Noorali Savani v. Roger Allen

Filing

UNPUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:06-cv-02805-JMC Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999475989].. [13-2512]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-2512

NOORALI SAM SAVANI, individually and on behalf of others
similarly situated; ROBERT P. TAYLOR, JR., individually and
on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
URS PROFESSIONAL SOLUTIONS, LLC, f/k/a Westinghouse Safety
Management
Solutions,
LLC,
f/k/a
Washington
Safety
Management
Solutions,
LLC;
URS
PROFESSIONAL
SOLUTIONS
PENSION PLAN, f/k/a Washington Safety Management Solutions,
LLC Pension Plan, f/k/a WSMS Pension Plan; URS ENERGY &
CONSTRUCTION, INC., f/k/a Washington Group International,
Inc.; ROGER ALLEN, as Trustee and Member of the Benefits now
Administrative Committee of URS Professional Solutions
Pension Plan; JULIE TSCHIDA BROWN, as Trustee and Member of
the
Benefits
now
Administrative
Committee
of
URS
Professional Solutions Pension Plan; DAVE HOLLAN, as Trustee
and Member of the Benefits now Administrative Committee of
URS Professional Solutions Pension Plan; DELOYD CAZIER, as
Trustee and Member of the Benefits now Administrative
Committee of URS Professional Solutions Pension Plan,
Defendants – Appellants,
and
WASHINGTON SAVANNAH RIVER COMPANY, LLC, f/k/a Westinghouse
Savannah River Company, LLC; WESTINGHOUSE SAFETY MANAGEMENT
SOLUTIONS, LLC PENSION PLAN; PAUL HARPER, as Trustee and
Member of the Benefits now Administrative Committee of URS
Professional Solutions Pension Plan; LEO SAIN, as Trustee of
Westinghouse Safety Management Solutions, LLC Pension Plan;
PRES RAHE, as Trustee of Westinghouse Safety Management
Solutions, LLC Pension Plan; WASHINGTON SAVANNAH RIVER
COMPANY'S PENSION PLAN; RALPH DISIBIO, as director of
Washington
Safety
Management
Solution,
LLC;

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PAUL GREFENSTETTE,
as
Director
of
Washington
Safety
Management Solutions, LLC; ROBERT PEDDE, as Director of
Washington
Safety
Management
Solutions,
LLC;
AMBROSE SCHWALLIE,
as
Director
of
Washington
Safety
Management
Solutions,
LLC;
WSMS
PENSION
PLAN,
f/k/a
Westinghouse Savannah River Company-Bechtel Savannah River
Inc Pension Plan, f/k/a Westinghouse Safety Management
Solutions, LLC Pension Plan, f/k/a Washington Safety
Management Solutions, LLC Pension Plan; WASHINGTON SAFETY
MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS, LLC; WASHINGTON SAFETY MANAGEMENT
SOLUTIONS, LLC PENSION PLAN; WASHINGTON GROUP INTERNATIONAL,
INC.,
Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Aiken.
J. Michelle Childs, District Judge.
(1:06-cv-02805-JMC)

Argued:

September 16, 2014

Decided:

November 17, 2014

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion.
Judge Gregory wrote
opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Keenan joined.

the

ARGUED:
H. Douglas Hinson, ALSTON & BIRD, LLP, Washington,
D.C., for Appellants.
Stanley G. Jackson, JACKSON LAW
OFFICES, Aiken, South Carolina, for Appellees.
ON BRIEF:
Emily
S. Costin, ALSTON & BIRD, LLP, Washington, D.C.;
Gray T. Culbreath, GALLIVAN, WHITE & BOYD, P.A., Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellants.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
Noorali
Employee

“Sam”

Savani

Retirement

filed

Income

this

class

action

under

Act

(“ERISA”),

Security

the

§ 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B)(2006), claiming that
Washington

Safety

Management

Solutions,

(“WSMS”) 1

LLC’s

termination of an early retirement pension supplement violated
ERISA’s anti-cutback provision.

