Gary Wall v. James Wade
Filing
AMENDING ORDER/OPINION filed [999290844] amending and superseding Published Authored Opinion [999289086-2] dated 02/03/2014. Originating case number: 7:11-cv-00191-JLK-RSB Copies to all parties. Mailed to: Elizabeth Turner. [13-6355]
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Filed:
February 4, 2014
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-6355
(7:11-cv-00191-JLK-RSB)
GARY WALL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JAMES WADE, Food Services Manager, ROSP; ROBERT ROWLETTE,
Assistant Warden of ROSP; T. RAY, Warden of ROSP;
J. STALLARD, Counselor of ROSP,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
C.
SELYERS,
Food
Services
Supervisor,
ROSP;
CAPTAIN K. MCCOY, Employee of ROSP; SERGEANT C. GILBERT,
Employee of ROSP; SERGEANT T. ADAMS, Investigator of ROSP;
CORPORAL D. LEE, Employee of ROSP; CORPORAL D. FARMER,
Employee of ROSP; CORPORAL PHILLIPS, Employee of ROSP;
K. CROWDER-AUSTIN, Western Regional Grievance Ombudsman for
VADOC;
LIEUTENANT
J.
FANNIN,
Employee
of
ROSP;
LIEUTENANT S. DAY, Employee of ROSP; SERGEANT T. HALE,
Employee of ROSP; SERGEANT UNKNOWN, Employee of ROSP;
CORPORAL BARROWMAN, Employee of ROSP; CORPORAL GIBSON,
Employee of ROSP; CORPORAL D. VANDOVER, Property Officer of
ROSP; CORPORAL UNKOWN, Employee of ROSP; R. MULLINS,
Grievance Coordinator of ROSP; JOHN GARMAN,
Defendants.
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O R D E R
The Court amends its opinion filed February 3, 2014,
as follows:
On page 3, section I., line 6 -- the word “sunrise” is
added after the word “before.”
For the Court – By Direction
/s/ Patricia S. Connor
Clerk
2
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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-6355
GARY WALL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JAMES WADE, Food Services Manager, ROSP; ROBERT ROWLETTE,
Assistant Warden of ROSP; T. RAY, Warden of ROSP;
J. STALLARD, Counselor of ROSP,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
C.
SELYERS,
Food
Services
Supervisor,
ROSP;
CAPTAIN K. MCCOY, Employee of ROSP; SERGEANT C. GILBERT,
Employee of ROSP; SERGEANT T. ADAMS, Investigator of ROSP;
CORPORAL D. LEE, Employee of ROSP; CORPORAL D. FARMER,
Employee of ROSP; CORPORAL PHILLIPS, Employee of ROSP;
K. CROWDER-AUSTIN, Western Regional Grievance Ombudsman for
VADOC;
LIEUTENANT
J.
FANNIN,
Employee
of
ROSP;
LIEUTENANT S. DAY, Employee of ROSP; SERGEANT T. HALE,
Employee of ROSP; SERGEANT UNKNOWN, Employee of ROSP;
CORPORAL BARROWMAN, Employee of ROSP; CORPORAL GIBSON,
Employee of ROSP; CORPORAL D. VANDOVER, Property Officer of
ROSP; CORPORAL UNKOWN, Employee of ROSP; R. MULLINS,
Grievance Coordinator of ROSP; JOHN GARMAN,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke.
Jackson L. Kiser, Senior
District Judge. (7:11-cv-00191-JLK-RSB)
Argued:
December 11, 2013
Decided:
February 3, 2014
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Before GREGORY, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote
the opinion, in which Judge Davis and Judge Wynn joined.
ARGUED: Elizabeth Scott Turner, COLLEGE OF WILLIAM & MARY,
Williamsburg Virginia, for Appellant.
Earle Duncan Getchell,
Jr., OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellees.
ON BRIEF: Tillman J. Breckenridge,
Washington, D.C., Robert M. Luck III, REED SMITH LLP, Richmond,
Virginia; Patricia E. Roberts, WILLIAM & MARY LAW SCHOOL
APPELLATE AND SUPREME COURT CLINIC, Williamsburg, Virginia, for
Appellant. Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General of
Virginia,
Michael
H.
Brady,
Assistant
Solicitor
General,
Patricia
L.
