US v. Richard Adam
Filing
PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Motion disposition in opinion denying Motion to defer [999723964-2] Originating case number: 5:08-cr-00004-D-1,5:12-cv-00577-D. [999758075]. [13-7107]
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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-7107
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RICHARD LEE ADAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (5:08-cr-00004-D-1; 5:12-cv-00577-D)
Argued:
December 9, 2015
Decided:
February 19, 2016
Before MOTZ and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and John A. GIBNEY, Jr.,
United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Virginia, sitting by designation.
Vacated by published opinion. Judge Floyd wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Motz and Judge Gibney joined.
ARGUED:
Marianna
F.
Jackson,
COVINGTON
&
BURLING,
LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
Christopher Michael Anderson,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Robert A. Long, COVINGTON & BURLING,
LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United
States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Seth M. Wood, Assistant
United States Attorneys, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
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FLOYD, Circuit Judge:
Appellant
conviction
violation
Richard
for
of
being
18
a
U.S.C.
Lee
Adams
felon
§
in
(Adams)
possession
922(g).
Adams
challenges
of
a
argues
his
firearm
that
in
he
is
actually innocent of the § 922(g) offense because he was not, at
the
time
of
the
offense,
a
convicted
felon.
We
agree
and
accordingly vacate his conviction and direct entry of judgment
in his favor.
I.
On January 2, 2008, a grand jury returned an eight count
indictment against Adams alleging that he committed a series of
armed
robberies
of
convenience
stores.
In
May
2009,
Adams
pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement to three of
the eight counts: (1) robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951
(Count 2); (2) using and carrying a firearm during a crime of
violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 3); and (3)
being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18
U.S.C.
§
provision
922(g)
in
(Count
which
8).
Adams
The
waived
plea
his
agreement
right
to
contained
challenge
a
his
conviction or sentence in a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
unless
he
did
so
on
the
basis
of
ineffective
counsel or prosecutorial misconduct.
guilty
plea,
the
district
court
2
held
assistance
of
Before accepting Adams’s
a
colloquy
pursuant
to
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Federal
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Rule
of
Criminal
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Procedure
11.
The
district
court
singled out the waiver provision “in particular” and read it to
Adams.
J.A.
50.
Adams
indicated
that
he
understood
the
appellate and collateral attack rights he was giving up as part
of his plea agreement.
In exchange for the concessions made by
Adams in the plea agreement, the government agreed to dismiss
the remaining five counts of the indictment relating to other
armed robberies.
The district court held a sentencing hearing on October 23,
2009.
Based
history
on
category
a
total
of
offense
IV,
the
level
of
district
23
court
and
a
criminal
determined
the
Sentencing Guidelines range as to Counts 2 and 8 to be 70 to 87
months
imprisonment
and
as
to
Count
3
to
be
120
months
imprisonment to run consecutively with any term of imprisonment
imposed with regard to Counts 2 and 8.
After a motion by the government, the court departed upward
at sentencing.
imprisonment
The district court sentenced Adams to a term of
of
120
months
as
to
Counts
2
and
8
to
run
concurrently and a sentence of 120 months as to Count 3 to run
consecutively
to
the
sentences
imposed
in
Counts
2
and
8.
Adams’s total sentence was, therefore, 240 months imprisonment.
The court detailed its rationale for the upward departure in a
written order issued on October 30, 2009.
sentence.
This
Court
affirmed
3
both
his
Adams appealed his
conviction
and
his
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sentence on January 3, 2011.
United States v. Adams, 416 F.
App’x 233 (4th Cir. 2011).
On August 28, 2012, Adams filed a motion pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his § 922(g) conviction as a felon in
possession of a firearm.
Adams argued that none of his prior
convictions—all
were
of
which
under
North
Carolina
law—were
felonies after our decision in United States v. Simmons, 649
F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (overruling United States v. Harp, 406
F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2005)), and that he was, therefore, actually
innocent
of
being
a
felon
in
possession
of
a
firearm.
In
Simmons, we held that for an offense to be a prior felony under
North Carolina’s Structured Sentencing Act as then written, a
defendant must have actually faced the possibility of more than
a year in prison.
government
determine
could
the
649 F.3d at 244-45. In other words, the
not
rely
maximum
term
on
hypothetical
of
imprisonment.
enhancements
Id.
at
to
248-49.
Adams further alleged that his attorneys were ineffective for
failing to anticipate our ruling in Simmons.
