JOHN DOE, Member of the Virginia State Bar
Disciplinary Board ("Board"), sued as individual of an
unauthorized entity; CYNTHIA D. KINSER, sued as individual;
DONALD W. LEMONS, sued as individual; S. BERNARD GOODWYN,
sued as individual; LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR., sued as
individual; WILLIAM C. MIMS, sued as individual; ELIZABETH
A. MCCLANAHAN, sued as individual; CLEO E. POWELL, sued as
individual;
CHARLES
S.
RUSSELL,
sued
as
individual;
ELIZABETH B. LACY, sued as individual; LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ,
sued as individual; JANE DOE, Officer of the Virginia State
Bar, sued as individual; JOHN DOE, Officer of the Virginia
State Bar, sued as individual; KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI, II,
sued
as
individual;
CATHERINE
CROOKS
HILL,
sued
as
individual; JANE DOE, Officer/Member of the Virginia
Employment Commission, sued as individual; JOHN DOE,
Officer/Member of the Virginia Employment Commission, sued
as individual; JOHN G. ROBERTS, Justice of the United States
Supreme Court; WILLIAM K. SUTER, Justice of the United
States Supreme Court; MEMBERS OF THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, sued as individuals;
MEMBERS OF THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT,
sued as individuals; MEMBERS OF THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT, sued as individuals; MEMBERS OF THE
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, sued as
individuals; MEMBERS OF THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT, sued as individuals; MEMBERS OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEAL AND COMMITTEE ON
ADMISSIONS, sued as individuals; LEONIE M. BRINKEMA, sued in
her individual capacity; RICHARD W. ROBERTS, sued in
individual capacity; PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, sued in individual

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capacity; JAMES E. BOASBERG, sued in individual capacity;
JOHN O. COLVIN, sued in individual capacity; L. PAIGE
MARVEL, sued in individual capacity; RICHARD T. MORRISON,
sued in individual capacity; LAURENCE J. WHALEN, sued in his
individual capacity; DOUGLAS SHULMAN, sued in his individual
capacity; ERIC HOLDER, sued in individual capacity; RICHARD
A. SCHWARTZ, sued in his individual capacity; OFFICE OF THE
ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY, EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, sued
in individual capacity; OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT U.S.
ATTORNEY FOR D.C., sued in individual capacity; OFFICE OF
THE ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA, sued in individual capacity; OFFICE OF THE
ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW
YORK, sued in individual capacity; JAMES LEROY BANKS, sued
as individual; WILLIAM ETHAN GLOVER, sued as individual;
STEPHEN A. WANNALL, sued as individual; GLENN M. HODGE, sued
as
individual;
WILLIAM
CARLYLE
BOYCE,
JR.,
sued
as
individual; JACK HARBESTON, sued individually and as alter
ego HFP, Inc., IOTA Partners, and Sea Search Armada LLC
(DE); JANE/JOHN DOES, AND DOE ENTITIES; UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA,
Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond.
John A. Gibney, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:12-cv-00663-JAG)

Submitted:

November 22, 2013

Decided:

December 11, 2013

Before Ed CARNES, Chief Judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation, and
William H. PRYOR, Jr., Circuit Judge of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation, and
Joel F. DUBINA, Circuit Judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Isidoro Rodriguez, Appellant Pro Se.
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA,
2

Farnaz Farkish, OFFICE OF
Richmond, Virginia, for

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Commonwealth Appellees.
Jonathan Holland Hambrick, Assistant
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Richmond, Virginia, for the United States.
James S. DelSordo,
ARGUS LEGAL, LLC, Manassas, Virginia, for Appellee Jack
Harbeston.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Appellant

Isidoro

Rodriguez,

a

disbarred

attorney

proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
claims alleging treason, Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-481(5), 18.2-482;
Racketeering
(“RICO”)

Influenced

violations,

18

and

Corruption

U.S.C.

§ 1962(c)

Organization
and

Va.

Acts

Code

Ann.

§ 18.2-514; and a business conspiracy, Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-499;
and seeking a writ quo warranto for misuse of office, Va. Code
Ann. § 8.01-636. 1

On appeal, Rodriguez argues that the district

court’s dismissal of his complaint with prejudice—on the grounds
that his claims were barred by res judicata, the Rooker-Feldman 2
doctrine, judicial immunity, and failure to state a claim—was
erroneous.

Rodriguez

also

challenges

the

district

court’s

imposition of sanctions after he filed his notice of appeal from
the district court’s dismissal of his complaint.
I.
We

review

dismissals

for

lack

of

subject

jurisdiction and failure to state a claim de novo.

matter

Cooksey v.

