Bonnilyn Mascio v. Carolyn Colvin
Filing
PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:11-cv-00065-FL. [999548160]. [13-2088]
Appeal: 13-2088
Doc: 48
Filed: 03/18/2015
Pg: 1 of 21
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-2088
BONNILYN A. MASCIO,
Plaintiff − Appellant,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City.
Louise W.
Flanagan, District Judge. (2:11-cv-00065-FL)
Argued:
December 11, 2014
Decided:
March 18, 2015
Before AGEE, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Reversed and remanded with instructions by published opinion.
Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge Agee and Judge
Floyd joined.
ARGUED: David J. Cortes, ROBERTI, WITTENBERG, LAUFFER, WICKER &
CINSKI, P.A., Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Mark J.
Goldenberg, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Thomas G. Walker, United States
Appeal: 13-2088
Doc: 48
Filed: 03/18/2015
Pg: 2 of 21
Attorney, R.A. Renfer, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
2
Appeal: 13-2088
Doc: 48
Filed: 03/18/2015
Pg: 3 of 21
DIAZ, Circuit Judge:
Bonnilyn
Mascio
appeals
Administration’s
denial
security
benefits.
income
of
Social
application
her
the
for
Because
we
Security
supplemental
conclude
that
the
administrative law judge erred by not conducting a function-byfunction
analysis,
moderate
by
limitation
ignoring
in
(without
her
ability
explanation)
to
Mascio’s
maintain
her
concentration, persistence, or pace, and by determining Mascio’s
residual functional capacity before assessing her credibility,
we reverse and remand.
I.
A.
Mascio
alleges
degenerative
adjustment
that
she
disc
disease,
disorder. 1
In
is
carpal
2008,
an
disabled
tunnel
from
severe
syndrome,
administrative
law
and
judge
(“ALJ”) found that Mascio was not disabled, but the district
1
An “adjustment disorder” is “a disorder the essential
feature of which is a maladaptive reaction to an identifiable
psychological stress, or stressors, that occurs within weeks of
the onset of the stressors and persists for as long as 6 months;
the maladaptive nature of the reaction is indicated by
impairment in occupational (including school) functioning, or in
usual social activities or relationships with others, or with
symptoms that are in excess of a normal or expectable reaction
to the stressor.” Stedman’s Medical Dictionary 259610 (28th ed.
2006).
3
Appeal: 13-2088
Doc: 48
Filed: 03/18/2015
Pg: 4 of 21
court reversed and the case was remanded to a second ALJ for
another hearing and disability determination.
found
that
Mascio
was
November 30, 2009. 2
filed
a
complaint
not
disabled
from
The second ALJ
March
15,
2005,
to
Mascio lost her administrative appeal and
in
the
district
court,
which
granted
the
Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and upheld
the denial of benefits.
This appeal followed.
B.
We review de novo a district court’s decision on a motion
for judgment on the pleadings.
Korotynska v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 474 F.3d 101, 104 (4th Cir. 2006).
We will affirm the
Social Security Administration’s disability determination “when
an ALJ has applied correct legal standards and the ALJ’s factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence.”
Bird v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec. Admin., 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012).
Mascio
does not dispute the ALJ’s factual findings but argues that the
ALJ made four legal errors by (1) not conducting a function-byfunction
analysis;
persistence,
or
(2)
pace
not
including
limitation
in
Mascio’s
his
concentration,
hypothetical
to
the
vocational expert; (3) determining Mascio’s residual functional
capacity before assessing her credibility; and (4) not applying
2
While her first appeal was pending, the Social Security
Administration approved Mascio’s application for benefits from
an onset date of December 1, 2009.
4
Appeal: 13-2088
Doc: 48
Filed: 03/18/2015
Pg: 5 of 21
the so-called “great weight rule” to Mascio’s subjective claims
of pain.
Before
turning
to
Mascio’s
arguments,
we
provide
an
overview of the five-step sequential evaluation that ALJs use to
make disability determinations.
C.
The Social Security Administration regulations describe the
five-step
process
(2014).
in
detail.
See
20
C.F.R.
