James E. Joyner v. Crane Co.
Filing
PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:12-cv-02294-CCB Copies to all parties and the district court/agency.[999416262].. [13-1868]
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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1868
KATHLEEN R. WOOD, Personal Representative for the Estate of
James E. Joyner,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CRANE CO., individually and as successor to National−U.S.
Radiator, is a Delaware Corporation with its principal
place of business in Connecticut,
Defendant – Appellant,
and
A.C. & R INSULATION CO., INC.; ALLEN−BRADLEY COMPANY, INC.;
ALLIS−CHALMERS
ENERGY,
INC.;
AIR
&
LIQUID
SYSTEMS
CORPORATION, Successor by Merger to Buffalo Pumps, Inc.;
A.O. SMITH CORPORATION; ARMSTRONG INTERNATIONAL, INC.;
AQUA−CHEM, INC., d/b/a Clever−Brooks Division; AURORA PUMP,
CO; A.W. CHESTERTON, INC.; BW/IP, INC., and its wholly
owned subsidiaries as successor−in−interest to BW/IP;
CARRIER CORP.; CBS CORPORATION, f/k/a Viacom, Inc., as
successor
to
Westinghouse
Electric
Corp.;
CERTAINEED
CORPORATION;
CLEAVER−BROOKS
COMPANY;
COLUMBIA
BOILER
COMPANY; CROWN CORK & SEAL COMPANY, INC.; EATON ELECTRICAL,
INC., f/k/a Cutler Hammer, Inc.; ELLIOTT COMPANY I, f/k/a
Elliott
Turbomachinery
Co.
Inc.;
FMC
CORPORATION,
individually,
on
behalf
of
its
Former
Construction
Equipment
Group
&
Former
Peerless
Pump
Division;
FOSTER−WHEELER LLC; FOSTER WHEELER ENERGY CORPORATION,
f/k/a Foster Wheeler Corporation; GARDNER DENVER, INC.;
GARDNER DENVER NASH, LLC, a/k/a Gardner Denver, Inc., f/k/a
Nash Elmo Industries, LLC; GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY;
GEORGIA−PACIFIC, LLC; THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY,
individually
and
as
successor−in−interest
to
Durabla
Manufacturing; GOULDS PUMPS, INC., a subsidiary of ITT
Industries, Inc.; THE GRISCOM−RUSSELL COMPANY, f/k/a The
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Dial Corporation, a Delaware Corporation; H.B. FULLER
COMPANY, Successor/or parent of Benjamin Foster Division of
Amchem Products, Inc.; H.B. SMITH COMPANY, INC., a/k/a
Smith Cast Iron Boilers; HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.;
HOPEMAN BROTHERS, INC.; IMO INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED,
individually and on behalf of and successor to DeLaval;
DeLaval Stream Turbine Co., IMO DeLaval and Warren Pump
Co.; INGERSOLL−RAND COMPANY; INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY,
INC.; JOHN CRANE, INC.; KAISER GYPSUM COMPANY, INC.;
MCNALLY
INDUSTRIES,
INC.,
individually
and
as
successor−in−interest to Northern Pump Company and Northern
Fire
Apparatus
Company;
MCIC,
INC.,
f/k/a
McCormick
Asbestos Co.; METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO.; NATIONAL
SERVICE INDUSTRIES, INC., f/k/a North Brothers, Inc.;
OWENS−ILLINOIS, INC.; RAPID−AMERICAN CORPORATION; RILEY
POWER, INC., f/k/a Babcock Borsig, Inc., f/k/a Riley Stoker
Corporation; SB DECKING, INC., f/k/a Selby, Battersby &
Company; SEALING EQUIPMENT PRODUCTS CO. INC.; SIEMANS DEMAG
DELAVAL
TURBOMACHINERY,
INC.,
f/k/a
Demag
Delaval
Turbomachinery, Inc.; SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC USA, INC., f/k/a
Square D Company; UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION; UNIROYAL,
INCORPORATED; VALEN VALVE CORPORATION; WALLACE & GALE
ASBESTOS SETTLEMENT TRUST; THE WALTER E. CAMPBELL COMPANY,
INC.; WARREN PUMPS, LLC, f/k/a Warren Pumps, Incorporated;
WEIL
PUMP
COMPANY
INC.;
WEIL−MCLAIN,
INC.;
YARWAY
CORPORATION;
ROCKWELL
AUTOMATION,
INC.,
successor−in−
interest to Allen−Bradley Co.,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:12-cv-02294-CCB)
Argued:
March 19, 2014
Decided:
August 15, 2014
Before DUNCAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Wynn joined. Judge Duncan concurred in the judgment
only.
