David Martin v. NAES Corporation
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 6:12-cv-00058-NKM-RSB. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999433037]. [13-2445]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-2445
DAVID C. MARTIN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
NAES CORPORATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Lynchburg.
Norman K. Moon, Senior
District Judge. (6:12-cv-00058-NKM-RSB)
Submitted:
August 29, 2014
Decided:
September 10, 2014
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mary M. Spangler, LAW OFFICE OF M.M. SPANGLER, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellant.
Alison N. Davis, LITTLER MENDELSON,
P.C., Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
David C. Martin filed suit in state court against his
employer, NAES Corp. (“NAES”), alleging breach of contract and
discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”).
NAES
removed
the
action
to
federal
court.
The
district court initially granted summary judgment to NAES on
Martin’s
breach
ADEA
of
claim
contract
but
denied
claim.
summary
After
judgment
completion
on
of
Martin’s
discovery,
however, the court granted NAES’s renewed motion for summary
judgment on the remaining breach of contract claim.
Martin now
appeals, challenging the district court’s reliance on a transfer
letter as dispositive of his breach of contract claim.
Finding
no reversible error, we affirm.
Martin
worked
as
a
technician
at
NAES,
an
energy
company that contracted with Dominion Power to provide services
at a power station located in Altavista, Virginia.
informed
that
his
employment
would
be
Martin was
terminated,
but
was
offered severance.
Martin was subsequently offered a job at
NAES’s
plant.
Pittsylvania
The
offer
letter
unequivocally
provided that by accepting the offer of transfer, previously
provided severance documents would become null and void.
Martin
accepted both the transfer offer and the severance package on
the same day, noting that his acceptance of the transfer order,
requiring
him
to
forgo
his
severance,
2
was
“under
duress.”
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Martin subsequently filed suit claiming breach of contract and
seeking enforcement of the severance offer.
In granting summary
judgment to NAES, the district relied heavily on the transfer
letter signed by Martin, finding that NAES’s offer of a transfer
to
Pittsylvania
specifically
excluded
Martin
from
eligibility
for the severance.
On
appeal,
Martin
challenges
the
district
court’s
reliance on the transfer letter on four grounds: (1) he was not
given an opportunity to respond to the district court’s finding
that the transfer letter was a separate contract, a claim not
raised by either party; (2) the court erred in treating it as a
stand-alone contract rather than a personnel action; (3) if the
letter
is
correctly
viewed
a
new
contract,
his
should
be
deemed
counteroffer
and
therefore
there
a
as
notations
was
no
meeting of the minds; and (4) the court erred in relying on a
letter that “has never been offered into evidence, has never had
a proper foundation for its introduction into evidence, and will
likely not withstand objections to its introduction.”
This
court
reviews
the
district
court’s
grant
of
summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts and the reasonable
inferences
therefrom
nonmoving party.
Cir. 2010).
in
the
light
most
favorable
to
the
See Robinson v. Clipse, 602 F.3d 605, 607 (4th
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
3
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and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The relevant inquiry on summary judgment
is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that
one party must prevail as a matter of law.”
Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).
An otherwise properly
supported summary judgment motion will not be defeated by the
existence of some factual dispute; however, only disputes over
facts
that
governing
might
law
judgment.
Id.
affect
will
at
the
properly
248.
outcome
of
preclude
Indeed,
to
the
the
suit
entry
withstand
a
under
of
the
summary
motion
for
summary judgment, the non-moving party must produce competent
evidence sufficient to reveal the existence of a genuine issue
of material fact for trial.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Thompson
v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002)
(“Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice, nor does
a
mere
scintilla
of
evidence
in
support
of
[the
non-moving
party’s] case.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under
Martin’s
these
claims
and
standards,
conclude
we
that
have
they
examined
are
each
meritless.
of
The
district court correctly applied Virginia law to conclude that
the transfer letter constituted a superseding contract and that
no counteroffer existed.
letter
was
admissible
We further conclude that the transfer
evidence
4
and
was
therefore
properly
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considered by the district court in granting summary judgment to
NAES.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We
dispense
contentions
with
are
oral
argument
adequately
because
presented
in
the
facts
and
the
materials
legal
before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
5
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