§ 416.920(a)(4)
To summarize, the ALJ asks at step one whether the
claimant has been working; at step two, whether the claimant’s
medical impairments meet the regulations’ severity and duration
requirements;
at
step
three,
whether
the
medical
impairments
meet or equal an impairment listed in the regulations; at step
four, whether the claimant can perform her past work given the
limitations caused by her medical impairments; and at step five,
whether the claimant can perform other work.
The
first
four
claimants to meet.
steps
create
a
series
of
hurdles
for
If the ALJ finds that the claimant has been
working (step one) or that the claimant’s medical impairments do
not
meet
the
severity
and
duration
requirements
of
the
regulations (step two), the process ends with a finding of “not
disabled.”
At
claimant
disabled
is
step
three,
the
ALJ
either
finds
that
because
her
impairments
match
a
5
the
listed
Appeal: 13-2088
Doc: 48
impairment
Filed: 03/18/2015
or
continues
the
Pg: 6 of 21
analysis.
The
ALJ
cannot
deny
benefits at this step.
If
the
first
determination,
three
the
ALJ
steps
then
do
not
assesses
lead
the
to
a
conclusive
claimant’s
residual
functional capacity, which is “the most” the claimant “can still
do
despite”
physical
ability to work.
the
ALJ
must
and
mental
limitations
Id. § 416.945(a)(1).
“consider
all
of
that
affect
her
To make this assessment,
[the
claimant’s]
medically
determinable impairments of which [the ALJ is] aware,” including
those not labeled severe at step two.
Id. § 416.945(a)(2).
The ALJ then moves on to step four, where the ALJ can find
the claimant not disabled because she is able to perform her
past work.
Or, if the exertion required for the claimant’s past
work exceeds her residual functional capacity, the ALJ goes on
to step five.
At
step
five,
the
burden
shifts
to
the
Commissioner
to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claimant can
perform other work that “exists in significant numbers in the
national
economy,”
considering
the
claimant’s
residual
functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.
Id.
§§ 416.920(a)(4)(v); 416.960(c)(2); 416.1429.
The Commissioner
typically
testimony
offers
this
evidence
through
the
of
a
vocational expert responding to a hypothetical that incorporates
the
claimant’s
limitations.
If
6
the
Commissioner
meets
her
Appeal: 13-2088
Doc: 48
Filed: 03/18/2015
Pg: 7 of 21
burden, the ALJ finds the claimant not disabled and denies the
application for benefits.
In this case, at step one, the ALJ determined that Mascio
had not been working.
four
severe
At step two, he found that Mascio had
impairments--degenerative
disc
disease,
carpal
tunnel syndrome, adjustment disorder, and a history of substance
abuse--that, alone or together, met the regulations’ duration
requirement.
At
step
three,
he
decided
that
Mascio’s
impairments did not meet or equal any of the impairments listed
in the regulations.
The ALJ then found that Mascio had the residual functional
capacity to perform “light work,” 3 except that she was further
limited to “chang[ing] between sitting and standing every 30
minutes
balancing,
than
(‘sit/stand
bending,
frequent
3
option’);
stooping,
fingering;
no
only
occasional
climbing,
crouching
or
crawling;
no
exposure
to
hazards
such
The regulations define light work as
lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent
lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10
pounds.
Even though the weight lifted may be very
little, a job is in this category when it requires a
good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves
sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling
of arm or leg controls.
To be considered capable of
performing a full or wide range of light work, [the
claimant] must have the ability to do substantially
all of these activities.
20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b).
7
more
as
Appeal: 13-2088
Doc: 48
unprotected
Filed: 03/18/2015
heights
or
Pg: 8 of 21
dangerous
machinery;
adjustment disorder, only unskilled work.”
and,
due
A.R. 492.
to
her
At step
four, he concluded that Mascio could not perform her past work
based on her residual functional capacity.
five,
he
found
that
Mascio
could
Finally, at step
perform
other
work
and
therefore was not disabled.
II.
With
this
background
in
mind,
we
turn
to
Mascio’s
contentions of error.
A.
Mascio first argues that the ALJ erred in assessing her
residual
functional
capacity
function-by-function analysis.
because
he
did
not
conduct
a
We agree that, on the facts of
this case, the ALJ’s failure to perform this analysis requires
remand.