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ARGUED:
Michael
James
Ross,
K&L
GATES
LLP,
Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania,
for
Appellant.
Jacqueline
Gagne
Badders,
RUCKDESCHEL LAW FIRM, LLC, Ellicott City, Maryland, for
Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Nicholas P. Vari, Syed D. Ali, K&L GATES
LLP, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Neil J. MacDonald, MACDONALD LAW
GROUP, LLC, Beltsville, Maryland, for Appellant.
Jonathan
Ruckdeschel, Z. Stephen Horvat, RUCKDESCHEL LAW FIRM, LLC,
Ellicott City, Maryland, for Appellee.
3
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DIAZ, Circuit Judge:
Crane
Company,
litigation,
removed
one
of
this
many
case
to
defendants
federal
in
this
court,
asbestos
asserting
a
federal defense to plaintiff James Joyner’s 1 state tort claims.
When
Joyner
amended
his
complaint,
eliminating
the
claims
underlying that federal defense, the district court remanded to
state court.
Crane now complains that it should have been given
the opportunity to assert a new basis for federal jurisdiction-even though it had declined to do so in a timely fashion.
We
affirm the district court’s decision to remand.
I.
A.
James Joyner was diagnosed with mesothelioma in March 2012.
His illness allegedly resulted from exposure to asbestos while
working as an electrician for the Coast Guard and then in the
private sector.
Joyner filed suit in Maryland state court, alleging (1)
strict liability for defective design and failure to warn; (2)
breach of implied warranty; (3) negligence products liability
claims; and (4) aiding and abetting and conspiracy to conceal
1
Joyner passed away during the course of these proceedings,
and his representative, Kathleen Wood, has been substituted in
the caption. We continue to refer to Joyner in our opinion.
4
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information
defendants
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about
a
the
number
dangers
of
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of
asbestos.
manufacturers
who
Joyner
allegedly
named
as
supplied
asbestos-containing materials with which he came into contact at
various points in his career.
Co.,
allegedly
manufactured
One of those defendants, Crane
and
supplied
asbestos-containing
valves and gaskets to the Navy, 2 on whose ships Joyner worked
while employed by the Coast Guard.
Crane removed the case to federal court under the federal
officer
removal
provision
statute.
allows
for
See
removal
28
of
U.S.C.
suits
§ 1442(a)(1).
against
“[t]he
That
United
States or . . . any officer . . . in an official or individual
capacity,
office.”
for
Id.
or
relating
to
any
act
under
color
of
such
In support of its position, Crane averred that it
would assert the federal contractor defense, as it had supplied
the valves in conformance with military specifications.
J.A. 42.
See
Crane’s notice of removal did mention that the valves
included gaskets as internal component parts, but Crane did not
explicitly assert the defense as related to gaskets.
See J.A.
42.
2
Joyner’s complaint did not identify the valves and gaskets
as the source of his injuries; this information became available
during the course of depositions, after which Crane filed its
notice of removal.
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Joyner moved to remand to state court, arguing that Crane’s
evidence
was
allegations.
insufficient
In
the
to
support
alternative,
its
Joyner
jurisdictional
moved
to
sever
the
valve claims against Crane and to remand the claims against the
other
defendants--as
well
Crane--to state court.
as
Joyner’s
gasket
claims
against
At oral argument before the district
court, Crane explicitly refused to take a position as to whether
the
federal
might
have
contractor
defense
supplied.
Rather,
applied
Crane
to
any
gaskets
apparently
Crane
sought
to
preserve its contention that the gaskets simply weren’t theirs.
