Edmund Goins v. Warden, Perry Correctional In

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:12-cv-00267-JMC. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999378116]. Mailed to: Robert Dressel, Ethan Simon, Jacky Werman. [13-6407]

Appeal: 13-6407

Doc: 42

Filed: 06/18/2014

Pg: 1 of 18

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-6407

EDMUND GOINS,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
WARDEN, PERRY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,
Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Orangeburg.
J. Michelle Childs, District
Judge. (5:12-cv-00267-JMC)

Argued:

May 14, 2014

Decided:

June 18, 2014

Before GREGORY and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Robert Dressel, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW,
Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant.
James Anthony Mabry,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Stephen L. Braga, Kevin
Cope, Ethan Simon, Third Year Law Student, Jacky Werman, Third
Year Law Student, Appellate Litigation Clinic, UNIVERSITY OF
VIRGINIA
SCHOOL
OF
LAW,
Charlottesville,
Virginia,
for
Appellant.
Alan Wilson, Attorney General, John W. McIntosh,
Deputy Attorney General, Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant

Appeal: 13-6407

Doc: 42

Filed: 06/18/2014

Pg: 2 of 18

Deputy Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

2

Appeal: 13-6407

Doc: 42

Filed: 06/18/2014

Pg: 3 of 18

PER CURIAM:
Appellant Edmund Goins (“Appellant”), an inmate in the
custody of the state of South Carolina, petitions for a writ of
habeas corpus in connection with his life sentence for assault
and battery with intent to kill (“ABWIK”).

He argues that his

trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984), for failing to present evidence of his
mental health issues in order to negate the mens rea required
for an ABWIK conviction.
On state habeas review, the South Carolina Court of
Appeals

rejected

reasoning

that

Appellant’s

his

counsel’s

ineffective
failure

to

assistance
present

the

claim,
mental

health evidence could not have prejudiced the outcome of his
trial because South Carolina does not recognize a diminished
capacity defense.

See Goins v. State (“Goins I”), No. 2010–UP–

339, 2010 WL 10080077, at *1 (S.C. Ct. App. June 29, 2010).

The

District Court for the District of South Carolina agreed.

See

Goins v. Warden, Perry Corr. Inst. (“Goins II”), No. 5:12–cv–
00267-JMC,

2013

WL

652995

(D.S.C.

February

21,

2013).

We

granted a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) “on the issue of
whether [Appellant] received ineffective assistance of counsel
based on his claim that his trial attorney failed to adequately
investigate or present evidence regarding [his] mental health
issues.”
3

Appeal: 13-6407

Doc: 42

Filed: 06/18/2014

Pg: 4 of 18

We conclude that Appellant’s challenge is, at bottom,
a challenge to a state court’s interpretation and application of
its own law, the federal ramifications of which have not been
preserved for our review.

Consequently, we affirm the judgment

of the district court.
I.
On

May

maximum-security

30,

2000,

cell

within

Appellant
the

was

incarcerated

Cherokee

County

in

a

Detention

Center in Cherokee County, South Carolina, where he was awaiting
trial on several counts of breaking and entering.

Appellant had

spent the day engaging in a variety of disciplinary infractions,
including flooding his toilet, dismantling a mop, and blocking
the view into his cell.

He was naked, as his uniform had been

confiscated, save for a pair of underwear that he was wearing on
his head, he says, to “keep [his] head warm.”

J.A. 176. 1

In

response to Appellant’s escalating infractions, two correctional
officers, Officers Blackwell and Wisher, asked cellblock control
to open his cell door.

Once the door was opened, Appellant

rushed out, wielding a pillow and a filed metal rod.
ensuing

melee,

Appellant

stabbed

1

Officer

Blackwell

In the
several

Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed
by the parties in this appeal.

4

Appeal: 13-6407

Doc: 42

times.

Filed: 06/18/2014

Pg: 5 of 18

Officer Wisher and a second inmate, Trustee Ellis, were

stabbed when they attempted to intervene.
As a result of this incident, Appellant was indicted
in

the

Cherokee

County

counts of ABWIK.

Court

of

General

Sessions

for

three

On July 23, 2001, a jury convicted Appellant

on one count of ABWIK, for the attack on Officer Blackwell, and
two counts of the lesser included offense of assault and battery
of a high and aggravated nature (“ABHAN”), for the attacks on
Officer

Wisher

history,

which

court

and

Trustee

included

sentenced

a

Ellis.
prior

Appellant

to

Based

ABWIK
a

on

his

conviction,

mandatory

criminal
the

state

of

life

term

imprisonment without parole on the ABWIK count, see S.C. Code
Ann.