As we held in the first appeal

of this case, the “clear terms” of the WSMS Pension Plan (the
“Plan”) “include the [early retirement pension supplement] in
the definition of ‘accrued benefit.’”

Savani v. Wash. Safety

Mgmt. Solutions, LLC (Savani I), 474 F. App’x 310, 316 (4th Cir.
Mar.

20,

2012)

(per

curiam)

(unpublished).

In

this

second

appeal, WSMS argues that it may lawfully eliminate that early
retirement

pension

Robert Taylor,

and

(defined below).

benefit
a

as

similarly

to

situated

another
subset

of

employee,
the

class

We again hold that the unambiguous terms of

the Plan clearly include the pension benefit at issue within the
Plan’s definition of “accrued benefit,” and that WSMS may not
lawfully eliminate the benefit.

We therefore affirm the grant

of summary judgment to the plaintiffs-appellees.
1

WSMS is now called URS Professional Solutions, LLC, and
both WSMS and the appellees’ previous employer, Westinghouse
Savannah River Company (“WSRC”), are wholly owned subsidiaries
of a company called URS Energy & Construction.
For ease of
reference and consistency with this Court’s prior opinion, this
memorandum refers only to WSMS and WSRC.
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I.
While Savani was the focus of the first appeal, Taylor and
the

subclass

now

take

center

stage.

Much

of

the

relevant

background is set forth in great detail in Savani I, 474 F.
App’x at 312-14, and is repeated below to the extent necessary.
Taylor, like Savani, was an employee of the Westinghouse
Savannah River Company (“WSRC”) in 1997 when WSMS was formed.
“At its inception, WSMS recruited a number of WSRC employees,
including Savani [and Taylor], to transfer to the newly formed
company.”

Id. at 312.

Taylor and the other WSRC employees

“were informed of the employee benefit plans available to newly
transferred employees.”

Id.

Taylor was then and remains a

participant in the Plan.
Prior to a 2004 amendment, the Plan provided in relevant
part:

“‘Accrued

determination,

the

Benefit’
normal

means,

retirement

as

of

Pension

any

date

computed

of

under

Section 4.01(b) . . . less the WSRC Plan offset as described in
Section

4.13,

plus

any

Section 4.12 . . . .”

applicable

supplements

described

in

Additionally, the Plan provided that an

“early retirement Pension shall be a deferred Pension beginning
on the first day following the Member’s Normal Retirement Date
and . . . shall be equal to his Accrued Benefit.
Member

may

elect

to

receive

an

4

early

However, the

retirement

Pension

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beginning before his Normal Retirement Date.

. . .”

Finally,

the Plan described the following supplemental benefit:
4.12 Supplemental Benefits
(a) If a Member who:
(i) otherwise satisfies the requirements for a Pension
under this Plan; and
(ii) has at least one year of service with WSMS; and
(iii) transferred to the Plan from an Affiliated
Employer on or before January 1, 1998 or transfers to
the Plan from WSRC; and
(iv) retires before his Normal Retirement
active service on or before October 1, 1998,

Age

from

he shall be entitled to a monthly supplement (which
shall commence with the first Pension payment under
the Plan on account of such retirement and the last
payment shall be in the month preceding the Member’s
attainment of Normal Retirement Age) equal to the
following: [omitted] 2
“On

December

28,

2004,

the

Plan’s

benefits

committee

amended the Plan to eliminate § 4.12(a), which granted a $700
monthly

benefit

to

Plan

members

electing

retirement on or after January 1, 2005.”
at

313.

Later,

on

January

3,

2006,

to

take

early

Savani I, 474 F. App’x
the

benefits

committee

further amended the Plan, effective December 31, 2005 (“the 2005
Amendment”).
the

following

Among other things, the 2005 Amendment included
provision:

“Notwithstanding

2

anything

to

the

As discussed in our first opinion, § 4.12(b) of the Plan
sets forth an additional $200 benefit payable upon reaching
Normal Retirement Age.
The $200 benefit is not at issue for
purposes of the current appeal.
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contrary

in

this

‘frozen’

as

of

thereafter.”

