US v. Stanley Partman

Filing

UNPUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:11-cr-02063-JFA-10 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999341983].. [13-4212]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4212

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
STANLEY D. PARTMAN, a/k/a Goat,
Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District
Judge. (3:11-cr-02063-JFA-10)

Argued:

March 19, 2014

Decided:

April 23, 2014

Before DUNCAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion.
Judge Duncan
opinion, in which Judge Wynn and Judge Diaz joined.

wrote

the

ARGUED: Casper Fredric Marcinak, III, SMITH MOORE LEATHERWOOD,
LLP, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Robert Frank
Daley, Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: William N. Nettles,
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:
Appellant

Stanley

Partman

appeals

the

district

court’s

denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, denial of his
motion

for

a

new

trial,

and

application

of

obstruction of justice sentencing enhancement.

a

two-level

For the reasons

that follow, we affirm.

I.
From 1996 to 2011, Partman supplied and distributed cocaine
and crack cocaine as a member of a drug trafficking conspiracy
operating

out

conspiracy,

of

Columbia,

Partman’s

South

Carolina.

coconspirators

included,

During
among

this

others,

Donnay Rickard, Rondeal Woods, and Anthony Thompson.

In March

of

cellular

2011,

the

FBI

obtained

a

wiretap

for

Rickard’s

telephone that produced recordings of numerous phone calls among
Rickard,
include

Partman,
Partman’s

and

their

statements

coconspirators.
to

Rickard

that

The
he

recordings
possessed

firearm and intended to kill Woods for selling bad cocaine.

a
In

August of 2011, Partman was indicted for several violations of
the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, et seq., 1 and
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
1

Partman challenges his convictions under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841,
843, and 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2 only indirectly through his
appeal of the denial of his motion for a new trial.

2

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crime

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in

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violation

of

18

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U.S.C.

§

924(c).

proceeded to trial on five counts.

Partman’s

case

We recount the relevant

portions of the trial below.
A.
At jury selection, Partman appeared before the potential
jurors in a collared button-down shirt provided by his attorney
and

slippers

Partman

did

and

pants

object

not

red

to

issued
his

by

attire

his
or

detention
request

civilian clothing be provided at that time.

center.

that

other

However, nearly a

month later, just before trial, Partman sought to disqualify the
jury,

alleging

that

the

jurors

could

not

be

impartial

result of his appearance before them in prison attire.

as

a

After

interviewing the jury, the district court dismissed two jurors
who recalled Partman’s jury selection attire with specificity.
Juror

129

J.A.

140,

remembered
and

Partman’s

Juror

132

“orange

remembered

his

correctional issued” pants, J.A. 147.
211, had

no

affirmative

recollection

or

reddish”
“court

jumpsuit,
issued

A third juror, number
and

in

response

to

court’s question asked “[w]as it something orange maybe?”
142.

Partman

argued

that

the

or

third

juror

should

the
J.A.

also

be

dismissed, and that because there were no remaining alternates,
the jury

should

be

disqualified.

Partman’s motion.

3

The

district

court

denied

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To support its 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) charge at trial, the
government sought to establish that Partman had attempted to
shoot Woods for selling him bad cocaine in March of 2011.

The

government presented Partman’s admission that he possessed two
firearms during the relevant period, the testimony of multiple
witnesses that Partman had threatened to kill Woods, a witness’s
testimony
entered

that

someone

Woods’s

matching

barbershop

Partman’s

looking

for

description

Woods,

and

had

wiretap

recordings in which Partman stated that he was in possession of
a

firearm

and

was

attempting

to

find

and

kill

Woods.

The

government did not submit any evidence that a firearm belonging
to Partman had been recovered or that any witness had actually
seen Partman with a firearm during the relevant period.

On the

basis of this evidence, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt
that

Partman

possessed

a

firearm

in

furtherance

of

drug

trafficking activities.
During the course of the trial, Partman, who did not take
the stand, spoke directly to the jury in open court.