1

Rodriguez has abandoned any claim regarding a writ quo
warranto because he did not offer argument on the writ in his
initial brief. See Cavallo v. Star Enter., 100 F.3d 1150, 1152
n.2 (4th Cir. 1996).
2

Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149
(1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303(1983).

4

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Futrell,

721

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F.3d

226,

234

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(4th

Cir.

2013)

(subject

matter

jurisdiction); Cavallo v. Star Enter., 100 F.3d 1150, 1153 (4th
Cir. 1996) (failure to state a claim).
Applying

the

doctrine

of

res

judicata

is

proper

where:

(1) a prior case resulted in a final judgment on the merits;
(2) there is “an identity of the cause of action in both the
earlier and the later suit”; and (3) there is “an identity of
parties

or

their

privies

in

the

two

suits.”

Clodfelter

v.

Republic of Sudan, 720 F.3d 199, 210 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

As to the second prong, we apply a

transactional approach, under which the first case will have a
preclusive effect if “the second suit arises out of the same
transaction or series of transactions as the claim resolved by
the prior judgment.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Thus, a “newly articulated claim” will be barred by res judicata
“if it is based on the same underlying transaction and could
have been brought in the earlier action.”

Id.

We conclude from the record that the district court did not
err

in

dismissing

on

the

basis

of

res

judicata

Rodriguez’s

current claims against defendants that he had previously sued.
In Rodriguez v. Editor in Chief, Legal Times, 285 F. App’x 756
(D.C. Circuit 2008), and Rodriguez v. Shulman, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2012), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
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issued final judgments on the merits of Rodriguez’s claims of
RICO violations and federal and state constitutional violations
for, among other reasons, claim and issue preclusion, judicial
immunity, and failure to state a claim.
Rodriguez’s

current

case

arose

transactions—specifically,
Rodriguez

from

the

practicing

out

These prior cases and

of

alleged

law.

the

same

conspiracy

Although

series
to

of

prevent

Rodriguez

raises

several new claims in the instant case, these new claims are
barred

by

res

judicata

because

they

are

based

on

the

same

conspiracy that Rodriguez alleged in his previous actions, and
he

could

have

brought

the

claims

in

those

actions.

See

lower

federal

courts

state

court

Clodfelter, 720 F.3d at 210.
II.
Under
lack

subject

judgments.
2006).
the

the

matter

doctrine,

jurisdiction

to

review

Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 463 (4th Cir.

Thus, a lower federal court may not review a case where

losing

caused

Rooker-Feldman

by

party

from

state-court

state

court

judgments

“complain[s]

rendered

before

of

injuries

the

district

court proceedings commenced and invit[es] district court review
and

rejection

marks omitted).

of

those

judgments.”

Id.

(internal

quotation

“In other words, the doctrine applies where a

party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an unfavorable statecourt decision to a lower federal court.”
6

Id. at 464 (internal

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quotation

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marks

omitted)

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(explaining

that

“the

test

is

not

whether the relief sought in the federal suit ‘would certainly
upset’ the enforcement of a state court decree, . . . but rather
whether the relief would ‘reverse or modify’ the state court
decree”).
Because

Rodriguez

seeks

in

this

lawsuit,

among

other

relief, reinstatement to the bar and the payment of unemployment
benefits, we conclude that the district court did not err in
applying

the

Rooker-Feldman

doctrine.

That

is,

in

seeking

reinstatement as an attorney, Rodriguez challenges the Supreme
Court of Virginia’s affirmance of his disbarment.

In seeking

the payment of unemployment benefits, Rodriguez challenges the
affirmance by the Court of Appeals of Virginia of the lower
state court decision that he was disqualified from receiving
unemployment benefits.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars lower

federal courts from reviewing such state court decisions.

See

Adkins, 464 F.3d at 463-64.
III.
“[J]udicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just
from ultimate assessment of damages.”
9,

11,

overcome

112

S.Ct.

only

actions—that

286,

where:

is,

288(1991).
(1) the

“actions

not

judge
taken

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S.
Judicial
engaged
in

the

immunity
in

can

be

nonjudicial

judge’s

judicial

capacity”; or (2) there was a complete lack of jurisdiction.
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Id. at 11-12, 112 S.Ct. at 288.

Allegations of bad faith or

malice will not overcome judicial immunity.
S.Ct. at 288.

Id. at 11, 112

Where state supreme court justices hear an appeal

from a lower court’s disciplinary decision, they are performing
a

“traditional

adjudicative

task.”

Supreme

Court

of

Va.

v.

Consumers Union, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 734, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 1976
(1980), superseded on other grounds by statute, Federal Courts
Improvement

Act

of

1996,

Pub.

