Dawn Flores v. Ethicon, Incorporated

Filing

UNPUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:12-cv-01804 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999325109].. [13-1889]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1889

DAWN FLORES; ALFRED E. FLORES,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
v.
ETHICON, INC.; JOHNSON & JOHNSON; STEVEN A. SCHEUER, M.D.;
GREATER LONG BEACH GENITO-URINARY MEDICAL GROUP, INC.; ST.
MARY MEDICAL CENTER; DIGNITY HEALTH; DOES 1-100, Inclusive,
Defendants – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston.
Joseph R. Goodwin,
District Judge. (2:12-cv-01804)

Argued:

January 29, 2014

Decided:

March 28, 2014

Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion.
Judge Duncan wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Keenan concurred.
Judge Wynn wrote a
separate opinion dissenting in part.

ARGUED: Daniel Mitchell Graham, DANIEL M. GRAHAM, APC, Torrance,
California, for Appellants. Philip Combs, THOMAS COMBS & SPANN,
PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellees.
ON BRIEF:
Gerald P. Peters, LAW OFFICE OF GERALD PHILIP PETERS, Thousand
Oaks, California, for Appellants.
David B. Thomas, Daniel R.
Higginbotham, THOMAS COMBS & SPANN, PLLC, Charleston, West
Virginia; Susanna M. Moldoveanu, BUTLER, SNOW, O'MARA, STEVENS &
CANNADA, PLLC, Memphis, Tennessee; Christy D. Jones, John C.

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Henegan, BUTLER, SNOW, O'MARA, STEVENS &
Ridgeland, Mississippi, for Appellees Ethicon,
Johnson & Johnson.
David P. Pruett, CARROLL,
FRANZEN & MCKENNA, Long Beach, California, for
Health.

CANNADA, PLLC,
Incorporated and
KELLY, TROTTER,
Appellee Dignity

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Dawn Flores 1 appeals from the district court's
denial

of

her

motion

to

remand

to

California

state

court,

dismissal of her action without prejudice, and denial of her
motion to reconsider the dismissal and reinstate the action.
Flores contends that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because her complaint alleged a viable cause of
action against non-diverse defendants and that it abused its
discretion by dismissing her case for failure to comply with a
scheduling order.

For the reasons that follow we affirm.

I.
On December 29, 2003, Flores underwent surgery at St. Mary
Medical

Center

in

Long

Beach,

California

to

implant

in

her

pelvic cavity a transvaginal mesh sling produced and distributed
by Ethicon, Inc. and Johnson & Johnson (“J&J”).

The mesh device

was implanted by Dr. Steven A. Scheuer, a member of Greater Long
Beach

Genito-Urinary

Medical

Group,

Flores’s stress urinary incontinence.

Inc.

(“GLBG”),

to

treat

During the life of the

implant, which was removed on July 21, 2011, Flores developed
pelvic

infections,

hematuria,

and

1

necrosis

which

she

alleges

Dawn Flores’s husband, Alfred Flores, is also an appellant
but because all of his claims are derivative of hers, for
convenience we refer to only Mrs. Flores throughout.
3

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resulted

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from

the

erosion

March

14,

2012,

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of

the

mesh

into

adjacent

pelvic

organs.
On

Flores

initiated

this

action

in

the

Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California against Ethicon
and J&J, New Jersey corporations, and Scheuer, GLBG, and Dignity
Health d/b/a St. Mary Medical Center, California residents and
entities. 2
strict

Flores’s

products

consortium.
to

the

liability,

raises

breach

of

claims

of

warranty,

negligence,
and

loss

of

On May 10, 2012, Ethicon and J&J removed the action

Central

California

complaint

District

defendants

of

were

California

fraudulently

contending
joined

and

that

the

that

the

district court therefore possessed subject-matter jurisdiction
to hear the case.

Flores filed a timely motion to remand on May

24, 2012.
On

May

30,

2012,

the

Judicial

Panel

on

Multi-District

Litigation transferred Flores’s action to the Southern District
of West Virginia and consolidated it with thousands of similar
cases against Ethicon (the “MDL”).

Flores’s motion to remand

remained pending before the district court.

On October 4, 2012,

the district court entered Pretrial Order 17, requiring all MDL
plaintiffs

to

submit

an

abbreviated

2

Plaintiff

Profile

Form

Flores also names “Does 1-100” but the citizenship of
fictitious parties is not relevant for purposes of determining
diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
4

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(“PPF”)

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containing

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preliminary

interrogatory

responses,

including medical information, by December 3, 2012.
whose

terms

were

agreed

upon

by

lead

counsel

Order 17,

for

the

MDL

plaintiffs and defense counsel, provides that “[i]f a plaintiff
does not submit a PPF within the time specified in this Order,
defendants may move immediately to dismiss that plaintiff’s case
without

first

procedures.”

resorting

to

[this

Order’s]

moved

to

dismiss

Flores’s

failure to comply with Order 17.
that

she

was

reasonably

denied

Flores’

On December 28, 2012,

case

with

prejudice

for

Flores contended in opposition

concerned

waive her right to remand.
court

cure

J.A. 281.