Mascio’s argument rests on Social Security Ruling 96-8p, 4
which
explains
how
functional capacity.
functional
capacity
adjudicators
should
assess
residual
The Ruling instructs that the residual
“assessment
must
first
identify
the
individual’s functional limitations or restrictions and assess
4
The Ruling’s title is “Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles
II and XVI: Assessing Residual Functional Capacity in Initial
Claims.”
8
Appeal: 13-2088
his
Doc: 48
or
her
Filed: 03/18/2015
work-related
Pg: 9 of 21
abilities
on
a
function-by-function
basis, including the functions” listed in the regulations. 5
96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,474, 34,475 (July 2, 1996).
SSR
“Only after
that may [residual functional capacity] be expressed in terms of
the exertional levels of work, sedentary, light, medium, heavy,
and very heavy.”
residual
Id.
functional
The Ruling further explains that the
capacity
“assessment
must
include
a
narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each
conclusion,
findings)
citing
and
observations).”
Mascio
procedures.
specific
nonmedical
medical
facts
evidence
(e.g.,
(e.g.,
daily
laboratory
activities,
Id. at 34,478.
contends
that
the
ALJ
did
not
follow
these
The Commissioner responds that Mascio’s argument is
“moot” because the ALJ found at step four that Mascio could not
perform her past work.
argument
unconvincing
We, however, find the Commissioner’s
because
ALJs
5
clearly
use
the
residual
The listed functions are the claimant’s (1) physical
abilities,
“such
as
sitting,
standing,
walking,
lifting,
carrying,
pushing,
pulling,
or
other
physical
functions
(including manipulative or postural functions, such as reaching,
handling, stooping or crouching)”; (2) mental abilities, “such
as limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying out
instructions, and in responding appropriately to supervision,
coworkers, and work pressures in a work setting”; and (3) other
work-related abilities affected by impairments “such as skin
impairment(s), epilepsy, impairment(s) of vision, hearing or
other senses, and impairment(s) which impose environmental
restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(b)-(d).
9
Appeal: 13-2088
Doc: 48
Filed: 03/18/2015
Pg: 10 of 21
functional capacity finding at steps four and five.
See id. at
34,475-76; see also id. at 34,476 (“At step 5 of the sequential
evaluation process, . . . [w]ithout a careful consideration of
an
individual’s
functional
capacities
to
support
[a
residual
functional capacity] assessment based on an exertional category,
the adjudicator may either overlook limitations or restrictions
that would narrow the ranges and types of work an individual may
be able to do, or find that the individual has limitations or
restrictions that he or she does not actually have.” (emphasis
added)).
Alternatively,
the
Commissioner
urges
us
to
join
other
circuits that have rejected a per se rule requiring remand when
the
ALJ
analysis.
does
not
perform
an
explicit
function-by-function
See, e.g., Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d
Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citing cases from the Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits).
inappropriate
given
that
We agree that a per se rule is
remand
would
prove
futile
in
cases
where the ALJ does not discuss functions that are “irrelevant or
uncontested.”
Id.
But declining to adopt a per se rule does
not end our inquiry.
In that regard, we agree with the Second
Circuit that “[r]emand may be appropriate . . . where an ALJ
fails
to
functions,
assess
despite
a
claimant’s
contradictory
10
capacity
evidence
to
in
perform
the
relevant
record,
or
Appeal: 13-2088
Doc: 48
where
other
Filed: 03/18/2015
inadequacies
meaningful review.”
Id.
Pg: 11 of 21
in
the
ALJ’s
analysis
frustrate
We find this to be such a case.
Here, the ALJ has determined what functions he believes
Mascio can perform, but his opinion is sorely lacking in the
analysis needed for us to review meaningfully those conclusions.
In
particular,
perform
certain
ability
to
although
analysis
conflicting
functions,
perform
is
the
them
especially
evidence
ALJ
he
for
said
a
full
troubling
as
concluded
to
that
nothing
about
workday.
because
Mascio’s
the
Mascio
Mascio’s
The
record
residual
can
missing
contains
functional
capacity--evidence that the ALJ did not address.
For
example,
the
administrative
record
includes
two
residual functional capacity assessments (Exhibits 12F and 20F)
by
state
agency
disability
conflict with each other.
examiners.