§

17-25-45,

and

to

two

consecutive

imprisonment on the ABHAN counts.

terms

of

ten

years

Appellant’s direct appeal, in

which he filed a pro se brief asserting ineffective assistance
of counsel, was unsuccessful.
On March 9, 2004, Appellant filed an application for
post-conviction

relief

(“PCR”)

in

state

court.

In

that

application, he argued that his trial counsel was ineffective
for

failing

to

investigate

or

present

at

trial

concerning his history of mental health problems.
22,

2005,

Appellant’s
testified,

the

PCR

claims.
and

court

conducted

Both

Appellant

an

Appellant
submitted
5

On September

evidentiary
and

his

various

evidence

hearing

on

trial

counsel

medical

records

Appeal: 13-6407

Doc: 42

related

to

Filed: 06/18/2014

his

evidence”).

stays

at

Pg: 6 of 18

area

hospitals

(the

“mental

health

Appellant did not present any expert testimony in

support of his claims.
On
granting

July

3,

Appellant

conviction.

2006,

habeas

the

PCR

relief

on

court
all

entered
three

an

order

counts

of

The PCR court found, inter alia, that Appellant had

a documented history of diagnoses for mood disorder, bipolar
disorder,

polysubstance

personality disorder.

related

disorder,

and

antisocial

In the PCR court’s view,

[I]f a jury had been exposed to evidence of
the
Applicant’s
prior
episode
of
decomposition where he stripped off his
clothes and engaged in aberrant behavior, 2
there is a reasonable probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome of
this
trial,
that
the
jury
would
have
interpreted the Applicant’s conduct on May
30, 2000, as impulsive and dangerous, but
insufficient to support a finding of [the
mens rea required for ABWIK]. . . . [and]
returned three convictions on ABHAN, as
opposed to two convictions on ABHAN and one
for AB[W]IK.

2

Appellant’s medical records contain reference to an
incident that occurred in 1997, when Appellant was first
diagnosed
with
bipolar
disorder.
See
J.A.
384-86.
Specifically, on October 3, 1997, Appellant took off all of his
clothes and climbed a water tower because he believed he was
speaking with God.
See id. at 316-17, 384.
Immediately
following this incident, Appellant was involuntarily committed
to the Dorothea Dix Hospital in Raleigh, North Carolina. He was
released on October 9, 1997, over two and a half years before he
engaged in the conduct giving rise to the ABWIK conviction at
issue in the instant case.

6

Appeal: 13-6407

Doc: 42

Filed: 06/18/2014

Pg: 7 of 18

J.A. 495 (internal citations omitted).
On July 30, 2007, the state of South Carolina filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme
Court.

That court transferred the appeal to the South Carolina

Court of Appeals, which granted the petition for the writ of
certiorari

on

March

11,

2009.

The

South

Carolina

Court

of

Appeals reversed the PCR Court’s grant of post-conviction relief
and reinstated the three convictions on June 29, 2010.
In its opinion, the South Carolina Court of Appeals
acknowledged

the

mental

health

evidence,

but

emphasized

that

Appellant had not “put forth any evidence that he was either
insane at the time of the assaults or incompetent at the time of
trial.”

Goins I, No. 2010–UP–339, 2010 WL 10080077, at *1 (S.C.

App. June 29, 2010).
prejudice

analysis

It went on to characterize the PCR court’s
as

“tantamount

to

a

recognition

of

the

defense of diminished capacity, 3 which we do not recognize in

3

The South Carolina Supreme Court
diminished capacity defense as follows:

has

described

The diminished capacity doctrine allows a
defendant to offer evidence of his mental
condition with respect to his capacity to
achieve the mens rea required for the
commission of the offense charged.
In
particular, the defense may be invoked to
negate specific intent, where such intent is
an
element
of
the
offense
charged.
Diminished
capacity
differs
from
the
insanity defense in that it may be raised by
(Continued)
7

the

Appeal: 13-6407

Doc: 42

this state.”

Filed: 06/18/2014

Pg: 8 of 18

Id. at *1 (citations omitted).

Consequently, the

South Carolina Court of Appeals concluded, Appellant had failed
to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s failure to introduce
this evidence “undermine[d] confidence in the outcome of the
trial.”

Id. (citing Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 42-44

(2009) (per curiam)).
Appellant

unsuccessfully

sought

discretionary

review

of the South Carolina Court of Appeals’ decision in the South
Carolina

Supreme

Court.

Thereafter,

on

January

26,

2012,

Appellant filed a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C
§ 2254 in the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina.

