US v. Anturan Morri
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:13-cr-00067-JRS-1. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999373764]. [13-4844]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4844
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ANTURAN DAQUAN MORRIS,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond.
James R. Spencer, District
Judge. (3:13-cr-00067-JRS-1)
Submitted:
April 29, 2014
Decided:
June 11, 2014
Before KING, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Alexandria,
Virginia, Frances H. Pratt, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Carolyn V. Grady, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF
THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.
Dana J. Boente, Acting United States Attorney, Alexandria,
Virginia, Olivia L. Norman, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Anturan Daquan Morris appeals his conviction for being a
felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1) and his resulting 51-month sentence.
For the reasons
that follow, we affirm.
I.
A.
At
trial,
the
government
presented
evidence
that,
on
December 12, 2012, Officers Joachin Okonkwo and James A. Spada
of the Richmond Police Department approached a man whom they
recognized by sight but not by name.
They asked him to stop,
but the man fled and the officers pursued him.
Officer Okonkwo
testified that while he lost sight of the man he was chasing a
few times, those lapses were “just momentary.”
J.A. 46.
During
the chase, Officer Spada saw the man remove a firearm from his
clothing and discard it in the street.
At the end of the chase,
the man was apprehended and identified as Morris.
Morris told
the officers that he carried the gun, but only for protection.
No witness was asked to perform a courtroom identification
of
Morris.
When
asked
on
direct
examination,
“[d]o
you
recognize Mr. Morris here today?” Officer Spada testified that
he did, J.A. 69, although the record does not show that he
pointed or gestured to Morris.
When asked if there was “any
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question in [his] mind” that the individual who threw the gun
was “Mr. Morris,” Officer Spada answered that there was “[n]o
question at all.”
J.A. 77.
Following the government’s case in
chief, Morris moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed.
R. Crim. P. 29.
That motion was denied.
A jury found Morris
guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm.
B.
The presentence report (“PSR”) placed Morris at an offense
level of 20 and a criminal history category of IV.
Guidelines sentence ranged from 51 to 63 months.
object
to
the
PSR
or
the
Guidelines
His advisory
Morris did not
calculation.
At
the
sentencing hearing, the district court accepted the PSR, adopted
its findings, and then heard the parties’ arguments.
Morris argued for a below-Guidelines sentence of 42 months
because he did not fire the gun he was convicted of possessing
and because his personal history and relative youth placed him
at a particularly high risk of criminality.
that
his
offenses
criminal
and
that
history
a
was
42-month
Morris also argued
exaggerated
sentence
by
would
punishment, as the longest he had ever received.
non-serious
provide
just
The government
argued for a sentence within the Guidelines range.
The
district
court
sentenced
Morris
to
51
months’
imprisonment, saying that it had “considered all the arguments
of the parties” and that it was denying Morris’s motion for a
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below-Guidelines sentence “primarily because you can’t run from
your
history.
appropriate.”
That
Guidelines
J.A. 201.
Range
was
earned
and
is
This appeal followed.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a Rule 29
motion for judgment of acquittal.
United States v. Green, 599
F.3d 360, 367 (4th Cir. 2010).
A guilty verdict survives “if,
viewing
light
the
evidence
in
the
most
favorable
to
the
prosecution, the verdict is supported by substantial evidence.”
United
States
v.
Smith,
451
F.3d
209,
216
(4th
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Cir.
2006)
We may only
set aside a conviction if “no rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.”
United States v. Royal, 731 F.3d 333, 337 (4th Cir.
2013).
We review criminal sentences for substantive and procedural
reasonableness using an abuse of discretion standard.
United
States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2010).
If we
find an abuse of discretion, the sentence can stand only if the
error was harmless.
Id.
4
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III.
Morris
argues
that
the
government
did
not
present
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdict for two
reasons.
First, Morris argues that because no witness identified him
in court, the government did not present sufficient evidence of
his
identity
as
the
man
who
possessed
the
firearm.