West,
Chief
Deputy
Attorney
General,
Wesley G. Russell, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
2
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GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
In
this
appeal
we
review
the
application
of
a
state
prison’s policy conditioning an inmate’s request for a religious
accommodation on his possession of physical indicia of faith.
We also address whether the inmate’s claims for equitable relief
were mooted after the prison abandoned the policy.
the
district
defendants
court’s
qualified
monetary relief.
summary
immunity
judgment
on
the
order
We vacate
granting
plaintiff’s
claims
the
for
We also vacate the district court’s decision
that the prison’s abandonment of the policy mooted the claims
for equitable relief.
We remand to the district court for such
further proceedings as may be appropriate.
I.
The plaintiff, Gary Wall, is a state prisoner housed at Red
Onion State Prison (“ROSP”) in Pound, Virginia.
the
Nation
of
Islam,
in
2008
and
2009
Wall
As a member of
was
allowed
observe the holy month of Ramadan while in state custody.
accommodate
Ramadan
observance,
prison
officials
to
To
provide
participating inmates with special meals served before sunrise
and after sunset.
While at ROSP, Wall also received “common
fare” meals, which satisfied his religious beliefs.
Prior to 2010, Muslim inmates at ROSP simply had to sign up
to participate in Ramadan.
In 2009, approximately half of the
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inmate population signed up.
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ROSP staff later determined that a
significant number of the participating inmates were not, in
fact,
practicing
Muslims.
eligibility policy for 2010:
As
a
result,
ROSP
devised
a
new
in addition to signing up, inmates
had to provide some physical indicia of Islamic faith, such as a
Quran, Kufi, prayer rug, or written religious material obtained
from the prison Chaplain’s office. 1
have
such
materials
or
refused
to
ROSP inmates who did not
acquire
them
were
deemed
insincere in their religious beliefs and were prohibited from
participating in Ramadan. 2
Wall
was
participate.
one
After
of
the
inmates
initially
who
signing
was
up,
not
Wall
allowed
was
asked
to
by
defendants James Wade, C. Selyers, and J. Stallard to provide
physical evidence of the sincerity of his beliefs in accordance
with
the
new
including
his
policy.
articles
Wall
of
stated
faith,
that
had
all
been
his
lost
belongings,
during
his
1
This policy was somewhat unique among Virginia Department
of Corrections (“VDOC”) facilities.
Most prisons maintain a
“religious pass list,” which keeps track of which inmates
participate in specific religious services.
However, because
most ROSP inmates are in long-term administrative segregation,
ROSP does not offer group religious services.
Consequently,
ROSP does not keep a religious pass list.
2
In 2010, with the new policy in place, only 176 of the 360
inmates who signed up to participate provided the necessary
materials. The other 187 inmates were prohibited from observing
the fasting hours.
4
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transfer to ROSP.
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He showed Wade a state court judgment against
the Commonwealth as proof that VDOC had lost his possessions. 3
Wall
also
produced
documents
showing
that
he
was
receiving
common fare meals in accordance with his faith, and he informed
the officers that he had observed Ramadan in 2008 and 2009.
Despite this, Wade responded, “that don’t mean anything,” and
instructed Stallard and Selyers to remove Wall from the Ramadan
list.
J.A. 139.
Wall
then
filed
an
informal
complaint,
again
explaining
that his religious materials had been lost and requesting to be
allowed to participate.
In a memo in response to the complaint,
Wade reiterated ROSP’s new policy, stating:
[ROSP] does not have religious services so the
following rules apply to this institution.
You are
required to have religious material such as ([ku]f
[i], [Qu]r[a]n, prayer rug or religious pamphlets that
pertain to the Ramadan month long fasting.)
Food
service went to every inmate[’]s cell to inspect the
above religious material. Either you had no religious
material or refused to present material[.]
[T]his is
why you were removed from the Ramadan pass list.
J.A. 42.
On August 11, 2010, the first morning of Ramadan, Wall did
not eat breakfast and concealed a portion of his meal in his
3
Although the judgment itself does not reference the nature
of Wall’s underlying claim, he later received a letter from the
Virginia Attorney General’s office explaining that it was in
response to “founded grievances regarding . . . lost property
. . . .” J.A. 126.
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cell to save until after sunset.
ROSP staff found the food and
threatened to charge him with possessing contraband.
Faced with
choosing between starvation and sanctions, Wall ate during the
day and violated his religious beliefs.