In his petition, he again argued that he was

denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel
failed to investigate his mental health disorders and present
the mental health evidence.

On February 21, 2013, the district

court dismissed the petition and denied a COA.

See Goins II,

No. 5:12–cv–00267-JMC, 2013 WL 652995, at *4 (D.S.C. February
21, 2013).
18,

2013,

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on March
and

we

granted

a

COA

“on

the

issue

of

whether

a defendant who has conceded to be legally
sane.
Gill v. State, 552 S.E.2d 26, 32 (S.C. 2001) (internal citations
omitted).

8

Appeal: 13-6407

Doc: 42

Filed: 06/18/2014

Pg: 9 of 18

[Appellant] received ineffective assistance of counsel based on
his

claim

that

his

trial

attorney

failed

to

adequately

investigate or present evidence regarding [his] mental health
issues.”
II.
Although we review de novo a district court’s decision
on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that is based on the
state court record, see Barnes v. Joyner, --- F.3d ----, 2014 WL
1759085, at *6 (4th Cir. May 5, 2014), we review the underlying
state court judgment pursuant to the deferential standards set
forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (“AEDPA”).
The relevant statute permits a federal court to grant
relief to a state petitioner “only on the ground that he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see also Wilson v.

Corcoran, 131 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2010) (per curiam) (“‘[F]ederal
habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’”
(quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991))).
claim

has

been

adjudicated

on

the

merits

in

a

state

When a
court

proceeding, habeas relief is permissible under AEDPA only if the
state court’s determination:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as
9

Appeal: 13-6407

Doc: 42

Filed: 06/18/2014

determined by the
United States; or

Pg: 10 of 18

Supreme

Court

of

the

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

We must also presume the correctness of

the state court’s factual findings unless rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence, see id. § 2254(e)(1), and we are bound by
“a

state

court’s

announced

on

Bradshaw

v.

interpretation

direct
Richey,

appeal
546

of

U.S.

of

state

the

law,

including

challenged

74,

76

one

conviction,”

(2005)

(per

curiam)

(citations omitted).
As
repeatedly

the

Supreme

emphasized,

Court

AEDPA

of

the

imposes

United

States

a

“highly

has

deferential

standard for evaluating state-court rulings” that “demands that
state-court
Woodford

v.

decisions
Visciotti,

be

given

537

U.S.

the
19,

(internal quotation marks omitted).
is

not

whether

a

federal

court

benefit
24

of

the
(per

(2002)

doubt.”
curiam)

“The question under AEDPA
believes

the

state

court’s

determination was incorrect but whether that determination was
unreasonable —-a substantially higher threshold.”
Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007).

Schriro v.

Accordingly, “[a] state

court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal
habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on
the correctness of the state court’s decision.”
10

Harrington v.

Appeal: 13-6407

Doc: 42

Richter,

Filed: 06/18/2014

131

S.

Ct.

770,

Pg: 11 of 18

786

(2011)

Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).

(quoting

Yarborough

v.

A state prisoner, in other

words, “‘must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim
being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification
that

there

was

existing

an

law

error

well

beyond

understood

any

and

comprehended

possibility

for

in

fairminded

disagreement’” in order to obtain habeas relief from a federal
court.

White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (quoting

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 786-87).
To establish ineffective assistance under Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a state habeas petitioner
must demonstrate not only that (1) his counsel’s performance was
deficient and (2) he suffered prejudice as a result, but also
that “the state court’s rejection of [the] claim of ineffective
assistance

of

counsel

was

‘contrary

to,

or

involved

an

unreasonable application of’ Strickland, or it rested ‘on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.’”
558

U.S.

30,

§ 2254(d)).
performance
suffered

39

the

(per

curiam)

(quoting

28

U.S.C.

Notably, we need not address whether “counsel’s
was

by

deficient

the

deficiencies.”
that

(2009)

Porter v. McCollum,

state

defendant

before
as

a

examining
result

the
of

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
court

“reasonably
11

could

have

the

prejudice
alleged

If we determine
concluded

that

Appeal: 13-6407

Doc: 42

Filed: 06/18/2014

Pg: 12 of 18

[Appellant] was not prejudiced by counsel’s actions,” then we
need proceed no further with Appellant’s claim.

Premo v. Moore,

131 S. Ct. 733, 745 (2011).
Under Strickland’s prejudice prong, “[t]he defendant
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.”
Supreme

Court,

“[a]

466 U.S. at 694.

reasonable

probability

As defined by the
is

a

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”

probability
Id.