After the

jurors were sworn, Partman interjected “I do not want this guy
to represent me because he said...it would not be in my best
interest.
because

he’s

appointed
Partman

And he says he’s not going to represent me fully
not

him.”

and

getting
J.A.

explained

paid

156.
to

him

enough

The

district

several
4

because

times

court
that

the

[c]ourt

reprimanded
he

was

not

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permitted

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to

address

proceedings.

the

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jury

or

otherwise

interrupt

the

However, Partman subsequently spoke to the jury

again, stating “Jury they won’t let me tell you what I want to - in this case--.”
district

court

J.A. 680.

removed

As a result of his outbursts, the

Partman

remainder of the trial.

from

J.A. 692.

the

courtroom

for

the

The jury convicted Partman

on all counts.
B.
After

his

conviction,

a

probation

officer

attempted

interview Partman to prepare the pre-sentence report.

to

Partman

was nonresponsive, and the parties requested that Dr. Thomas
Martin,
before

the

forensic

trial,

psychiatrist

reassess

his

who

had

competency.

cooperate with Dr. Martin’s evaluation.

examined

Partman

Partman

refused

to

As a result, Dr. Martin

testified at sentencing that he relied on an interview with one
of Partman’s correctional officers and recordings of Partman’s
prison telephone calls to assess his competency.
concluded that Partman was competent.
in-court

disruptions

conviction

process,

and
the

On the basis of Partman’s

noncompliance

district

Dr. Martin

court

during
imposed

the
a

post-

two-level

enhancement for obstruction of justice.
Partman
imprisonment.

was

sentenced

to

He timely appealed.

5

a

total

of

396

months’

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II.
“We review the district court's denial of a motion for a
new trial under an abuse of discretion standard.”

United States

v. Wilson, 624 F.3d 640, 660 (4th Cir. 2010).

The district

court

a

“should

exercise

its

discretion

to

award

new

trial

sparingly, and a jury verdict is not to be overturned except in
the rare circumstance when the evidence weighs heavily against
it.”

United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 217 (4th Cir. 2006)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
“We review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence de
novo.”

United States v. Kelly, 510 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir.

2007).

We must find that the “evidence adequately supports a

conviction if, viewing it in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 234 (4th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
We review criminal sentences for reasonableness using an
abuse of discretion standard.
38, 51 (2007).
for

clear

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.

We review the district court’s factual findings

error

and

its

legal

conclusions

de

novo.

United

States v. Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 292 (4th Cir. 2012).

“A

district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or
irrationally,

fails

to

consider
6

judicially

recognized

factors

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constraining

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its

exercise

of

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discretion,

relies

on

erroneous

factual or legal premises, or commits an error of law.”

United

States v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468, 470 (4th Cir. 2007).

III.
On appeal, Partman contends that a new trial was required
because his appearance in prison-issued clothing prejudiced the
jury,

acquittal

was

required

because

there

was

insufficient

evidence to support his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction, and that
the

sentencing

enhancement

was

unwarranted

because

his

noncompliance and in-court disruptions did not rise to the level
of obstruction of justice.

We consider each issue in turn.
A.

We first address Partman’s appeal of the district court’s
denial of his motion for a new trial.

Partman argues that his

Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial was violated because
the jury was not disqualified after he appeared before it in
detention

center-issued

clothing.

Partman

contends

that

one

juror who remembered his attire was improperly allowed to remain
after the district court questioned the jury members about their
recollections
contends

that

and

excused

Partman

two

other

waived

his

jurors.
right

to

The
have

government
the

jury

disqualified because he waited for nearly a month after jury
selection, until the eve of trial, to make his motion.
7

It

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argues

in

Partman

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the

failed

alternative
to

show

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that

actual

if

the

issue

prejudice

was

preserved,

resulting

from

his

appearance in prison-issued clothing.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Partman’s motion for a new trial because as a matter of law it
did not err by impaneling the jury.
went

above

Partman’s

and
right

In fact, the district court

beyond

what

was

to

fair

trial.

a

required
The

of

it

to

secure

“particular

evil

proscribed” by Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), the
controlling Supreme Court precedent, is “compelling a defendant,
against his will, to be tried in jail attire.”