On August 15, Wall filed a formal grievance, which was also
denied.
Six days later, he had a conversation with Wade and
Assistant Warden Robert Rowlette, in which Rowlette asked if he
would like to be put back on the Ramadan list provided it could
be verified that he had truly lost his belongings.
According to
Wall, he responded that he still wanted to participate, but that
he also wanted an explanation for why he was taken off the list
in the first place.
Rowlette replied, “[o]kay,” and then walked
away while Wall shouted “I want to participate in Ramadan!
want
my
Ramadan,
Rowlette!”
J.A.
140.
According
to
I
the
defendants, however, Wall refused Rowlette’s offer to be put
back on the list, saying, “[n]o, I’m going to pursue this in
court.”
J.A.
93.
Ultimately,
Wall
was
not
allowed
to
participate in Ramadan in 2010.
Having
exhausted
his
administrative
remedies,
Wall
filed
suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act
(“RLUIPA”),
§ 1983.
42
U.S.C.
§ 2000cc,
et
seq.,
and
42
U.S.C.
In an amended complaint, Wall alleged violations of
RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, in
addition
to
several
related
state
6
law
claims.
The
amended
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complaint
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sought
“[a]
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declaratory
judgment,
nominal
damages,
unspecified joint and several compensatory damages, $10,000 in
punitive damages from each defendant, and any additional relief
this court deems just, proper, and equitable.”
J.A. 32-33.
Shortly after the suit was filed, Wall was transferred out
of
ROSP
district
to
a
court
lower-security
granted
the
facility.
defendants’
Subsequently,
motion
for
the
summary
judgment, finding that any claims for equitable relief were moot
following Wall’s transfer, and ruling that the defendants were
entitled
to
qualified
immunity
on
the
plaintiff’s
claim
for
damages.
Following the district court’s ruling, Wall was transferred
back
to
ROSP.
The
defendants
claim
that
ROSP
has
since
abandoned its policy of requiring prisoners to possess physical
indicia of faith in order to participate in Ramadan or other
religious observations.
The new policy, adopted in a September
13, 2011 memo by VDOC’s Chief of Corrections Operations, 4 states
that
inmates
demonstrate
in
segregation
sincerity
by
facilities,
showing
that
such
they
have
as
in
ROSP,
the
may
past
borrowed religious material such as DVDs, CDs, or literature
4
The memo was not submitted as evidence in this case and is
therefore not part of the record, but it was referenced in a
related case involving the same policy.
DePaola v. Wade, No.
7:11-cv-00198, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44340, *7-10 (W.D. Va. Mar.
30, 2012).
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from the Chaplain’s office.
made
following
an
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The memo states that the change was
investigation
by
VDOC’s
Inspector
General,
which concluded that “it is not appropriate to require inmates
to buy something which is related to exercising First Amendment
[r]ights.”
Following the policy change, Wall and other inmates
who were prohibited from observing Ramadan in 2010 were allowed
to participate in a “make-up” Ramadan in April 2012.
II.
We review two issues in this appeal:
whether the district
court correctly determined that Wall’s equitable claims under
RLUIPA
and
the
First
Amendment
were
moot
following
ROSP’s
decision to abandon the 2010 Ramadan policy; and whether the
district
court
correctly
granted
the
defendants
qualified
immunity on Wall’s First Amendment claim for damages. 5
issues are questions of law which we review de novo.
v.
City
of
(mootness);
Raleigh,
Johnson
v.
523
F.3d
Caudill,
2007) (qualified immunity).
293,
475
298
F.3d
(4th
645,
650
Both
See Green
Cir.
(4th
2008)
Cir.
We address the issues in turn.
5
We note at the forefront that Congress did not authorize
damages claims against state officials under RLUIPA.
See
Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1658-59 (2011) (prohibiting
damages claims against state officials in their official
capacity); Rendleman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 189 (4th Cir. 2009)
(same for individual capacity). Therefore, the plaintiff’s only
potential remedies under RLUIPA are equitable.
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A.
In granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
the
district
court
that
Wall’s
transfer
to
his request for equitable relief. 6
facility mooted
Wall’s
found
subsequent
return
to
ROSP
rendered
this
another
Although
justification
obsolete, the district court also ruled that in such an event
Wall’s claims would remain moot in light of VDOC’s decision to
terminate the 2010 Ramadan policy.
