US ex rel. Karen T. Wilson v. Graham County Soil & Water

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:01-cv-00019-MR. [999522317]. [13-2345]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-2345

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel. KAREN T. WILSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
GRAHAM COUNTY SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT; CHEROKEE
COUNTY SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT; RICHARD GREENE,
in his individual capacity; WILLIAM TIMPSON, in his
individual capacity; KEITH ORR, in his individual and
official capacities; RAYMOND WILLIAMS, in his individual
capacity; DALE WIGGINS, in his individual capacity; GERALD
PHILLIPS, in his individual capacity; ALLEN DEHART, in his
individual capacity; LLOYD MILLSAPS, in his official
capacity; BILLY BROWN, in his individual capacity; LYNN
CODY, in his individual capacity; BILL TIPTON, in his
official capacity; C. B. NEWTON, in his individual capacity;
EDDIE WOOD, in his individual capacity; GRAHAM COUNTY,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
GRAHAM COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; CHEROKEE COUNTY
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; CHERIE GREENE; RICKY STILES;
BETTY JEAN ORR; JOYCE LANE; JIMMY ORR; JERRY WILLIAMS, in
his individual capacity; EUGENE MORROW; CHARLES LANE;
CHARLES LANEY; GEORGE POSTELL; LLOYD KISSLEBURG; TED ORR;
BERNICE
ORR;
JOHN
DOE,
JR.;
JOHN
DOE
CORPORATION;
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES, 1-99,
Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Bryson City.
Martin K.
Reidinger, District Judge. (2:01-cv-00019-MR)

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Argued:

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December 9, 2014

Decided:

February 3, 2015

Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and Arenda L. Wright
ALLEN, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Virginia, sitting by designation.

Reversed by published opinion. Judge Motz wrote the opinion, in
which Judge King and Judge Allen joined.

Mark Tucker Hurt, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellant.
Sean
Francis
Perrin,
WOMBLE
CARLYLE
SANDRIDGE
&
RICE,
PLLC,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees Raymond Williams, Dale
Wiggins, Lynn Cody, and Graham County. Martin McCracken, NORTH
CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellees Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District,
Cherokee County Soil & Water Conservation District, Gerald
Phillips, Allen Dehart, Lloyd Millsaps, Bill Tipton, C.B.
Newton, and Eddie Wood.

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DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
A long and winding road has brought this False Claims Act
(FCA) case to us on appeal a third time.

After two trips to the

Supreme Court, Relator Karen Wilson now appeals the district
court’s dismissal of her qui tam action for lack of jurisdiction
pursuant to the FCA’s public disclosure bar.

For the reasons

that follow, we reverse.

I.
We need only briefly recount the factual and procedural
history.

Fuller accounts of each can be found in Graham Cnty.

Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson,
559 U.S. 280 (2010), and United States ex rel. Wilson v. Graham
Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 528 F.3d 292 (4th Cir.
2008).
When a February 1995 storm caused significant flooding and
erosion in parts of western North Carolina, the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) agreed to help the affected
counties cover the costs of cleanup and recovery through the
Emergency

Watershed

Protection

Program

generally 7 C.F.R. §§ 624.1–624.11.

(“EWP

Program”).

See

Jointly administered by the

National Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) and the United
States

Forest

assistance

to

Service,
eligible

the
states

EWP
and
3

Program

provides

political

financial

subdivisions

“to

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relieve

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imminent

hazards

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. . . created

by

a

natural

that causes a sudden impairment of a watershed.”

disaster

Id. § 624.2.

North Carolina’s Graham and Cherokee Counties applied for
storm relief under the EWP Program and each was deemed eligible
to receive federal funding.

As required, each county entered

into a “Cooperative Agreement” with NRCS, see id. § 624.8(c),
agreeing to perform or contract out the necessary recovery work.
NRCS then agreed to reimburse the counties for most of the total
cost.

In each county, responsibility for the EWP Program fell

to the respective Soil and Water Conservation District (SWCD), a
local special-purpose government entity.