These
assessments
Exhibit 12F states that Mascio can
lift 50 pounds, but Exhibit 20F limits her to 20 pounds.
Yet
the ALJ’s findings are more consistent with Exhibit 20F, about
which
he
said
nothing.
To
make
matters
worse,
the
ALJ’s
discussion of Exhibit 12F trails off right where he was poised
to announce the weight he intended to give it:
11
Appeal: 13-2088
Doc: 48
Filed: 03/18/2015
Pg: 12 of 21
A.R. 496 (emphasis added).
Because we are left to guess about how the ALJ arrived at
his
conclusions
functions
and
on
Mascio’s
indeed,
ability
to
perform
relevant
remain
uncertain
as
to
the
what
ALJ
intended, remand is necessary.
B.
Mascio
next
argues
that
the
ALJ
presented
insufficient hypothetical to the vocational expert. 6
a
legally
The ALJ
asked the expert if jobs existed for a hypothetical person with
Mascio’s age, education, and work experience, where the claimant
is “limited to light work but [can] sit or stand at will about
every
30
activities
minutes,
and
such
balancing,
as
[can]
do
only
stooping,
6
occasional
kneeling,
postural
crouching,
We find it appropriate to address Mascio’s other alleged
errors because they could recur on remand.
12
Appeal: 13-2088
Doc: 48
Filed: 03/18/2015
Pg: 13 of 21
crawling and climbing; [but cannot be] expos[ed] to hazardous
conditions such as heights or moving machinery; and can do . . .
frequent fingering.”
A.R. 586.
Notably, the hypothetical said
nothing about Mascio’s mental limitations.
The vocational expert responded that there were unskilled,
light work jobs for that person, including office helper, order
caller, and warehouse checker. 7
The ALJ’s hypothetical, together
with the vocational expert’s unsolicited addition of “unskilled
work,”
matched
the
ALJ’s
finding
regarding
Mascio’s
residual
functional capacity.
Thus, the hypothetical was incomplete only
if
to
the
ALJ
failed
account
for
a
relevant
determining Mascio’s residual functional capacity.
Mascio,
that
is
precisely
what
happened--the
factor
when
According to
ALJ
did
not
consider her mental limitations despite crediting at step three
Mascio’s diagnosis of an adjustment disorder and also finding
that
Mascio
had
moderate
difficulties
in
maintaining
her
concentration, persistence, or pace as a side effect of her pain
medication.
7
Although the ALJ’s hypothetical said nothing about
“unskilled work,” the expert added that limitation to her
response. The regulations define unskilled work as “work which
needs little or no judgment to do simple duties that can be
learned on the job in a short period of time.”
20 C.F.R.
§ 416.968(a).
13
Appeal: 13-2088
Doc: 48
Filed: 03/18/2015
Pg: 14 of 21
The Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly excluded any
limitation for concentration, persistence, or pace because the
ALJ (1) disbelieved Mascio’s need for pain medication because
she
had
been
convicted
of
selling
her
prescription
pain
medication and had lied to her doctor about using marijuana; and
(2) disbelieved Mascio’s claim that her pain medication caused
daytime fatigue because she never sought treatment for this side
effect. 8
As to the first point, the ALJ’s analysis does not go as
far as the Commissioner’s does.
The ALJ concluded only that
Mascio’s conviction and lie “make[] her statements that her pain
is as limiting as she has alleged less credible.”
(emphasis added).
A.R. 496
The ALJ did not find that she suffered from
no pain or that she never took medication for it.
As to the second point, it is true that the ALJ concluded
that Mascio’s allegation that her pain caused daytime fatigue
was “less credible” because she did not complain about this side
effect to her doctors.
A.R. 496.
8
But this leaves us to wonder
The Commissioner also says that the ALJ properly excluded
the limitation for concentration, persistence, or pace because
Mascio did not attend five scheduled follow-up appointments with
a mental health counselor.
But those appointments related to
her adjustment disorder, not side effects from pain medication.
And, despite Mascio not following up for treatment, the ALJ
credited Mascio’s adjustment disorder as requiring a limitation
to unskilled work.
14
Appeal: 13-2088
Doc: 48
Filed: 03/18/2015
Pg: 15 of 21
if the ALJ found her claim of fatigue partially or completely
incredible, particularly since the ALJ elsewhere concluded that
Mascio’s pain medication “impacts her thought processes.”