Flores did not submit a timely PPF.
Ethicon

deficiency

that

filing

the

PPF

would

On April 10, 2013, the district

motion

to

remand,

holding

that

the

California defendants were fraudulently joined because there was
no possibility that Flores could prevail against them in state
court on any cause of action raised in her complaint.

On May

20, 2013, the district court granted Ethicon’s motion in part,
dismissing

Flores’s

case

failure to submit a PPF.

without

prejudice

for

her

ongoing

Flores filed a motion to reconsider

the dismissal and reinstate her action which the district court

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denied on June 18, 2013.

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At the time of the parties’ oral

argument on appeal, Flores had never submitted a PPF. 3

II.
We

review

“questions

of

subject

matter

jurisdiction

de

novo, ‘including those relating to the propriety of removal.’”
Md. Stadium Auth. v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 407 F.3d 255, 260
(4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 460
(4th Cir. 1999)).

The party seeking removal bears the burden of

establishing jurisdiction and we construe removal jurisdiction
strictly.

Id.

is necessary.”

“If federal jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand
Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d

148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994).
We

review

for

abuse

of

discretion

the

imposition

sanctions for violation of a scheduling or discovery order.

3

of
See

Prior to filing her appeal in this action, Flores
initiated a second action raising the same claims against the
same defendants in California Superior Court.
We raised the
question of whether this later action rendered the appeal before
us moot.
The parties agree, and we now hold, that Flores’s
appeal is not mooted by her pending state court action because
she has a continuing cognizable interest in the outcome of the
appeal.
Specifically, if we affirm the dismissal of Flores’s
first case, the statute of limitations may not be tolled in
relation to her later filed case, see Wood v. Elling Corp., 572
F.2d 755, 758 (Cal. 1977), and she would then be susceptible to
a statute of limitations defense. We are persuaded by the First
Circuit’s rule that a cognizable interest in the earlier filed
case persists in such circumstances. See Patriot Cinemas, Inc.
v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 215-16 (1st Cir. 1987).
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f); Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 9991000 (4th Cir. 1985).
motion

for

abuse

of

We review the denial of a Rule 59(e)
discretion.

Robinson

v.

Corp. LLC, 599 F.3d 403, 407 (4th Cir. 2010).

Wix

Filtration

“A district court

abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally,
fails to consider judicially recognized factors constraining its
exercise of discretion, relies on erroneous factual or legal
premises,

or

commits

an

error

of

law.”

United

States

v.

Delfino, 510 F.3d 468, 470 (4th Cir. 2007).

III.
The district court denied remand on the ground that the
California
Center,

defendants,

were

possibility

Scheuer,

fraudulently

that

Flores

joined

could

she

alleged

a

and

St.

because

prevail

against them in state court.
that

GLBG,

on

any

Mary

there
of

Medical
was

her

no

claims

On appeal Flores contends only

cognizable

claim

against

the

California

defendants for negligent failure to warn.
Under the fraudulent joinder doctrine, a district court may
“disregard,

for

jurisdictional

purposes,

the

citizenship

of

certain nondiverse defendants, assume jurisdiction over a case,
dismiss

the

jurisdiction.”

nondiverse

defendants,

Mayes, 198 F.3d at 461.

and

thereby

retain

To establish that a

defendant has been fraudulently joined, “the removing party must
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establish

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either:

[t]hat

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there

is

no

possibility

that

the

plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action against
the in-state defendant in state court; or [t]hat there has been
outright

fraud

in

the

plaintiff's

pleading

of

jurisdictional

facts.”

Marshall v. Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229, 232 (4th

Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The burden of showing no possibility of relief is heavy.
The

removing

party

“must

show

that

the

plaintiff

cannot

establish a claim against the nondiverse defendant even after
resolving all issues of fact and law in the plaintiff's favor.”
Id. at 232-33.

The standard is “even more favorable to the

plaintiff than the standard for ruling on a motion to dismiss
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).”

Hartley v. CSX Transport,

Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 424 (4th Cir. 1999).

In fact, “‘there need

be only a slight possibility of a right to relief’ to defeat a
claim of fraudulent joinder.”

Mayes, 198 F.3d at 464 (quoting

Hartley, 187 F.3d at 426).
Contrary to Flores’s contention, we are only permitted, not
required,

to

look

propriety of removal.

beyond

the

complaint

to

determine

the

Hartley, 187 F.3d at 426 (“[T]he court is

not bound by the allegations of the pleadings, but may instead
consider the entire record, and determine the basis of joinder
by

any

means

available.”

(emphasis

added)).