Both the Graham County

SWCD and the Cherokee County SWCD hired independent contractors
to complete the required cleanup and remediation.
Appellant,

Relator

Karen

Wilson,

worked

at

the

Graham

County SWCD as a part-time secretary from 1993 until 1997.
after

Graham

County

received

approval

for

the

EWP

Soon

Program,

Wilson began to suspect fraud in its implementation, not only by
her

colleagues

at

the

SWCD,

but

also

by

NRCS

officials

who

oversaw the Program.

In December 1995, Wilson wrote a letter to

USDA

Richard

Special

Agent

Gallo

outlining

her

concerns.

According to Wilson’s letter, two NRCS employees, H. Richard
Greene

and

William

Timpson,

had

agreed

with

the

independent

contractors to front the cost of supplies in exchange for a
share of the ultimate profits.

Wilson’s letter also indicated
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that the

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Graham

County

SWCD

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had

chosen

as

its

“independent”

contractor Keith Orr, who was a salaried SWCD employee and so
ineligible to work on the contract.

In addition, Wilson told

Gallo, the Graham County SWCD was at that time “being audited by
county auditors.”
Four months later, in April 1996, those auditors formalized
their findings in an “Agreed Upon Procedures Report” (“the Audit
Report”)
SWCD’s

detailing
handling

several

of

characterized

Orr’s

County’s

of

code

the

problems
EWP

with

hiring

as

conduct,”

and

a

likely

pointed

to

Graham

County

The

program.

the

Audit

Report

“violation
a

lack

of

of

the

proper

documentation surrounding both the bidding and the invoicing of
the EWP contracts.

An accompanying cover letter indicated that

Graham County received four copies of the Audit Report, two for
the County’s own records, and one each “for the Graham County
Soil & Water Conservation District and . . . the US Department
of Agriculture, should you be required to distribute copies to
them.”

In the cover letter, the independent accounting firm

responsible for the Audit Report also reported sending one copy
to the North Carolina Local Government Commission and one to the
North Carolina Division of Soil and Water Conservation.
The

Audit

suspicions.
another

USDA

Report

failed

to

put

an

end

to

Wilson’s

In November 1996, she made a written statement to
Special

Agent,

A.
5

Kenneth

Golec,

not

only

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reiterating and expanding on some of her earlier allegations,
but also raising new ones -- notably that Richard Greene had
stolen logs intended for use in the rebuilding efforts.
allegations against Greene proved well-founded.

The

In August 1997,

Special Agent Golec completed a Report of Investigation (“USDA
Report”) that concluded Greene had “received payment by checks
issued in his name from a lumber mill for the delivery of trees
removed from the Emergency Watershed Program (EWP), sites he
represented.”

The cover page of the USDA Report included a

distribution list to certain state and federal law enforcement
agencies
outside

and
your

a

warning

agency

.

that
.

.

it

was

without

“not

to

prior

be

distributed

clearance

from

the

qui

tam

Office of Inspector General, USDA.”
In

2001,

Wilson

filed

suit

under

the

FCA’s

provision, alleging that fraudulent invoices were submitted to
the federal government under the EWP Program in both Graham and
Cherokee

Counties.

In

2006,

Wilson

filed

her

third

amended

complaint -- the operative pleading for this appeal -- in which
she named as defendants Graham County, the Graham County SWCD,
and the Cherokee County SWCD, along with several individuals,
including Orr, Greene, and Timpson.

Although the intervening

years, and decisions of both this court and the Supreme Court,
have eliminated several of Wilson’s claims for relief, her core
FCA

claims

pertaining

to

the

EWP
6

Program

in

both

counties

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survived until the district court dismissed them in the order
from which Wilson now appeals.

II.
In

its

qui

tam

provision,

the

False

Claims

Act

permits

private citizens (known as relators) to bring suit on behalf of
the United States “to recover from those persons who make false
or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States.”

Graham

Cnty., 559 U.S. at 283 (citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 3279-3733 (2006)).
The

statute’s

earlier

version,

which

applies

to

this

appeal, contains a jurisdiction-stripping provision:
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under
this section based upon the public disclosure of
allegations or transactions . . . in a congressional,
administrative,
or
Government
Accounting
Office
report, hearing, audit, or investigation . . . unless
the action is brought by the Attorney General or the
person bringing the action is an original source.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006).