The
district
court
issued
an
§ 2255 motion on July 1, 2013.
order
dismissing
Adams’s
The court determined that the
substantive Simmons-related claims Adams presented were barred
by the waiver in his plea agreement.
The court also determined
that Adams suffered no prejudice from any Simmons-related error
because
even
if
his
§
922(g)
conviction
4
were
vacated,
Adams
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would still be required to serve a sentence of 240 months in
prison. 1
counsel
attorneys
With
claims,
were
applicable law.
respect
the
not
to
Adams’s
district
ineffective
court
ineffective
for
assistance
determined
counselling
that
him
in
of
Adam’s
then-
Further, the court again noted that it would
have issued the same sentence even had Simmons applied, so Adams
could not make the requisite showing of prejudice.
court denied a certificate of appealability.
The district
Adams appealed
nonetheless.
This Court granted Adams a certificate of appealability on
the issue of whether Adams’s waiver in his plea agreement barred
consideration of his claim that Simmons rendered him actually
innocent of the § 922(g) conviction.
We conclude that Adams’s
claim of actual innocence is outside the scope of the appellate
1
The government wisely does not press this argument on
appeal.
Appellee’s Br. 26.
Felony convictions carry a myriad
of collateral consequences above and beyond time in prison,
including the possibility that a future sentence will be
enhanced based on the challenged conviction, the possibility of
using the conviction for future impeachment, and societal
stigma.
Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 302 (1996).
Adams’s § 922(g) conviction also carried with it a mandatory
special assessment which constituted additional punishment that
would not have been imposed absent a conviction.
See id. at
301-03.
Because an erroneous conviction and accompanying
sentence, even a concurrent sentence, can have significant
collateral consequences, the fact that Adams’s sentence would
not change does not bar his claim. See Guam v. Torre, 68 F.3d
1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The law is plain that multiple
convictions, apart from concurrent sentences, carry adverse
collateral consequences that may not be ignored.” (internal
quotations and citation omitted)).
5
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waiver, and, for the reasons explained below, we also conclude
that Adams is indeed actually innocent.
II.
A.
We first examine whether Adams entered a valid waiver.
The
validity of a waiver of appeal and collateral attack rights is
reviewed de novo, and we will enforce the waiver if it is valid
and
the
issue
appealed
is
within
the
scope
of
the
waiver.
United States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d 522, 529 (4th Cir. 2013).
waiver
must
be
knowing
and
voluntary.
United
Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir. 2005).
extraordinary
circumstances,
a
properly
States
A
v.
In the absence of
conducted
colloquy establishes the validity of the waiver.
Rule
11
Id. at 221.
Here, neither party argues that Adams’s waiver was invalid, and
there is no evidence in the record to support such a conclusion.
Rather,
the
issue
is
whether
Adams’s
Simmons-based
claim
is
within the scope of the valid waiver in his plea agreement.
We have previously held that a Simmons-based challenge to a
sentence
falls
within
the
scope
Copeland, 707 F.3d at 529-30.
of
a
valid
appeal
waiver.
A waiver remains valid even “in
light of a subsequent change in the law.”
Id. at 529 (citing
United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 2005)).
6
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Copeland,
challenges
however,
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does
within
automatically
not
the
render
scope
all
of
merely because such a challenge invokes Simmons.
a
collateral
valid
waiver
We will refuse
to enforce an otherwise valid waiver if to do so would result in
a miscarriage of justice.
137,
151
(4th
Cir.
United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d
2005).
“A
proper
showing
of
‘actual
innocence’ is sufficient to satisfy the ‘miscarriage of justice’
requirement.”
Wolfe v. Johnson, 565 F.3d 140, 160 (4th Cir.
2009) (explaining the meaning of “miscarriage of justice” in the
context
of
procedural
default).
Such
claim outside the scope of the waiver.
a
that
Adams
Adams’s
has
made
a
cognizable
claim
showing
renders
the
Thus, if we determine
of
actual
innocence,
§ 2255 motion falls outside the scope of his waiver.
Miller v. United States, 735 F.3d 141 (4th Cir. 2013)—a
case cited by neither party—settles the key issue in this case:
whether Adams properly alleges that he is actually innocent of
the § 922(g) conviction.
petition
vacated
claiming
because,
In Miller, a defendant filed a § 2255
that
after
his
§
Simmons,
922(g)
his
convictions were no longer felonies.
conviction
predicate
should
North
be
Carolina
We agreed and ordered the
district court to grant Miller’s § 2255 motion, holding that
Simmons announced a substantive rule retroactively applicable.