While

the

vast

majority of decisions in this Circuit review the entire record,
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and as a consequence, fraudulent joinder is typically only found
in

cases

of

legal

impossibility,

that

analysis

produces

the

exact result that the doctrine intends to prevent in a case such
as this.

Where a complaint is so inadequate and the record so

entirely lacking in factual support that we can only reasonably
conclude that the non-diverse defendants were added to defeat
jurisdiction, analysis of the entire record works an injustice
on the removing party.
The extent of Flores’s allegations against the California
defendants is an assertion that all of the defendants, diverse
and non-diverse, “were negligent in failing to use reasonable
care

in

designing,

manufacturing,

marketing,

packaging, supplying and selling the Product.”

labeling,

J.A. 32.

The

complaint contains no allegations of specific actions by the
California defendants that fell below a standard of reasonable
care.

The only theory of liability that Flores maintains on

appeal,

negligent

complaint

and

was

failure
never

to

warn,

argued

is

not

alleged

before

the

district

in

the

court.

Flores’ only reason for raising it now is the district court’s
creation and rejection of that argument in its order denying
remand.
allege

It is unsurprising then that the complaint fails to
two

necessary

elements

of

that

theory,

that

the

California defendants knew or should have known of the dangers
of the mesh implant and that consequently their failure to warn
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Flores

was

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unreasonable,

in

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even

a

conclusory

manner.

See

Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347, 1351-52 (Cal. 1996).
Moreover,

there

are

no

factual

allegations

in

the

complaint

which would allow a court to reasonably infer such knowledge and
no

factual

basis

in

the

record

for

Flores

to

allegations, a fact which she admits repeatedly.

make

such

Appellants’

Br. 25 4, 28 5.
Contrary

to

pleading state.

Flores’s

assertion,

California

is

a

fact

A complaint must “state[] facts sufficient to

constitute a cause of action” when it is given “a reasonable
interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their
context.”
1171

City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare, 161 P.3d 1168,

(Cal.

2007).

Unlike

in

a

notice

pleading

state,

when

assessing the sufficiency of the complaint, California courts
assume the truth of “all material facts properly pleaded, but do
not assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions
of law.”

Id.

As articulated above, Flores has not alleged any

4

“Were the California defendants among the health care
providers who reported the risks associated with the implanted
mesh?
Were they aware of other health care providers who
reported the risks? We simply do not know at this point in the
litigation.”
5
“At this point, since there has been no discovery, it is
not known what the California residents knew at the time of
implantation.”; “Similarly, it is not now known whether the
California
resident
defendants,
at
some
point
after
implantation, learned of the risks associated with implanted
transvaginal mesh.”.
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facts, or for that matter any sufficient conclusions of law,
that would allow a court to reasonably infer negligence of any
kind on the part of the California defendants. 6

Therefore on the

complaint as pled, even when all facts and reasonable inferences
are viewed in the light most favorable to Flores, there is no
possibility that she could prevail in state court against the
California defendants on her claim of negligent failure to warn.
Because negligent failure to warn is the only cause of action
before us on appeal, the district court’s denial of Flores’s
motion to remand is affirmed.

IV.
Flores also appeals the district court’s dismissal of her
case without prejudice in accordance with Case Management Order
17. 7

Flores does not contend that the district court’s decision

was inconsistent with Order 17 or that she ever complied with
6

Flores also argues that she should have been allowed to
amend her complaint to allege the necessary facts.
Flores has
admitted that she does not possess such facts, and in any case
she has waived this argument by raising it for the first time on
appeal. See United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 236 n.5 (4th
Cir. 2005).
7
To the extent that there is a question regarding our
jurisdiction to consider this dismissal on appeal, the general
rule in this Circuit is that dismissal of an action without
prejudice is final and appealable while dismissal of a complaint
without prejudice is not because a saving amendment is usually
possible. See, e.g., Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local
Union, 392, 10 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir. 1993). The district
court’s order explicitly dismissed Flores’s case as a whole.
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the

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Order

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by

filing

a

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PPF.

She

argues

that

she

was

substantially justified in not complying with Order 17. 8

This

argument is meritless.
Flores
because

contends

she

constitute

was

an

that

reasonably

affirmative

right to remand.

she

did

not

comply

concerned

act

that

with

the

Order

that

doing

so

would

would

deprive

the

jurisdiction.

of

her

Her argument appears to conflate the doctrines

of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction.
challenge

her

district
Her

motion

court’s
for

exercise

remand

rested

Flores did not
of

personal

entirely

on

an

assertion that the non-diverse defendants were properly joined
and

that

the

jurisdiction.