It
is
cessation
well
of
a
established
challenged
that
practice”
a
defendant’s
moots
an
“voluntary
action
only
if
“subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly
wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528
U.S.
167,
189
(2000);
see
Knox
6
v.
Service
Employees
Intern.
As an initial matter, the defendants argue that, to the
extent Wall has a justiciable claim for equitable relief, his
amended complaint failed to request injunctive relief in
particular.
While it is true that his original complaint was
more specific than the amended complaint, we are comfortable
reading Wall’s prayer for any relief deemed “just, proper, and
equitable” as encompassing a claim for injunctive relief.
An
appropriately liberal reading of the amended complaint indicates
that Wall sought to prevent the defendants from wrongfully
limiting his observance of Ramadan in the future through the
issuance of an injunction.
See De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d
520, 524 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[Courts must] afford liberal
construction to the allegations in pro se complaints raising
civil rights issues.”).
We also note that the district court,
while not explicitly ruling on the issue, referred to Wall’s
claim as a request for “injunctive relief.” J.A. 142.
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Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (2012) (“The voluntary
cessation of challenged conduct does not ordinarily render a
case
moot
because
a
dismissal
for
mootness
would
permit
a
resumption of the challenged conduct as soon as the case is
dismissed.”).
Were it otherwise, “courts would be compelled to
leave ‘[t]he defendant . . . free to return to his old ways.’”
City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, 455 U.S. 283, 289 n.10
(1982) (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629,
632 (1953)).
“The ‘heavy burden of persua[ding]’ the court that
the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up
again lies with the party asserting mootness.”
Laidlaw, 528
U.S. at 189 (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate
Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)).
We have no difficulty concluding that the defendants failed
to
meet
their
“heavy
“absolutely
clear”
reinstated.
Id.
burden”
the
2010
of
establishing
Ramadan
policy
that
will
it
is
not
be
Unsubstantiated assurances in their appellate
brief aside, the defendants have failed to put forth even a
single
piece
of
evidence
establishing
that
the
practice
of
requiring physical indicia of faith has been terminated once and
for all.
The September 13, 2011 memorandum describing VDOC’s
purported change in policy –- which was only submitted in a
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different case 7 –- also fails to establish that VDOC will not
reinstate the policy following completion of this lawsuit.
We
have previously held that when a defendant retains the authority
and capacity to repeat an alleged harm, a plaintiff’s claims
should not be dismissed as moot.
Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko,
728 F.3d 391, 395 n.3 (4th Cir. 2013); Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d
307, 316 (4th Cir. 2013); Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes,
Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 800 (4th Cir. 2001).
suggests
that
VDOC
is
actually
barred
Nothing in the memo
–-
or
even
considers
itself barred -- from reinstating the 2010 Ramadan policy should
it so choose.
separate
To the contrary, the fact that at least three
policies
have
been
utilized
at
ROSP
since
2009
indicates some degree of doubt that the new policy will remain
in place for long.
The defendants invite us to adopt an approach employed by
several of our sister circuits, in which governmental defendants
are
held
to
defendants.
a
less
demanding
burden
of
proof
than
private
See, e.g., Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of
Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1116 (10th Cir. 2010) (“In practice
. . . ,
Laidlaw’s
heavy
burden
frequently
has
not
prevented
governmental officials from discontinuing challenged practices
7
While we are confident in our authority to take judicial
notice of the memorandum, we note that litigants do themselves
no favor in relying on our willingness to do so.
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and mooting a case.”); Sossamon v. Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 325 (5th
Cir.
2009)
(“[C]ourts
are
justified
in
treating
a
voluntary
governmental cessation of possibly wrongful conduct with some
solicitude,
mooting
cases
that
might
have
been
allowed
proceed had the defendant not been a public entity.”).
to
However,
even if we were to adopt this approach, a question which we
expressly do not decide, we would have no trouble determining
that the defendants’ near total failure to provide the Court
with information regarding the change would remain insufficient
even under a lesser standard.
In short, bald assertions of a
defendant –- whether governmental or private –- that it will not
resume a challenged policy fail to satisfy any burden of showing
that a claim is moot. 8
We therefore vacate the district court’s
dismissal of the plaintiff’s equitable claims.
8
Nor do we find any merit in the defendants’ contention
that the voluntary cessation doctrine does not apply in this
case because the change in policy was unrelated to the
litigation.
