US v. Juan Deras-Lovo
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:12-cr-00375-LMB-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999206800].. [13-4102]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4102
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JUAN JOSE DERAS-LOVO, a/k/a Richard Chacon Melgar, a/k/a
Juan Jose Lovo, a/k/a Jaun Jose Lovo, a/k/a Juan Jose
Lovo-Deras, a/k/a Juan Richard Chacon Melgar,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Leonie M. Brinkema,
District Judge. (1:12-cr-00375-LMB-1)
Submitted:
September 20, 2013
Decided:
October 2, 2013
Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Joshua Paulson,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. Platt, Appellate
Attorney,
Alexandria,
Virginia,
for
Appellant.
Julia
K.
Martinez, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Juan Jose Deras-Lovo appeals from his conviction and
twenty-four month sentence, entered pursuant to his guilty plea
to
illegal
aggravated
pursuant
reentry
after
felony.
to
being
deported
On
v.
Anders
appeal,
counsel
California,
subsequent
has
386
filed
U.S.
738
to
a
an
brief
(1967),
concluding that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but
questioning
whether
the
substantively reasonable.
has filed a brief.
sentence
is
procedurally
and
Neither Deras-Lovo nor the Government
We affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
abuse of discretion standard.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330,
335 (4th Cir. 2009).
for
“significant
calculate
(or
In so doing, we first examine the sentence
procedural
improperly
error,”
including
calculating)
the
“failing
Guidelines
to
range,
treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the
[18
U.S.C.]
based
on
§ 3553(a)
clearly
[(2006)]
erroneous
explain the chosen sentence.”
factors,
facts,
or
selecting
failing
a
sentence
to
adequately
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
We presume
on appeal that a sentence within a properly calculated advisory
Guidelines range is reasonable.
United States v. Allen, 491
F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007); see Rita v. United States, 551
2
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U.S. 338, 346-56 (2007) (upholding presumption of reasonableness
for within-Guidelines sentence).
Counsel
first
questions
whether
the
district
court
provided an adequate explanation for Deras-Lovo’s sentence.
district
range,
court
properly
responded
to
calculated
the
parties’
explained the chosen sentence.
F.3d
325,
330
(4th
Cir.
the
advisory
arguments,
and
The
Guidelines
sufficiently
See United States v. Carter, 564
2009)
(district
court
must
conduct
individualized assessment based on the particular facts of each
case, whether sentence is above, below, or within the Guidelines
range).
The court recognized Deras-Lovo’s main argument that
the United States was the only home he had ever known when
granting
him
a
departure
for
cultural
assimilation.
In
addition, the court explicitly noted that it declined to give a
variance
sentence
based
behavior
and
fact
the
deportation.
We
upon
that
conclude
Deras-Lovo’s
he
that
paid
there
no
repeated
heed
was
to
no
criminal
his
error
prior
in
the
district court’s explanation of the given sentence.
If we find a sentence procedurally reasonable, we also
must
given
examine
the
the
substantive
totality
of
the
reasonableness
of
circumstances.
the
United
sentence
States
v.
Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2012).
A sentencing court
must
not
“impose
necessary,
to
a
sentence
comply
sufficient,
with
the
3
but
purposes
greater
set
forth
than
in
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[§ 3553(a)(2)].”
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18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Even if we would reach a
different sentencing result, this fact alone is insufficient to
justify
reversal
of
the
district
court.
United
States
v.
Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 474 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Here,
counsel
avers
that
Deras-Lovo’s
sentence
was
substantively unreasonable because the illegal reentry guideline
is fundamentally flawed.
First, Deras-Lovo contends that his
sentence was unreasonably high due to his marijuana conviction
being used both to increase his offense level and to calculate
his criminal history score.
He also avers that his marijuana
conviction is not as serious as other crimes that would trigger
the twelve-level increase.
As such, Deras-Lovo concludes that
the twelve-level increase in his offense level resulted in a
Guidelines range which exceeded that which was necessary to do
justice in his case.
However, we have held that use of a prior conviction
to
increase
both
permissible
for
the
the
felony conviction.
offense
offense
level
of
and
reentry
criminal
by
an
history
alien
after
is
a
United States v. Crawford, 18 F.3d 1173,
1179 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding it is not impermissible double
counting
to
characteristic
§ 2L1.2(b)
treat
prior
under
(2012)
and
felony
U.S.
to
as
Sentencing
count
4
it
in
a
specific
offense
Guidelines
Manual
calculating
criminal
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history,
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where
criminal
prior
history
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offense
points
accounted
and
for
six
sixteen-level
of
twelve
enhancement).
Further, there was no substantive error in correctly calculating
the offense level based upon Deras-Lovo’s marijuana conviction.
See United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir.
2006) (finding that, even in light of significant sentencing
disparities, failure to impose below-Guidelines sentence was not
substantively unreasonable given totality of the circumstances).
Next,
Deras-Lovo
contends
that
his
sentence
was
substantively unreasonable because it was longer than necessary
to deter him, as his longest prior sentence was only twelve
months.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion.
almost
Deras-Lovo illegally reentered the United States
immediately
after
being
deported.
Thus,
it
was
reasonable to believe that a substantially longer sentence was
necessary to deter him from reentering again.
Moreover, the
district court did not base its sentence entirely on deterrence,
as it also noted the nature and circumstances of Deras-Lovo’s
offense and his criminal history.
Finally,
Deras-Lovo
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553.
asserts
that
his
sentence
was
substantively unreasonable because the district court’s reliance
on
USSG
§ 2L1.2
was
erroneous.
Specifically,
Deras-Lovo
contends that a sentence based upon § 2L1.2 is not entitled to a
presumption
of
reasonableness
in
5
this
court
because
the
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deportation
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enhancement
is
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not
based
on
empirical
data
as
required by Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 110 (2007)
(holding that district court may vary from the Guidelines based
on policy disagreements).
The Kimbrough opinion, however, did
not require district courts to consider the presence or absence
of
empirical
data
underlying
the
Guidelines,
see
United
States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 101-02 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied,
133
courts
to
sentences
S.
Ct.
274
discard
the
“based
on
(2012),
nor
did
presumption
of
non-empirically
it
permit
appellate
reasonableness
grounded
for
Guidelines.”
United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 366-67 (5th
Cir. 2009).
Here,
while
the
district
court
did
not
explicitly
address Deras-Lovo’s Kimbrough argument, * the court considered
his criminal history, his current crime, and his lack of ties to
El Salvador and found that, while a departure was warranted for
cultural
assimilation,
appropriate.
The
fact
a
within-Guidelines
that
the
relevant
range
sentence
Guidelines
are
was
not
“empirically-based” does not provide a basis to second guess the
district
court’s
conclusion
that
*
a
Guidelines
sentence
was
This argument was raised in Deras-Lovo’s motion for a
departure based on cultural assimilation, which was granted,
although not to the extent sought by Deras-Lovo. Deras-Lovo did
not reargue this issue at the sentencing hearing when seeking a
variance sentence.
6
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appropriate.
See
Pg: 7 of 7
Mondragon-Santiago,
564
F.3d
at
367.
Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it relied on USSG § 2L1.2.
Pursuant to Anders, we have examined the record for
any
meritorious
affirm
issue
Deras-Lovo’s
and
have
conviction
found
and
none.
Accordingly,
sentence.
This
we
court
requires that counsel inform Deras-Lovo in writing of his right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review.
If Deras-Lovo requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel
may
move
representation.
was
served
on
this
court
for
leave
to
withdraw
from
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
Deras-Lovo.
We
dispense
with
oral
argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
7
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