US v. Kwame Djanson

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:13-cr-00177-LO-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999393663].. [13-4854]

Appeal: 13-4854

Doc: 36

Filed: 07/11/2014

Pg: 1 of 8

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4854

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KWAME ESSEL DJANSON,
Samuel Kofi Essel,

a/k/a

Quarmey

Gyanson

Essel,

a/k/a

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Liam O’Grady, District
Judge. (1:13-cr-00177-LO-1)

Submitted:

June 27, 2014

Decided:

July 11, 2014

Before KING, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Caroline S.
Platt, Appellate Attorney, Brooke Sealy Rupert, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant.
Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Dina S. Finkel, Special
Assistant United States Attorney, Gene Rossi, Assistant United
States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Appeal: 13-4854

Doc: 36

Filed: 07/11/2014

Pg: 2 of 8

PER CURIAM:
Kwame

Essel

Djanson

appeals

his

conviction

for

unlawful procurement of naturalization, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1425(a) (2012), * and the district court’s order revoking his
naturalization.

Finding no error, we affirm.

Djanson
state an
denying

first

offense,
his

timely

and

claims
the

that

the

district

motion

to

indictment

court

dismiss.

failed

to

erred

in

therefore
He

argues

that

“an

indictment for an offense which includes a ‘contrary to law’
element
violated
elements

—

without

—

is
of

stating

inadequate
the

which

law

the

because

it

does

offense

with

defendant’s
not

set

sufficient

conduct

forth

the

specificity.”

(Appellant’s Br. at 26-27).
In

reviewing

the

denial

of

a

motion

to

dismiss

an

indictment, we review the district court’s factual findings for
clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.

United States v.

Woolfolk, 399 F.3d 590, 594 (4th Cir. 2005).

“When a criminal

defendant challenges the sufficiency of an indictment prior to
the verdict, we apply a heightened scrutiny.”
Kingrea,

573

F.3d

186,

191

(4th

*

Cir.

United States v.

2009).

A

federal

Djanson does not appeal his remaining convictions for
making a false statement in connection with the purchase of a
firearm and making a false statement in an application for a
passport.

2

Appeal: 13-4854

Doc: 36

Filed: 07/11/2014

Pg: 3 of 8

indictment must contain the elements of the offense charged,
fairly

inform

defendant

to

the

defendant

plead

double

of

the

jeopardy

charge,

prosecutions for the same offense.

as

a

and

enable

defense

to

the

future

United States v. Resendiz–

Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 108 (2007); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1).
After
language

reviewing

contained

indictment

in

properly

the

the

set

statutory

indictment,

forth

the

language

the

conclude

we

and
that

the

elements

of

the

offense

charged, fairly informed Djanson of the charge, and informed him
of

the

making.

material

false

statements

that

he

was

charged

with

Although the phrase “contrary to law” is not defined in

§ 1425(a), it has been interpreted to mean a violation of the
laws governing naturalization.

See United States v. Puerta, 982

F.2d 1297, 1300-01 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The statute does not define
the phrase ‘contrary to law.’

Presumably the ‘law’ referred to

is the law governing naturalization.”); see also Fedorenko v.
United States, 449 U.S. 490, 506 (1981) (recognizing that “there
must

be

imposed

strict

compliance

prerequisites

to

with

the

all

of

acquisition

the
of

congressionally
citizenship”

and

that “[f]ailure to comply with any of these conditions renders
the

certificate

of

citizenship

‘illegally

procured,’

and

naturalization that is unlawfully procured can be set aside”).
Because knowingly making material false statements to procure
naturalization is always contrary to the law, we find Djanson’s
3

Appeal: 13-4854

Doc: 36

Filed: 07/11/2014

Pg: 4 of 8

argument without merit and we uphold the district court’s denial
of the motion to dismiss.
Djanson next alleges that the district court erred in
failing to give his proposed jury instruction on the § 1425(a)
charge and contends that the court failed to properly instruct
the jury on the “contrary to law” element of the offense.

We

review

to

de

correctly

novo
state

a

claim

the

that

a

jury

applicable

instruction

law.

See

failed

United

Jefferson, 674 F.3d 332, 351 (4th Cir. 2012).

States v.

“A trial court

has ‘considerable discretion in choosing the specific wording of
[its]

instructions,’

instructional

error

and
‘is

we

will

determined

not
to

reverse

have

based on a review of the record as a whole.’”

been

unless

an

prejudicial,

United States v.

Whitfield, 695 F.3d 288, 305 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Figg v.
Schroeder, 312 F.3d 625, 640 (4th Cir. 2002)), cert. denied, 133
S. Ct. 1461 (2013).
single

instruction

In conducting our review, we do “not view a
in

isolation;

rather

we

consider

whether

taken as a whole and in the context of the entire charge, the
instructions accurately and fairly state the controlling law.”
United States v. Rahman, 83 F.3d 89, 92 (4th Cir. 1996).
We

have

thoroughly

reviewed

Djanson’s

proposed

instruction and the instructions given by the district court in
the context of its entire charge to the jury.
above,

we

conclude

that

the

Government
4

was

not

As discussed
required

to

Appeal: 13-4854

Doc: 36

specify

an

Filed: 07/11/2014

underlying

Pg: 5 of 8

predicate

offense

Djanson with a § 1425(a) violation.

in

order

to

charge

Moreover, to the extent

that Djanson contends that the instructions never set forth the
element

that

his

statements

must

be

“contrary

to

law,”

we

conclude that the entire charge, taken as a whole, accurately
and fairly stated the controlling law.

