Washington Gas Light Company v. International Brotherhood
Filing
UNPUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:13-cv-00560-LO-TRJ Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999484988].. [13-2102]
Appeal: 13-2102
Doc: 27
Filed: 12/02/2014
Pg: 1 of 12
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-2102
WASHINGTON GAS LIGHT COMPANY,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, Local 96,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Liam O’Grady, District
Judge. (1:13-cv-00560-LO-TRJ)
Argued:
September 19, 2014
Decided:
December 2, 2014
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, and DAVIS,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Reversed and remanded by unpublished opinion. Senior Judge Davis
wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge
Niemeyer joined.
ARGUED: Mark James Murphy, MOONEY, GREEN, SAINDON, MURPHY &
WELCH, PC, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
Joseph Edward
Santucci, Jr., MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, Washington, D.C.,
for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: David R. Broderdorf, MORGAN, LEWIS &
BOCKIUS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
Appeal: 13-2102
Doc: 27
Filed: 12/02/2014
Pg: 2 of 12
DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge:
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Washington
Gas
Light
Company
(“the
Company”)
against
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 96 (“the Union”)
vacating
an
arbitration
arbitrator
exceeded
award.
his
The
court
under
authority
reasoned
the
that
terms
of
the
a
collective bargaining agreement by interpreting the agreement in
a manner inconsistent with its text.
Union,
mindful
arbitrator’s
as
we
are
of
decision-making,
the
we
In this appeal by the
deference
reverse
the
courts
owe
an
judgment
of
the
district court and remand with instructions to reinstate the
arbitration award.
I
The
Company
and
the
Union
bargaining agreement (“CBA”).
are
parties
to
a
collective
The CBA declares that arbitration
is the chosen method of resolution for grievances unresolvable
between the parties.
grievance
procedure.
Article XVIII of the CBA sets forth the
It
provides
for
the
selection
of
an
arbitrator from a rotating panel of nine arbitrators, compiled
and agreed to by the parties.
Central to the dispute here is
section 16(a), which permits either party, for any reason, to
strike
up
to
two
arbitrators
from
the
panel.
It
further
provides that, “[i]f the Company or the Union elects to strike
an arbitrator, it must do so not later than 24 hours before the
2
Appeal: 13-2102
time
Doc: 27
the
Filed: 12/02/2014
arbitration
hearing
Pg: 3 of 12
is
scheduled
XVIII, sec. 16(a), para. 5. J.A. 66. *
to
begin.”
Art.
While the arbitrator has
the authority to “interpret and apply the provisions of [the]
Labor Contract” in deciding grievances, the arbitrator cannot
“alter, extend, modify or in any way change the provisions of
[the] Labor Contract.”
Art. XVIII, sec. 17(a), para. 1. J.A.
67.
As the gravamen of the dispute in this case is focused on
temporal
benchmarks,
we
set
forth
in
detail
the
dates
of
relevant events, all occurring in 2012.
On February 13, the Union filed a grievance regarding the
discharge
of
an
employee.
On
May
18,
Jerome
H.
Ross
was
selected as the arbitrator to hear the grievance, and on June 1,
a hearing was scheduled for August 14.
requested
that
the
hearing
be
On July 12, the Company
rescheduled
due
to
witness
unavailability; the hearing did not occur on August 14.
On
October
on
3,
the
rescheduled
hearing
was
set
to
commence
November 15, with December 5 or 6 as dates for a potential
second day.
On October 31, the Company stated that it could not
attend
hearing
the
on
hearing on December 6.
November
15,
but
could
commence
the
On November 29, the Company informed the
*
Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed
by the parties in this appeal.
3
Appeal: 13-2102
Doc: 27
Filed: 12/02/2014
Pg: 4 of 12
Union that it had decided to strike Arbitrator Ross pursuant to
its right under section 16(a) of the CBA.
