US v. Cynthia Lemon

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:08-cr-00004-CMC-1. [999516039]. [13-4696]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4696

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CYNTHIA LEMON,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia.
Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior
District Judge. (3:08-cr-00004-CMC-1)

Argued:

December 11, 2014

Before MOTZ and
Circuit Judge.

THACKER,

Decided:

Circuit

Judges,

January 23, 2015

and

DAVIS,

Senior

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Motz wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Thacker and Senior Judge Davis joined.

ARGUED: Katherine E. Evatt, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Winston
David Holliday, Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF:
William N.
Nettles, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

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DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
Cynthia Lemon appeals her twenty-four month prison sentence
for several violations of her supervised release.

She argues

that the district court committed plain error at her revocation
hearing by considering her rehabilitative needs as a factor in
determining

the

length

of

her

sentence.

For

the

following

reasons, we affirm.

I.
The parties do not dispute the facts of this case.

In

2008, Lemon pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United
States by making, uttering, and possessing forged securities in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 531 and § 371.

The district court

sentenced her to thirty months in prison and three years of
supervised release.
February 2013.

Lemon’s supervised release term began in

Five months later, she was arrested for multiple

violations of her supervision, including several instances of
forging checks.
Based on the nature of Lemon’s violations and her extensive
criminal

history,

the

supervised

release

violation

report

provided for a Guidelines range of 21-27 months’ imprisonment.
Factoring in the statutory maximum reduced that range to 21-24
months.

Lemon filed no objections to the report, and Lemon’s

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probation officer recommended a sentence of twenty-four months’
imprisonment.
At

the

revocation

hearing,

the

sentence within the Guidelines range.
a

sentence

release.

of
In

time
the

served

and

alternative,

Government

requested

a

Lemon’s counsel requested

continuation
Lemon’s

on

counsel

supervised
requested

a

sentence of one year and one day -- the same sentence the court
had imposed on Lemon’s co-defendant.
The district court adopted the Government’s recommendation,
revoking

Lemon’s

supervised

release

twenty-four months in prison.

and

sentencing

her

to

After announcing its sentence,

the court addressed Lemon and commented on both the basis for
its sentence and its concern about her mental health:
I cannot imagine what was in your mind that led you to
do this again, what you possibly could have been
thinking that you could get away with this. To me it
almost indicates some loss of contact with reality,
that you could think you could possibly get away with
this.
And to do it, you know, over and over again
while you are on supervised release, after having
served state time and federal time for the similar
type [of] conduct.
So, I don’t know whether you received any type of
counseling when you were serving your time before, I
don’t know whether you will be able to this time, but
I hope maybe you can.
Because you have a serious
emotional problem that would cause you to behave this
way despite what it costs your children and your
family.
It’s just so unfair to them, and you don’t
seem to get it.
So, I have considered the seriousness of the offense,
the revocation offenses, I have considered that this
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is a category six criminal history, continuing to reoffend. I have considered that you do have a serious
family situation, but you aren’t really helping your
family
situation,
you
are
hurting
your
family
situation.
I have considered the need for the sentence to reflect
the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for
the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate
deterrence.
I have also considered specifically the need to
protect the public from further crimes.
I believe
that if you were out again you would be doing the same
thing,
and
I
believe
that
you
need
further
correctional treatment and some type of evaluation.
I’m going to recommend some sort of mental health
counseling while you are in the BOP this time to see
if there is anything they can do for you to stop this
recidivist behavior.
Lemon

noted
an

a

timely

Anders

appeal

brief

of

that

her

sentence,

identified

no

and

her

counsel

filed

reversible

error.

After reviewing the record, we requested supplemental

briefing on whether the district court impermissibly sentenced
Lemon based on its perception that she needed rehabilitative
mental health treatment.

II.
The only error Lemon now alleges is that the district court
considered her rehabilitative needs when determining the length
of

her

revocation

sentence,

in

States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011).

violation

of

Tapia

v.

United

As Lemon’s counsel acknowledged

at oral argument, this issue was not raised at the revocation

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hearing.

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Therefore, we review for plain error.

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993).