Miller, 735 F.3d at 145-46.
We concluded:
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For defendants convicted of possessing a
firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C.
§
922(g)(1),
where
the
predicate
conviction(s) supporting their § 922(g)(1)
convictions
were
North
Carolina
felony
offenses for which they could not have
received sentences of more than one year in
prison, Simmons also makes clear that those
felony
convictions
do
not
qualify
as
predicate felonies for purposes of federal
law, and those defendants are actually
innocent of the § 922(g)(1) offense of which
they were convicted.
Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
Adams makes exactly the same claim
as Miller; like Miller, Adams makes a valid claim of actual
innocence.
Therefore,
in
keeping
with
our
precedent
and
to
prevent a miscarriage of justice, we conclude Adams’s claim is
outside the scope of his appeal waiver.
erred
in
dismissing
Adams’s
claim
as
The district court
barred
by
the
waiver
provision in the plea agreement.
B.
Having determined that Adams’s actual innocence claim is
outside the scope of his appeal waiver, we reach the merits of
his § 2255 motion.
The government makes two arguments against
Adams’s claim of actual innocence, both of which rely on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S.
612 (1998).
may
have
First, the government contends that although Adams
shown
innocence.”
“legal
innocence”
he
has
not
shown
“factual
Second, the government contends that Adams had not
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shown that he is also actually innocent of the conduct alleged
in the five dismissed counts of the indictment.
In Bousley the Supreme Court observed that actual innocence
“means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.”
623.
Id. at
The government contends that although Adams may no longer
be legally convicted of a violation of § 922(g) after Simmons,
he remains, nonetheless, somehow still factually guilty.
We find this argument to be without merit.
“To show a
§ 922(g)(1) violation, the government must prove three elements:
(i) that the defendant was a convicted felon at the time of the
offense; (ii) that he voluntarily and intentionally possessed a
firearm;
and
(iii)
that
commerce at some point.”
the
firearm
traveled
in
interstate
United States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d
134, 136 (4th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The
government
recognizes
for
that
predicate
felony
conviction
Simmons.
Appellee’s Br. 10.
Adams
under
lacks
§
the
required
922(g)(1)
following
Under our holding in Simmons,
Adams was not a convicted felon at the time of the offense, and
it was therefore not a violation of § 922(g)(1) for Adams to be
in possession of a firearm.
We conclude that Adams has, indeed,
shown “factual innocence” as contemplated by Bousley because he
has shown that it is impossible for the government to prove one
of
the
required
elements
of
a
9
§
922(g)(1)
charge—that
the
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defendant was a convicted felon at the time of the offense.
This is so because Adams was “in fact” not a felon.
In addition to requiring a showing of factual innocence,
the Supreme Court in Bousley set out an additional requirement:
“[i]n
cases
where
the
Government
has
forgone
more
serious
charges in the course of plea bargaining, petitioner’s showing
of actual innocence must also extend to those charges.”
U.S. at 624.
523
The government argues that a showing of factual
innocence as to the § 922(g) charge is insufficient to support
vacating Adams’s conviction.
Instead, the government urges us
to read the above-quoted language from Bousley to require that
Adams show that he is also factually innocent of the charges
contained in the five dismissed counts of the indictment.
The
facts
of
Bousley
are
instructive
here
and
counsel
against adoption of the government’s reading of the case.
In
Bousley, Kenneth Bousley pleaded guilty to “using” a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).
After
§
Bousley
924(c)(1)’s
pleaded
“use”
guilty,
prong
to
the
require
“active employment of the firearm.”
516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995).
Bousley, 523 U.S. at 616.
Supreme
the
Court
government
construed
to
show
Bailey v. United States,
Bousley challenged his conviction via
a motion pursuant to § 2255 and alleged that he was actually
innocent of “using” a firearm as the Supreme Court had defined
“use” in Bailey.
Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623.
10
The government
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argued before the Supreme Court that Bousley had to show that he
was
actually
innocent
of
both
“using”
and
of
“carrying”
a
firearm, both violations of § 924(c)(1), in order to show that
he was actually innocent of his conviction under that provision.
Id. at 624.