See ACLU of Mass. v. U.S. Conf. of Catholic
Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 55 (1st Cir. 2013) (“[T]he voluntary
cessation doctrine does not apply when the voluntary cessation
of the challenged activity occurs because of reasons unrelated
to the litigation.”) (quoting M. Redish, Moore’s Federal
Practice, § 101.99[2]). It is undisputed that the September 13,
2011 memo was issued after the plaintiff’s original complaint
was filed; and, as noted above, the change was made in the midst
of a separate lawsuit filed by another ROSP inmate challenging
the same policy. The timing strongly indicates that the change
was at least somewhat related to the two pending lawsuits.
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B.
Turning to the plaintiff’s claim for monetary damages under
the
First
defendants
Amendment,
were
the
entitled
to
district
court
qualified
ruled
that
immunity. 9
the
Qualified
immunity protects government officials performing discretionary
functions unless:
true,
substantiate
“(1) the allegations underlying the claim, if
the
violation
of
a
federal
statutory
or
constitutional right; and (2) this violation was of a clearly
established
known.”
right
of
which
a
reasonable
person
would
have
Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d
292, 306 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
we conclude that the defendants have failed to establish as a
matter of law that the 2010 Ramadan policy, as applied to the
plaintiff, did not violate his First Amendment rights.
We also
hold that their alleged actions violated the plaintiff’s clearly
established rights, and that they are therefore not entitled to
qualified immunity.
9
The plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief are not
affected by the doctrine of qualified immunity, which “has no
application to suits for declaratory or injunctive relief.”
South Carolina State Bd. of Dentistry v. F.T.C., 455 F.3d 436,
446-47 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Rowley v. McMillan, 502 F.2d
1326, 1331 (4th Cir. 1974)).
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1.
“The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment forbids
the adoption of laws designed to suppress religious beliefs or
practices.”
2001).
Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 656 (4th Cir.
This
encompasses
policies
that
impose
a
substantial
burden on a prisoner’s right to practice his religion.
v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 198 & n.8 (4th Cir. 2006).
the
Free
Exercise
established
. . .
Clause
right
. . . ,
to
a
a
diet
prisoner
consistent
Lovelace
“Under . . .
has
with
a
‘clearly
his
. . .
religious scruples,’ including proper food during Ramadan.”
Id.
at 198-99 (quoting Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 597 (2nd Cir.
2003)).
The
defendants
concede
that
denying
Wall
the
opportunity to observe Ramadan imposed a substantial burden on
his religious freedom.
However,
adapted
to
permissible.
free
exercise
achieving
Id.
at
a
restrictions
legitimate
200.
In
that
are
penological
other
“reasonably
objective”
words,
then,
are
prison
officials may restrict an inmate’s religious practices subject
to a “reasonableness” test that accords substantial deference to
the professional judgment of correctional officers.
See Overton
v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003). 10
10
This differs from the test utilized under RLUIPA, which
requires that restrictions be narrowly tailored to a compelling
government interest. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). Thus, in the
(Continued)
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A prison regulation is reasonable and thus permissible if
it satisfies the four factors established in Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78 (1987).
That test asks:
(1) whether there is a
“valid, rational connection” between the prison regulation or
action and the interest asserted by the government, or whether
this interest is “so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or
irrational”; (2) whether “alternative means of exercising the
right . . . remain open to prison inmates”; (3) what impact the
desired accommodation would have on security staff, inmates, and
the allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether there exist
any “obvious, easy alternatives” to the challenged regulation or
action.
Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 200 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at
89-92).
As
a
appropriately
asserted
as
authentic.”
preliminary
question
the
basis
Cutter
v.
matter,
whether
for
a
“prison
a
prisoner’s
requested
Wilkinson,
officials
544
may
religiosity,
accommodation,
U.S.
709,
725
n.
is
13
(2005); see Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 457 (1971)
(“[T]he ‘truth’ of a belief is not open to question; rather, the
prison context, the First Amendment affords officials greater
latitude than RLUIPA. Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 199 n. 8. (“RLUIPA
adopts a ‘more searching standard’ of review than that used for
parallel First Amendment claims, strict scrutiny instead of
reasonableness.”) (quoting Madison v. Ritter, 355 F.3d 310, 31415 n.1 (4th Cir. 2003)).