See United

To prevail, Lemon

must show that “an error (1) was made, (2) is plain (i.e., clear
or obvious), and (3) affects substantial rights.”
v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 577 (4th Cir. 2010).
such

a

showing,

this

court

“may

United States

Even if Lemon makes

exercise

its

discretion

to

correct the error only if it seriously affects the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
A.
In

Tapia,

the

Supreme

Court

held

that

the

“Sentencing

Reform Act precludes federal courts from imposing or lengthening
a

prison

term

rehabilitation.”
the

Court

in

order

to

promote

131 S. Ct. at 2385.

distinguished

between

a

criminal

defendant's

In reaching that holding,

permissible

and

impermissible

discussions of rehabilitation at a sentencing hearing. 1
one

hand,

“[a]

court

commits

no

error

by

On the

discussing

the

opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits
of specific treatment or training programs.”

Id. at 2392.

A

court crosses the line, however, if it chooses to “impose or

1

Although the sentence at issue in Tapia was imposed after
the defendant’s initial conviction, we have held that Tapia
applies to revocation sentences. United States v. Bennett, 698
F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1506
(2013).
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lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a
treatment program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation.”

Id.

at 2393 (emphasis omitted).
The underlying facts in Tapia illustrate this distinction.
There, the district court had indicated that it chose the length
of the defendant’s sentence at least in part so that she could
participate
2385.

in

a

particular

Specifically,

the

drug
court

treatment
had

program.

explained

Id.

that

at

“[t]he

sentence has to be sufficient to provide needed correctional
treatment, and here I think the needed correctional treatment is
the 500 Hour Drug Program. . . . I am going to impose a 51-month
sentence, . . . and one of the factors that affects this is the
need to provide treatment.”

Id. (alterations in original).

The

Supreme Court found that these comments “suggest[ed] that the
court
ensure

may

have

that

she

calculated
receive[d]

the

length

certain

Id. at 2393 (emphasis omitted).

of

Tapia’s

sentence

rehabilitative

to

services.”

The Court remanded the case to

the Ninth Circuit, which then held that the district court had
in fact committed plain error.

United States v. Tapia, 665 F.3d

1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2011).
We have emphasized that Tapia “does not prevent a district
court

from

considering

sentencing proceeding.”

[rehabilitation]

in

the

course

of

a

United States v. Alston, 722 F.3d 603,

609 (4th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 808
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(2013).

Instead, “Tapia stands for the proposition that a court

cannot

impose

or

lengthen

rehabilitative purpose.

a

sentence”

to

further

a

Id. (emphasis in original).

Accordingly, in Alston we rejected the defendant’s claim of
Tapia

error

because

we

determined

that

the

defendant’s

rehabilitative needs did not affect the length of his sentence.
Id.

at

609.

rehabilitation

All
at

the

district

sentencing

was

court

had

said

regarding

that

its

sentence

would

“protect[] the public” from the defendant and “provide[] the
needed treatment of care in the most effective manner possible.”
Id. at 608.

We concluded that these comments indicated the

district court’s awareness of the rehabilitative benefits of the
defendant’s sentence, but they did not indicate that the court
chose or lengthened the sentence because of those benefits.

Id.

at 608-09.
In United States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2012),
by contrast, we concluded that the district court impermissibly
linked the defendant’s rehabilitative needs to the length of his
sentence.

The district court there noted that the defendant

“needs intensive substance abuse treatment.

So, the court will

impose a sentence that provides ample time for that.”

7

Id. at

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196-97.

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We held that the court’s reliance on rehabilitative

needs in fashioning its sentence constituted error. 2

Id. at 200.

Alston and Bennett illustrate the line between permissible
comment upon a defendant’s rehabilitative needs and reliance on
those needs as a factor in selecting the length of his prison
sentence.

This distinction accords with the “broad consensus”

among our sister circuits that the presence of Tapia error turns
on

“whether

needs [is]

a

sentencing

causally

court’s

related

to

reference

the

length

to
of

rehabilitative
the

sentence.”

United States v. Del Valle-Rodriguez, 761 F.3d 171, 174 (1st
Cir.) (emphasis added) (citing cases), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
293 (2014).
Such
Tapia,

a

a

causal

relationship

sentencing

court

has

may
a

be

clearest

particular

when,

as

in

rehabilitative

program in mind and uses the length of that program to justify
the

length

of

its

sentence.

See,

e.g.,

United

States

v.

Kubeczko, 660 F.3d 260, 261 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding clear Tapia
error where a district court explained that the defendant needed
“to be in one place longer than 18 months” to get mental health
treatment). Courts have also found Tapia violations when there
2

We then assumed that the error was plain, but we
ultimately concluded that it did not affect the defendant’s
substantial rights because it was the “brazen breach of trust
inherent in [the defendant’s] unlawful actions,” rather than his
rehabilitative
needs,
that
“drove
the
district
court’s
sentencing decision.” Bennett, 698 F.3d at 200.
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are less clear indicia that rehabilitation affected the length
of a defendant’s sentence.

