US v. Heather DeYoung

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 7:12-cr-00475-GRA-2. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999355726]. [13-4538]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4538

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
HEATHER DEYOUNG,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Spartanburg.
G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (7:12-cr-00475-GRA-2)

Submitted:

April 10, 2014

Before AGEE and
Circuit Judge.

DIAZ,

Circuit

Decided:

Judges,

and

May 14, 2014

HAMILTON,

Senior

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.

Jill E.M. HaLevi, MEDIATION & LEGAL SERVICES, LLC, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant.
William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, William J. Watkins, Jr., Assistant United
States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Heather

DeYoung

appeals

her

conviction

and

sentence

after pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to possess
with intent to distribute oxycodone in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (2012).

On appeal, DeYoung contends the

district court erred under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting her
guilty plea, and her sentence is unreasonable.

We affirm her

conviction, vacate her sentence, and remand for resentencing.
“A

guilty

plea

operates

as

a

waiver

of

important

rights, and is valid only if done voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently,

‘with

sufficient

awareness

circumstances and likely consequences.’”

of

the

relevant

Bradshaw v. Stumpf,

545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 748 (1970)).

In federal cases, Rule 11 of the Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure “governs the duty of the trial judge
before accepting a guilty plea.”
238, 243 n.5 (1969).

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.

It “require[s] a district court, before

accepting a guilty plea, to ‘personally inform the defendant of,
and

ensure

that

he

understands,

the

nature

of

the

charges

against him and the consequences of his guilty plea.’”

United

States v. Hairston, 522 F.3d 336, 340 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting
United States v. Damon, 191 F.3d 561, 564 (4th Cir. 1999)).
Rules 11(b)(1) and 11(b)(2) require the district court
to

“address

the

defendant

personally
2

in

open

court”

to

both

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inform her of her rights as a defendant and consequences of the
plea, and to determine that her plea is knowing and voluntary.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b).

If the parties “discuss and reach a

plea agreement,” they “must disclose the plea agreement in open
court when the plea is offered.”

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c).

If

the Government agrees to “recommend, or agree[s] not to oppose
the

defendant’s

request,

that

a

particular

sentence

or

sentencing range is appropriate,” the court “must advise the
defendant that the defendant has no right to withdraw the plea
if the court does not follow the recommendation or request.”
Fed.

R.

Crim.

P.

11(c)(1)(B),

(c)(3)(B);

United

States

v.

Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 530-31 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Iaquinta, 719 F.2d 83, 84-85 (4th Cir. 1983).
We “accord deference to the trial court’s decision as
to how best to conduct the mandated colloquy.”

United States v.

DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991); see also United
States v. Wilson, 81 F.3d 1300, 1307 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting
this

“Court

has

repeatedly

refused

to

script

the

Rule

11

colloquy, relying rather on the experience and wisdom of the
district judges below”).

A guilty plea may be knowingly and

intelligently made based on information received before the plea
hearing.

See DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 116; see also Bradshaw, 545

U.S. at 183 (trial court may rely on counsel’s assurance that
defendant was properly informed of elements of the crime).
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“A federal court of appeals normally will not correct
a legal error made in criminal trial court proceedings unless
the

defendant

attention.”
(2013)

first

the

error

to

the

trial

court’s

Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1124

(citing

(1993)).

brought

United

States

v.

Olano,

507

U.S.

725,

731

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) creates an

exception to the normal rule, providing “[a] plain error that
affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was
not brought to the court’s attention.”
Because

DeYoung’s

Rule

11

Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
claim

is

raised

first time on appeal, we review for plain error.

for

the

See United

States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 71 (2002); Martinez, 277 F.3d at
525.

It is thus DeYoung’s burden to show (1) error; (2) that

was plain; (3) affecting her substantial rights; and (4) that
this Court should exercise its discretion to notice the error.
See Martinez, 277 F.3d at 529, 532.

To show her substantial

rights were affected, she “must show a reasonable probability
that, but for the error, [she] would not have entered the plea.”
United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004).
We have reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs,
and we conclude that DeYoung fails to make this showing.