This provision, known as the

public disclosure bar, is designed to strike a balance between
empowering

the

public

to

expose

fraud

on

the

“preventing ‘parasitic’ actions” on the other.

one

hand,

and

United States ex

rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1348 (4th
Cir.

1994)

(citation

omitted).

In

short,

it

mandates

the

dismissal of claims brought by a relator if those claims are

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based on a public disclosure, unless the relator qualifies as an
original source. 1
We asked the district court on remand to make the factual
findings necessary to apply this statutory scheme.

Pursuant to

this directive, the court considered (1) whether any relevant
audits, reports, hearings, or investigations had been publicly
disclosed;
public

(2)

whether

disclosures;

nonetheless

an

Wilson

and

original

based

her

claims

(3)

if

so,

whether

source

of

those

claims.

on

any

such

Wilson

was

See

United

States ex rel. Wilson v. Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation
Dist., 976 F. Supp. 2d 755, 760 (W.D.N.C. 2013), on remand from
399 F. App’x 774 (4th Cir. 2010).

Reaching all three questions,

the court concluded that both the Audit Report and the USDA
Report had been publicly disclosed, that Wilson based her claims
on these reports, and that she was not an original source of any
of those claims.
therefore

Id. at 770, 772-73, 776.

dismissed

Wilson’s

action

1

in

its

The district court
entirety,

holding

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”),
enacted in 2010, amended this provision slightly.
See Pub. L.
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 § 10104(j)(2).
Rather than depriving a
court of jurisdiction over actions based on public disclosures,
the statute now provides only that “[t]he court shall dismiss
[such] an action or claim.”
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
The
PPACA, however, is not retroactive.
Graham Cnty., 559 U.S. at
283 n.1.
We thus apply the statute’s earlier version to this
appeal, a fact that renders the public-disclosure question one
of subject-matter jurisdiction.
As is customary, we use the
present tense when discussing the operative version of the
statute.
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that the public disclosure bar deprived it of subject-matter
jurisdiction.

Id. at 776.

Wilson timely noted this appeal.
court’s

“jurisdictional

findings”

Our review of a district

is

“deferential.”

United

States ex rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 350 (4th Cir.
2009).

When a finding of fact undergirds the district court’s

conclusion with respect to jurisdiction, we leave it undisturbed
unless

it

is

clearly

erroneous.

Id.

at

348.

The

“legal

conclusions flowing therefrom,” however, are reviewed de novo.
Id.

III.
To sustain the district court’s holding, we must find that
the court correctly concluded that (1) all relevant reports had
been

publicly

disclosed,

and

(2)

Wilson

based

her

claims

on

those public disclosures, and (3) Wilson was not the original
source of her claims.

With respect to the first requirement --

public disclosure -- the court concluded that the Audit Report
and

the

fraud,
because

USDA

Report,

constituted
they

had

both

public
been

of

which

contained

disclosures
distributed

of
to

allegations

relevant
public

of

reports
officials

responsible for managing the subject forming the basis of the
claims.

Graham Cnty., 976 F. Supp. 2d at 770.

The distribution

to these officials amounted to a public disclosure under the
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FCA, the court reasoned, because it put the government on notice
of the possible fraud.
district

court’s

Id.

factual

Though we find no fault with the
findings,

the

court

applied

an

incorrect legal standard in reaching its conclusion as to public
disclosure.

Because the district court erred with respect to

this first issue, we must reverse.
A.
The FCA withdraws federal jurisdiction over qui tam actions
“based

upon

the

transactions”

in

an

public
“audit”

§ 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006).
Report

clearly

disclosure

qualify

or

of

allegations

“investigation.”

31

or

U.S.C.

Since the Audit Report and the USDA
as

eligible

sources

under

controlling

law, 2 the sole question at issue is whether the reports were
“publicly disclosed” prior to the time Wilson filed this action.
The
suggests

plain
that

affirmative

meaning
they

act.

of

were
See

the

phrase

not.
Webster’s

“public

“Disclosure”
Third

New

disclosure”
requires

an

International

Dictionary 645 (1993) (defining “disclose” as “to open up to
general knowledge,” “to expose to view,” and “to make known”).
2

Under the current iteration of the FCA, amended by the
PPACA, the Audit Report would not qualify as a “public
disclosure” because it is not a “Federal . . . audit.”
31
U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). The version of the
statute controlling this appeal, however, contains no such
modifier and has been held to encompass state and local
materials as well as federal ones.
See Graham Cnty., 559 U.S.
at 283.
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Such an act, in turn, requires a recipient -- a person, group,
or entity to whom the information is revealed.