Id. at 508.

When a defendant is represented by counsel, the burden is on the
defendant,

not

the

defendant’s attire.

court,

to

raise

an

objection

to

the

See id. at 511-12.

Therefore, contrary to Partman’s contention, the relevant
inquiry

is

not

whether

the

defendant

was

seen

by

potential

jurors in prison clothing, but instead, whether he was required
by the government to appear in prison clothing.

In this case,

it is clear on the face of the record that there was no such
compulsion.
provided

by

Partman
his

was

attorney

permitted
to

jury

8

to

wear

a

selection.

civilian
There

shirt
is

no

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evidence in the record, nor does Partman contend in his briefs, 2
that he would not have been permitted to wear other pants and
shoes as well had he requested them or had his attorney provided
them.

Furthermore, Partman did not object to the fact that he

was wearing prison issued clothing prior to appearing before the
potential jury.

The district court was under no obligation to

determine if this was an intentional choice, mere indifference,
or lack of preparation.
Because neither the government nor the district court was
responsible for the fact that Partman appeared before the jury
in prison attire, the district court did not err by refusing to
disqualify the jury and did not abuse its discretion by denying
Partman’s motion for a new trial.
B.
We
motion

turn
for

next

to

judgment

Partman’s
of

appeal

acquittal.

of

the

Partman

denial

argues

of

his

that

the

evidence presented to the jury was insufficient as a matter of
law to support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) because
there was no indication that he possessed a firearm in a manner
2

Partman states in both his Opening and Reply briefs that
he appeared at jury selection in prison clothes “through no
fault of his own.”
Appellant’s Br. 12; Reply Br. 6.
However,
he does not claim that he was instructed to wear his detention
center jumpsuit or that he requested other clothing, and the
district court was not obligated to take action on his behalf to
secure other clothing.

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that

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furthered

any

illegal

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activity.

He

contends

that

no

evidence established his possession during any particular event,
and that no evidence was offered to establish any of the factors
identified in United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701 (4th Cir.
2002).
The

government

contends

that

it

presented

sufficient

evidence to allow the jury to conclude that Partman possessed a
semiautomatic weapon that he intended to, and in at least one
case attempted to, use to threaten or kill his coconspirator
Woods.

It argues that this possession was established at trial

by Partman’s admissions and corroborated by witness testimony. 3
To convict under the possession prong of § 924(c), the jury
must

find

possessed

beyond
a

a

reasonable

firearm,

and

(2)

doubt

that

that

the

the

defendant

possession

furtherance of a drug crime or other crime of violence.
States v. Jeffers, 570 F.3d 557, 565 (4th Cir. 2009).

was

(1)
in

United
To prove

that a firearm was possessed in furtherance of a drug crime, the
government must “present evidence indicating that the possession

3

Partman states in his Opening Brief that the audiotapes
containing
his
purported
admissions
were
“questionable.”
Appellant’s Br. 8.
He does not, however, elaborate on this
assertion or argue that his conviction should be overturned on
the basis of improperly admitted evidence. Any argument Partman
could have made to exclude the audiotape evidence is therefore
waived.
IGEN Int’l, Inc. v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, 335 F.3d
303, 308 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A).

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of

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a

firearm

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furthered,

trafficking crime.”

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advanced,

or

helped

Lomax, 293 F.3d at 705.

forward

a

drug

When making this

determination:
the fact finder is free to consider the numerous ways
in which a firearm might further or advance drug
trafficking.
For example, a gun could provide a
defense against someone trying to steal drugs or drug
profits, or it might lessen the chance that a robbery
would even be attempted.
Additionally, a gun might
enable a drug trafficker to ensure that he collects
during a drug deal.
And a gun could serve as
protection in the event that a deal turns sour. Or it
might prevent a transaction from turning sour in the
first place. Furthermore, a firearm could help a drug
trafficker defend his turf by deterring others from
operating in the same area.
Id.

Whether a firearm “served such a purpose is ultimately a

factual question.”
jury

may

Id.