district

court

therefore

lacked

subject-matter

It is a central premise of American jurisprudence

that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and that

8

Flores also argues on appeal that the district court’s
dismissal was an abuse of discretion because 1) Order 17
violates due process and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
2) dismissal violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and
Multi-District Litigation Manual Rule 10.15, 3) the court
impermissibly failed to warn Flores or impose lesser sanctions
prior to dismissal, and 4) Ethicon did not demonstrate
substantial prejudice as a result of Flores’s failure to comply
with Order 17.
Flores had the opportunity to raise these
arguments in both her response to Ethicon’s motion to dismiss
and in her motion for reconsideration but she failed to do so
and they are therefore waived.
Evans, 404 F.3d at 236 n.5.
Flores arguably raised the lack of substantial prejudice to
Ethicon in her Rule 59(e) reply, but arguments raised for the
first time in Rule 59 motions are also generally considered
waived. Holland v. Big River Minerals Corp., 181 F.3d 597, 605
(4th Cir. 1999).
12

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“‘[n]o

action

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of

the

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parties

can

jurisdiction upon a federal court.’”

confer

subject-matter

Orquera v. Ashcroft, 357

F.3d 413, 416 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ireland,
Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982)).

Because

any

reasonable

diligence

on

Flores’s

part

would have revealed that her concern was unfounded, her refusal
to comply with Order 17 was willful and unreasonable.

Moreover,

the district court did not rule on Ethicon’s motion to dismiss
until

40

days

after

it

denied

Flores’s

motion

to

remand.

Therefore, even if her jurisdictional concern had originally had
merit she was given ample time to come into compliance with the
district court’s Order after that concern was removed.
The

district

court

did

not

abuse

its

discretion

by

dismissing Flores’s case in accordance with the procedures of
Order 17 as a result of her unjustified refusal to comply, 9 and
its dismissal without prejudice is therefore affirmed.

9

Flores argued in her Rule 59(e) motion that although she
failed to submit a PPF, her submission of a different
noncompliant document after the entry of the dismissal without
prejudice satisfied the underlying informational needs of the
defendants. Her claim that the dismissal was therefore an abuse
of discretion is unavailing. The requirements of, and penalties
associated with, Order 17 are plain, and Flores had numerous
opportunities to file a PPF to cure the defect.
The district
court was under no obligation to accept any submission in place
of a timely-filed PPF, and its decision to enforce Order 17 in
light of Flores’s willful refusal to comply was well within its
discretion.
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V.
Finally, Flores appeals the district court’s denial of her
motion for reconsideration of its dismissal. 10
unsupported,

conclusory

requirements

of

Federal

assertions
Rule

of

that
Civil

Flores makes only

she

satisfied

Procedure

59(e)

the
by

presenting new evidence after dismissal and by alleging that
dismissal would result in manifest injustice. 11

The district

court’s denial of her motion is therefore affirmed.

VI.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s denial of
Flores’s
prejudice,

motion

to

remand,

and

denial

of

her

dismissal
motion

of
for

her

case

without

reconsideration

and

reinstatement are
AFFIRMED.

10

Flores contends on appeal that she satisfied the
requirements for relief under both Rule 29 and Rule 59.
However, Flores did not move the district court for relief under
Rule 29 so that argument is waived. Evans, 404 F.3d at 236 n.5.
11
A Rule 59(e) motion “may only be granted in three
situations: ‘(1) to accommodate an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available
at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent
manifest injustice.’”
Mayfield v. NASCAR, 674 F.3d 369, 378
(4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Zinkland v. Brown, 478 F.3d 634, 637
(4th Cir. 2007)).
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WYNN, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:
I agree that the district court correctly denied the motion
to remand and acted within its discretion in dismissing the case
without

prejudice

as

a

sanction

for

Plaintiffs’

refusal

to

comply with the district court’s pretrial discovery procedures.
Nonetheless, I cannot agree that the district court properly
denied Plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider the dismissal
and reinstate the case.

By the date of their motion, Plaintiffs

had remedied the discovery defect, which was the sole basis for
dismissal.
the

In denying Plaintiffs’ motion to reinstate the case,

district

court

observed

that

the

applicable

statute

limitations likely barred refiling of Plaintiffs’ action.
the

district

court

recognized

that

denial

of

the

of

Thus,

motion

to

reinstate the case effectually dismissed Plaintiffs’ action with
prejudice.
“Mindful of the strong policy that cases be decided on the
merits, and that dismissal without deciding the merits is the
most extreme sanction,” imposed only “with restraint,” United
States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 462 (4th Cir. 1993),
I

would

motion

reverse
to

the

reinstate

district
the

court’s

action.

denial

Because

of
I

Plaintiffs’

believe

that

dismissal is an unduly harsh sanction for a case in which there
is no evidence of bad faith by Plaintiffs or prejudice to the

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opposing party, I respectfully dissent from Section V of the
majority opinion.

I.
As the majority notes, Plaintiffs Dawn and Alfred Flores
initiated this action in California after Mrs. Flores developed
pelvic

infections,

hematuria,

and

necrosis

following

surgical

implantation of a synthetic mesh device manufactured by Ethicon,
Inc.

