US v. Antonio William
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:12-cr-00014-MFU-3 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999290153].. [13-4257, 13-4304, 13-4311, 13-4330]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4257
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANTONIO DEMETRIUS WILLIAMS, a/k/a Little Wayne, a/k/a Black,
a/k/a Antonio Williams,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 13-4304
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DEMARIO DERMINE COFFIE, a/k/a Mario, a/k/a Demario Coffie,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 13-4311
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
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ALFANCO DEXTER BRITTON, a/k/a
Alfanco, a/k/a Alphonso Britton,
Mike,
a/k/a
Mann,
a/k/a
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 13-4330
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
NIKKI KATHLEEN WILLIAMS, a/k/a Nikki Williams,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg.
Michael F. Urbanski,
District
Judge.
(5:12-cr-00014-MFU-3;
5:12-cr-00014-MFU-4;
5:12-cr-00014-MFU-2; 5:12-cr-00014-MFU-1)
Submitted:
January 30, 2014
Decided:
February 4, 2014
Before KING, SHEDD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John S. Hart, Jr., HART LAW OFFICES, Harrisonburg, Virginia;
Roland Santos, LAW OFFICE OF ROLAND SANTOS, Harrisonburg,
Virginia;
Wynn
Andrew
Harding,
W.
ANDREW
HARDING,
PLC,
Harrisonburg, Virginia; Aaron Lee Cook, COOK ATTORNEYS, A
PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATION,
Harrisonburg,
Virginia,
for
Appellants.
Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, Grayson
A. Hoffman, Assistant United States Attorney, Harrisonburg,
Virginia, for Appellee.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Appellants Antonio Williams, Demario Coffie, Alfanco
Britton, and Nikki Williams were convicted after a jury trial of
one count of conspiracy to distribute and manufacture 280 grams
or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(A), 846 (2012).
Antonio Williams, Coffie, and Britton
were also convicted of multiple counts of distributing cocaine
base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C).
Prior
to trial, the Government filed informations of prior felony drug
convictions pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 (2012), describing three
prior convictions sustained by Antonio Williams, and four prior
convictions sustained by Britton.
The district court sentenced
Antonio Williams and Britton to life imprisonment, Coffie to 120
months
of
imprisonment,
and
Nikki
Williams
to
210
months
of
imprisonment.
On
appeal,
all
appellants
assert
that
the
district
court erred in denying their motion for a mistrial based on
possible
witnesses.
tainted
in-court
identifications
by
Government
Antonio Williams and Britton argue that the district
court erred in finding that the life sentences mandated by 21
U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A)
did
not
violate
the
Fifth
and
Eighth
Amendments, and that the district court plainly erred in failing
to submit to the jury the issue of whether they had previously
been convicted of felony drug offenses sufficient to trigger the
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statutory mandatory minimum penalties.
Britton argues that the
district
his
court
erred
in
finding
that
prior
felony
drug
convictions that triggered the mandatory life sentence were not
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.
Finally,
Nikki Williams argues that the district court erred in enhancing
her sentence for a leadership role in the offense.
All appellants argue that the district court erred in
denying their motion for a mistrial after the discovery that two
witnesses, Bell and Miller, were shown the courtroom and the
seating
of
the
defendants
before
the
witnesses
testified.
Appellants assert that showing the witnesses the courtroom and
location
of
the
identifications
denial
of
a
of
motion
defendants
the
for
tainted
defendants.
a
mistrial
This
for
their
court
abuse
of
in-court
reviews
the
discretion.
United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 631 (4th Cir. 2009).
Appellants’ argument is centered on their assertion that
If the taint was restricted to Bell and Miller, the
Court would have acted in its fullest authority to
correct the error and the Appellants would not have a
basis to ask for more.
Unfortunately the taint was
not restricted to them and that taint, at day seven
after more than a dozen lay witnesses, was the grave
error that necessitated a mistrial in this case.
Appellants’ Br. at 25-26.
Appellants
district court.
asserted
a
similar
argument
before
the
The court repeatedly asked counsel to point out
any factual basis for their claim that prior witnesses must have
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been improperly coached and thus their identification testimony
was tainted.
Counsel answered only that their clients had told
them that similar incidents had occurred throughout the trial.
Notably,
none
of
the
defendants
support of that assertion.
were
called
to
testify
in
Our review of the record leads us to
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying a mistrial.
As in the district court, Appellants point
to no record evidence that any witnesses who testified before
the jury were improperly coached, or that their identification
of the defendants was tainted.
Even assuming that the actions
of the officer were improper, the remedy that the district court
ordered,
exclusion
of
the
witnesses
impropriety, cured any taint.
F.3d
354,
363
(4th
Cir.
affected
by
that
See United States v. Cropp, 127
1997)
(“The
Supreme
Court
has
long
recognized that a trial court may employ one of three remedies
when a sequestration order has been violated: sanction of the
witness; instructions to the jury that they may consider the
violation toward the issue of credibility; or exclusion of the
witness’ testimony.”).
Antonio Williams and Britton argue that the district
court erred in finding that the life sentences mandated by 21
U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A)
Amendments.
did
not
violate
the
Fifth
and
Eighth
Specifically, they assert that their sentences were
grossly disproportionate to their crimes and constitute cruel
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and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
They also assert that their sentences violate their due process
rights under the Fifth Amendment because the statutory penalty
prevents
the
district
court
from
conducting
individualized
sentencing and violates separation of powers because it allows
executive usurpation of the judicial authority over sentencing.
In their reply brief, however, they acknowledge that precedent
of the Supreme Court and this court forecloses their argument.