Even

assuming that the district court did plainly err under Rule 11,
DeYoung fails to assert or show that she would not have entered
her guilty plea but for the alleged error.
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We review a criminal sentence for reasonableness using
an abuse of discretion standard.

United States v. McManus, 734

F.3d 315, 317 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).
court

committed

improperly

We first consider whether the district

a

significant

calculating

the

procedural

Guidelines

explaining the sentence imposed.

error,

range

or

such

as

inadequately

United States v. Allmendinger,

706 F.3d 330, 340 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2747
(2013).

If the sentence is procedurally reasonable, we then

consider

whether

it

is

substantively

reasonable,

account the totality of the circumstances.
51.

taking

into

Gall, 552 U.S. at

We presume that a sentence within or below a properly

calculated Guidelines range is substantively reasonable.

United

States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012).
We

review

preserved

sentencing

claims

for

abuse

of

discretion, and if we find abuse, reversal is required unless
the error was harmless.
576 (4th Cir. 2010).
when

it

acts

judicially

United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572,

“A district court abuses its discretion

arbitrarily

recognized

or

irrationally,

factors

constraining

fails
its

to

consider

exercise

of

discretion, relies on erroneous factual or legal premises, or
commits an error of law.”

United States v. Grant, 715 F.3d 552,

557 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotations omitted).

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In sentencing, the district court must first correctly
calculate the defendant’s Guidelines range.
F.3d at 340.

Allmendinger, 706

The court is next required to give the parties an

opportunity to argue for what they believe is an appropriate
sentence, and the court must consider those arguments in light
of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).

Id.

When rendering a sentence, the court must make and place on the
record

an

individualized

facts of the case.

assessment

based

on

the

particular

United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328,

330 (4th Cir. 2009).

In explaining a sentence, the “sentencing

judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court
that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.”
Rita

v.

United

States,

551

U.S.

338,

356

(2007).

Where

a

defendant or the Government presents nonfrivolous reasons for
imposing a sentence outside the Guidelines, the district court
should address those arguments and explain why it has rejected
them.

See Rita, 551 U.S. at 357; Lynn, 592 F.3d at 584-85.
We

have

reviewed

the

record

and

conclude

that

the

district court failed to adequately explain its sentence, and
the sentence is procedurally unreasonable.

DeYoung and her co-

defendant, who was her ex-husband, pled guilty together.

At

their guilty plea hearing, the Government placed on the record
that it had agreed to make sentencing recommendations in their
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Based on DeYoung’s minor role in the conspiracy, the

Government recommended that she be sentenced to twelve months of
home confinement.

In her co-defendant’s case, the Government

recommended a reduction in drug weight and no enhancement for a
leadership role in the conspiracy.

The district court sentenced

the co-defendant as recommended by the parties.
At DeYoung’s sentencing that immediately followed, she
requested

that

the

district

court

likewise

sentence

her

as

recommended by the Government, or if the court determined that a
prison

sentence

was

appropriate,

that

it

give

her

the

same

benefit that her co-defendant received from the reduction in
drug weight.

The district court rejected both requests without

explanation, sentencing her instead to 70 months in prison, the
bottom of her advisory Guidelines range.

While the co-defendant

was more culpable, he received the same sentence.
Because
district

court

the

record

considered

does

not

DeYoung’s

make

arguments

clear
when

that

the

sentencing

her or had a reasoned basis for rejecting them, we conclude that
the court erred by ignoring her “nonfrivolous arguments for a
different
choice.”
say

with

sentence

and

failing

to

Lynn, 592 F.3d at 584-85.
fair

assurance

that

the

explain

the

sentencing

Moreover, because we cannot
district

court’s

explicit

consideration of DeYoung’s arguments would not have affected the
sentence imposed, we conclude that the Government has not shown
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that the error was harmless.

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See United States v. Boulware, 604

F.3d 832, 838-40 (4th Cir. 2010).
Accordingly,

we

affirm

DeYoung’s

her sentence, and remand for resentencing.

conviction,

vacate

We also direct that

this case be assigned to a different judge on remand.

See

United States v. Lentz, 383 F.3d 191, 221-22 (4th Cir. 2004).
We

dispense

contentions

with
are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the

facts

and

the

materials

legal
before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED

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