Laura Martin v. Jack Wood

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 4:13-cv-00018-AWA-LRL. [999476875]. [13-2283]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-2283

LAURA LYNN MARTIN,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JACK LEE WOOD; MILAGROS ALCALA JONES,
Defendants – Appellants,
and
COMMONWEALTH
OF
VIRGINIA;
COMMONWEALTH
OF
VIRGINIA
DEPARTMENT OF BEHAVIORAL HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENTAL SERVICES;
EASTERN STATE HOSPITAL,
Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News. Arenda L. Wright Allen,
District Judge. (4:13-cv-00018-AWA-LRL)

Argued:

September 17, 2014

Decided:

November 18, 2014

Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded with instructions by published opinion.
Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Judge Duncan and
Judge Thacker joined.

ARGUED: Sydney Edmund Rab, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants.
Raymond Lee

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Hogge, Jr., HOGGE LAW, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
ON
BRIEF: Kenneth Thomas Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, Earle
Duncan Getchall, Jr., Solicitor General, Wesley Glenn Russell,
Jr., Deputy Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants.
Kenneth Michael
Golski, HOGGE LAW, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

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NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
Laura Martin, a registered nurse formerly employed by a
state-operated

hospital

in

Williamsburg,

Virginia,

commenced

this damages action against two supervisors at the hospital,
alleging that the supervisors improperly refused to authorize
overtime pay for the hours that she worked in excess of 40 hours
per week, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219.

The supervisors filed a motion

to dismiss the complaint, claiming sovereign immunity.

They

contend that their conduct, as alleged, involved their official
duties on behalf of the hospital, such that the complaint was,
in reality, directed against the hospital, which has sovereign
immunity.

The

relying

Martin’s

on

district

court,

assertion

in

however,
her

denied

complaint

the
that

motion,
she

was

suing the supervisors in their individual capacities.
Because the actions of Martin’s supervisors, as alleged in
the complaint, were inextricably tied to their official duties,
we conclude that the Commonwealth of Virginia is the real party
in interest in this action.

Since the Eleventh Amendment has

withdrawn jurisdiction over suits of this nature against the
States, effectively giving the Commonwealth immunity, we reverse
and remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint.

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I
In her complaint, Martin alleges that from November 2010
until January 2012 she was employed as a registered nurse by
Eastern State Hospital and that the Hospital paid her wages on
an hourly basis.
changes

at

performing

Because of transitional duties during shift

the

Hospital,

her

duties

Martin

claims

20 minutes

or

that

more

she

often

began

her

shift

before

started and continued working 30 to 90 minutes after her shift
ended.

She also alleges that she often worked through her 30-

minute lunch break.

Even though this often resulted in her

working more than 40 hours per week, Martin alleges that she was
compensated

for

only

40 hours,

in

violation

of

the

overtime

provision of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
Martin

further

alleges

that,

when

she

complained

to

Milagros Jones, the registered nurse coordinator for the unit in
which
refused

Martin
to

worked,

take

“inefficiency.”

about

action,

not

being

attributing

paid

overtime,

Martin’s

extra

Jones

time

to

Martin also asserts that Jack Wood, the chief

executive officer and director of the Hospital, “willfully and
deliberately
overtime.
was

refused

to

correct”

the

failure

to

pay

her

The complaint notes, however, that this allegation

“[b]ased

upon

circumstantial

evidence

including

but

not

necessarily limited to the job duties and responsibilities of
Wood.”

The

complaint,

which

named
4

only

Wood

and

Jones

as

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defendants, asserts that in failing to authorize overtime pay to
Martin, Wood and Jones “acted directly and indirectly in the
interest of Eastern State Hospital in relation to the hours of
work and payment of wages to Eastern State Hospital employees
including

Martin.”

It

demands

damages

from

them

in

their

individual capacities in the form of “overtime compensation,”
“liquidated damages in an equal amount,” and interest.
Wood

and

Jones

filed

a

motion

to

dismiss

the

complaint

under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6),
asserting that they are entitled to the same sovereign immunity
enjoyed

by

Eastern

State

Commonwealth of Virginia.