L.

No.

104-317,

§ 309(c),

110

Stat. 3847 (1996).
We

conclude

from

the

record

that

the

district

court

correctly determined that the judicial defendants were entitled
to

judicial

immunity.

The

prior

judicial

decisions

that

Rodriguez challenges in this case as part of a vast conspiracy
to deprive him of his rights were issued by the judges acting in
their judicial capacities.

See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, 112

S.Ct. at 288; Consumers Union, Inc., 446 U.S. at 734, 100 S.Ct.
at 1976.

Moreover, any argument that the judges acted with a

complete lack of jurisdiction is without merit.

See Mireles,

502 U.S. at 11, 112 S.Ct. at 288.
IV.
In reviewing the dismissal of a complaint, we assume that
all

well-pleaded

facts

are

true

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.

and

draw

all

reasonable

Cooksey, 721 F.3d at 234.

“[C]ourts may consider relevant facts obtained from the public
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record, so long as these facts are construed in the light most
favorable

to

allegations

the

of

plaintiff

the

along

complaint.”

with

the

Clatterbuck

well-pleaded
v.

City

of

Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
“To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint
must establish facial plausibility by pleading factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
(internal

quotation

plaintiff

must

marks

“nudge[]

omitted).
[his]

To

claims

resist

across

Id. at 554
dismissal,

the

line

a

from

conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).
accept

as

true

unreasonable

legal

conclusions

conclusions,

or

or

The court need not

“unwarranted

arguments.”

inferences,

Simmons

v.

United

Mortg. & Loan Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754, 768 (4th Cir. 2011)
(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).

To

survive

a

motion

to

dismiss, the complaint must include sufficient facts “to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
the alleged activity.”
615

F.3d

312,

317

(4th

US Airline Pilots Ass’n v. Awappa, LLC,
Cir.

2010)

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).
Under Virginia state law, it is a crime to commit treason,
which

includes

“[r]esisting

the
9

execution

of

the

laws

under

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color

of

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its

authority.”

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Va.

Code

Ann.

§ 18.2-481(5).

Misprision of treason, which is also a crime, occurs when an
individual conceals the commission of treason.

Id. § 18.2-482.

We have explained, in the context of a federal civil rights suit
involving a federal criminal statute, that, “[t]he Supreme Court
historically has been loath to infer a private right of action
from

a

bare

criminal

statute,

because

criminal

statutes

are

usually couched in terms that afford protection to the general
public

instead

Broderick,

of

225

a

discrete,

F.3d

440,

well-defined

447-48

(4th

group.”

Cir.

Doe

2000)

v.

(internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).
The federal RICO statute prohibits a person from conducting
an

“enterprise’s

affairs

through

a

pattern

activity or collection of unlawful debt.”

of

racketeering

18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).

Similarly, the Virginia RICO statute prohibits a person from
participating in an “enterprise through racketeering activity.”
Va.

Code

Ann.

§ 18.2-514(c).

plaintiff

must

allege

at

continuing

pattern

and

activities

showing

they

Anderson

v.

Found.

for

a

As

least

to

two

the

federal

racketeering

relationship
had

the

same

Advancement,

among
or

statute,
acts

the

similar

Educ.

&

Indians, 155 F.3d 500, 505 (4th Cir. 1998).

and

a
“a

defendant’s
purposes.”

Emp’t

of

Am.

A plaintiff may

show continuity by showing that the racketeering acts were part
of the enterprise’s usual way of doing business.
10

Id.

As to the

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pattern requirement, “[i]t is not the number of predicates but
the

relationship

external

that

organizing

arranged.”

they

bear

principle

to

that

each

other

renders

or

them

to

some

ordered

or

H. J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238,

109 S.Ct. 2893, 2900 (1989).

A plaintiff may establish the

relationship requirement “by showing that the criminal acts have
the same or similar purposes, victims, or methods of commission,
or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics
and are not isolated events.”

Id. at 240, 109 S.Ct. at 2893.

The Virginia business conspiracy statute prohibits two or
more

persons

from

agreeing

and

mutually

undertaking

to

“willfully and maliciously injur[e] another in his reputation,
trade, business or profession by any means whatever.”

Va. Code

Ann. § 18.2-499(A).
We

conclude

from

the

record

that

the

district

court

correctly found that Rodriguez failed to state claims upon which
relief

may

be

granted

as

to

his

violations, and business conspiracy.

claims

of

treason,

RICO

First, because Rodriguez

has presented no argument as to why the court should infer a
private
treason

right

of

criminal

action

from

statutes,

the
the

treason
district

and

misprision

court

of

correctly

determined that it was not plausible that the defendants would
be liable for treason or misprision of treason in this action.
See Clatterbuck, 708 F.3d at 554; Doe, 225 F.3d at 447-48.
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Next,

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as

to

Pg: 12 of 15

Rodriguez’s

RICO

and

business

conspiracy

claims, his complaint does not establish plausibility.