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question is whether the objector’s beliefs are ‘truly held.’”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
limit
religious
question
in
accommodations
this
case
is
Accepting that prisons may
to
sincere
whether
ROSP’s
believers,
specific
means
the
of
testing Wall’s sincerity was permissible; that is, whether ROSP
was allowed to require him to possess specific, physical items
of Islamic faith as proof of belief.
We
hold
that
under
the
current
record,
the
defendants’
application of the 2010 Ramadan policy fails an analysis under
the Turner factors. 11
as
proof
achieving
Strict
of
faith
the
officials
will
prison’s
application
connection
First, demanding specific physical items
of
make
stated
such
requirement.
must
rarely
a
be
an
acceptable
interest
rule
Although
determinations
in
fails
we
of
reducing
even
recognize
who
means
is
a
that
of
costs.
rational
prison
entitled
to
accommodations, it exceeds their authority to decide which, if
any,
religious
relics
are
sufficiently
11
important
as
to
With limited exceptions, much of the material facts
regarding the defendants’ actions are undisputed.
However, for
the plaintiff to ultimately succeed on remand, he must still
prove that the defendants’ actions were intentional.
Lovelace,
472 F.3d at 194-95, 201-02 (holding that suits under both RLUIPA
and the First Amendment require a showing of “conscious or
intentional interference” with the plaintiff’s rights).
In
evaluating the legality of the policy in this section of the
opinion, we focus on the largely undisputed allegations of the
defendants’ actions, and not their as yet unproven intent.
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constitute an appropriate gauge of faith.
albeit
under
administrators
RLUIPA’s
more
may
assume
not
exacting
that
This Court has held,
standard,
a
“lack
of
that
prison
sincerity
(or
religiosity) with respect to one practice [of a given religion]
means lack of sincerity with respect to others.”
F.3d
at
188.
Thus,
the
fact
that
Wall
did
Lovelace, 472
not
have,
for
example, a prayer rug in his possession is not a sufficiently
reliable indicator of whether he is a practicing Muslim.
A
prison may not condition an inmate’s constitutionally protected
rights on so narrow a set of grounds without “render[ing] the
policy arbitrary or irrational.”
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90.
Indeed, the circumstances of Wall’s case highlight exactly
why such an unyielding policy is unreasonable.
Despite Wall’s
other outward manifestations of faith, most notably his past
participation
in
Ramadan
and
common
fare
diet, 12
he
was
prohibited from observing the fast solely because he did not
possess any of the approved items.
The defendants also ignored
Wall’s perfectly believable explanation, later verified, that he
did not have the items only because VDOC had lost all of his
12
The defendants note that members of a number of different
faiths receive the common fare diet, making it an over-inclusive
test.
However, Wall’s amended complaint states that he
presented Selyers with his common fare signup form, which
specifically notes his Islamic faith as the justification for
participating in the diet.
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belongings during his transfer to ROSP.
Nor was Wall’s attempt
to store food in his cell on the first day of Ramadan enough to
convince ROSP officials that he was sincere in his desire to
observe the fasting requirements.
Wall also continued to pursue
the issue after his initial denial, filing several grievances
and requesting to be placed back on the list.
rejected
these
requests
and
simply
The defendants
reiterated
their
without further consideration of Wall’s circumstances.
policy
Finally,
at least according to Wall, on August 21, 2011, Rowlette offered
to place Wall back on the participation list provided he could
verify that Wall’s belongings had actually been lost.
Rowlette
then rescinded the offer once Wall stated that he intended to
pursue a formal adjudication of the matter regardless.
Taking
this fact in the light most favorable to Wall, it indicates that
the officials were more interested in protecting their earlier
decision
than
in
honestly
discerning
whether
Wall
should
be
permitted to participate.
In
short,
Wall
has
alleged
that
the
defendants
ignored
numerous signs that he is a practicing Muslim who was merely
seeking to exercise his genuinely held beliefs.
policy
in
so
rigid
a
manner,
18
the
restriction
By applying the
lost
whatever
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“valid, rational connection” to the government’s stated interest
that might have existed at the time it was adopted. 13
An analysis of the remaining Turner factors also supports
the
plaintiff’s
claims.
The
second
factor
asks
whether
“alternative means of exercising the right . . . remain open to
[the] prison[er].”
absolutely
482 U.S. at 90.
precluded
defendants’ actions.
from
observing
It is clear that Wall was
Ramadan
because
of
the
When he attempted to adhere to the fasting
requirements on his own by storing food in his cell, he was
threatened with disciplinary action.