[J.A. 27]

throughout
debilitating
J.A.

37.

actions

the

Plaintiffs alleged that, like numerous women
country,

Mrs.

injuries”

caused

Plaintiffs’

case

pending

against

Flores
by

the

is

one

Ethicon

in

sustained
synthetic
of

“severe
mesh

thousands

of

multi-district

and

device. 1
similar

litigation

assigned to the Southern District of West Virginia (the “multidistrict litigation”).
Following

removal

to

federal

court

and

transfer

of

Plaintiffs’ action to the multi-district litigation, and while

1

Plaintiffs further alleged that the United States Food and
Drug Administration has received “thousands of reports from
numerous manufacturers . . . regarding the severe health
complications related to the use of transvaginal placement of
surgical mesh.”
J.A. 31.
According to Plaintiffs, health
problems associated with the use of synthetic transvaginal mesh
include infections, urinary problems, recurrence of pelvic organ
prolapse, incontinence, and erosion of the mesh following
surgery.
Complications include bleeding, infection, discharge,
pain, backaches, bowel movement difficulties, bladder outlet
obstruction, and vaginal scarring and shortening. [J.A. 31]
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Plaintiffs’ motion to remand to state court remained pending,
Ethicon moved to dismiss the case with prejudice under Federal
Rule 37 of Civil Procedure for Plaintiffs’ failure to comply
with

the

court’s

multi-district

pretrial

litigation

order

(“Order

plaintiffs

17”)

to

requiring

submit

“Plaintiff Profile Form” by December 3, 2012.

a

all

five-page

[J.A. 286-94]

Ethicon argued that “[t]he information contained in a completed
[Plaintiff Profile Form], as well as the medical records that a
plaintiff

must

submit

with

the

completed

[Plaintiff

Profile

Form]” were “essential to the defense of this action” and that
Plaintiffs’ failure to submit a Plaintiff Profile Form warranted
immediate

dismissal

Plaintiffs

asserted

of

the

that

case.

they

had

J.A.
no

292.

In

objections

response,

to

filing

a

Plaintiff Profile Form, but feared that engaging in discovery
would be viewed by the court as an affirmative act waiving their
right to remand.
Upon

[J.A. 296]

consideration

of

the

motions,

the

district

court

denied Plaintiffs’ motion to remand [J.A. 356], but also found
that “Ethicon has not provided sufficient support to dismiss
this action with prejudice.”
granted

the

motion

to

J.A. 371.

dismiss

“to

the

The court therefore
extent

Ethicon

seeks

dismissal of plaintiffs’ case” but denied the motion “insofar as
Ethicon seeks such dismissal with prejudice.”

17

J.A. 371.

The

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court entered its order dismissing the case without prejudice on
May 20, 2013.
Within hours of the court’s dismissal, Plaintiffs served
Ethicon with a “Plaintiff Fact Sheet.”

[J.A. 412]

A Plaintiff

Fact Sheet is a twenty-six-page discovery form setting forth and
expanding

upon

the

information

and

requested in the Plaintiff Profile Form.
Plaintiff Fact Sheet)]
17.

medical

authorizations

[J.A. 308-355 (sample

Both forms were established under Order

In short, a Plaintiff Fact Sheet is simply a more detailed

version of the Plaintiff Profile Form. 2

Under Order 17, only

those plaintiffs selected to participate in the multi-district
litigation discovery pool must file the more detailed Plaintiff
Fact Sheet.

[J.A. 281]

Although they were not so selected,

Plaintiffs explained that they served the Plaintiff Fact Sheet

2

Notably, the majority opinion omits Plaintiffs’ filing of
the Plaintiff Fact Sheet from its recitation of the facts, and
only later identifies the Plaintiff Fact Sheet in a footnote as
“a different noncompliant document[.]”
Ante at 13, n.9.
However, the district court never found that filing the
Plaintiff Fact Sheet did not fulfill Plaintiffs’ discovery
obligations under Order 17, or that the Plaintiff Fact Sheet was
deficient or otherwise “noncompliant.”
To the contrary, both
Ethicon and the district court acknowledged that the Plaintiff
Fact Sheet is a more in-depth discovery document than a
Plaintiff Profile Form. [J.A. 413, 432 n.2] Simple comparison
of the two documents indisputably shows that the Plaintiff Fact
Sheet contains all of the information required by a Plaintiff
Profile Form.
It would, therefore, be inaccurate to suggest
that Plaintiffs failed to submit the information that Order 17
required.
18

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instead of the Plaintiff Profile Form to minimize any potential
prejudice to Ethicon.
Having

[J.A. 373 n.1]

submitted

the

Plaintiff

Fact

Sheet,

Plaintiffs

moved, pursuant to Federal Rule 59(e) of Civil Procedure, for
reconsideration

of

dismissal

and

reinstatement

of

the

case.