See J.A. 2646 (“Crane has a different position with regard to
their
gasket
because
it
was
never,
never
on
the
Navy’s
QPL
[qualified products list] and should never have been used.”);
see also J.A. 2732 3 (“To be clear, it is Crane Co.’s position
that Mr. Joyner did not work with replacement Cranite gaskets on
Navy vessels because Cranite gaskets were not on any government
QPL list, and thus were not able to be ordered for use on Navy
vessels
through
however,
to
gaskets
“would
the
make
an
have
procurement
argument
been
process.”).
in
the
supplied
3
Crane
declined,
alternative--that
pursuant
to
the
detailed
This citation is to Crane’s opposition to Joyner’s notice
of abandonment and request for remand, filed on April 11, 2013
in the district court.
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government specifications”--until much later in the litigation.
J.A. 2732.
In a memorandum opinion and order issued March 7, 2013, the
district
court
found
that
Crane
had
sufficiently
supported
removal pursuant to § 1442(a)(1), focusing on the valve claims.
See Joyner v. A.C. & R. Insulation Co., No. CCB-12-2294, 2013 WL
877125 (D. Md. Mar. 7, 2013).
It did, however, grant in part
Joyner’s motion to sever the valve claims from all the others.
The court noted that it could exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the other claims, but largely declined to do so.
found
that
state
law
claims
predominated
over
The court
the
claims
implicating the federal defense and that Maryland had a strong
interest in adjudicating its own state law claims, leading the
court to sever the claims against the other defendants.
But the
court also noted its interest in economy, which weighed against
forcing Crane to litigate claims regarding valves in one court
and gaskets in another.
Thus, the court remanded the claims
against the other defendants back to Maryland state court, but
retained both claims against Crane.
Shortly thereafter, Joyner filed a “notice of abandonment
of
claims
remand.”
regarding
J.A.
2722.
Crane
The
Co.
valves
notice
only
explained
and
that
request
for
Joyner
was
abandoning his claims against Crane with respect to its valves,
retaining only his claims involving injuries caused by Crane’s
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gaskets.
Crane’s
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See J.A. 2722–23, 2923.
removal
to
federal
court
Joyner argued that because
relied
on
the
government
contractor defense as to the valves alone, the district court
had no subject matter jurisdiction without those claims.
Crane vociferously contested Joyner’s motion, arguing that
Joyner
was
manipulating
his
complaint
to
avoid
federal
jurisdiction and that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 does
not permit Joyner to amend his complaint with such precision.
Crane also argued that it could assert its federal defense in
relation to the gaskets.
The district court addressed these concerns in a memorandum
opinion and order on June 6, 2013.
See Joyner v. A.C. & R.
Insulation Co., No. CCB-12-2294, 2013 WL 2460537 (D. Md. June 6,
2013).
The
court
chose
to
construe
Joyner’s
notice
of
abandonment as a motion to amend his complaint under Rule 15(a).
Finding that such an amendment would not prejudice Crane, the
district court granted leave to amend.
The court found that
Crane had not asserted a federal defense with respect to gaskets
and that 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) prevented Crane from asserting it
now,
well
beyond
notice of removal.
claims
for
the
thirty
days
that
provision
grants
for
The court also explained that any cross-
contribution
would
be
irrelevant,
forfeited any damages related to the valves.
as
Joyner
had
Thus, the defense
would not apply as to potential cross-claims from co-defendants.
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Accordingly,
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the
court
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remanded
Joyner’s
remaining
claims
to
Maryland state court.
B.
Crane
appeals
contending
court.
that
all
both
the
claims
March
should
7
and
6
orders,
remained
have
June
in
federal
The case is calendared for trial in the Circuit Court
for Baltimore City, and we think it belongs there.
Because the
district court did not err in remanding the Crane gasket claims
to
state
court,
we
need
not
evaluate
the
propriety
of
the
court’s earlier decision to remand the claims against the other
defendants, or whether we even have jurisdiction to consider
that question.
II.
As
an
initial
matter,
Joyner
jurisdiction to review this appeal.
asserts
that
we
have
no
We disagree.
Crane correctly observes that “[a]n order remanding a case
to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable
on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to
the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section
1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or
otherwise.”
28
U.S.C.
§ 1447(d).
This
case
was
originally
removed pursuant to § 1442(a)(1) and is thus reviewable.