By specifying

that a “disclosure” must be “public,” Congress indicated that
only disclosures made to the public at large or to the public
domain

had

jurisdictional

significance.

Neither

the

Audit

Report nor the USDA Report was distributed to, or intended to be
distributed to, the public.

Indeed, the authors of both reports

attached to them distribution lists, limiting distribution to
government entities.

And nothing in the record suggests that

either report made it further than its limited intended audience
until Wilson filed suit.
In
publicly

holding

to

disclosed

the
--

contrary

the

--

district

that
court

the

reports

quoted

and

were
almost

exclusively relied on a Seventh Circuit case, United States v.
Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 1999), overruled on
other grounds by Glaser v. Wound Care Consultants, Inc., 570
F.3d 907 (7th Cir. 2009).

There the court held that information

on which the relator based her qui tam action had been “publicly
disclosed” because it had been disclosed “to a competent public
official.”

Id. at 861.

Reasoning that “‘public’ . . . can also

be defined as ‘authorized by, acting for, or representing the
community,’”

the

disclosure,

“not

rather

a

to

Bank

of

actually

“public

Farmington

made

to

official,”
11

the

court
public

sufficed

held
at

to

that

large,”
trigger

a
but
the

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jurisdictional bar in § 3730(e)(4)(A).
English Dictionary 779 (2d ed. 1989)).

Id. (quoting 12 Oxford
Here, the district court

similarly held that because the distribution lists accompanying
the Audit Report and the USDA Report included federal agencies
with

relevant

oversight,

the

reports

had

been

publicly

disclosed.
No

other

circuit,

however,

has

adopted

the

Seventh

Circuit’s interpretation of the public disclosure requirement.
Rather, the other five circuits to consider the question have
rejected the Seventh Circuit’s approach.

See United States ex

rel. Oliver v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 763 F.3d 36, 42 (D.C.
Cir. 2014); United States ex rel. Meyer v. Horizon Health Corp.,
565 F.3d 1195, 1200 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2009); United States ex rel.
Rost

v.

Pfizer,

overruled

on

Inc.,

other

507

grounds

F.3d
by

720,

Allison

730

(1st

Engine

Cir.

Co.

v.

2007),
United

States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662 (2008); Kennard v. Comstock
Res., Inc., 363 F.3d 1039, 1043 (10th Cir. 2004); United States
ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1499-1500 (11th
Cir. 1991); see also United States ex rel. Beauchamp v. Academi
Training Ctr., Inc., 933 F. Supp. 2d 825, 844 (E.D. Va. 2013);
United States v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 2d 773, 78284 (W.D. Tenn. 2010).
Until now, we have had no occasion to weigh in on this
issue.

Today we too reject the Seventh Circuit’s view, holding
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instead that “a ‘public disclosure’ requires that there be some
act of disclosure outside of the government.”
728 (emphasis added).

Rost, 507 F.3d at

As the Tenth Circuit has explained, a

“public disclosure” must somehow reach the public domain and
“the Government is not the equivalent of the public domain.”
Kennard, 363 F.3d at 1043.
“equate[]

the

“superfluous”

government

with

public

disclosure

the

Rost, 507 F.3d at 729.
disclosure

bar

To hold otherwise would wrongfully

only

the

public,”

bar’s

rendering

namesake

phrase.

For “[b]y its express terms, the public

applies

when

allegations

or

transactions

have been made public through [certain] channels [and] . . .
[t]he government’s own, internal awareness of the information is
not one such channel.”

Oliver, 763 F.3d at 42.

As we have

noted in the past, “the FCA’s public disclosure bar is far from
a model of careful draftsmanship.”
305.

