US v. Ricardo O. Curry, II

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:12-cr-00163-WDQ-1. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999370045].. [13-4514]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4514

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RICARDO O. CURRY, II,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
William D. Quarles, Jr., District
Judge. (1:12-cr-00163-WDQ-1)

Submitted:

May 30, 2014

Decided:

June 5, 2014

Before SHEDD and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lee Ann Anderson McCall, Amanda F. Davidoff, Elizabeth A.
Cassady, Jared P. Roscoe, James H. Congdon, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL
LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States Attorney, Gregory R. Bockin, David I. Sharfstein,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Hannah E. Logue, Student Law
Clerk, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Ricardo O. Curry, II, was convicted following a jury
trial of two counts of aiding in the preparation of a fraudulent
tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) (2012), four
counts of bankruptcy fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 157(2),
2 (2012), four counts of falsification of records in bankruptcy,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519, 2 (2012), and making false
statements in connection with a bankruptcy case, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), 2 (2012).

Curry received a total sentence

of eighty-seven months’ imprisonment.
that

the

district

On appeal, Curry argues

(1)

erred

intelligently,

knowingly,

court

in

determining

and

voluntarily

waived

that

his

he

Sixth

Amendment right to counsel; and (2) failed to adequately protect
his due process rights.

We affirm.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the
right

to

counsel,

counsel.
Johnson

and,

if

indigent,

the

right

to

appointed

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963);
v.

Zerbst,

304

U.S.

458,

462-63

(1938).

The

Sixth

Amendment’s guarantee of counsel also “necessarily implies the
right of self-representation.”
806,

832

(1975).

The

right

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
to

self-representation

“must

be

preserved even if the court believes that the defendant will
benefit

from

the

advice

Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091,

of

counsel.”

United

1095-96 (4th Cir. 1997).
2

States

v.

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This

Court

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reviews

de

novo

a

district

court’s

determination that a defendant has waived his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.
right

of

Id. at 1097 n.3.

self-representation

unequivocally;

(2)

must

knowingly,

553,

558

assertion
against

be

an

(4th
clear

Cir.
and

inadvertent

do

so

intelligently,

and (3) in a timely fashion.
F.3d

A defendant who asserts the
(1)

clearly

and

and

voluntarily;

United States v. Frazier-El, 204

2000).

“The

unequivocal
waiver

of

is

the

requirement
necessary

right

to

to

that

the

protect

counsel

by

a

defendant’s occasional musings,” and “prevents a defendant from
taking advantage of and manipulating the mutual exclusivity of
the rights to counsel and self-representation.”

United States

v. Bush, 404 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
A defendant “should be made aware of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will
establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made
with eyes open.”
marks omitted).
intelligent

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (internal quotation
“The determination of whether there has been an

waiver

of

right

to

counsel

must

depend,

in

each

case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding
that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of
the accused.”

Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464; see Singleton, 107 F.3d

at 1097-98.
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We conclude that the district court did not err in
granting Curry’s request to waive counsel and proceed pro se.
Our review of the record demonstrates that Curry clearly and
unequivocally

asserted

Throughout

the

appointment

of

counsel

but

his

right

proceedings,
counsel

and

remained

to

Curry

did

adamant

not

about

self-representation.

never
avail
his

requested

himself
desire

of

to

the

standby

represent

himself.
Curry’s election to proceed pro se was also knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary.

The record reflects that at the

time he waived his right to counsel, Curry understood the legal
proceedings and was aware of the nature of the charges against
him

and

the

occasions,

penalties

Curry

was

he

faced

informed

if

of

convicted.

the

On

disadvantages

representation and was advised to obtain counsel.

multiple
of

self-

Despite these

safeguards, he elected to proceed pro se.
Curry also argues that the district court erred in
failing to sua sponte terminate his self-representation when it
became apparent during the trial that he would not participate
in the proceeding.

Although a “trial judge may terminate self-

representation

a

by

defendant

who

deliberately

engages

in

serious and obstructionist misconduct,” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834
n.46,

Curry’s

significantly

failure
obstruct

to
or

effectively
disrupt
4

defend
the

himself

trial

did

not

proceedings.

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Moreover, “a criminal defendant’s ability to represent himself
has

no

bearing

representation.”

upon

his

competence

to

choose

self-

Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993).

“[A]lthough [a defendant] may conduct his own defense ultimately
to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of that
respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.”
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834.

Therefore, the adequacy of Curry’s

performance during trial has no bearing on the fact that his
waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Next, Curry contends that he was denied his right to a
fair trial under the Due Process Clause.

“[T]he right of an

accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the
right

to

a

accusations.”

fair

opportunity

Montana

v.

to

defend

Egelhoff,

518

against
U.S.

37,

the

State’s

52

(1996).

While Curry opted not to participate in the jury selection, call
witnesses or present evidence, or make objections during trial,
the district court provided Curry every opportunity to defend
against the charges, including the opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses and to testify in his own defense, and provided him
the benefit of standby counsel.
Because these procedural safeguards were available to
Curry, he was afforded the protections of the due process of the
law.

His refusal to take advantage of those protections is not

equivalent to their denial.

Again, while Curry “conduct[ed] his
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own defense ultimately to his own detriment,” Faretta, 422 U.S.
at 834, the district court honored his choice by abstaining from
interfering with his right to self-representation.
conclude

that

Curry

has

not

demonstrated

that

We therefore
the

district

court’s conduct resulted in an unfair trial.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We

dispense

contentions

with
are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the

facts

and

the

materials

legal
before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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