This
argument is meritless because a courtroom identification is not
required to show sufficient evidence of a defendant’s identity
if other evidence of identity is sufficient.
United States v.
Taylor, 900 F.2d 779, 782 (4th Cir. 1990) (testimony of one
witness who identified the defendant by name as the person who
committed the crime was sufficient evidence of the defendant’s
identity, even without a courtroom identification).
Second, Morris argues that the government’s evidence of his
identity
as
the
insufficient.
that
a
who
We cannot agree.
defendant
sufficient
individual
was
evidence
the
of
a
possessed
the
firearm
was
The testimony of one witness
person
who
defendant’s
committed
the
identity
to
crime
is
support
a
conviction.
United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273, 274 (4th
Cir. 1974).
At trial, the jury heard extensive testimony from
multiple witnesses who saw, chased, and apprehended Morris, and
who
recognized
encounter.
him
as
the
same
individual
throughout
the
Officer Spada testified that he saw Morris discard
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the firearm, and that Morris admitted to possessing the firearm.
These
facts
constituted
substantial
evidence
that
Morris
possessed the firearm.
IV.
Morris
next
unreasonable
argues
because
that
the
his
district
sentence
court
is
did
procedurally
not
provide
a
sufficiently individualized explanation for choosing a 51-month
sentence,
rejecting
sentence.
sentence
We
was
Morris’s
may
arguments
presume
substantively
that
for
a
Morris’s
reasonable.
below-Guidelines
within-Guidelines
United
States
Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216–17 (4th Cir. 2010).
v.
However,
we need not reach the question of whether the district court
erred.
of
Even if we assume that the district court’s explanation
Morris’s
sentence
was
insufficient,
we
agree
with
the
government that any error was harmless.
For a procedural sentencing error to be found harmless, the
government must show that the error “did not have a substantial
and
injurious
influence
on
the
result.”
United
States
v.
Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
The government bears the burden of
showing that the error was harmless, but it can meet this burden
by showing that it would be “unrealistic” to think that the
error affected the sentence length.
6
Id. at 840.
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To determine whether a district court’s failure to explain
a
sentencing
decision
primary factors.
was
harmless
error,
we
consider
two
The first is the strength or weakness of a
party’s arguments that the district court did not address.
at 839–40.
The second is an indication in the record that the
district court considered and understood those arguments.
Morris’s
weak.
Id.
Like
arguments
the
for
a
defendant’s
below-Guidelines
arguments
in
Id.
sentence
Boulware,
were
many
of
Morris’s arguments were based on circumstances that are “not
atypical for a defendant.”
arguments
people.
was
about
his
Id. at 840.
personal
history
He admits that his
could
be
made
by
many
Similarly, Morris’s argument that his criminal history
exaggerated
substantial.
was
weak
because
his
criminal
history
was
His argument that he did not use the firearm he
was convicted of possessing, and only carried it for protection,
has little to do with why he should be sentenced below the
Guidelines range for being a felon in possession of a firearm.
Where, as here, the government can show that the district
court
fully
considered
a
party’s
arguments
for
a
particular
sentence, but failed to explicitly address them, that failure is
a harmless error.
Boulware, 604 F.3d at 840.
In the present
case, the district court’s statement that it had “considered all
of the arguments of the parties,” J.A. 201 (emphasis added),
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demonstrates that it fully considered Morris’s arguments for a
below-Guidelines sentence.
Considering these facts, we can say with “fair assurance”
that
that
the
district
court
would
not
impose
a
different
sentence if it were forced to explain its reasoning, and the
district
court’s
“substantial
failure
and
to
injurious
do
so
could
influence”
on
not
have
Morris’s
had
a
sentence.
Boulware, 604 F.3d at 840, 838 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
assume
Morris’s
For these reasons, we hold that even if we
sentence
was
procedurally
unreasonable,
any
error was harmless.
V.
Accordingly,
We
dispense
contentions
we
with
are
affirm
oral
Morris’s
argument
adequately
conviction
because
presented
in
and
sentence.
the
facts
and
the
materials
legal
before
this court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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