Graham Cnty., 528 F.3d at

But it seems clear that by “public disclosure,” Congress

did not somehow mean “disclosure to the government.”
Moreover, “[t]he history of the FCA strongly bolsters this
conclusion.”

Oliver, 763 F.3d at 42.

When Congress enacted the

statute during the Civil War, “the FCA placed no restriction on
the

sources

from

which

a

qui

tam

relator

information on which to base a lawsuit.”

could

acquire

Schindler Elevator

Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885, 1893
(2011).

To combat the growing problem of “parasitic” suits,
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Congress amended the statute to bar “qui tam actions based on
evidence of information in the possession of the United States
. . . at the time such suit was brought.”
quotation marks and citation omitted).
replaced

th[is]

so-called

Government

Id. at 1894 (internal
But “in 1986, Congress

knowledge

bar

with

narrower public disclosure bar” that governs this appeal.
(citation omitted).
the

government’s

public

Id.

Holding, as the district court did, that

awareness

disclosure

bar

of

potential

“would

fraud

essentially

triggers

the

reinstate

jurisdictional bar Congress expressly eliminated.”
F.3d at 42.

the

a

Oliver, 763

This we decline to do.

In short, while both the Audit Report and the USDA Report
were disclosed to government officials charged with policing the
type of fraud Wilson alleges, nothing in the record suggests
that either report actually reached the public domain.

Thus,

the public disclosure bar was not triggered on this basis.
B.
That

the

reports

were

disclosed

to

state

and

local

government agencies as well as federal agencies does not alter
our conclusion.
Report

and

Graham County directed compilation of the Audit

shared

it

with

in,

or

other

local,

federal

involved

Program.

The USDA prepared its report and similarly shared it

state

agencies

with

enforcement
14

the

and

entities

with

overseeing,

state,

cooperative

responsibilities.

EWP

In

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neither

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instance

did

the

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relevant

information

move

beyond

a

limited sphere of government actors interacting as part of a
cooperative local-state-federal program.
Moreover, each report made clear on its face that it was
See J.A. 3 380 (Audit Report)

intended for official use only.

(“This report is intended solely for your information and should
not be used by those who did not participate in determining the
procedures.”); J.A. 264 (USDA Report) (“This document is FOR
OFFICIAL

USE

ONLY.

It

and

its

contents

are

not

to

be

distributed outside your agency, nor duplicated, without prior
clearance from the Office of Inspector General, USDA.”).
The mere fact that local, state, and federal agencies share
official information in the course of a cooperative endeavor
cannot, without more, trigger the public disclosure bar.
Supreme

Court

explained

at

an

earlier

juncture

in

As the

this

very

case:
Just how accessible to the Attorney General a typical
state or local source will be, as compared to a
federal source, is an open question. And it is not
even the right question.
The statutory touchstone,
once again, is whether the allegations of fraud have
been “public[ly] disclos[ed],” § 3730(e)(4)(A), not
whether they have landed on the desk of a DOJ lawyer.
Graham Cnty., 559 U.S. at 299-300; see also United States ex
rel. Maxwell v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp., 540 F.3d 1180, 1184
3

Citations to J.A. refer to the joint appendix filed by the
parties in this appeal.
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(10th

Doc: 34

Cir.

between

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2008)

federal

and

Pg: 16 of 19

(finding

certain

information

state

government

not

transferred

publicly

disclosed

“insofar as the communication does not release the information
into the public domain such that it is accessible to the general
population”).

Cooperation -- and thus the flow of information -

- between federal, state, and local agencies is a common and
critical feature of our system of federalism.
conclude

that

such

information

has

been

We simply cannot

made

public

without

contorting the plain meaning of that word. 4
C.
The existence of public information laws also erects no
obstacle to our holding.

On appeal, perhaps recognizing the

weight of authority contrary to the district court’s holding,
Appellees

pivot

slightly

from

that

court’s

rationale.