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Joyner
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argues
that
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because
he
amended
his
complaint
to
disclaim any cause of action regarding the valves, the part of
the case that was removed pursuant to § 1442 simply no longer
exists.
were
As Joyner sees it, because the issues now before us
in
the
district
court
pursuant
to
its
supplemental
jurisdiction, they do not fall within the narrow exceptions of
§ 1447(d).
But Joyner ignores a basic proposition: that parties remove
cases,
not
“case”
removed
originally
claims.
Section
from
removed
state
pursuant
1447(d)
court.
to
the
explicitly
Because
federal
refers
this
case
officer
to
a
was
removal
statute, we have jurisdiction now.
III.
The district court remanded this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c). 4
See J.A. 3007.
That statute provides that “[i]f at
4
To be clear, we recognize that the district court could
certainly have chosen to exercise supplemental jurisdiction even
after the valve claims were gone. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.
Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988) (“[A] district court has
discretion to remand to state court a removed case involving
pendent claims upon a proper determination that retaining
jurisdiction over the case would be inappropriate.
The
discretion to remand enables district courts to deal with cases
involving pendent claims in the manner that best serves the
principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity which
underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.”).
Our reading of
the March 7 and June 6 orders together suggests to us that the
district court declined to do so.
See Mangold v. Analytic
(Continued)
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any
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time
court
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before
lacks
remanded.”
final
subject
Id.
Pg: 11 of 25
judgment
matter
it
appears
jurisdiction,
that
the
the
case
district
shall
be
Crane contends that the district court never
“lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction,” asserting that Joyner’s
disclaimer as to the valves was wholly ineffectual.
And in the
alternative,
assert
Crane
argues,
it
should
be
able
to
new
grounds for subject matter jurisdiction in response to Joyner’s
disclaimer.
We address each argument in turn, and in so doing,
interpret the relevant statutes de novo.
See Holland v. Pardee
Coal Co., 269 F.3d 424, 430 (4th Cir. 2001).
A.
Crane first asserts that Joyner’s disclaimer is a legal
nullity, devoid of real effect.
federal
district
court
has
Crane does not dispute that “a
discretion
under
the
doctrine
of
pendent jurisdiction to remand a properly removed case to state
court
when
all
federal-law
claims
in
the
action
eliminated and only pendent state-law claims remain.”
have
been
Carnegie-
Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1442, 1450 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting our
“power--and responsibility--to look past contextually ambiguous
allusions and even specific citations to § 1447(c) to determine
by independent review of the record the actual grounds or basis
upon which the district court considered it was empowered to
remand” (emphasis omitted)).
We simply understand the district
court to say that it no longer had an independent basis for
subject
matter
jurisdiction
besides
the
supplemental
jurisdiction it declined to exercise.
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Mellon
see
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Univ.
also
v.
Cohill,
Appellant’s
Br.
Pg: 12 of 25
484
16.
at
U.S.
343,
But
345
because
(1988);
the
federal
question arose from the defense to the dismissed claims, rather
than the claims themselves, Crane thinks different rules apply.
In support of this assertion, Crane cites to one unreported
district court case from outside our circuit.
That court held
that “[b]ecause removals pursuant to the federal officer removal
statute
are
premised
rather
than
neither
Plaintiff’s
a
on
the
of
artfully
plaintiff’s
existence
constructed
disclaimer
nor
[his] claims are determinative.”
[his]
a
federal
defense,
complaint,
characterizations
of
Brantley v. Borg-Warner Morse
Tec, Inc., No. 3:12cv540 AJB (JMA), 2012 WL 1571129, at *2 (S.D.
Cal.
May
3,
2012)
(internal
quotation
marks
and
citations
omitted).
Even
if
we
authority,
the
disclaimer”
of
officer
the
of
were
case
any
inclined
is
rest
our
distinguishable.
claims
United
to
related
States
to
the
Government,”
decision
on
“[D]espite
“direction
Brantley
such
[his]
of
an
“still
s[ought] damages arising out of his exposure to asbestos in and
around the Westinghouse turbines produced by Defendants while
serving in the United States Navy . . . .”
5
Id. 5
But here,
Brantley apparently contended that Westinghouse supplied
turbines with little or no direction from the Navy as to product
specifications.