The Union disagreed with the Company’s assertion of its
authority to strike the arbitrator as of November 29 (it was
untimely), and it notified the Company and Arbitrator Ross of
its intention to appear for the December 6 hearing, expecting to
address the issue of the timeliness of the Company’s striking of
Arbitrator Ross as a threshold matter.
that,
as
it
had
struck
Arbitrator
The Company responded
Ross,
he
was
without
jurisdiction and lacked authority to make any rulings.
Arbitrator Ross notified the parties that he intended to
convene
the
hearing
on
December
6,
to
decide
first
the
jurisdictional issue and then to proceed to the merits of the
grievance
depending
on
his
decision
on
jurisdiction.
The
Company reiterated that it would not participate in the December
6 hearing, and it requested that if the hearing did go forward,
the
arbitrator
consider
only
the
jurisdictional
issue
and
withhold ruling on the merits.
On December 6, Arbitrator Ross conducted the hearing with
only the Union present.
testified
both
to
the
Michael Hampton, the Union President,
negotiating
history
provision and the merits of the grievance.
Arbitrator Ross issued his opinion.
of
the
striking
On March 12, 2013,
He found that the striking
provision contained a latent ambiguity as to the timing of a
4
Appeal: 13-2102
Doc: 27
party’s
Hampton’s
Filed: 12/02/2014
authority
to
Pg: 5 of 12
an
arbitrator.
regarding
testimony
strike
the
negotiating
He
credited
history
of
the
striking provision, see infra pp. 10-11, and concluded that the
Company’s November 29 decision to strike him from the roster was
untimely
under
the
CBA.
Arbitrator
Ross
then
went
on
to
consider the merits of the grievance, and ruled in favor of the
grievant,
reducing
his
discharge
to
a
14-day
suspension
and
reinstating him.
On May 3, 2013, the Company filed suit in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, seeking to vacate
the
arbitration
award.
The
parties
filed
cross
motions
for
summary judgment, and the district court held a hearing on the
motions.
decision
On
August
granting
the
3,
2013,
the
Company’s
district
motion
for
court
issued
summary
its
judgment.
The Union timely appealed.
II
“Whether
authority
an
presents
arbitrator
a
question
acts
of
within
law,
and
judgment of the district court de novo.”
the
so
scope
we
of
his
review
the
PPG Indus. Inc. v.
Int'l Chem. Workers Union Council of United Food & Commercial
Workers,
587
F.3d
648,
652
(4th
Cir.
2009)
(hereafter
PPG
Industries) (citing Island Creek Coal Co. v. Dist. 28, United
Mine Workers of Am., 29 F.3d 126, 129 (4th Cir. 1994)).
5
Appeal: 13-2102
Doc: 27
Filed: 12/02/2014
Pg: 6 of 12
A court reviewing a labor arbitration award is limited to
“determin[ing] only whether the arbitrator did his job -- not
whether he did it well, correctly, or reasonably, but simply
whether he did it.”
Workers
Int'l
Therefore,
Mountaineer Gas Co. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic
Union,
“as
long
76
F.3d
as
the
606,
608
arbitrator
(4th
is
Cir.
even
1996).
arguably
construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope
of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious
error
does
not
suffice
to
overturn
his
decision.”
PPG
Industries, 587 F.3d at 652 (quoting United Paperworkers Int'l
Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)).
An arbitrator’s
award must be confirmed where it “draws its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement.”
United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
III
The
Union
argues
that
the
language
of
the
striking
provision is susceptible to multiple interpretations, and the
arbitrator simply acted within his authority to use extrinsic
evidence
to
find
the
correct
interpretation.
The
Company
counters that the arbitrator ignored the unambiguous language of
the
CBA,
and
that
his
decision
reflected
an
impermissible
construction of the agreement.
The Union has the better argument.
in
the
striking
provision
is
The ambiguity inherent
unmistakable.
6
The
provision
Appeal: 13-2102
Doc: 27
Filed: 12/02/2014
Pg: 7 of 12
requires a party to strike an arbitrator “not later than 24
hours before the time the arbitration hearing is scheduled to
begin.”