Plan,

a

December

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Member’s
31,

Accrued

2005

and

Further, it provided:

Benefit

shall

not

shall

be

increase

“Notwithstanding anything

to the contrary in this Plan, effective December 31, 2005, no
additional Credited Service will be awarded or earned under the
Plan for any purpose.

In other words, all Credited Service will

be ‘frozen’ as of December 31, 2005.”

The 2005 Amendment also

“added the following sentence at the end” of § 1.13 of the Plan:
“Although

the

Employee

shall

accordance

Plan

with

is

frozen

continue
the

as

to

terms

of

earn
of

December
Eligibility

the

Plan

for

31,

2005,

an

Service

in

purposes

of

determining eligibility for certain benefits and eligibility for
a vested Pension.”
During the first appeal of this case, Savani successfully
challenged the 2004 elimination of § 4.12(a) as a violation of
ERISA’s anti-cutback provision.

See id. at 316 (“[W]e hold that

the Plan’s clear terms include the § 4.12(a) supplement in the
definition of accrued benefits.”).

The 2005 Amendment was not

directly at issue at that time.
Upon remand, the district court certified Savani’s case as
a class action.

Savani is the lead plaintiff for the class,

which is defined to be:
Employees of Washington Safety Management Solutions,
LLC,
formerly
Westinghouse
Safety
Management
Solutions, LLC [collectively “WSMS”] who (1) are
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members of the WSMS Plan, (2) have at least one year
of service with WSMS, and (3) transferred to the Plan
from an Affiliated Employer as defined in § 1.02 of
the Plan on or before January 1, 1998, or transferred
to the Plan from Washington Savannah River Company,
LLC, formerly, Westinghouse Savannah River Company,
LLC [collectively, “WSRC”].
During

the

course

of

the

district

court

proceedings,

WSMS

“opposed paying certain members of the above class who after
December 31, 2005 have or may have become eligible for § 4.12(a)
WSMS [Plan] benefits as related to freeze of benefits as of
December 31, 2005.”

The appellees therefore moved to add Taylor

as a party and subclass representative, and the district court
granted the motion.

Thus, Taylor is the lead plaintiff of the

subclass, which is defined to be:
All members of the Class defined above who, as of
December 21, 2005, either (1) did not have 15 total
years of service with WSMS or an Affiliated Employer
as defined in § 1.02 of the Plan, or (2) was not 50
years of age, or (3) did not meet the 25 years of
service and age 45 but less than 50 years of age
requirements for an Optional Retirement Pension as
defined in § 4.04 of the WSMS Plan.
On
summary

July

31,

judgment

2012,
on

the

the

parties

issue

of

filed

whether

cross
the

motions

2005

for

Amendment

resulted in the lawful elimination of the § 4.12(a) benefit for
Taylor and the members of the subclass.
parties’

motions,

the

district

court

In considering the

observed

that

the

2005

Amendment permitted Plan members to continue to earn Eligibility
Service years in order to determine the members’ “eligibility

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for certain benefits and eligibility for a vested Pension.”

In

light of the unambiguous language of the 2005 Amendment, as well
as

this

Circuit’s

§ 4.12(a)

prior

supplement

holding

violated

that

the

ERISA’s

elimination

anti-cutback

of

the

provision,

the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Taylor
and the subclass members and held that they are entitled to
receive the supplement.

WSMS subsequently filed a motion to

remand the matter to the Plan’s benefits committee, or in the
alternative, for the district court to reconsider its summary
judgment ruling.

WSMS argued that the district court had “erred

by not remanding the case back to the Committee for an initial
interpretation
argued

in

of

the

the

language

alternative

of

the

that

2005

the

Amendment.”

district

misconstrued the nature of the parties’ dispute.
court

denied

unambiguous

the

Plan

motion,
language,

reasoning
and

that

that

it

remand

court

It
had

The district

had
“would

interpreted
be

futile

because a different interpretation of this clear language would
be an abuse of the committee’s discretion.”