“When

a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether
there

is

errors,

a

reasonable

probability

the

factfinder

would

respecting guilt.”

that,

have

Id. at 695.

had

absent
a

reasonable

doubt

“The likelihood of a different

result must be substantial, not just conceivable.”
131 S. Ct. at 792.

[counsel’s]

Harrington,

In determining whether there is a reasonable

probability of a different result, we “consider all the relevant
evidence that the jury would have had before it if [counsel] had
pursued [a] different path.”

Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 19

(2009) (per curiam) (emphasis omitted).
that

was

adduced

at

trial

as

well

This includes evidence
as

presented until post-conviction review.
41; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696.

12

that

which

was

not

See Porter, 558 U.S. at

Appeal: 13-6407

Doc: 42

Filed: 06/18/2014

Pg: 13 of 18

III.
In

this

appeal,

Appellant

argues

that

his

trial

counsel’s failure to introduce evidence of his mental health
issues to negate the mens rea required for his ABWIK conviction
amounted

to

ineffective

conclude

that

the

assistance

South

Carolina

under
Court

Strickland.

of

Appeals

We

neither

unreasonably applied clearly established federal law nor made an
unreasonable determination of the facts in dismissing this claim
for lack of merit.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A.

We turn first to Appellant’s argument that the South
Carolina

Court

of

conclude

that

the

prohibited

Br.

must

“unreasonably

[mental

‘diminished

Appellant’s
Appellant

Appeals

25.

health

capacity’
In

demonstrate

applied

evidence]

defense
to

prevail

that

the

South

law

constituted

under

order

the

on

state
this

Carolina

to
a

law.”
theory,

Court

of

Appeals’ adjudication of his claim “resulted in a decision that
.

.

.

involved

an

unreasonable

application

of,

clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States.”

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

A state court

decision is an “unreasonable application of” clearly established
federal
governing

law

when

legal

the

rule

state
from

court

[the

13

“identifies

Supreme]

the

Court’s

correct

cases

but

Appeal: 13-6407

Doc: 42

Filed: 06/18/2014

Pg: 14 of 18

unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state
prisoner’s case.”

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000).

Here, the South Carolina Court of Appeals correctly
identified
established
assistance

Strickland
Federal
claim.

and
law”

See

its

progeny

governing
Goins

I,

as

the

Appellant’s

No.

“clearly

ineffective

2010–UP–339,

2010

WL

10080077, at *1 (S.C. App. June 29, 2010) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984))).

It went on to rely on

two state court decisions, Gill v. State, 552 S.E.2d 26 (S.C.
2001), 4 and State v. Santiago, 634 S.E.2d 23 (S.C. Ct. App.
2006), 5 to conclude that the PCR court’s finding of prejudice
4

Gill is the seminal case in South Carolina on diminished
capacity. In that case, the trial court permitted the defendant
to call an expert witness, who testified that the defendant had
borderline mental capacity and an antisocial personality. Gill,
522 S.E.2d at 32. The expert opined that, as a result of these
conditions,
the
defendant
“could
not
formulate
malice
aforethought, an essential element of murder.”
Id.
The
defendant asked for a diminished capacity instruction at the
close of trial, and the judge refused.
See id.
The South
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding, “[t]he trial judge did
not err by refusing to charge diminished capacity because it is
not recognized in South Carolina.” Id.
5

In Santiago, the trial court refused a defendant’s request
to have an expert witness testify during trial “that because of
[the defendant’s] Asperger’s disorder he did not have the
requisite mental state to commit murder nor the ability to
provide a voluntary confession.”
634 S.E.2d at 161-62.
The
South
Carolina
Court
of
Appeals
affirmed,
observing,
“[e]ssentially, defense counsel argued that [the defendant] was
culpable of a lesser offense because of his diminished capacity.
However, the diminished capacity defense is not recognized in
South Carolina.” Id. at 162.

14

Appeal: 13-6407

Doc: 42

Filed: 06/18/2014

Pg: 15 of 18

under Strickland was “tantamount to a recognition of the defense
of

diminished

state.”

capacity,

which

we

do

not

recognize

Goins I, 2010 WL 10080077, at *1.

in

this

Having found that

the evidence presented to the PCR court was thus inadmissible
for

Appellant’s

intended

purpose

as

a

matter

of

state

evidentiary law, the South Carolina Court of Appeals determined
Appellant could not have been prejudiced within the meaning of
Strickland by its absence.
Appellant

See id.

contends

the

South

Carolina

Court

of

Appeals’ decision erroneously “conflated the affirmative defense
of diminished capacity with more traditional defensive efforts
to introduce evidence to undermine the prosecution’s burden” of
proving intent.
cases

from

Appellant’s Br. 27.

state

courts,

district

He points to a plethora of
courts,

and

other

circuit

courts of appeals in support of his theory that South Carolina
has apparently settled on an “incorrect definition of diminished
capacity.”