Rather,

his complaint indicates that the events in question began with
two separate and unrelated complaints to the state bar, which
ultimately led to Rodriguez’s disbarment in Virginia and other
courts, his loss of unemployment benefits, and several lawsuits.
Rodriguez’s
conspiracy

assertion
between

that

his

the

former

bar

complaints

client

and

the

arose
U.S.

from

a

Attorney

General is an “unreasonable conclusion[],” which we need not
accept.

See Simmons, 634 F.3d at 768.

As to the events that

followed the initial bar complaints, it is not plausible that
the individuals and courts who worked on these cases comprised
an enterprise or conspiracy that sought to victimize Rodriguez
and injure his profession.
Clatterbuck,

708

F.3d

at

See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-499(A);
554.

Nor

has

Rodriguez

presented

“factual content” to support a finding that such an enterprise
or

conspiracy

existed.

See

Clatterbuck,

708

F.3d

at

554.

Rather, the reasonable inference to draw from these facts and
from the decisions in Rodriguez’s prior cases—which we consider
as part of the public record—is that the individuals and courts
who

worked

determined

on
that

Rodriguez’s
they

were

cases

considered

without

merit

his

for

a

claims
variety

and
of

reasons, including failure to state a claim, judicial immunity,
and

claim

and

issue

preclusion.
12

See

id. at

557;

Editor

in

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Chief, Legal Times, 285 F. App’x at 759-60; Shulman, 844 F.
Supp. 2d at 7-12.
For

all

of

the

above

reasons,

we

affirm

the

district

court’s dismissal of Rodriguez’s complaint.
V.
We review jurisdictional questions de novo and the issuance
of a pre-filing injunction for an abuse of discretion.

Balas v.

Huntington Ingalls Indus., Inc., 711 F.3d 401, 406 (4th Cir.
2013) (jurisdiction); Cromer v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390
F.3d 812, 817 (4th Cir. 2004) (pre-filing injunction).
We have upheld the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions imposed
after

the

district

court

issued

its

appellant filed a notice of appeal.
v.

S.

Fuels

Co.,

813

F.2d

final

judgment

and

the

Langham-Hill Petroleum Inc.

1327,

1330-31

(4th

Cir.

1987)

(upholding the imposition of attorney’s fees awarded under Rule
11

despite

the

appellant’s

argument

that

the

district

court

lacked jurisdiction to impose sanctions after it filed a notice
of appeal).
It is the appellant’s duty to order transcripts relevant to
any

findings

appeal.

or

conclusions

Fed.R.App.P.

that

10(b)(2);

he
4th

intends
Cir.

R.

to

challenge

10(c)(1).

on
An

appellant waives an issue if he fails to comply with Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b)(2) and provide us with the

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relevant transcripts.

Pg: 14 of 15

Keller v. Prince George’s Cnty., 827 F.2d

952, 954 n.1 (4th Cir. 1987).
“[F]ederal courts [have] the authority to limit access to
the courts by vexatious and repetitive litigants.”
F.3d at 817.

Cromer, 390

“Such a drastic remedy must be used sparingly,”

but may be appropriate in cases where a litigant abuses “the
judicial process by filing meritless and repetitive actions.”
Id. at 817-18 (quoting Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1038 (3d
Cir. 1993)).
Rodriguez’s

argument

that

the

district

court

lacked

jurisdiction to impose sanctions after he filed his notice of
appeal is without merit.

See Langham-Hill Petroleum Inc., 813

F.2d at 1330-31.
Furthermore, the district court has the ability to limit
access

to

the

courts,

and

Rodriguez

has

waived

any

argument

regarding the merits of the pre-filing injunction because he
failed to provide the Court with the transcript of the sanctions
hearing.
n.1.

See Cromer, 390 F.3d at 817; Keller, 827 F.2d at 954

For

the

above-stated

reasons,

14

we

affirm

the

district

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judgment

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of

dismissal

Pg: 15 of 15

and

the

district

court’s

imposition of sanctions. 3
AFFIRMED

3

We DENY as moot Rodriguez’s motion to disqualify and
recuse the judges of the Fourth Circuit and Chief Justice John
G. Roberts.
We also DENY Rodriguez’s motion to strike the
federal defendants’ response brief, and DENY Rodriguez’s motion
for an injunction.

15