[J.A. 372]

In their motion, filed May 29, 2013, Plaintiffs

advised

district

the

court

that

the

applicable

statute

of

limitations likely barred refiling and that unless the case was
reinstated, “the [d]ismissal [o]rder may turn out to be exactly
what the [c]ourt did not intend”—a dismissal with prejudice.
J.A.

379.

Plaintiffs

argued

that

such

a

sanction

was

unwarranted and would result in manifest injustice, given the
substantial injuries sustained by Mrs. Flores, the absence of
any pattern of dilatory conduct by Plaintiffs, and the lack of
prejudice

to

Ethicon. 3

In

opposing

Plaintiffs’

Rule

59(e)

motion, Ethicon confirmed that on the afternoon of May 20, 2013,
it

had

received

acknowledged,

Plaintiffs’

was

“a

more

[Plaintiff Profile Form.]”

Plaintiff
extensive

Fact

Sheet,

disclosure

which,
than

it
the

Nonetheless, Ethicon asserted that

3

The majority opinion states that Plaintiffs failed to
raise the issue of substantial prejudice to Ethicon in their
motion for reconsideration.
Ante at 12, n.8.
But Plaintiffs
explicitly argued that dismissal of the case would result in
manifest injustice because, among other reasons, “there has been
absolutely no showing of prejudice incurred by [Ethicon].” J.A.
380.
19

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Plaintiffs’ failure to submit the information by December 3,
2012, had “deprived the defendants any opportunity to consider
[Plaintiffs’] case for the discovery pool.”

J.A. 413.

Ethicon

articulated no other grounds for prejudice.
Despite
prejudice,

its

the

previous
district

ruling
court

dismissing

denied

the

case

Plaintiffs’

without

motion

for

reconsideration and reinstatement on the grounds that Plaintiffs
failed to show clear error of law or newly discovered evidence
justifying reconsideration under Rule 59(e).

[J.A. 431]

As to

manifest injustice, the district court stated that although it
was “cognizant of the fact that the plaintiffs’ case might be
barred by the applicable statute of limitations[,]” such was
“the

result

of

strategic

decisions

made

by

the

plaintiffs’

counsel” in failing to submit a Plaintiff Profile Form before
the case was dismissed.
bad

J.A. 438.
faith

by

The district court made no

findings

regarding

Plaintiffs

Ethicon.

or

prejudice

to

Plaintiffs timely appealed.

II.
Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the
district court to impose a variety of sanctions upon parties who
fail to comply with a discovery order, including “dismissing the
action or proceeding in whole or in part[.]”
37(b)(2)(A)(v).

However,

the
20

power

to

Fed. R. Civ. P.

dismiss

a

case

“is

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appropriately exercised only with restraint.”
569 F.2d 807, 810 (4th Cir. 1978).
prevent

delays

must

be

weighed

“‘Against the power to

the

deciding cases on their merits.’”

Dove v. CODESCO,

sound

public

policy

of

Id. at 810 (quoting Reizakis

v. Loy, 490 F.2d 1132, 1135 (4th Cir. 1974)).

Thus, while a

district court has discretion in fashioning a discovery sanction
under Rule 37, this discretion is tempered when the sanction
terminates

the

action

without

a

decision

on

the

merits.

Reizakis, 490 F.2d at 1135; Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc.,
561 F.2d 494, 503 (4th Cir. 1977) (stating that “[t]he power to
impose sanctions under Rule 37(b) for failure, after court order
in discovery proceedings to produce documents, is discretionary
with the Trial Court.

It is not, however, a discretion without

bounds or limits but one to be exercised discreetly and never
when it has been established that failure to comply has been due
to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of
[the

non-complying

omitted).

This

is

party].”)
because

(quotation
the

court’s

marks

and

interest

in

footnotes
judicial

administration and enforcement of its orders conflicts with “the
party’s rights to a trial by jury and a fair day in court.”
Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Richards & Assoc., 872 F.2d 88,
92

(4th

Cir.

1989)

(reviewing

imposed under Rule 37).

21

sanction

of

default

judgment

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To balance these competing interests and determine whether
dismissal under Rule 37 is an appropriate sanction, “a court
must consider” the following four factors:
(1) whether the noncomplying party acted in bad faith;
(2) the amount of prejudice the noncompliance caused
the adversary; (3) the need for deterring the
particular
sort
of
noncompliance;
and
(4)
the
effectiveness of less drastic sanctions.
Hillig v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 916 F.2d 171, 174 (4th
Cir. 1990); cf. Davis v. Williams, 588 F.2d 69, 70 (4th Cir.
1978) (applying substantially similar four-part test to sanction
of dismissal with prejudice under Federal Rule 41(b) of Civil
Procedure).