They

argue that the Audit Report entered the public domain because it
would have been “available” to the public via a public records

4

We note that the Tenth Circuit has held that a sharing of
information by state and federal agencies constitutes a “public
disclosure” unless the recipient is subject to a duty of
confidentiality. United States ex rel. Fine v. MK-Ferguson Co.,
99 F.3d 1538, 1545 (10th Cir. 1996).
But see id. at 1550-51
(Henry, J., dissenting) (opining that “public disclosure” should
hinge upon whether “the state . . . took positive steps to
release [the information] to the public,” not on whether it “has
the [information] in a file cabinet somewhere subject to public
disclosure”); see also section III.C, infra. We prefer to leave
the focus where the statute’s plain language indicates it should
lie: on whether there has been an actual disclosure beyond the
government to the public.
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request.

Appellees contend that the Audit Report was publicly

disclosed

because

receive

the

“members

audit,”

both

of

the

“[u]nder

public
the

could

North

Carolina

Records Act” and through “a federal clearinghouse.”
Br.

10-11.

The

distinguish
available

argument

between

--

upon

is

meritless.

information
request

--

information

or

399

F. App’x

at

776

(quoting

United

Public

fail

to

potentially

“‘affirmatively

provided to others not previously informed thereof.’”
Cnty.,

and

Appellees’

Appellees

theoretically

and

request

States

Graham
ex

rel.

Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514, 1521 (10th
Cir. 1996)).

It is the latter that is the talisman of the

public disclosure bar.
To equate eligibility for disclosure with disclosure itself
does more than merely place the cart before the horse; it places
the cart before a horse that may never follow.
sister

circuits

placed

[a]

has

report

noted,
in

its

a

state

agency

investigative

As one of our

that

file

and

has

“simply

restricted

access to those persons clairvoyant enough to specifically ask
for

it”

has

not

publicly

meaning of the FCA.

disclosed

that

report

within

the

Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1521; accord Meyer,

565 F.3d at 1200-01 (“[A] public disclosure is restricted to
information that is actually made public as opposed to material
that is only theoretically available upon the public’s request.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
17

Appeal: 13-2345

Doc: 34

Filed: 02/03/2015

Pg: 18 of 19

At oral argument, Appellees attempted to return both cart
and horse to their logical positions, suggesting that Wilson
actually received a copy of the Audit Report through the state’s
Public

Records

Act.

But

the

district

court

made

no

such

finding, probably because nothing in the record lends support
for such a finding.

The cover letter that accompanied the Audit

Report indicates that of the four copies sent to Graham County,
one was earmarked specifically for the Graham County SWCD, where
Wilson worked.

And in deposition, Wilson admitted to receiving

a copy of the Audit Report “[a]s soon as it was available . . .
[b]ut I think I requested that from Graham County.”
Wilson’s
letter’s

recollection

instructions,

secretary

at

the

comports

but

Graham

also

County

not

only

with

common

SWCD,

Wilson

with

the

cover

sense.
spoke

provided files to the auditor performing the review.
would have been aware of the forthcoming Audit Report.

As
with

a
and

Thus, she
Nothing

indicates that she obtained a copy through a cumbersome Public
Records Act request rather than by simply asking for one.

Far

from defeating jurisdiction, then, Wilson’s receipt of the Audit
Report confirms
blowing

that

insider[]”

she

the

is

precisely

statute

18

seeks

the
to

sort

of

encourage.

“whistleGraham

Appeal: 13-2345

Doc: 34

Filed: 02/03/2015

Pg: 19 of 19

Cnty., 559 U.S. at 294 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). 5

IV.
Satisfied that nothing triggered the public disclosure bar
in this case, we hold that the district court had jurisdiction
over this action.
the

limited

We emphasize that our holding addresses only

issue

of

subject-matter

jurisdiction.

Whether

Wilson’s complaint sufficiently alleges actionable fraud against
the government is an issue not before us today and one on which
we do not opine.

For the sole reason that no public disclosure

deprived it of jurisdiction, the judgment of the district court
is
REVERSED.

5

Appellees, like the district court, fleetingly suggest a
third potential public disclosure:
the 1998 federal indictment
of USDA employee Richard Greene.
The record offers no support
for this conclusion.
In fact, two years before the indictment
was filed, Wilson provided substantially all the information in
it to Special Agent Golec.
Compare J.A. 247 with Bill of
Indictment (Dec. 8, 1998), ECF No. 261-1.
Thus, Wilson could
not have based her claims on the Indictment.
19