“consider

both

When making that determination, the
circumstantial

as

well

as

direct

evidence, and a conviction may rely entirely on circumstantial
evidence.”
2011).

United States v. Bonner, 648 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir.

Furthermore, “a firearm need not be seized to sustain a

§ 924(c) conviction.”

Jeffers, 570 F.3d at 566 n.6.

The basis for Partman’s conviction is unusual because no
firearm was recovered and no witness testified to seeing Partman
with a firearm in any relevant instance.

However, under the

particular

highly

facts

of

this

sufficiency-of-the-evidence

case

and

standard,

our
we

conclude that the jury’s verdict was proper.

11

are

deferential

constrained

to

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As an initial matter, Partman’s contention that the proof
was insufficient because the government was unable to adduce
evidence related to several of the factors articulated in Lomax
is meritless.
jury

might

In Lomax, we stated that among the factors the
find

helpful

in

determining

whether

the

in

furtherance requirement has been satisfied are:
[T]he type of drug activity that is being conducted,
accessibility of the firearm, the type of weapon,
whether the weapon is stolen, the status of the
possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the gun is
loaded, proximity to drugs or drug profits, and the
time and circumstances under which the gun is found.
293 F.3d at 705 (quoting United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218
F.3d 409, 414-15 (5th Cir. 2000)).

Partman argues that his

conviction cannot stand because no evidence was presented to
establish where or when his firearm was found or what condition
it

was

etc.). 4

in
It

(easily
is

accessible,

clear,

however,

loaded,
that

illegally

these

factors

possessed,
can

only

reasonably be considered when a firearm is seized, and as we
held in Jeffers, a possession conviction can be sustained even
if no firearm is recovered.
As discussed below, Partman’s conviction does not rely in
any

way
4

on

seizure

Partman
type of drug
meritless in
trafficking in

or

physical

evidence

of

a

firearm,

and

also asserts that there was no evidence of the
activity being conducted, but this is clearly
light of the overwhelming evidence of cocaine
the record.

12

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accordingly
concluded

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the

physical

Partman

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attributes

possessed

are

of

the

simply

firearm

the

irrelevant.

jury
Lomax

accounts for the possibility that the factors it recites might
not be applicable to a particular case.

We explicitly stated in

Lomax that “there are many factors that might lead a fact finder
to

conclude”

connected

to

that

a

his

defendant’s

drug

possession

trafficking

of

activity

a

firearm

and

that

was

those

factors “may include, but are not limited to” those stated in
the opinion.

293 F.3d at 705.

In light of the flexibility of

the standard and the irrelevance of the particular facts that
Partman claims are necessary, the government’s failure to prove
them to the jury cannot invalidate Partman’s conviction.
More generally, there is substantial evidence in the record
before us to allow a rational juror to conclude that Partman’s
conduct

violated

§

924(c)

on

these

facts.

At

trial,

the

government presented Partman’s admission that he possessed two
firearms

in

trafficking

March

of

2011

activities.

and
J.A.

that

he

558-61.

was
It

engaged
also

in

drug

presented

recordings of several phone calls in which Partman admitted that
he was currently in possession of a firearm and was attempting
to locate Woods in order to shoot him as a result of a bad drug

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transaction.
including

263-64 5;

J.A.

Rickard

and

Pg: 14 of 20

265 6;

Thompson,

268 7.

Several

testified

that

witnesses,

Partman

had

admitted to possessing a firearm and had repeatedly threatened
to shoot Woods because of Woods’s sale of bad cocaine.
Because

Partman

does

not

challenge

the

authenticity

or

admissibility of the recorded evidence or witness testimony on
appeal, his sufficiency argument is more accurately understood
as a claim that the jury should have adopted his interpretation
of the facts instead of the government’s version.
that

the

evidence

actually

supports

his

claim

that

He argues
he

never

brought a firearm into Woods’s barbershop 8 and that his recorded
statements
assuming

to
that

his

coconspirators

Partman’s

were

explanation

is

mere

puffery.