We utilize the same four-part balancing test to

assess whether a sanction of default judgment under Rule 37 is
appropriate.

Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 872 F.2d at 92.

This balancing test “[i]nsure[s] that only the most flagrant
case, where the party’s noncompliance represents bad faith and
callous disregard for the authority of the district court and
the Rules, will result in the extreme sanction of dismissal or
judgment by default.”

Id.; accord Hillig, 916 F.2d at 174-75

(stating that the “harsh sanction” of dismissal under Rule 37
“is reserved for only the most flagrant case, where the party’s
noncompliance represents bad faith and callous disregard for the
authority of the district court and the Rules”) (quotation marks
omitted); cf. Projects Mgmt. Co. v. Dyncorp Int’l LLC, 734 F.3d
366,

373

(4th

Cir.

2013)

(cautioning
22

that,

although

courts

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the

inherent

power

Pg: 23 of 29

to

dismiss

a

case,

orders

of

dismissal “must be entered with the greatest caution” and are
“appropriate when a party deceives a court or abuses the process
at

a

level

that

is

utterly

inconsistent

with

the

orderly

administration of justice or otherwise undermines the integrity
of the process”) (quotation marks omitted).
A party seeking relief from dismissal may move the court to
alter or amend its judgment under Federal Rule 59(e) of Civil
Procedure.

Rule 59(e) “permits a district court to correct its

own errors, sparing the parties and the appellate courts the
burden of unnecessary appellate proceedings.”

Pac. Ins. Co. v.

Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998)
(quotation marks omitted).
59(e)

motion

to

prevent

The district court may grant a Rule
manifest

injustice.

See

EEOC

v.

Lockheed Martin Corp., 116 F.3d 110, 112 (1997); Hutchinson v.
Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993).

We review the

district court’s denial of a Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of
discretion.

See

BearingPoint,
(holding

Inc.,

that

the

Matrix
576

Capital

F.3d

district

172,

court

Mgmt.
192-96

abused

Fund,
(4th
its

L.P.
Cir.

v.

2009)

discretion

in

denying the plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) motion seeking to alter the
judgment

of

complaint).

dismissal

with

prejudice

and

allow

an

amended

Generally speaking, failure by the district court

to actually exercise its discretion by considering and balancing
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relevant factors amounts to an abuse of discretion.

See James

v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 1993).

III.
In this case, the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’
motion

for

reconsideration

and

reinstatement

is

flawed

on

several fronts.

First, the district court failed to undertake

the

balancing

multi-factor

test

before

Plaintiffs’ action with prejudice.

effectually

dismissing

In denying reinstatement of

the case, the court recognized that the applicable statute of
limitations likely barred refiling the action.

See Dove, 569

F.2d at 810 n.3 (assuming the prejudicial effect of a dismissal
without prejudice handed down after the statute of limitations
had run).

Thus, the district court acknowledged that denial of

reinstatement

would

likely

end

the

case

and

thus

ultimately

preclude Plaintiffs from exercising their “rights to a trial by
jury and a fair day in court.”
872 F.2d at 92.
the

district

Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,

Denial of reinstatement effectively transformed
court’s

earlier

order

of

prejudice into a dismissal with prejudice.

dismissal

without

See Dove, 569 F.2d

at 809-10 (construing dismissal without prejudice as dismissal
with prejudice where the plaintiff could not refile the action
due

to

statute

of

limitations).

And,

of

course,

had

the

district court dismissed the case with prejudice in the first
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instance, it would have been required to perform the four-part
balancing test at that time.
that

“[a]

court

must

Hillig, 916 F.2d at 174 (stating

consider

.

.

.

four

factors

before

dismissing a case” under Rule 37).
Despite

recognizing

reconsideration
justify
court

the

dismissal,

severity

made

prejudice

of

no
to

the

of

findings
Ethicon,

the

finality
the

of

court

sanction

made

order
no

imposed.

indicating

bad

the

for

need

its

faith

attempt
The

by

to

district

Plaintiffs,

deterrence,

ineffectiveness of less drastic sanctions.

denying

or

the

See Wilson, 561 F.2d

at 516 (faulting district court for failing to make appropriate
findings

on

required

to

“critical
address

in

issues

which

determining

judgment” as a Rule 37 sanction).

the

District

whether

to

Court

grant

was

default

In short, the district court

failed to support its decision with any findings demonstrating
“flagrant”

and

“callous

disregard”

for

the

authority

court necessitating the “harsh” sanction of dismissal.

of

the

Hillig,

916 F.2d at 174-75.
Nor

does

the

record

reflect

such

“callous

disregard.”