491.
A.R.
We think this inconsistency needs to be explained.
In addition, we agree with other circuits that an ALJ does
not
account
“for
a
claimant’s
limitations
in
concentration,
persistence, and pace by restricting the hypothetical question
to simple, routine tasks or unskilled work.”
Winschel v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2011) (joining the
Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits).
As Mascio points out, the
ability to perform simple tasks differs from the ability to stay
on
task.
Only
the
latter
limitation
would
account
for
a
claimant’s limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace.
Perhaps
the
ALJ
can
explain
why
Mascio’s
moderate
limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace at step three
does
not
translate
functional capacity.
into
a
limitation
in
Mascio’s
residual
For example, the ALJ may find that the
concentration, persistence, or pace limitation does not affect
Mascio’s
ability
to
work,
in
which
case
it
would
have
been
appropriate to exclude it from the hypothetical tendered to the
vocational expert.
See id. at 1181.
But because the ALJ here
gave no explanation, a remand is in order.
15
Appeal: 13-2088
Doc: 48
Filed: 03/18/2015
Pg: 16 of 21
C.
Next, Mascio contends that the ALJ erred by determining her
residual functional capacity before assessing her credibility.
We
agree
that
the
ALJ
erred,
and
that
the
error
was
not
harmless.
Mascio’s argument stems from the ALJ’s use of the following
language in his opinion:
After careful consideration of the evidence, the
undersigned
finds
that
the
claimant’s
medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected
to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant’s
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and
limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to
the extent they are inconsistent with the above
residual functional capacity assessment.
A.R.
495.
We
agree
with
the
Seventh
Circuit
that
this
boilerplate 9 “gets things backwards” by implying “that ability to
work
is
determined
first
claimant’s credibility.”
The
boilerplate
and
is
then
used
to
determine
the
agency’s
own
Bjornson, 671 F.3d at645.
also
conflicts
with
the
regulations, which direct the ALJ to “determine the extent to
which
[the
claimant’s]
alleged
functional
limitations
and
restrictions due to pain or other symptoms can reasonably be
9
As the government concedes, this language comes from a
template “drafted by the Social Security Administration for
insertion into any administrative law judge’s opinion to which
it pertains.”
Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 644-45 (7th
Cir. 2012).
16
Appeal: 13-2088
Doc: 48
Filed: 03/18/2015
Pg: 17 of 21
accepted as consistent with the medical signs and laboratory
findings
and
other
symptoms
affect
§ 416.929(a).
evidence
[his
or
to
her]
decide
how
ability
to
[the
claimant’s]
work.”
20
C.F.R.
Thus, the ALJ here should have compared Mascio’s
alleged functional limitations from pain to the other evidence
in the record, not to Mascio’s residual functional capacity.
The boilerplate also suggests that the ALJ acted contrary
to the agency’s rulings.
Social Security Ruling 96-8p defines
residual functional capacity as “an administrative assessment of
the
extent
to
which
an
individual’s
medically
determinable
impairment(s), including any related symptoms, such as pain, may
cause physical or mental limitations or restrictions that may
affect
his
or
her
mental activities.”
added).
capacity
And
when
“assessment
capacity
to
do
work-related
physical
and
SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. at 34,475 (emphasis
explaining
must
be
that
based
the
on
residual
all
of
functional
the
relevant
evidence in the case record,” Ruling 96-8p’s illustrative list
includes
“[e]ffects
of
symptoms,
including
pain,
that
are
reasonably attributed to a medically determinable impairment.”
Id. at 34,477 (second emphasis added).
Thus, a claimant’s pain
and residual functional capacity are not separate assessments to
be compared with each other.
Rather, an ALJ is required to
consider a claimant’s pain as part of his analysis of residual
functional capacity.
17
Appeal: 13-2088
Doc: 48
Filed: 03/18/2015
Pg: 18 of 21
The ALJ’s error would be harmless if he properly analyzed
credibility elsewhere.
three
reasons
Mascio
(1)
for
had
But here, the ALJ did not.
rejecting
not
Mascio’s
complied
with
The ALJ gave
statements
follow-up
as
to
mental
pain:
health
treatment; (2) had lied to her doctor about using marijuana; and
(3)
had
been
convicted
for
selling
her
prescription
pain
medication.