Art. XVIII, sec. 16(a), para. 5.
However, “the time” a
hearing is “scheduled to begin” is susceptible to alternative,
reasonable interpretations.
It could be referring to the date
on which the parties reach agreement as to a hearing date.
Or
it could be the date of a hearing that is first agreed upon by
the
parties.
Or
it
could
refer
to
the
date
on
which
the
ultimate hearing is scheduled to begin when the parties have
agreed to a postponement and rescheduled the date, as they did
in this case.
Thus, the answer to the question which “time”
triggers the running of the 24-hour clock is not found in the
plain
language
of
the
CBA.
While
the
arbitrator
did
not
articulate the specific date referred to by the language, he did
conclude
that
arbitrator
the
Ross
Company’s
was
well
arbitration agreement.
November
past
the
29
date
decision
to
specified
strike
in
the
The district court disagreed with this
analysis and interpreted the striking provision to require a
party to strike the arbitrator not later than 24 hours prior to
the start of any rescheduled hearing, here December 6.
But it was not the task of the district court, nor is it
our task on appeal, to interpret the CBA.
left to the arbitrator.”
That is “a matter
Westvaco Corp. v. United Paperworkers
Intern. Union, AFL-CIO, 171 F.3d 971, 975 (4th Cir. 1999).
7
By
Appeal: 13-2102
Doc: 27
Filed: 12/02/2014
Pg: 8 of 12
the express terms of the CBA, the arbitrator had the authority
to
interpret
and
apply
its
provisions.
The
arbitrator’s
construction of the CBA was therefore bargained for “and so far
as
the
arbitrator’s
decision
concerns
construction
of
the
contract, the courts have no business overruling him because
their interpretation of the contract is different from his.”
United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 599.
“This same maxim applies
even when the arbitrator’s interpretation resolves a question
relating
to
the
scope
of
the
arbitrator’s
own
authority.”
Westvaco Corp., 171 F.3d at 975.
At the outset of his discussion and findings, Arbitrator
Ross
acknowledged
that
his
authority
was
limited
interpretation
and
application
of
the
clear
and
provisions
the
contract.
In
the
event
that
of
conflicting
interpretations
of
contractual
to
an
unambiguous
plausible,
language
arose,
he
reasoned, he could turn to extrinsic evidence to determine the
parties’
competing
intent.
The
interpretations
arbitrator
of
the
highlighted
striking
the
provision
parties’
before
turning to an examination of the bargaining history.
The Company takes issue with the arbitrator’s actions and
urges us to find that the arbitrator ignored the plain language
of
the
striking
provision,
but
as
we
have
described,
language of the provision is steeped in ambiguity.
the
Thus, this
case is readily distinguishable from our decisions, to which the
8
Appeal: 13-2102
Doc: 27
Filed: 12/02/2014
Pg: 9 of 12
Company cites, that vacated an arbitration award on the ground
that
an
arbitrator’s
interpretation
was
impermissible.
See
Mountaineer Gas, 76 F.3d at 610 (concluding that the arbitrator
“blatantly ignored the unambiguous language” of the company’s
policy, and imposed a penalty that “appealed to his own notions
of
right
and
wrong”);
Champion
Int’l
Corp.
v.
United
Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, 168 F.3d 725, 730-32 (4th
Cir. 1999) (finding that the arbitrator “drew on his own notions
of fairness” to fashion an award that was not justified by the
CBA or a separate agreement); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Am. Postal
Workers
Union,
AFL-CIO,
204
F.3d
523,
531
(4th
Cir.
2000)
(concluding that the arbitrator “negated [the] clear language”
of the contract, and thus, the award “did not draw its essence
from the agreement”).
The arbitrator’s sound finding of an ambiguity in this case
permitted him to turn to extrinsic evidence — a move that we
have expressly allowed.