This court rejected the exact arguments presented by Williams
and Britton almost twenty years ago, and affirmed a mandatory
life sentence imposed under § 841(b)(1)(A).
See United States
v. Kratsas, 45 F.3d 63, 65-69 (4th Cir. 1995) (applying Harmelin
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991)).
constitutional
challenge
to
the
Williams’s and Britton’s
mandatory
life
sentence
is
without merit.
Antonio
Williams
and
Britton
also
argue
that
the
district court plainly erred in failing to submit to the jury
the
issue
felony
of
drug
whether
offenses
they
had
previously
sufficient
mandatory minimum penalties.
to
been
trigger
convicted
the
of
statutory
They rely primarily on the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
2151, 2155, 2163-64 (2013) (holding that any fact that increases
the statutory mandatory minimum is an element of the offense
that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable
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In their reply brief, they acknowledge that this claim
is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S.
224 (1998), and that this court cannot provide relief on this
claim at this time.
Their concession is appropriate.
Alleyne
did not address, much less overrule, the exception for the use
of prior convictions to enhance a sentence that was recognized
by the Supreme Court in Almendarez-Torres.
Alleyne, 133 S. Ct.
at 2160 n.1; see also United States v. Graham, 711 F.3d 445, 455
(4th Cir. 2013) (“In any event, we are bound by AlmendarezTorres unless and until the Supreme Court says otherwise.”);
United States v. Cheek, 415 F.3d 349, 351-52 (4th Cir. 2005)
(rejecting
argument
that
Almendarez-Torres
overruled by subsequent decisions).
was
implicitly
Thus, this claim is without
merit.
Britton
argues
that
the
district
court
erred
in
finding that his prior felony drug convictions that triggered
the mandatory life sentence were not obtained in violation of
his constitutional rights.
the
convictions,
but
He does not deny the existence of
asserts
that
his
guilty
pleas
were
not
knowing and voluntary because the state trial courts failed to
advise him that his plea could be used to enhance a future
sentence, and failed to ensure that he understood the rights he
was giving up by pleading guilty.
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“A person claiming that a conviction alleged in the
information was obtained in violation of the Constitution . . .
shall
have
the
burden
of
proof
evidence on any issue of fact.”
by
a
preponderance
of
21 U.S.C. § 851(c)(2).
the
“In
reviewing the propriety of such an enhancement, we assess the
district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal
rulings de novo.”
(4th
Cir.
United States v. Kellam, 568 F.3d 125, 143
2009).
determined
by
voluntariness
considering
surrounding the plea.
(1970).
The
the
totality
of
of
a
guilty
the
plea
is
circumstances
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749
To be knowing and voluntary, a plea must be entered
with a full understanding of the charges and the consequences of
the plea.
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969).
The
plea must represent an uncompelled choice among the courses of
action open to the defendant.
North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 31 (1970).
Prior to the hearing on Britton’s challenge to the
convictions, the district court watched a video recording of the
plea hearing in question.
The court also reviewed the plea
forms executed by Britton and his attorneys in the proceedings,
and heard testimony from Britton.
The information contained on
the plea forms conveys the necessary advice regarding the rights
Britton gave up by his plea, as well as the possibility that his
plea
could
be
used
to
enhance
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future
sentences.
Although
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Britton testified that he could not read or understand most of
the information on the forms, his answers to direct inquiries
from
the
state
court
judge
contradict
his
testimony.
See
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (sworn statements
carry
a
strong
“presumption
of
verity”);
Fields
v.
Attorney
Gen., 956 F.2d 1290, 1299 (4th Cir. 1992) (“Absent clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, a defendant is bound by the
representations he makes under oath during a plea colloquy.”).
Moreover, his attorneys certified by their signatures on the
form that they had explained the rights listed on the form to
Britton.
pleading
Finally, Britton testified that he understood he was
guilty
and
understood
when
the
court
rejected
his
initial plea deal in one of the cases because it involved a
mandatory minimum sentence.
On this record, the district court
did not err in finding that Britton’s pleas were knowing and
voluntary.
The
convictions
were
properly
used
as
predicate
felony drug convictions to enhance his sentence under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B).
Nikki Williams argues that the district court plainly
erred in imposing the three-level enhancement for her role in
the
offense.
This
court
reviews
the
district
application of a leadership enhancement for clear error.
court’s
United
States v. Steffen, __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 6698604 (4th Cir. 2013).
We will find that the district court clearly erred “only when,
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after reviewing all the evidence, we are left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
A three-level enhancement
for a defendant’s role in the offense may be applied “[i]f the
defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or
leader)
and
participants
the
or
criminal
activity
otherwise
Williams
§ 3B1.1(b).
was
does
involved
extensive
not
contest
.
five
.
.
that
or
more
.”
the
USSG
criminal
activity in this case involved five or more participants or was
otherwise
extensive,
but
argues
that
the
evidence
was
insufficient to establish that she exercised any leadership or
management role.
“[T]he
aggravating
role
adjustment
is
appropriate
where the evidence demonstrates that the defendant controlled
the
activities
of
other
participants
or
exercised
management
responsibility.”
United States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 390
(4th
(internal
Cir.
2010)
quotation
marks
omitted).
The
defendant need only have exercised control over one participant.
See USSG § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2.
Our review of the record leads us to
conclude that the district court did not err in finding that the
enhancement
Williams’s
was
supported
actions
in
by
the
managing
the
testimony
financial
describing
aspects
conspiracy, which included directing other participants.
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Nikki
of
the
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgments.
We
dispense
contentions
with
are
oral
argument
adequately
because
presented
in
the
facts
and
the
materials
legal
before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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