Although Plaintiffs’ concern that engaging in discovery would
jeopardize their motion to remand may have been misguided, their
behavior does not demonstrate a “pattern of indifference and
disrespect to the authority of the court,” Mutual Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass’n, 872 F.2d at 93, rising to the level of bad faith.
25

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See Hillig, 916 F.2d at 174-175 (vacating order of dismissal
where there was no evidence of bad faith and the circumstances
of the case did “not merit the harsh sanction of dismissal for
failure to comply with a discovery order”); Dove, 569 F.2d at
810 (reversing order of dismissal as abuse of discretion where
the record “disclose[d] a number of minor defaults” but “nothing
which [could] be construed as evidence of deliberate delay on
the part of Dove or his attorneys”); cf. Wilson, 561 F.2d at
503-12 (holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish
a pattern of misconduct to justify sanction of default, although
the district court had issued two orders compelling discovery
and extended the discovery deadline, and notwithstanding that
the plaintiffs had only received incomplete responses to their
interrogatories and requests for documents).
Moreover,

any

prejudice

arising

from

Plaintiffs’

failure to serve the Plaintiff Profile Form is minimal.

initial
Ethicon

suggested in its motion to dismiss that prejudice arose because
it

had

been

“deprived

.

.

.

any

opportunity

[Plaintiffs’] case for the discovery pool.”
argument

is

inapposite,

however,

because

to

consider

J.A. 413.

Plaintiffs

This

submitted

the Plaintiff Fact Sheet, which is the very document that would
have been required had they been selected to participate in the
discovery pool.

In other words, since the day of the dismissal,

Ethicon has possessed all of the information it would have had
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if Plaintiffs had timely filed their Plaintiff Profile Form and
had then been selected to participate in the discovery pool.
Ethicon advanced no other grounds for prejudice, and none is
apparent from the record.
The

district

particularly

court’s

baffling

refusal

given

its

to

reinstate

previous

the

case

decision

is

denying

Ethicon’s Rule 37 motion to dismiss the case with prejudice.
The

district

court

explicitly

rejected

Ethicon’s

argument

in

support of dismissal with prejudice, concluding that Ethicon had
“not provided sufficient support to dismiss this action with
prejudice.”

J.A. 371.

The court nevertheless found some merit

to Ethicon’s position and agreed to dismiss the case without
prejudice

as

Plaintiff

Profile

dismissal,

a

sanction
Form.

Plaintiffs

for

Plaintiffs’

Immediately

fully

complied

failure

following
with

to

file

the

their

the

court’s
discovery

obligations by serving the Plaintiff Fact Sheet, which contained
all

of

the

information

required

under

Order

17.

Yet

when

Plaintiffs requested reinstatement of the case--having cured the
single

defect

that

prompted

dismissal--the

district

court

refused.
Why would the district court, having determined that there
was insufficient evidence to dismiss the case with prejudice at
a time when Plaintiffs’ discovery remained outstanding, refuse
to reinstate the case once the discovery had been served?
27

What

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did the district court mean when it dismissed the case without
prejudice?

Without prejudice to what, if not reinstatement?

Nothing in the record suggests a satisfactory answer to these
questions.

Nothing

occurred

between

the

dismissal

without

prejudice and the order denying reinstatement to explain the
district court’s abrupt change of heart.
These

unanswered

questions

are

especially

concerning

in

light of the district court’s suggestion that central blame for
the

dismissal

lay

with

plaintiffs’ counsel.”

“strategic

J.A. 438.

decisions

made

by

the

We have long recognized that,

in granting judgment against a party based on the failings of
counsel,

the

court

should

first

carefully

availability of less severe sanctions.

consider

the

See, e.g., Hillig, 916

F.2d at 174 (“A dismissal sanction is usually inappropriate when
it

unjustly

penalizes

a

blameless

client

for

the

attorney’s

behavior.”); Reizakis, 490 F.2d at 1135 (“Rightfully, courts are
reluctant to punish a client for the behavior of his lawyer.”).
Here, there is no evidence the district court considered lesser
sanctions.
In sum, the district court ended Plaintiffs’ case without
engaging in the balancing test we have, for years, required to
ensure that the “harsh sanction of dismissal” is “reserved for
only the most flagrant case” evincing “bad faith and callous
disregard for the authority of the district court[.]”
28

Hillig,

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916

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F.2d

court’s

at

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174-75

refusal

to

Pg: 29 of 29

(quotation

marks

reinstate

the

omitted).

case

The

district

in

manifest

results

injustice to Plaintiffs, who have been denied their day in court
without

the

requisite

Because

nothing

in

showing
this

case

of

bad

faith

prejudice.

that

indicates

or

Plaintiffs

“deceive[d] [the] court or abuse[d] the process at a level . . .
utterly inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice”
or

otherwise

“undermine[d]

the

integrity

of

the

[judicial]

process,” Projects Mgmt., 734 F.3d at 373, I would hold that the
district

court

abused

its

discretion

in

denying

motion for reconsideration and reinstatement.
respectfully dissent.

29

Plaintiffs’

Accordingly, I