US v. Randy Jone

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:12-cr-00004-D-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999244422].. [13-4242]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4242

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RANDY WESLEY JONES, a/k/a Shabba-J,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
James C. Dever, III,
Chief District Judge. (5:12-cr-00004-D-1)

Submitted:

November 19, 2013

Before WYNN and
Circuit Judge.

FLOYD,

Circuit

Decided: November 21, 2013

Judges,

and

HAMILTON,

Senior

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lewis A. Thompson, III, BANZET, THOMPSON & STYERS, PLLC,
Warrenton, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Jennifer P. MayParker,
Assistant
United
States
Attorney,
Raleigh,
North
Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Randy

Wesley

Jones

pled

guilty

pursuant

to

a

plea

agreement to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute powder cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and was sentenced to 228 months in prison.
Jones’

counsel

California,
view,

386

there

questioning
error when

filed
U.S.

are
whether

it

a
738

no
the

accepted

sentencing hearing.

brief

in

(1967),

meritorious
district
Jones’

accordance
stating

that,

issues
court

guilty

with

for

in

and

v.

counsel’s

appeal,

committed

plea

Anders

but

reversible

during

Jones’

Jones has not filed a pro se supplemental

brief, despite receiving notice of his right to do so, and the
Government has declined to file a responsive brief.

We affirm.

The purpose of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy is to
ensure that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily enters the
guilty plea.

See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58 (2002).

Thus, before accepting a guilty plea, a trial court must inform
the defendant of, and determine that he understands the nature
of, the charges to which the plea is offered, any mandatory
minimum penalty, the maximum possible penalty he faces, and the
various rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty.
Crim. P. 11(b).

Fed. R.

The court also must determine whether there is

a factual basis for the plea.

Id.; United States v. DeFusco,

949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991).
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There

is

a

strong

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presumption

that

a

defendant’s

guilty plea is binding and voluntary if the Rule 11 hearing was
adequate.
Cir.

United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th

1995).

Additionally,

in

the

absence

of

a

motion

to

withdraw a guilty plea in the district court, we review for
plain error the adequacy of the guilty plea proceeding under
Rule 11.
2002).

United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir.
“To establish plain error, [Jones] must show that an

error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error
affected his substantial rights.”
478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007).

United States v. Muhammad,
Even if Jones satisfies

these requirements, “correction of the error remains within our
discretion, which we should not exercise . . . unless the error
seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of

judicial

proceedings.”

Id.

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).
Jones has not presented any evidence or argument to
demonstrate plain error.

Indeed, the record reveals that the

district court fully complied with Rule 11’s requirements during
the plea colloquy, ensuring that Jones’ plea was knowing and
voluntary, that he understood the rights he was giving up by
pleading guilty and the sentence he faced, and that he committed
the

offense

attested

to

during

which
the

he

was

hearing

pleading
that
3

he

guilty.
fully

Jones

understood

also
the

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ramifications of his guilty plea, and that no one made promises
to

him

outside

agreement.

those

made

by

the

Government

in

his

plea

We conclude that Jones’ plea was knowing, voluntary,

and supported by a sufficient factual basis.

Accordingly, we

affirm Jones’ conviction.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
abuse of discretion standard.

See Gall v. United States, 552

U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d
330, 335 (4th Cir. 2009).
both

the

procedural

sentence.
district

This review requires consideration of

and

substantive

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
court

properly

reasonableness

of

the

We first assess whether the

calculated

the

advisory

Guidelines

range, considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2012), analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and
sufficiently explained the selected sentence.

Gall, 552 U.S. at

49–51; United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575–76 (4th Cir.
2010).
we

If the sentence is free of significant procedural error,

review

the

substantive

reasonableness

of

the

sentence,

“examin[ing] the totality of the circumstances to see whether
the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that
the

sentence

§ 3553(a).”

it

chose

satisfied

the

standards

set

forth

in

United States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216

(4th Cir. 2010).

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In this case, the district court properly calculated
Jones’ Guidelines

range,

assistance

motion,

considered

the

granted

treated

applicable

the
§

the

Government’s

Guidelines

3553(a)

as

substantial

advisory,
Moreover,

factors.

and
the

record establishes that the district court based Jones’ sentence
on its “individualized assessment” of the facts of the case.
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009).
Accordingly,

we

conclude

that

Jones’

sentence

is

both

procedurally and substantively reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
therefore

affirm

the

district

court’s

judgment.

This

We
court

requires that counsel inform Jones, in writing, of the right to
petition

the

Supreme

Court

of

the

United

States

for

further

review.

If Jones requests that a petition be filed, but counsel

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may

move

in

representation.

this

and

materials

legal
before

for

leave

to

withdraw

from

Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof

was served on Jones.
facts

court

We dispense with oral argument because the

contentions

are

adequately

this

and

argument

court

presented

would

not

in

the

aid

the

decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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