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Joyner expressly disclaimed any damages--giving his disclaimer
real effect, unlike Brantley’s.
that
the
state
court
As we have no reason to believe
will
fail
to
hold
Joyner
to
this
disclaimer, it effectively precludes any defense based on the
valves alone.
Crane
also
argues
that
Joyner’s
amendment
should
be
disallowed as a “manipulative tactic[]” meant to evade federal
jurisdiction.
is
no
See Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 357.
“categorical
prohibition”
on
such
But there
manipulation.
Id.
Instead, “[i]f the plaintiff has attempted to manipulate the
forum,
account
the
[district]
court
in
determining
whether
considered
under
the
remand in the case.”
Crane
Co.’s
federal
pendent
Id.
should
the
take
this
balance
jurisdiction
of
behavior
factors
doctrine
into
to
support
be
a
Crane’s bare assertion that “even if
defense
were
somehow
extinguished,
supplemental jurisdiction remained,” Appellant’s Br. at 14, is
insufficient to raise the issue of whether the district court
abused
its
discretion
in
declining
jurisdiction over the remaining claim.
to
exercise
supplemental
See Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Failure to
comply with the specific dictates of this rule [requiring the
reasons for contentions and citations to authorities and the
record] with respect to a particular claim triggers abandonment
of that claim on appeal.”).
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B.
Accepting the disclaimer’s effect, we next consider whether
Crane may properly assert any other grounds of subject matter
Crane primarily argues 6 that it should have been
jurisdiction.
able to assert a federal defense regarding the gasket claims
after Joyner amended his complaint.
We think not.
As the district court noted, defendants have thirty days to
file a “short and plain statement of the grounds for removal”--a
window that had closed by the time Joyner amended his complaint.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).
The court reasoned that Crane should have
asserted any and all federal defenses within those thirty days.
Instead,
whether
Crane
the
explicitly
federal
refused
officer
to
defense
take
a
applied
position
to
the
as
to
gasket
claims.
1.
Crane first suggests that it should have been allowed to
amend its notice of removal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1653. 7
This
6
Crane also notes that the other defendants’ cross-claims
as to the valves remain in play, thus invoking the same defense.
But, as the district court explained, because Joyner disclaimed
any right to damages regarding the valves, any damages so
attributed would remain beyond his reach: Crane cannot be liable
to Joyner or any other defendant for that sum. The cross-claims
fall with the primary claim as a matter of course.
7
It is not clear to us that Crane made this argument before
the district court. But as we explain, the contention fails on
its merits.
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argument at first seems plausible on the face of the statute,
which provides that “[d]efective allegations of jurisdiction may
be amended, upon terms, in the trial or appellate courts.”
Id.
But courts generally apply the thirty-day limit to this statute
as well, at least in cases where the amendment is something more
than a minor technical correction.
See Nutter v. New Rents,
Inc., No. 90-2493, 1991 WL 193490, at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 1, 1991)
(“We
. . .
merely
apply
perfects
the
a
majority
rule
technically
that
an
amendment
defective
which
jurisdictional
allegation in a timely filed removal petition may be allowed
after the 30-day removal period.”); see also Barrow Dev. Co. v.
Fulton Ins. Co. 418 F.2d 316, 317 (9th Cir. 1969) (“[S]ince
removal must be effected by a defendant within 30 days after
receiving a copy of the complaint, the removal petition cannot
be thereafter amended to add allegations of substance but solely
to
clarify
‘defective’
allegations
of
jurisdiction
previously
made.” (internal citations omitted)); 14C Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3733 (4th ed.
2009)
(“In
completely
most
circumstances,
. . .
new
grounds
removal
for
defendants
or
may
furnish
not
add
missing
allegations, even if the court rejects the first-proffered basis
of removal . . . .”).
In short, “[t]he privilege of removal may
be lost if it is not asserted in time and in conformity with the
provisions of the statute.”
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart
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and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1433
(6th ed. 2009).
Our district courts have noted the tension between these
statutes, providing for a thirty-day window on the one hand and
amendment on the other.
The confusion, they assert, has caused
a split among our circuit’s district courts.