The only alternative means
proffered by the defendants is that had Wall obeyed the policy,
he would have been allowed to participate.
This suggestion, of
course, it is not an “alternative means” at all, it is merely a
13
We note our disagreement with the defendants’ suggestion
that the Supreme Court’s decision in O’Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350 (1987), is controlling.
In O’Lone,
the Court examined a prison’s policy of prohibiting inmates
assigned to outside work duty from returning to the prison
during the day in order to attend Jumu’ah, an Islamic
congregational service held on Friday afternoons.
Id. at 349.
The Court deemed that the policy was logically related to the
prison’s legitimate interest in maintaining “institutional order
and security” by relieving overcrowding, easing “congestion and
delays at the main gate,” and lessening the pressure on the
guards who previously had to evaluate individual return
requests.
Id. at 350-51.
While the O’Lone decision certainly
supports
the
general
proposition
that
courts
should
be
deferential to the decisions of prison administrators, the case
does not examine the relevant issue in this case -- the
reasonableness of a sincerity test –- and is therefore largely
inapposite.
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reiteration of the same rigid requirements Wall was unable to
meet. 14
We
also
believe
that
the
third
Turner
factor,
which
examines the impact the requested accommodation would have on
the prison’s efficient operation, also supports the plaintiff’s
claim.
482
U.S.
at
92.
We
are
not
satisfied
that
the
defendants have sufficiently explained how a less restrictive
policy
would
resources.
have
imposed
a
significant
burden
on
prison
The defendants contend generally that Ramadan is
expensive because participants require special meals, and the
schedules
of
both
inmates
and
guards
must
accommodate pre-dawn and post-sunset meals.
be
rearranged
to
However, the record
is void of any specific information regarding these purported
costs, and we are not content to permit a prison to deny an
inmate’s constitutional right in the face of such generalized
14
We recognize that in O’Lone the Supreme Court interpreted
the concept of alternative means broadly, asking not only
whether a particular religious practice has been impeded, but
instead addressing “all forms of religious exercise” of the
prisoner’s faith.
482 U.S. at 352.
However, such an
interpretation is unduly restrictive with respect to Wall’s
case.
Ramadan, unlike Jumu’ah, is one of the five pillars of
Islam, and its observance is integral to all practicing Muslims.
Moreover, we have previously held that “a prisoner has a clearly
established . . . right to a diet consistent with his . . .
religious scruples, including proper food during Ramadan.”
Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 198-99 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
We decline to read O’Lone, decided before
Lovelace, as conflicting with the latter’s holding.
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This is especially so in light of the negligible
costs associated with adding one additional inmate to an already
existent
program.
convincing
Nor
argument
why
have
an
the
defendants
individualized
presented
interpretation
Wall’s case would have been unduly burdensome.
a
in
To the contrary,
Wall presented the officials with significant evidence of his
Muslim faith, which the defendants could have accepted without
the need to conduct any further investigation on their own.
Finally, we are satisfied that there existed “easy[] [and]
obvious alternatives” to the challenged regulation.
Id. at 93.
This
ultimately
is
most
plainly
seen
in
the
fact
that
ROSP
changed its policy, which has since allowed Wall and others to
observe Ramadan without incident.
Additionally, a VDOC guidance
document issued June 25, 2010 addressed how inmates who were not
on
an
institution’s
demonstrate
designated
eligibility
for
religious
Ramadan
pass
list
observance.
could
One
consideration utilized was past involvement in Ramadan fasting.
ROSP, which does not maintain religious pass lists due to its
status as a segregation facility, could have utilized the same,
less restrictive criterion for determining eligibility.
In
sum,
viewing
the
current
record
in
the
light
most
favorable to the plaintiff, the defendants’ application of the
2010
Ramadan
defendants
policy
relied
to
Wall
exclusively
on
21
was
a
unconstitutional.
narrow
set
of
The
parameters
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while ignoring obvious indications of the sincerity of Wall’s
beliefs.
The First Amendment demands a more reasoned approach,
even within the difficult confines of a prison environment. 15
2.
Having established a claim for a constitutional violation,
we must now ask whether the defendants transgressed law that was
“clearly established” at the time of the violation.
447 F.3d at 306.
Ridpath,
We conclude that, given Wall’s circumstances,
his right to participate in Ramadan was clearly established, and
the defendants are therefore not entitled to qualified immunity.