Hospital

as

an

agency

of

the

They noted that the complaint centers

on their official authority to direct and control employees,
such as Martin, with respect to their hours and wages and that
it fails to allege that they acted in an ultra vires manner
against

Martin

interest.

or

that

they

acted

to

serve

any

personal

Thus, they claimed that, because their conduct was

“tied inextricably to their official duties,” they had the same
sovereign

immunity

as

did

the

Hospital,

relying

on

Lizzi

v.

Alexander, 255 F.3d 128, 136 (4th Cir. 2001), overruled in part
on

other

grounds

by

Nevada

Department

of

Human

Resources

v.

Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
The

district

court

denied

explaining:
5

Wood

and

Jones’

motion,

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[T]he
Complaint
alleges
significant
intentional
misconduct committed by Mr. Wood and Ms. Jones.
The
FLSA
claims
are
unquestionably
directed
against
Mr. Wood and Ms. Jones in their individual capacities.
In sum, Ms. Martin’s Complaint, on its face,
states FLSA claims against Mr. Wood and Ms. Jones in
their individual capacities.
Sovereign immunity is
inapplicable to such claims. See Hafer [v. Melo, 502
U.S. 21, 31 (1999)].
Wood and Jones filed this interlocutory appeal, contending
that

the

immunity.
Inc.,

district

court

erred

in

denying

them

sovereign

See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy,

506 U.S.

139,

144

(1993)

(authorizing

interlocutory

appeals from orders denying Eleventh Amendment immunity).

II
The FLSA provides that “no employer shall employ any of his
employees . . . for a workweek longer than forty hours unless
such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess
of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and
one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.”
U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).

29

The term “employer” is defined to include

“any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer

in

relation

agency.”

to

an

employee

and

includes

a

public

Id. § 203(d).

Martin concedes that Eastern State Hospital, as an agency
of the Commonwealth of Virginia, has sovereign immunity from
damages claims brought under the FLSA by reason of the Eleventh
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Amendment. *

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In addition, she concedes that sovereign immunity

from such claims also extends to “state officers acting in their
official capacity.”

Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va.

Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 609 n.10 (2001)
(citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)). And while a
State may, by an unequivocal expression, waive its sovereign
immunity, Martin acknowledges that Virginia has not done so.
See Commonwealth v. Luzik, 524 S.E.2d 871, 878 (Va. 2000).
also

acknowledges

Amendment

immunity

that
with

while

Congress

respect

to

can

rights

abrogate

Eleventh

protected

Fourteenth Amendment, it did not do so in the FLSA.
v. Virginia, 145 F.3d 182, 189-91 (4th Cir. 1998).

She

by

the

See Abril
Rather, she

justifies the court’s jurisdiction over her complaint on the
fact that sovereign immunity does not extend to suits against
state officials who are sued in their individual capacities.
See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991); Suarez Corp. v.
McGraw, 125 F.3d 222, 229 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Hafer, 502
U.S. at 31).

As Martin candidly states, “[i]t is for this exact

∗

The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. And
the Amendment has been construed to withdraw jurisdiction over
any suit brought against an unconsenting State in federal court
by its own citizens. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 66263 (1974); Booth v. Maryland, 112 F.3d 139, 141 (4th Cir. 1997).
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reason

that

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[she]

took

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care

in

drafting

the

Complaint,

identifying and setting forth sufficient factual allegations to
assert

the

claims

against

their individual capacity.”

Appellants

Wood

and

Jones

only

in

Thus, to avoid sovereign immunity,

Martin did not sue Eastern State Hospital but rather only Wood
and Jones, naming them only in their individual capacities.
Wood

and

Eleventh

Jones

Amendment

individual

argue
by

capacities

that

Martin

naming
if,

in

them

cannot

as

reality,

circumvent

defendants

she

is

in

suing

the

their

them

for

actions taken by them in their official capacities on behalf of
Eastern State Hospital.
We begin the analysis by noting that “[w]hen [a] suit is
brought only against state officials, a question arises as to
whether

that

Pennhurst
(1984).

suit

State

is

Sch.

a

&

suit

Hosp.

against

v.

the

Halderman,

State

itself.”