See, e.g., Covert
v. Auto. Credit Corp., 968 F. Supp. 2d 746, 750 (D. Md. 2013);
W. Va. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 354 F. Supp. 2d 660, 668–69
(S.D.W. Va. 2005); Muhlenbeck v. KI, LLC, 304 F. Supp. 2d 797,
800–01 (E.D. Va. 2004).
The District of Maryland, for instance, has contrasted the
“strict
constructionist”
school
Covert, 968 F. Supp. 2d at 750.
with
the
“liberal
approach.”
Under the former, “amendments
after § 1446(b)’s thirty-day period are allowed only for the
purpose of setting forth more specifically grounds that had been
imperfectly stated in the original petition; missing allegations
may
not
be
supplied
nor
new
allegations
(internal quotation marks omitted).
furnished.”
Id.
Under the liberal approach,
it explains, supplemental allegations are permitted “where the
imperfection in the jurisdictional allegation is a mere defect.
However,
removal
even
was
under
this
completely
liberal
omitted
approach
as
opposed
if
to
a
ground
for
‘imperfectly
stated,’ the court has no discretion to permit amendment under
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§ 1653 and must remand the case to state court.”
Id. (internal
quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted).
In our view, these two schools differ only in verbiage.
The upshot is the same: after thirty days, district courts have
discretion to permit amendments that correct allegations already
present in the notice of removal.
Courts have no discretion to
permit amendments furnishing new allegations of a jurisdictional
basis.
831
See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826,
(1989)
(“But
§ 1653
speaks
of
amending
‘allegations
of
jurisdiction,’ which suggests that it addresses only incorrect
statements
about
jurisdiction
that
actually
exists,
and
not
defects in the jurisdictional facts themselves.”); id. at 832
(“[E]very
§ 1653
Court
has
inadequate
held
of
Appeals
that
it
jurisdictional
jurisdictional facts.
that
has
allows
considered
appellate
allegations,
the
scope
courts
but
to
not
of
remedy
defective
We decline to reject this longstanding
interpretation of the statute.” (footnote omitted)).
The trick
lies in placing a case within one of those two categories.
Our precedent indicates that amendment is appropriate for
technical
changes,
such
diversity jurisdiction.
as
the
exact
grounds
underlying
For instance, in Nutter, the original
notice of removal claimed that the defendant was a “Kentucky
corporation”; we permitted an amendment stating that Kentucky
was merely the party’s “principal place of business.”
17
1991 WL
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193490, at *2.
F.3d
753
(4th
Pg: 18 of 25
Similarly, in Yarnevic v. Brink’s, Inc., 102
Cir.
1996),
the
original
petition
for
removal
cited both federal question and diversity jurisdiction.
at 754.
See id.
The petition listed the plaintiff’s domicile as Ohio,
though he had moved to Pennsylvania after filing his complaint-but either state would have supported diversity jurisdiction.
We held that “[w]hile it would have been prudent for Brink’s to
file
a
supplemental
petition
specifying
the
new
basis
for
diversity within 30 days . . . it was not required,” as the
“change of domicile information simply added new evidence to
rebut [the] motion to remand.”
Id. at 755; see also Newman-
Green, 490 U.S. at 831 (explaining that Ҥ 1653 would apply if
[a
party]
were,
in
fact,
domiciled
in
a
State
other
than
Illinois or was, in fact, not a United States citizen, but the
complaint did not so allege,” but would not apply “where the
complaint is amended to drop a nondiverse party in order to
preserve statutory jurisdiction”).
One could argue, of course, that the difference between
valves and gaskets is no broader than the difference between
Ohio
and
Pennsylvania:
both
relate
to
the
underscoring the same source of jurisdiction.
factual
bases
Here, however,
the district court made clear that the valves and gaskets were
being
treated
nonetheless
separately
chose
to
for
preserve
purposes
its
18
of
position
removal.
that
it
Crane
had
not
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supplied
the
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gaskets.
That
Pg: 19 of 25
decision--made
in
open
court--
suggests that Crane’s failure to include gaskets as a ground for
removal was no “mere inadvertence,” see Clephas v. Fagelson,
Shonberger, Payne & Arthur, 719 F.2d 92, 94 (4th Cir. 1983), nor
a clerical error, but instead a strategic choice.
As a result,
the district court correctly denied as untimely Crane’s attempt
to amend its notice of removal to include the gasket claims.