As
noted,
we
have
previously
held
that
under
“the
Free
Exercise Clause . . . a prisoner has a clearly established . . .
right to a diet consistent with his . . . religious scruples,
including proper food during Ramadan.”
Lovelace, 472 F.3d at
198-99 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
established
Further, “[a] prison official violates this clearly
right
if
he
intentionally
15
and
without
sufficient
To be clear, we do not decide that prisons may never
require some tangible evidence of faith in support of a
religious accommodation. Rather, our reasoning merely restricts
prisons from requiring specific physical indicia of faith in the
face of significant alternative evidence that an inmate’s
beliefs are sincere. Nor do we mean to suggest that bright line
rules have no place in governing religious accommodation
requests, but only that prison officials may not turn a blind
eye to obvious justifications for exceptions when they present
themselves so plainly.
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justification denies an inmate his religiously mandated diet.”
Id. at 199.
We take these statements to mean quite exactly what
they
that
say:
Wall’s
right
to
participate
in
Ramadan
was
clearly established, and when the defendants abridged this right
without
subjected
first
satisfying
themselves
to
Turner’s
the
reasonableness
potential
for
test,
they
liability.
As
expressed above, the defendants’ application of their policy to
Wall
was
unnecessarily
strict.
They
overlooked
(at
best)
significant evidence that Wall was, in fact, a practicing Muslim
who was entitled to participate in Ramadan.
We cannot conclude
that a reasonable official in the defendants’ position, giving
proper consideration to our statement in Lovelace that the right
is clearly established, and to Turner’s objective reasonableness
test, would have felt it permissible to apply the policy in so
strict a fashion.
The defendants attempt to avoid this rather straightforward
result by arguing that there is a lack of case law elucidating
exactly how prisons may utilize sincerity tests in determining
eligibility for religious accommodations.
While it may be true
that we have never specifically evaluated a sincerity test, 16
16
Although not directly on point, we believe the result in
Lovelace is relevant for reasons beyond its general affirmation
that inmates are entitled to religious dietary accommodations.
In that case, we reviewed a prison’s policy of removing inmates
from its Ramadan list if they were observed breaking the fast
(Continued)
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argument
overlooks
the
Pg: 26 of 27
broader
right
at
issue:
that
inmates are entitled to religious dietary accommodations absent
a legitimate reason to the contrary.
stated,
clearly
established
As we have previously
“includes
not
only
already
specifically adjudicated rights, but those manifestly included
within
more
general
principle invoked.”
Cir. 1992).
applications
of
the
core
constitutional
Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 314 (4th
In light of our unequivocal statement in Lovelace
that inmates are entitled to religious dietary accommodations,
we
need
not
to
have
previously
passed
judgment
on
the
appropriateness of particular sincerity tests in order to demand
that
right.
prison
officials
act
reasonably
in
administering
that
An expectation of reasonableness in this context is not
a high bar, and does not punish officials for “bad guesses in
gray areas.”
1992).
Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir.
To the contrary, it offers only a minimal level of
even a single time. Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 181. We held that,
under RLUIPA’s more demanding standard, the policy was not the
least restrictive means of furthering the government’s interest
in efficiently running the prison. Id. at 190-94. Although the
policy was intended as a disciplinary measure and the inmate’s
sincerity was never in question, id. at 187 n. 2, the case
remains an example of how a harsh and unyielding policy may be
unlawful in the context of clearly protected individual rights.
It thus provided at least some degree of guidance to the
defendants in this case, if not enough to be dispositive.
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protection to inmates seeking to exercise their constitutionally
protected rights.
Having found that the plaintiff has established a claim for
a violation of his clearly established First Amendment rights,
we vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the
plaintiff’s First Amendment claim for damages.
III.
For the reasons explained above, we vacate the district
court’s decision concluding that (1) the plaintiff’s equitable
claims
are
moot,
and
(2)
the
defendants
are
entitled
to
qualified immunity on the plaintiff’s First Amendment damages
claim.
In so doing, we necessarily find that the plaintiff’s
claim under RLUIPA survives summary judgment as well, as such
claims are evaluated under the same factors, but subject to a
less demanding standard of proof.
See Lovelace, 472 F.3d at
190. Accordingly, we remand this action to the district court
for further
proceedings as appropriate.
VACATED AND REMANDED
25
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