On December 13,

2013, WSMS timely filed this appeal.

II.
On appeal, the WSMS argues that Taylor and the members of
the subclass are not eligible for the § 4.12(a) benefit because
they did not satisfy the requisite eligibility requirements for
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the benefit prior to the effective date of the 2005 Amendment.
Alternatively, the WSMS argues that the district court erred by
failing to remand this matter to the Plan’s benefits committee.
A.
We
novo.

review

a

court’s

order

granting

summary

judgment

de

United McGill Corp. v. Stinnett, 154 F.3d 168, 170 (4th

Cir. 1998).

And “[i]n an appeal under ERISA, we . . . employ[]

the same standards governing the district court’s review of the
plan administrator’s decision.”
Co.,

609

F.3d

622,

629

(4th

Williams v. Metro. Life. Ins.
Cir.

2010).

Where

“the

plan

expressly grants the plan administrator discretionary authority
to

construe

the

provisions,

the

administrator’s

reviewed for abuse of discretion.”

decision

is

United McGill Corp., 154

F.3d at 170 (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101, 115 (1989)).

“Under this deferential standard, ‘the

administrator or fiduciary’s decision will not be disturbed if
it

is

reasonable,

different

even

conclusion

if

this

court

independently.’”

would
Id.

have

come

(quoting

Ellis

Metro. Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228, 232 (4th Cir. 1997)).
the

Plan

grants

the

benefits

committee

discretion to interpret the Plan.”

“total

and

to

a
v.

Here,

complete

But “even as an ERISA plan

confers discretion in its administrator to interpret the plan,
the administrator is not free to alter the terms of the plan or
to construe unambiguous terms other than as written.”
9

Colucci

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v. Agfa Corp. Severance Pay Plan, 431 F.3d 170, 176 (4th Cir.
2005), abrogated on other grounds by Champion v. Black & Decker
(U.S.), Inc., 550 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 2008).

The discretionary

authority to interpret a plan “is not implicated . . . [where]
the terms of the plan itself are clear.”

Kress v. Food Emp’rs

Labor Relations Ass’n, 391 F.3d 563, 567 (4th Cir. 2010).
B.
WSMS

argues

subclass

did

that

not

because

satisfy

Taylor

the

age

and
and

the

members

service

of

the

eligibility

requirements for the § 4.12(a) benefit prior to the effective
date

of

Thus,

the

the

2005

Amendment,

argument

goes,

they

the

never

elimination

accrued
of

the

the

benefit.

benefit

for

Taylor and the subclass does not constitute an unlawful cutback
of accrued benefits.

This argument does not square with our

previous holding in this case that the unambiguous language of
the Plan’s definition of accrued benefit includes the § 4.12(a)
benefit.

Savani I, 474 F. App’x at 315-16.

Under the law of the case doctrine, “when a court decides
upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the
same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.”

TFWS, Inc.

v. Franchot, 572 F.3d 186, 191 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting United
States

v.

Aramony,

166

F.3d

Accordingly,

10

655,

661

(4th

Cir.

1991)).

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once the decision of an appellate court establishes
the law of the case, it “must be followed in all
subsequent proceedings in the same case in the trial
court or on a later appeal [] unless:
(1) a
subsequent
trial
produces
substantially
different
evidence, (2) controlling authority has since made a
contrary decision of law applicable to the issue, or
(3) the prior decision was clearly erroneous and would
work manifest injustice.”
Id. (quoting Aramony, 166 F.3d at 661) (alteration in original).
Here,

the

parties

have

not

presented

substantially

different

evidence, we are aware of no new controlling authority, and WSMS
has not argued that our prior decision was clearly erroneous.
Therefore, our analysis must be guided by our prior holding that
the $700 monthly supplement set forth in § 4.12(a) of the Plan
is an accrued benefit.
There is no dispute that an employer sponsored retirement
plan

cannot

ERISA’s

eliminate

anti-cutback

Importantly,

“ERISA

an

“accrued

benefit”

provision.
defines

29

‘accrued

without

U.S.C.

benefit’

violating

§ 1054(g)(1).
as

‘. . .

the

employee’s accrued benefit determined under the plan and . . .
expressed in the form of an annual benefit commencing at normal
retirement age . . . .’”