2.
Crane
also
argues,
in
a
amendment was necessary at all.
final
alternative,
that
no
Once the initial removal was
deemed appropriate, it posits, the notice of removal--and the
contents thereof--ceased to matter.
But federal jurisdiction, in such a case, is contingent on
removal.
Indeed, the statute simply provides that such a suit
“may be removed by [the officer] to the district court,” 28
U.S.C. § 1442(a); it “does not enlarge the original jurisdiction
of the district courts,” Mir v. Fosburg, 646 F.2d 342, 345 (9th
Cir. 1980).
Thus, having failed to assert the specific defense
it now invokes when it removed the action, Crane cannot rely on
§ 1442(a) as an independent jurisdictional hook.
See Mesa v.
California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989) (“Section 1442(a) . . .
cannot
independently
jurisdiction.
support
Art.
III
‘arising
under’
Rather, it is the raising of a federal question
in the officer’s removal petition that constitutes the federal
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law under which the action against the federal officer arises
for Art. III purposes.”).
And none of the cases Crane puts forth require a different
outcome.
Crane purports to rely primarily on Jamison v. Wiley,
14 F.3d 222 (4th Cir. 1994).
to the question at hand.
That case, however, is inapposite
In Jamison, the defendant--a federal
employee accused of sexual assault--removed the case to federal
court under the federal officer removal statute and the Westfall
Act, asserting that he had been acting within the scope of his
duties.
At that time, the Department of Justice had agreed to
provide his defense.
its mind.
At some point thereafter, the DOJ changed
The district court decided, as a result, that the
defendant had not been acting within the scope of his duties and
that the federal officer defense was no longer meritorious, and
remanded to state court.
We reversed, explaining that “removal jurisdiction exists
whenever
the
defendant-official
asserts,
in
his
petition, a ‘colorable’ federal defense to the action.”
239.
removal
Id. at
Thus, Jamison stands for the innocuous proposition that
later evidence regarding the merits of a defense does not impact
the
propriety
of
its
pleading.
Here,
by
contrast,
we
are
confronted with a defense that was never adequately asserted in
the first place.
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Two
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other
discussion.
cases
relied
Pg: 21 of 25
on
by
Crane
warrant
further
In Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (1969), the
Supreme Court confronted a similar issue where defendants had
asserted the federal officer defense.
In his motion for remand,
the plaintiff alleged that the defendants were not acting within
the scope of their official duties at the time in question.
The
Court pointed out that “[t]he only facts in the record which in
any way respond to this allegation appear in [the defendants’]
affidavits in support of their motion for summary judgment.”
Id. at 407.
In a footnote, the Court stated, “This material
should have appeared in the petition for removal.
purposes
of
this
petition
as
if
had
it
been
is
proper
amended
to
to
treat
include
the
removal
the
relevant
information contained in the later-filed affidavits.”
Id. at
407 n.3.
it
review,
However, for
This language indicates that the notice of removal
itself--rather than any subsequent docket entry--is the document
to which the court must refer.
At first glance, Willingham appears to be in tension with
our explanation of the impropriety of belated amendment.
But a
closer look reveals that the amendment permitted in Willingham
went to the merits of a previously raised ground for removal,
rather than the assertion of the ground itself.
Circuit agreed,
21
As the Third
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[t]he
Supreme
Court
has
upheld
removal
where
jurisdictional facts required to support the removal
were found in later-filed affidavits rather than in
the notice of removal. . . . . [W]e are satisfied that
sections 1446(a) and 1653, together with the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Willingham, permit a court to
consider jurisdictional facts contained in later-filed
affidavits as amendments to the removal petition
where, as here, those facts merely clarify (or correct
technical deficiencies in) the allegations already
contained in the original notice.
USX Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 190, 205 n.12 (3d Cir.
2003); see also Ruppel v. CBS Corp., 701 F.3d 1176, 1184 n.1
(7th Cir. 2012) (“CBS could also have amended its notice of
removal and added supporting exhibits under 28 U.S.C. § 1653
. . . .” (citing Willingham)); cf. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl
Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 488 F.3d 112, 129 (2d Cir.