See id.

Because Djanson

has failed to show that the “contrary to law” element was not
substantially covered by the district court’s jury charge or
that the failure to further define “contrary to law” seriously
impaired

his

ability

to

conduct

his

defense,

see

United

States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 129 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, __
S. Ct. __, 2014 WL 1747984 (U.S. June 9, 2014) (No. 13-9948), we
conclude that no error occurred.

See United States v. Latchin,

554 F.3d 709, 715 (7th Cir. 2009) (considering jury instructions
on § 1425(a) charge).
Djanson
evidence

to

next

support

argues

his

that

there

conviction.

We

was
review

insufficient
a

district

court’s decision to deny a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for a
judgment of acquittal de novo.
209,

216

sufficiency

(4th
of

Cir.
the

United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d

2006).
evidence

A

defendant

faces

a

heavy

challenging
burden.

the

United

States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997).

The

verdict of a jury must be sustained “if, viewing the evidence in
the

light

most

favorable

to

the
5

prosecution,

the

verdict

is

Appeal: 13-4854

Doc: 36

Filed: 07/11/2014

Pg: 6 of 8

supported by ‘substantial evidence.’”
(citations omitted).
reasonable

finder

Smith, 451 F.3d at 216

Substantial evidence is “evidence that a
of

fact

could

accept

as

adequate

and

sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.”
omitted).
weighs

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

Furthermore,

the

“[t]he

credibility

of

jury,
the

not

the

evidence

conflicts in the evidence presented.”

reviewing

and

court,

resolves

any

Beidler, 110 F.3d at 1067

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“Reversal for

insufficient evidence is reserved for the rare case where the
prosecution’s failure is clear.”

Id. (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).
In attacking the sufficiency of the evidence, Djanson
argues that “no witness specified which law [his] procurement of
naturalization
§ 1425(a).”

was

‘contrary

to’

(Appellant’s Br. at 34).

such

that

of

the

record

convinces

us

violated

As explained above, we

conclude that this argument is without merit.
review

it

that

Moreover, our

substantial

evidence

clearly supported the jury’s verdict in this case.
Finally,

Djanson

contends

that

the

erred in entering an order of denaturalization.

district

court

Pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1451(e) (2012),
When a person shall be convicted under section 1425 of
Title 18 of knowingly procuring naturalization in
violation of law, the court in which such conviction
6

Appeal: 13-4854

Doc: 36

Filed: 07/11/2014

Pg: 7 of 8

is had shall thereupon revoke, set aside, and declare
void the final order admitting such person to
citizenship, and shall declare the certificate of
naturalization
of
such
person
to
be
canceled.
Jurisdiction
is
conferred
on
the
courts
having
jurisdiction of the trial of such offense to make such
adjudication.
He argues that his judgment of conviction does not become final
until after he has exhausted his rights to appeal, and alleges
“the district [sic] erred when it concluded that it could not
wait to issue the denaturalization order until this appeal, and
any

potential

resolved.”

resulting

petition

for

certiorari,

have

been

(Appellant’s Br. at 36).
We conclude that Djanson’s argument is contrary to the

plain language of the statute.

Upon a § 1425(a) conviction, the

statute provides that the trial court “shall thereupon revoke,
set aside and declare void” the order admitting a defendant to
citizenship

and

naturalization.

“shall”

cancel

the

8 U.S.C. § 1451(e).

certificate

of

Moreover, the cases to

consider this statutory provision have found that revocation of
naturalization

is

automatic,

exercise of discretion.

ministerial,

and

involves

no

See, e.g., Latchin, 554 F.3d at 716

(“Under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e), a conviction for knowingly procuring
naturalization

in

violation

of

the

law

results

in

automatic

denaturalization.”); Bridges v. United States, 199 F.2d 845, 846
(9th

Cir.

1952)

(rejecting

defendant’s

claim

that

he

is

not

‘convicted’ until all appellate remedies have been exhausted and
7

Appeal: 13-4854

Doc: 36

finding

that

Filed: 07/11/2014

the

Pg: 8 of 8

revocation

“meant

is

to

be

a

part

criminal proceedings and not a separate proceeding.

of

the

This is

indicated by the language of the subsection itself which states
that

when

a

person

is

convicted

of

obtaining

citizenship

by

fraud, his citizenship shall ‘thereupon’ be revoked in the same
court where he was convicted.”), reversed on other grounds by
346 U.S. 209 (1953).

We therefore uphold the district court’s

denaturalization order.
Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment and the
district

court’s

order

revoking

naturalization.

We

dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately

expressed

in

the

materials

before

this

court

and

argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

8