Id. at 33.

What other courts may think of South

Carolina law, however, is of no moment -- “[i]t is beyond the
mandate

of

federal

interpretation

by

Richardson

Branker,

v.

habeas

state

courts

courts
668

F.3d

of

[]
a

128,

to

state’s
141

(4th

correct
own
Cir.

the

laws.”
2012)

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Wilson v. Corcoran, 131 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2010) (per curiam)
(“‘[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of
15

Appeal: 13-6407

state

Doc: 42

law’”

(1991))). 6

Filed: 06/18/2014

(quoting

Estelle

Pg: 16 of 18

v.

McGuire,

502

U.S.

62,

67

Consequently, in analyzing Appellant’s ineffective

assistance claim, we are bound by the South Carolina Court of
Appeals’ interpretation of South Carolina’s evidentiary rules.
See Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (per curiam)
(“[A] state court’s interpretation of state law, including one
announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a
federal court sitting in habeas corpus.”).
In

light

of

the

foregoing

principles,

we

will

not

disturb the South Carolina Court of Appeals’ conclusion that
Appellant was not prejudiced within the meaning of Strickland
when his trial counsel failed to make an attempt to introduce
inadmissible evidence.

As the Fifth Circuit recently observed,

“the failure to make a meritless attempt at introducing evidence
could not have prejudiced [the petitioner] because the evidence
ultimately would not have been introduced.”

Garza v. Stephens,

738 F.3d 669, 677 (5th Cir. 2013); see also Hoots v. Allsbrook,

6

We
must
reject
Appellant’s
attempt
to
give
a
constitutional dimension to this argument through invocation of
the Due Process Clause.
Although we do not doubt a habeas
petitioner’s ability to challenge a state evidentiary scheme as
violative of his due process rights, see, e.g., Clark v.
Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006), any such challenge falls well
outside of the COA in this case, see United States v. Nicholson,
475 F.3d 241, 244 (4th Cir. 2007) (observing that a petitioner’s
“appeal is limited” to the specific issue or issues identified
in the COA); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).

16

Appeal: 13-6407

785

Doc: 42

F.2d

Filed: 06/18/2014

1214,

counsel’s

1222

“decision

evidence .
counsel”).

.

.

did

(4th

not

to

not

Cir.

Pg: 17 of 18

1985)

attempt

constitute

to

(holding
introduce

ineffective

that

trial

inadmissible
assistance

of

Indeed, even taking Appellant’s arguments at face

value, his failure to make a specific proffer to the PCR court
as to what an expert witness would have testified regarding the
mental health evidence, had trial counsel properly investigated
and

sought

to

present

such

testimony,

reduces

any

claim

prejudice to mere speculation and is fatal to his claim.

of
See

Beaver v. Thompson, 93 F.3d 1186, 1195 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[A]n
allegation of inadequate investigation does not warrant habeas
relief absent a proffer of what favorable evidence or testimony
would have been produced.”); Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932,
940-41 (4th Cir. 1990) (appellant’s failure to “advise us of
what an adequate investigation would have revealed or what these
witnesses might have said, if they had been called to testify”
was fatal to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
Consequently, we hold that the South Carolina Court of
Appeals’ decision rejecting Appellant’s ineffective assistance
claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law.
B.
We need only briefly consider Appellant’s second and
final argument, i.e., that the South Carolina Court of Appeals
17

Appeal: 13-6407

Doc: 42

Filed: 06/18/2014

Pg: 18 of 18

“unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] . . . the historical facts” when it
“assum[ed]
introduce
rea.”

that
his

[Appellant]

mental

Appellant’s

would

not

health-related

Br.

37.

have

been

evidence

Although

to

allowed
negate

Appellant

to

mens

appears

to

present this theory in terms of a factual challenge under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), it is little more than a reimagining of his
first

argument

under

28

U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1).

In

any

event,

inasmuch as Appellant has wholly failed to demonstrate that any
of

the

South

Carolina

Court

of

Appeals’

“factual

determination[s]” as to the admissibility of the mental health
evidence were “objectively unreasonable in light of the record
before the court,” Merzbacher v. Shearin, 706 F.3d 356, 364 (4th
Cir.

2013)

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted),

we

readily

conclude he is not entitled to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(2).
IV.
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

the

judgment

of

the

district court is
AFFIRMED.

18