Savani I, 474 F. App’x at 315 (quoting

26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(7)(A)(i) (2010)).

This statutory definition

of an accrued benefit is “a signpost, directing us to look at
the terms of the plan at issue.”

Bd. of Trs. of the Sheet Metal

Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Comm’r, 318 F.3d 599, 602-03 (4th
Cir.

2003)

(emphasis

added).

As
11

we

previously

held,

the

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§ 4.12(a) benefit is an accrued benefit.
at 316.

Savani I, 474 F. App’x

Because Taylor and the members of the subclass can or

already do satisfy the requisite eligibility requirements for
the

§ 4.12(a)

benefit,

WSMS

may

not

lawfully

eliminate

that

benefit as to Taylor and the subclass.
WSMS argues that Taylor and the members of the subclass had
a

mere,

unprotected

benefit

because

requirements

expectation

they

prior

did

to

not

of

receiving

satisfy

December

31,

the

2005.

the

age
In

§ 4.12(a)

and

service

advancing

this

argument, WSMS relies heavily on the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling
in Cinotto v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 674 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir.
2012).

There, part of the Delta retirement plan definition of

“Accrued Benefit” stated:
No Participant shall have an Accrued Benefit based on
future or projected service or Earnings regardless of
the use of future dates by the Plan.
Such future
dates and the result of projected service on future
Earnings on a Participant’s potential retirement
benefit are not part of the Participant’s Accrued
Benefit.
Cinotto, 674 F.3d at 1287-88.
this

case,

provided:
Plan

are

froze

pension

The Delta plan, like the Plan in

benefits

with

an

amendment

that

“Effective December 31, 2005, all benefits under the
frozen

for

all

Participants

and

there

shall

be

no

further accruals of benefits under this plan after that date.”
Id. at 1289.
of

the

The amendment “also added this language to the end

[Delta]

Plan’s

definition
12

of

‘Accrued

Benefit’:

‘A

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Participant shall not accrue any additional benefits under the
Plan after December 31, 2005.’”

Id.

Under the amendment, “no

additional months of service or earnings would be taken into
account

in

calculating

either

[an

employee’s]

termination benefit under the [Delta] Plan.”

retirement

Id.

or

As a result

of the Delta plan language, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
plaintiff, who had not reached the age required to receive the
benefit

at

issue

before

December

expectation of a future accrual.”

31,

2005,

“had

at

most

an

Id. at 1297.

Unlike the amendment to the Delta plan, the 2005 Amendment
to the Plan at issue here explicitly incorporated future service
into the calculation of an accrued benefit.
Amendment

stated

Eligibility
certain

that

Service

benefits,”

Plan

years

members
“to

including

would

Indeed, the 2005
continue

determin[e]

the

to

eligibility

§ 4.12(a)

benefit.

earn
for
The

unambiguous terms of the Plan provide that Eligibility Service
years

determine

whether

a

Member

“otherwise

satisfies

the

requirements for a Pension under this Plan” such that he becomes
eligible for the § 4.12(a) $700 supplement. 3

Accordingly, the

appellants’ reliance on Cinotto -- which involved a pension plan

3

Pensions include, for example, the normal retirement
pension set forth in Plan § 4.01, the early retirement pension
set forth in Plan § 4.03, and the optional retirement pension
set forth in Plan § 4.04.
Each of these pensions references
“Eligibility Service.”
13

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with a materially different definition of an “accrued benefit” - is misplaced.

See Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v.

Comm’r, 318 F.3d at 602-03 (stating that courts “look at the
terms of the plan at issue”).
WSMS

also

argues

remanded

this

matter

reference

to

“certain

that
to

the

the

district

benefits

benefits”

in

“Eligibility Service” is ambiguous.
that

it

is

unclear

whether

court

should

committee

the

Plan’s

have

because

the

definition

of

Specifically, WSMS contends

the

term

“certain

benefits”

encompasses the § 4.12(a) benefit.