plausible,

“if

Even
the

5

“I told him I’d come catch him at the barbershop.
I’m
going to do him.
Chopper is in the truck right now.
Looking
for him.
I rode by the barbershop again and that MF ain’t
there.”
6

“Whenever I see you, I’m going to shoot that – whenever I
see him, I’m going to shoot him, period.”
7

“I’m gonna shoot that boy if I see him.
chopper in the truck with me right now.”
8

I done got my

We note that the parties’ focus on whether Partman
actually brought a firearm into Woods’s barbershop is misplaced.
Partman was convicted under the possession prong of 924(c), not
the use or carrying prong. As described above, under Lomax, the
contours of the in furtherance requirement for possession are
broad.
While an actual armed confrontation or attempted
confrontation would be sufficient to satisfy this prong, it is
not necessary.

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evidence

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supports

different,

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reasonable

interpretations,

the

jury decides which interpretation to believe,” and we are not
entitled to reweigh that evidence.
F.3d 143, 148 (4th Cir. 1994).
credit

the

testimony

of

United States v. Murphy, 35

The jury was clearly entitled to

the

coconspirator

witnesses

and

Partman’s own admissions if it found them to be convincing.

See

Bonner, 648 F.3d at 213 (“In assessing the evidence, the jury's
resolution

of

all

evidentiary

conflicts

determinations must be given deference.”).

and

credibility

It is equally clear

that Partman’s admitted attempt to use a firearm to threaten or
kill a coconspirator for providing bad cocaine to a drug dealing
conspiracy satisfies both the possession and nexus requirements
explained in Lomax.
In

sum,

given

the

deference

accorded

credibility

determinations and viewed in the light most favorable to the
government, we find that the facts here, including Partman’s own
words,
verdict.

provide

sufficient

evidentiary

support

for

the

jury

We stress the circumstances presented here to indicate

the extent to which we rely on them in the absence of physical
evidence of the firearm itself or direct eyewitness observation
of the violation.
C.
Finally, we turn to Partman’s sentencing claim.

Partman

argues that the district court’s application of the obstruction
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of justice enhancement was procedurally unreasonable because (1)
courts typically only apply the enhancement when cases actually
cannot continue to resolution, (2) his conduct caused only minor
interruptions to the proceedings because his disruptions were
quickly resolved, and (3) the district court did not find that
Partman’s

obstructive

actions

were

willful.

The

government

contends that the enhancement was warranted by the uncontested
facts on the record.

It also argues that Partman waived any

objection he might have had to the district court’s reliance on
his

malingering

enhancement

and

because

he

feigned
failed

incompetence
to

raise

to

that

support

argument

the

in

his

opening brief.

Finally, the government contends that if there

was

it

any

error

explicitly
sentence

stated

if

the

was
that

harmless
it

would

enhancement

had

because
have
not

the

given

district

Partman

applied.

the

Neither

court
same
party

challenges the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. 9
We need not decide on the merits of Partman’s objections to
dispose

of

“‘procedural

this
errors

issue.
at

As

the

sentencing...are

government
routinely

indicates,
subject

to

harmlessness review’” and we “may assume that a sentencing error

9

Although Partman argues in his Reply brief that the
sentence was substantively unreasonable, he waived this argument
by failing to raise it in his opening brief.
See IGEN Int’l,
335 F.3d at 308 (4th Cir. 2003); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A).

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occurred and proceed to examine whether the error affected the
sentence imposed.”

United States v. Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156, 161

(4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129,
141 (2009)).

A sentencing error is harmless “if the resulting

sentence was not longer than that to which [the defendant] would
otherwise be subject.”
283 (4th Cir. 2010).

United States v. Mehta, 594 F.3d 277,
Assuming error in certain cases allows us

“to avoid the ‘empty formality’ of an unnecessary remand where
it is clear that an asserted guideline miscalculation did not
affect the ultimate sentence.”
The

“assumed

error

Hargrove, 701 F.3d at 163.

harmlessness

inquiry

‘requires

(1)

knowledge that the district court would have reached the same
result even if it had decided the guidelines issue the other
way,

and

(2)

a

determination

that

the

sentence

would

be

reasonable even if the guidelines issue had been decided in the
defendant’s

favor.’”