465 U.S.

89,

101

And in addressing this question, the Supreme Court has

cautioned that allowing an action to proceed simply because the
complaint
capacity

names
“would

a
be

state
to

official

adhere

to

in
an

his

or

empty

her

individual

formalism

and

to

undermine the principle . . . that Eleventh Amendment immunity
represents

a

real

limitation

question jurisdiction.”

on

a

federal

court’s

federal-

Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho,

521 U.S. 261, 270 (1997); see also Bender v. Williamsport Area
Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 543 (1986); Lizzi, 255 F.3d at 137
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(“[T]he mere incantation of the term ‘individual capacity’ is
not

enough

to

transform

an

official

capacity

action

into

an

individual capacity action”).
Thus,
Martin’s

question

complaint,

individual
against

the

which

capacities,

the

presented
names

nonetheless

Commonwealth

itself.

in

this

Wood

case

and

effectively
Resolution

is

Jones

in

states
of

whether
their

a

claim

this

issue

requires us to look beyond the form of the complaint and the
conclusory allegations against Wood and Jones to determine who
is

the

“real,

substantial

party

in

interest.”

Pennhurst,

465 U.S. at 101 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury,
323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Booth v. Maryland, 112 F.3d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1997)
(“Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to state officials
when they are merely the nominal defendants and ‘the state is
the real, substantial party in interest’” (quoting Ford, 323
U.S. at 464)).
To identify the real, substantial party in interest, we
thus

examine

the

substance

of

the

complaint, positing inquiries such as:

claims

stated

in

the

(1) were the allegedly

unlawful actions of the state officials “tied inextricably to
their official duties,” Lizzi, 255 F.3d at 136; (2) if the state
officials had authorized the desired relief at the outset, would
the burden have been borne by the State, cf. Pennhurst, 465 U.S.
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at 109 n.7; (3) would a judgment against the state officials be
“institutional and official in character,” such that it would
operate against the State, id. at 108; (4) were the actions of
the state officials taken to further personal interests distinct
from

the

officials’

State’s

interests,

actions

ultra

id.;

vires,

and

id.

(5) were

at 111;

the

Lizzi,

state

255

F.3d

at 136.
Here,

Martin’s

complaint

alleges

that

Eastern

State

Hospital, as Martin’s employer, failed to compensate her for
overtime

because

compensation.

Wood

and

Jones

refused

to

approve

such

It alleges further that Wood and Jones, Martin’s

supervisors, “exercised authority to establish and control [her]
hours of work” at the Hospital and that, in the exercise of that
authority, they “failed and refused to include [overtime hours]
in the computation of Martin’s weekly wages,” in violation of
the FLSA.

Finally, it alleges that, in doing so, Wood and Jones

“acted directly and indirectly in the interest of Eastern State
Hospital.”
acting,

The complaint includes no allegation that, in so

Wood

attempted

to

and

Jones

serve

acted

personal

in

an

ultra

interests

vires

distinct

manner
from

or
the

Hospital’s interests.
Examining

Martin’s

complaint

in

light

of

the

stated

factors, we conclude that virtually every factor indicates that
Wood and Jones are being sued in their official capabilities.
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Martin’s complaint alleges that Wood and Jones had authority to
authorize overtime pay and refused to do so and that, if they
had

authorized

overtime

Eastern State Hospital.

pay,

Wood

and

Jones’

it

would

have

been

funded

by

actions

The inevitable conclusion follows that
were

“inextricably

official duties at the Hospital.

tied”

to

their

In these circumstances, we

hold that Virginia is the real party in interest, see Pennhurst
465

U.S.

at 101;

Lizzi,

immunity -- grounded

in

255
the

F.3d

at 136,

Eleventh

and

that

sovereign

Amendment --

requires

dismissal of the suit, Lizzi, 255 F.3d at 138; Booth, 112 F.3d
at 142.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order denying
Wood and Jones’ motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity
and remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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