The first reason has nothing to do with pain.
With respect
to the second and third reasons, the ALJ concluded that they
made Mascio’s “statements that her pain is as limiting as she
has
alleged
less
credible.”
A.R.
496.
Yet
in
determining
Mascio’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ chose to credit
some, but not all, of her statements.
For example, Mascio testified that “she cannot walk more
than about 100 feet, can stand for only 30 minutes, and can only
lift about 15 pounds.”
A.R. 495.
It appears that the ALJ
credited the second statement, by including the sit/stand option
in his finding as to residual functional capacity.
But despite
Mascio’s assertion that she was limited in her ability to walk
and lift, the ALJ found that Mascio could perform “light work,”
which includes lifting up to 20 pounds and performing “a good
deal
of
work”).
walking.”
20
C.F.R.
§ 416.967(b)
(defining
“light
Nowhere, however, does the ALJ explain how he decided
which of Mascio’s statements to believe and which to discredit,
18
Appeal: 13-2088
Doc: 48
Filed: 03/18/2015
Pg: 19 of 21
other than the vague (and circular) boilerplate statement that
he did not believe any claims of limitations beyond what he
found
when
considering
Mascio’s
residual
functional
capacity.
The ALJ’s lack of explanation requires remand.
D.
Lastly,
Mascio
maintains
that
the
ALJ
erred
by
not
following the so-called “great weight rule” when evaluating her
alleged pain.
We conclude that no such rule exists in this
circuit, and we are not persuaded to adopt it.
According to Mascio, ALJs must afford “great weight” to
subjective evidence regarding a claimant’s allegation that she
suffers from debilitating pain whenever it is uncontradicted or
supported by substantial evidence.
She relies on two of our
unpublished decisions to support this proposition.
See Felton-
Miller v. Astrue, 459 F. App’x 226, 229 n.1 (4th Cir. 2011);
Smith v. Astrue, 457 F. App’x 326, 329 (4th Cir. 2011).
Of course, unpublished opinions in this circuit do not bind
us.
Moreover, Mascio misreads the cases.
language
from
Felton-Miller
and
Smith
that
Right before the
Mascio
quotes
to
support her argument, we noted that our cases have recognized
“that
subjective
evidence
may
be
entitled
to
great
weight.”
Felton-Miller, 459 F. App’x at 229 n.1 (emphasis added); Smith,
457 F. App’x at 329 (emphasis added).
Read in context, we were
not articulating a per se rule requiring that ALJs afford great
19
Appeal: 13-2088
Doc: 48
Filed: 03/18/2015
Pg: 20 of 21
weight to subjective evidence or else be reversed.
were
merely
stating
uncontradicted
the
subjective
obvious--that
evidence
of
an
a
ALJ
Rather, we
faced
claimant’s
with
pain
is
likely to credit that evidence if the ALJ otherwise finds the
claimant credible.
See Combs v. Weinberger, 501 F.2d 1361, 1363
(4th Cir. 1974).
Similarly, an ALJ evaluating a record with
substantial evidence to support a claimant’s pain allegations
may well credit that evidence.
We
weight
also
rule”
note
that
would
adopting
conflict
deference owed to the agency.
Mascio’s
with
the
prescriptive
regulations
“great
and
the
The regulations direct an ALJ to
take into account “all of the available evidence,” not only the
claimant’s pain allegations.
20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(1).
In
addition, this court must affirm an ALJ’s determination when
supported by substantial evidence.
Bird v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012).
And it is possible
for
a
substantial
evidence
to
support
both
claimant’s
pain
allegations and the ALJ’s decision that the claimant’s pain does
not affect her ability to work to the extent that the claimant
alleges.
Because Mascio’s proposed “great weight rule” is both
unnecessary and unworkable, we decline to adopt it.
20
Appeal: 13-2088
Doc: 48
Filed: 03/18/2015
Pg: 21 of 21
III.
For
the
reasons
given,
we
reverse
the
district
court’s
judgment and remand with instructions to vacate the denial of
benefits and remand for further administrative proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
21
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?