The Eleventh Circuit has articulated

the

finding

most

expansive

test,

Tapia

error

whenever

“the

district court considers rehabilitation when crafting a sentence
of imprisonment.”

United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303,

1310

2014)

(11th

Cir.

(emphasis

in

original).

But

in

Vandergrift, as in Bennett, the sentencing court appeared to
“consider”

rehabilitation

defendant’s sentence.

with

an

eye

toward

lengthening

the

The court there explained that “I’ve also

got to consider what’s best for the defendant as a factor in the
equation” and observed that while the defendant “does not thrive
in

an

unstructured

environment,”

he

could

get

mental

health

treatment and “vocational training for a period of time in the
prison system.”

Id. at 1306 (emphasis added).

No matter how

the test is articulated, we find it unlikely that a court has
committed Tapia error unless it has considered rehabilitation
for the specific purpose of imposing or lengthening a prison
sentence.
B.
With

these

considerations

in

mind,

we

hold

that

the

district court did not plainly err when it discussed Lemon’s
need for mental health counseling at sentencing.

In arguing to

the contrary, Lemon attempts to align this case with Tapia and
Bennett.

See Appellant’s Supp. Br. 11-12.
9

But in contrast to

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those cases, the district court here never suggested that its
concern for Lemon’s mental health was a factor in fixing the
length of her sentence.
Lemon’s
factor.

counseling

In fact, the court’s uncertainty about

options

suggests

rehabilitation

was

not

a

After observing that it did not “know whether [Lemon

had] received any type of counseling” during her previous prison
term, the district court commented that “I don’t know whether
you will be able to this time, but I hope maybe you can.”

It is

difficult to conclude that the court lengthened Lemon’s sentence
so she could receive mental health treatment if the court was
unsure whether such treatment was even available. 3
Moreover,

the

district

court

provided

a

rationale

for

Lemon’s sentence that did not rest, expressly or implicitly, on
her rehabilitative needs.
that

Lemon

had

In particular, the court emphasized

“continu[ed]

to

re-offend,”

and

there

was

therefore a “need to protect the public from further crimes.”
3

In addition to Tapia and Bennett, Lemon relies on two
unpublished cases for her argument that the district court
impermissibly
considered
her
rehabilitative
needs.
See
Appellant’s Supp. Br. 11 (citing United States v. Pate, 503 F.
App’x 216 (4th Cir. 2013) (unpublished per curiam) and United
States v. Olds, 464 F. App’x 117 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished
per curiam)).
Unpublished opinions have no precedential value
in this circuit.
See Hentosh v. Old Dominion Univ., 767 F.3d
413, 417 (4th Cir. 2014). Even if published, neither case would
aid Lemon’s cause; in both, the sentencing court issued an
above-Guidelines sentence for the express purpose of providing
the defendant drug treatment.
See Pate, 503 F. App’x at 217;
Olds, 464 F. App’x at 118.
These cases thus provide clear
examples of Tapia error; Lemon’s does not.
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considerations,

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than

concern

for

Lemon’s

mental

health, appear to have motivated the court’s decision to impose
its sentence.
To be sure, the court could have more clearly separated its
discussion of Lemon’s rehabilitative needs from its discussion
of the factors that affected the length of her sentence.
advised

in

Bennett,

“[b]y

keeping

these

distinct

As we

concepts

distinct, courts will preclude the possibility of confusion on
appeal over whether a Tapia error has occurred.”
199.

698 F.3d at

But even if we read ambiguity into the revocation hearing

transcript, it is certainly not “clear or obvious,” Lynn, 592
F.3d at 577, that the district court impermissibly considered
rehabilitation.

Accordingly, the court did not plainly err in

sentencing Lemon. 4

4

At oral argument, Lemon’s counsel pointed to the disparity
between the sentences imposed on Lemon and her co-defendant as
evidence that the district court must have considered her need
for rehabilitation.
Having reviewed the record in both cases,
we are not troubled by the twelve-month difference in the
revocation sentences.
Although both defendants faced the same
Guidelines range at their revocation hearings, Lemon had
committed several more supervised release violations.
And at
the time of their underlying offenses, Lemon had nearly twice
the criminal history points as her co-defendant.
It is
understandable that the district court would treat the two
defendants differently.
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III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is
AFFIRMED.

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