Id.

at

162

(quoting

United

States

v.

Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d 119, 123 (4th Cir. 2011)) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).

An explicit statement

that the district court would have applied the same sentence
absent a particular sentencing enhancement is not required to
satisfy the first step of this analysis, but in this case the
district

court

provided

exactly

that.

At

sentencing,

the

district court stated that “[f]or all these reasons, as well as
those

I

have

outlined

previously,
17

I

find

that

the

sentence

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imposed in this case, 396 months, is the correct sentence even
if the obstruction of justice enhancement had not been imposed
in the case.” 10

J.A. 767.

An explicit statement by the district

court satisfies the first step of the inquiry and renders the
substantive

reasonableness

of

the

sentence

dispositive.

See

Hargrove, 701 F.3d at 163.
The

district

court

sentenced

Partman

to

a

term

of

imprisonment of 396 months, based on a criminal history category
of II, a total offense level of 40, including the two-level
obstruction enhancement, and the 60 month consecutive sentence
mandated
guideline

by

Partman’s

range

for

18

an

U.S.C.

offense

§

924(c)

level

of

conviction.
38

history category of II is 262 to 327 months.

and

a

The

criminal

With the addition

of the mandatory 60 month sentence, but without the two-level
enhancement,

the

highest

within-guidelines

sentence

that

the

district court could have imposed on Partman is 387 months, 9
months less than the sentence actually imposed.
“In reviewing any sentence, ‘whether inside, just outside,
or

significantly

outside

the

Guidelines

10

range,’

we

apply

a

The district court’s reasons as recounted at sentencing
were the particular egregiousness of the drug trafficking
activities, including the 14 year duration of the conspiracy,
the significant volume of drugs, Partman’s possession of
firearms, and his use of those firearms to threaten people in
the course of his drug trafficking. J.A. 766-67.

18

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‘deferential

Filed: 04/23/2014

abuse-of-discretion

Pg: 19 of 20

standard.’”

Savillon-Matute,

636 F.3d at 122 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 41).
to

presume

that

a

correctly

calculated

sentence is reasonable on appeal.

within-guidelines

United States v. Mendoza-

Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
sentence

exceeds

the

guidelines

We are entitled

range,

we

However, when a
“may

consider

the

extent of the deviation [from the guidelines range], but must
give due deference to the district court’s decision that the §
3553(a) factors on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.”
Hargrove, 701 F.3d at 163-64 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
A finding of substantive reasonableness is warranted when
the

“record

reflects

that

the

district

court

conducted

a

thorough individualized assessment of [the defendant] and his
offense conduct in light of the [3553(a)] factors.”

Id. at 164.

In this case it is clear that the district court undertook such
an

assessment,

finding

that

Partman’s

conduct,

including

his

dealing over 50 kilograms of cocaine and crack, engaging in a
high-speed chase with the police, and using a semi-automatic
weapon

in

connection

elevated sentence.

with

his

drug

trafficking

warranted

an

The court also considered Partman’s minimal

criminal history, difficult upbringing, and the need to avoid
sentencing disparities with codefendants as possible mitigating
factors.
acceptance

Finally it considered Partman’s lack of remorse or
of

responsibility.

See
19

generally

18

U.S.C.

§

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3553(a).

Filed: 04/23/2014

Pg: 20 of 20

Considering the district court’s thorough analysis,

the small degree of the variance from the guidelines range, and
the

fact

that

neither

party

challenged

the

substantive

reasonableness of the sentence, Partman’s sentence satisfies the
second prong of the Savillon-Matute analysis.
On the record before us, even assuming that the application
of

the

obstruction

of

justice

enhancement

was

erroneous,

we

conclude that the error was harmless and the district court did
not abuse its discretion by sentencing Partman to 396 months’
imprisonment.

IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s denial of
Partman’s motion for a new trial, denial of Partman’s motion for
judgment

of

acquittal,

and

application

of

a

two-level

enhancement for obstruction of justice are
AFFIRMED.

20