US v. Patrick Taylor
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 6:09-cr-00785-HMH-7 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999222064].. [13-4319]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4319
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PATRICK LEE EDWARD TAYLOR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville.
Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (6:09-cr-00785-HMH-7)
Submitted:
October 10, 2013
Decided:
October 21, 2013
Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lora E. Collins, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant.
William Jacob Watkins, Jr.,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Patrick
imposed
sentence
Lee
Edward
upon
Taylor
revocation
of
appeals
his
the
twelve-month
supervised
release.
Taylor’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386
U.S.
738
(1967),
stating
that
there
are
no
meritorious
grounds for appeal, but questioning whether the district court
abused its discretion by revoking Taylor’s supervised release
and imposing a twelve-month sentence.
Although advised of his
right to file a pro se supplemental brief, Taylor has not done
so. *
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
A decision to revoke a defendant’s supervised release
is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Pregent,
190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999).
The district court need only
find
of
a
violation
of
a
condition
preponderance of the evidence.
Supp. 2013).
supervised
release
by
a
18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (West
In this case, Taylor admitted that he violated the
*
Taylor has filed a letter with this court, questioning the
propriety of the district court’s rejection of counsel’s request
for service of the revocation sentence to commence immediately.
But, at the time of the revocation hearing, Taylor was in
federal court on a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.
Accordingly, he was not then in federal custody, nor was he
capable of being taken into federal custody, because he was
already in state custody.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) (2006) (“A
sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the
defendant
is
received
in
custody
awaiting
transportation
to . . . the official detention facility at which the sentence
is to be served.”).
We therefore conclude the district court
properly denied Taylor’s request.
See United States v. Hayes,
535 F.3d 907, 910 (8th Cir. 2008).
2
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conditions
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of
supervision.
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We
accordingly
find
no
abuse
of
discretion in the district court’s decision to revoke Taylor’s
supervised release.
Turning to Taylor’s sentence, we will not disturb a
sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release that is
within
the
prescribed
unreasonable.
(4th
Cir.
statutory
range
and
is
not
plainly
United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437–39
2006).
In
making
this
determination,
“we
follow
generally the procedural and substantive considerations” used in
reviewing original sentences.
Id. at 438.
A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district
court has considered the policy statements contained in Chapter
Seven of the Guidelines and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors, id. at 440, and has adequately explained the
sentence chosen, though it need not explain the sentence in as
much
detail
States
v.
sentence
as
when
Thompson,
is
imposing
the
595
544,
F.3d
substantively
original
547
reasonable
if
sentence.
(4th
Cir.
the
United
2010).
district
A
court
states a proper basis for its imposition of a sentence up to the
statutory maximum.
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
If, based on this
review, we decide that the sentence is not unreasonable, we will
affirm.
Id. at 439.
In the initial inquiry, we take a more deferential
posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion
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than when we apply the reasonableness review to post-conviction
Guidelines sentences.
656 (4th Cir. 2007).
United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652,
Only if we find the sentence unreasonable
must we decide whether it is “plainly” so.
Id. at 657.
Although counsel questions whether there is any error
rendering Taylor’s sentence plainly unreasonable, she identifies
no such error.
Indeed, as counsel acknowledges, the district
court properly calculated the applicable policy statement range
and sentenced Taylor to twelve months’ imprisonment, a sentence
within
the
policy
statement
range
and
below
the
statutory
maximum.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual
7B1.4(a)
§
(2009),
p.s.
Further,
our
review
of
the
record confirms that there was no sentencing error warranting
correction on plain error review.
See United States v. Knight,
606 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2010).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal.
We therefore affirm the judgment.
This court requires
that counsel inform Taylor, in writing, of his right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
If
Taylor requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in
this
court
for
leave
to
withdraw
from
representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy of the motion was served
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on Taylor.
legal
before
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
contentions
this
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court
are
adequately
and
argument
presented
would
not
in
aid
the
the
materials
decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
5
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