Because the indictment charged Bousley only with
“using” a firearm and there was no record evidence that the
government “elected not to charge” Bousley with “carrying” a
firearm in exchange for his plea of guilty, the Supreme Court
concluded Bousley needed to “demonstrate no more than that he
did not ‘use’ a firearm. . .” as charged in the indictment.
Id.
The Supreme Court concerned itself with whether Bousley’s
conduct
violated
§
924(c),
a
statute
criminalizing
using,
carrying, or possessing a firearm in relation to any crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime.
All of the Supreme Court’s
analysis related to what Bousley had to show to prove actual
innocence of his § 924(c) crime of conviction.
In other words,
the Court focused on one instance of criminal conduct: whether
Bousley violated § 924(c) by using, carrying, or possessing a
firearm.
Our decision in Lyons v. Lee, 316 F.3d 528 (4th Cir.
2003), employs a similar conduct-based approach.
In Lyons we
noted that to show actual innocence a defendant convicted of
common law robbery after a guilty plea must also show factual
innocence of the more serious, original charge of armed robbery.
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Id. at 533 n.5.
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Thus, the actual innocence inquiry in Lyons
focused on the underlying criminal conduct of robbery, just as
Bousley
focused
on
underlying
criminal
conduct
relating
to
firearms.
Perhaps
illustrated
the
by
a
criminal
conduct
hypothetical.
inquiry
Consider
a
can
best
defendant
who
be
is
charged with second-degree murder, a homicide crime, but who
later
negotiates
a
plea
voluntary manslaughter.
bargain
whereby
he
pleads
guilty
to
Under Bousley, if that defendant later
wishes to attack his guilty plea to the lesser crime with a
claim of actual innocence, he must show that he is factually
innocent
of
the
second-degree
murder
charge
as
well
as
the
voluntary manslaughter charge to which he pleaded guilty. In
other
words,
a
defendant
making
a
claim
of
actual
innocence
after a negotiated guilty plea must show that he is factually
innocent of the underlying criminal conduct—use of a firearm in
Bousley,
robbery
hypothetical.
in
Lyon,
and
homicide
nor
the
above
Here, the dismissed counts related to separate
allegations of different criminal conduct.
Lyons
in
common
sense
requires
Adams
Neither Bousley nor
to
show
that
he
is
actually innocent of other, dissimilar charged conduct in order
to
show
that
he
is
actually
innocent
of
being
a
felon
in
possession of a firearm, when he was not, in fact, a convicted
felon when he possessed the firearm.
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We conclude Adams has made the requisite showing of actual
innocence, and we will, therefore, grant his § 2255 motion and
vacate his § 922(g) conviction.
III.
Finally,
we
are
compelled
to
note
our
concern
with
the
government’s suggestion at oral argument and again in briefing
after argument, that, if we vacate Adams’s § 922(g) conviction
because we conclude Adams is actually innocent of the crime of
conviction, the government would seek to reinstate the dismissed
counts against Adams pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3296 and would seek
to add at least an additional fifty years to Adams’s current
sentence of twenty years in prison. 2
The government indicated it
may seek to add the additional fifty years even though nothing
in
our
opinion
today
requires
the
district
court
to
lessen
Adams’s current sentence of twenty years imprisonment.
Indeed, in the event we reached the holding we reach today,
the government asked us to reinstate the dismissed charges of
the indictment.
government
Appellee’s Br. 26.
treads
dangerously
close
2
We decline to do so.
to
punishing
Adams
The
for
Indeed, Adams was concerned enough about this possibility
that he asked us to defer our ruling beyond January 21, 2016 to
allow him to consult with counsel about whether the pursuit of
this appeal was worth the risk of five decades additional
imprisonment.
As this opinion is issued after January 21, we
hereby deny Adams’s motion as moot.
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pursuing what we have ultimately determined to be a
claim of actual innocence.
meritorious
“To punish a person because he has
done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process
violation of the most basic sort.”
United States v. Goodwin,
457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Just as the criminal justice system must see the guilty
convicted and sentenced to a just punishment, so too it must
ferret out and vacate improper convictions.
Because Adams was
not a convicted felon at the time of the charged offense, it was
not illegal under § 922(g) for him to possess a firearm.
He
should not remain convicted of a crime of which he is, under our
precedent in Simmons and Miller, actually innocent.
Adams’s
§
922(g)
special assessment.
conviction
and
its
attendant
We vacate
sentence
and
We direct the entry of judgment in favor of
Adams on his § 2255 motion without remand.
VACATED
14
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