This argument is unavailing.

Before

definition

the

2005

Amendment,

the

of

“Eligibility

Service” included a single reference to “certain benefits,” and
the

2005

Amendment

benefits.”

added

a

second

reference

to

“certain

It is undisputed that the single, pre-2005 Amendment

reference to “certain benefits” included the § 4.12(a) benefit.
To credit WSMS’s ambiguity argument would require a finding that
the second use of the phrase means something different than the
first.
term

There is no valid reason for the two uses of the same

within

the

same

Rather,

the

language

members

may

continue

definition
of
to

the
earn

2005

to

have

different

Amendment

Eligibility

is

clear:

Service

certain benefits, including the § 4.12(a) benefit.

meanings.

years

Plan
for

The benefits

committee’s discretion is not implicated given the unambiguous
language

of

the

amendment.

Kress,
14

391

F.2d

at

567.

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Accordingly, it was not error for the district court to decline
to remand the matter.
Somewhat relatedly, WSMS argues that “Fourth Circuit law is
clear that an ERISA plan participant is ‘required’ to exhaust
his/her

administrative

contends

that

challenged

the

the

remedies

original

meaning

of

before

lead

bringing

plaintiff,

‘certain

benefits’

suit.”

Savani,
of

It
“never

‘Eligibility

Service’ in the Freeze Amendment,” and that “Taylor has never
made

any

claim

to

the”

benefits

committee.

Therefore,

WSMS

continues, because the district court’s summary judgment ruling
involved

the

interpretation

of

the

Plan’s

terms,

the

court

should have first remanded the matter to the benefits committee
for it to interpret the Plan in the first instance.

We need not

decide whether any procedural error has occurred.

In reaching

its decision, the district court did not engage in any novel
interpretation of the Plan’s language.

Rather, the law of this

case is that the Plan’s definition of accrued benefit includes
the § 4.12(a) benefit, and as discussed above, the term “certain
benefits”

unambiguously

encompasses

the

§ 4.12(a)

benefit.

Thus, the benefits committee’s authority to interpret the Plan
is not implicated.

See Kress, 391 F.2d at 567.

Finally, although the parties devote a substantial amount
of their briefing to whether the § 4.12(a) benefit is an “early
retirement benefit” as that term is defined in the applicable
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regulations, we need not resolve the issue.

Regardless of how

the benefit is characterized from a statutory perspective, the
fact remains -- however much WSMS might wish to deny it –- that
the

specific

language

of

the

WSMS

Plan

incorporates

the

§ 4.12(a) benefit into the definition of “accrued benefit.”

And

“[w]hile we have held that unfunded, contingent early retirement
benefits or severance payments are not secured by ERISA itself,
the

drafters

benefits

as

of

a

accrued

protections.”

retirement
or

plan

vested,

may

and

choose

thereby

to

define

trigger

any

ERISA’s

Savani I., 474 F. App’x at 314 n.3 (citing Pierce

v. Sec. Trust Life Ins. Co., 979, F.2d 23 (4th Cir. 1992)); see
id. at 316 (“Stand-alone, ancillary welfare benefits generally
are not independently protected by ERISA.

Here, however, the

Plan plainly incorporated . . . [§ 4.12(a)] into its definition
of ‘accrued benefit.’” (citation omitted)).
the

choice

to

include

the

§ 4.12(a)

benefit

Because WSMS made
as

part

of

the

Plan’s accrued benefit, it is protected under the anti-cutback
provision of ERISA.

The WSMS must accept the consequences of

that choice.

III.
We reaffirm our holding that the Plan’s clear terms include
the § 4.12(a) supplement in the definition of “accrued benefit.”
Taylor and the subclass members are thus entitled to receive
16

Appeal: 13-2512

that

Doc: 29

benefit

Filed: 11/17/2014

so

Pg: 17 of 17

long

satisfy

as

they

the

age

and

requirements if and when they elect early retirement.

service
For the

foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

17