2007)
(noting
that
the
defendants
had
not
made
a
particular
allegation in the notice of removal, “[n]or do they cite any
later-filed affidavits which could provide the basis for us to
treat
the
allegations”
removal
(citing
petitions
as
amended
Willingham)).
Thus,
to
include
Willingham
those
comports
with our understanding of the importance of--and limits to-amending the notice of removal.
Williams v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 471 F.3d 975 (9th Cir.
2006), is also of no help to Crane.
There, the defendant had
removed on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, and when
the plaintiff amended his complaint to remove the federal claim,
the district court remanded.
The Ninth Circuit held that the
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remand
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was
inappropriate
Pg: 23 of 25
because
the
district
court
had
diversity jurisdiction as well--even though the defendant had
not asserted diversity in its notice of removal.
The court
postulated that “post-removal amendments to the pleadings cannot
affect whether a case is removable, because the propriety of
removal is determined solely on the basis of the pleadings filed
in state court.”
a
case
has
Id. at 976.
been
properly
The court then held that “[o]nce
removed,
the
district
court
has
jurisdiction over it on all grounds apparent from the complaint,
not just those cited in the removal notice”--grounds asserted
well
before
the
thirty-day
deadline.
Id.
at
977
(emphasis
added).
The Ninth Circuit’s approach, which mirrors that of the
Fifth Circuit, 8 has been criticized as contrary to well-settled
practice.
See
Jeannette
Jurisdictional
Grounds,
(arguing
the
that
Fifth
Cox,
86
N.C.
and
Removed
L.
Ninth
Cases
Rev.
937,
Circuits
and
Uninvoked
953–57
“have
(2008)
failed
to
adequately explain their departure from the traditional approach
to
uninvoked
jurisdictional
grounds”).
8
But
even
were
we
to
See Buchner v. F.D.I.C., 981 F.2d 816, 818 (5th Cir. 1993)
(“The fact that the FDIC waived its right to remove the instant
case is irrelevant to the determination of whether the case
should have or could have been remanded once it had been
properly removed by another party who had not waived the right
to remove.”).
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accept those principles, they do not control the result here.
Contrary to Crane’s view of things, we do not take the Ninth
Circuit’s language as carte blanche for defendants to assert new
grounds for removal at any time (as was the case here), but
rather an invitation for the court to look at those grounds
already before it.
Our
waive 9
litigation
model:
complaint,
if
or
system
a
a
typically
litigant
defense
in
fails
an
operates
to
on
raise
answer,
or
a
to
efficiency
and
discourages
sandbagging.
raise-or-
claim
in
preserve
objection at trial, they are generally out of luck.
forces
a
a
an
This model
It
is
thus
reasonable to expect that a litigant would raise every ground
for
removal
in
his
initial
filing.
Such
a
rule
prevents
precisely the incessant back-and-forth controversy we see here. 10
Crane made a strategic decision not to assert removal as to the
9
Though “raise-or-waive” is the usual nomenclature, in
reality, of course, courts--including us here--often mean
“raise-or-forfeit.”
“Waiver is different from forfeiture.
Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion
of a right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
725, 733 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
10
The thirty-day window for asserting federal jurisdiction
runs from the moment the grounds for such jurisdiction become
apparent, rather than the filing of the complaint--thus
preventing
the
plaintiff
from
sandbagging
by
hiding
jurisdictional grounds in a first complaint and later amending
it to add them. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3).
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claims.
We
gasket
usually
Pg: 25 of 25
hold
parties
to
that
sort
of
strategic decision, and are unable to discern why this situation
would merit a departure from the general rule.
We hasten to underscore the narrowness of our holding.
It
may seem unjust, at first glance, that Joyner was allowed to
amend his complaint to withdraw the relevant claims, but that
Crane may not respond by restructuring its defense.
is
already
a
remedy
in
place
for
such
a
scenario:
But there
had
the
district court thought that Joyner’s manipulative tactics were
too
sharp,
it
had
every
opportunity
to
federal court as a matter of discretion.
retain
the
case
in
“The district courts
thus can guard against forum manipulation . . . .”
Carnegie-
Mellon, 484 U.S. at 357 (explaining that a party’s manipulative
tactics are a factor the district court should weigh in deciding
whether to retain the case in federal court).
We trust that
they will do so.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is
AFFIRMED.
25
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