Union,
29
F.3d
931,
See CSX Transp., Inc. v. United Transp.
936
(4th
Cir.
1994)
(“If
the
parties’
written agreement is ambiguous or silent regarding the parties’
intent, the arbitrator may use past practices and bargaining
history to ‘fill a gap’ in the written contract.”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
similarly
approved
an
arbitrator’s
In PPG Industries, we
reliance
on
extrinsic
evidence to interpret the terms of a CBA where the CBA was
9
Appeal: 13-2102
Doc: 27
silent
Filed: 12/02/2014
on
the
issue
arbitrator
had
to
in
Pg: 10 of 12
dispute.
determine
whether
considered “actively employed.”
definition
of
“actively
employees,
the
turned
to
“[g]iven
the
two-sentence
CBA
at
striking
did
discussions to determine their intent.
that,
F.3d
Id. at 650.
employed”
arbitrator
587
The
employees
were
Because the CBA’s
not
the
653.
address
striking
parties’
bargaining
Id. at 651.
We stated
definition
of
‘actively
employed’ and the failure of the CBA to address strikers in
either sentence, we cannot conclude that the arbitrator ignored
the plain language of the CBA.”
the
company’s
argument
that
Id. at 653.
the
We then rejected
arbitrator
erred
in
using
extrinsic evidence. Because the arbitrator found the contract’s
terms ambiguous, he could properly consider extrinsic evidence
to resolve the ambiguity.
Here, the striking provision does not make clear when a
hearing is “scheduled to begin” for purposes of identifying the
relevant 24-hour striking window.
Hampton testified on behalf
of the Union that the provision represented a compromise between
the
Company
and
the
Union.
According
to
Hampton,
during
contract negotiations, the Company proposed that either party be
permitted to strike up to two arbitrators for any reason, “and
at
any
time
arbitration.”
proposal.
before
J.A.
the
18.
first
The
witness
Union
is
rejected
sworn
the
in
any
Company’s
Ultimately, the parties settled on the language at
10
Appeal: 13-2102
Doc: 27
issue.
Filed: 12/02/2014
Pg: 11 of 12
Hampton stated that, because it takes several emails for
the parties to agree to a hearing date, the 24-hour period was
understood to refer to the initially established hearing date,
and not future dates resulting from agreed postponements.
The arbitrator’s interpretation derived from the essence of
the agreement, and he did not exceed the scope of his authority
merely because his interpretation of the provision was contrary
to
the
Company’s,
and
certainly
not
because
he
relied
on
extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent. The Company, having
contractually
make
an
submitted
“attack
on
to
the
the
arbitrator’s
correctness
decision.”
PPG
Industries,
original).
This
Court
has
587
of
F.3d
repeated,
judgment,
the
cannot
arbitrator’s
at
653
(emphasis
time
and
again,
in
that,
“judicial review of arbitration awards is extremely limited-in
fact, it is ‘among the narrowest known to the law.’” U.S. Postal
Serv., 204 F.3d at 527 (quoting Union Pac. R.R. v. Sheehan, 439
U.S. 89, 91 (1978)).
In light of that standard, we decline to
second-guess the arbitrator’s decision.
The
Company
raises
two
alternative
grounds
on
which
it
contends we should affirm the district court’s vacatur of the
arbitral
award,
namely,
that
the
arbitrator
overlooked
a
limitation on his jurisdiction set forth in the CBA, and that he
was, in any event, disqualified from determining whether he had
been
properly
stricken.
The
district
11
court
did
not
address
Appeal: 13-2102
Doc: 27
Filed: 12/02/2014
Pg: 12 of 12
these issues; moreover, by declining to appear for the arbitral
proceedings,
the
Company
has
not
exhausted
these
claims
presenting them to the arbitrator in the first instance.
by
Under
the circumstances, we decline to consider them.
IV
For the reasons set forth, we reverse the judgment of the
district
court
and
remand
with
directions
to
enforce
the
arbitral award.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?