Shaidon Blake v. Micheal Ross, Sgt.

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 8:09-cv-02367-AW. [999587645]. [13-7279]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-7279

SHAIDON BLAKE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL ROSS, Lt.,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
THE
DEPARTMENT
M.R.D.C.C.; GARY
JAMES MADIGAN,

OF
CORRECTIONS;
STATE
OF
MARYLAND;
MAYNARD, Sec.; MICHAEL STOUFFER, Comm.;

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Alexander Williams, Jr., District
Judge. (8:09-cv-02367-AW)

Argued:

January 27, 2015

Before TRAXLER,
Judges.

Chief

Judge,

Decided:

and

GREGORY

and

May 21, 2015

AGEE,

Circuit

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote
the majority opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler joined.
Judge Agee wrote a dissenting opinion.

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ARGUED:
Scott Matthew Noveck, MAYER BROWN LLP, Washington,
D.C., for Appellant.
Sarah W. Rice, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
ON
BRIEF:
Reginald R. Goeke, Scott A. Claffee, MAYER BROWN LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney
General of Maryland, Dorianne Meloy, Assistant Attorney General,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellee.

2

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GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
Inmate Shaidon Blake appeals the district court’s summary
dismissal

of

Lieutenant

his

Michael

42

U.S.C.

Ross

on

§ 1983

the

claim

ground

that

against
Blake

Appellee
failed

to

exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

Because

we hold that Blake reasonably believed that he had sufficiently
exhausted

his

remedies

by

complying

with

an

internal

investigation, we reverse the judgment of the district court and
remand for further proceedings.

I.
A.
Since we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the
following account frames the facts in the light most favorable
to Blake, the non-movant, and draws all reasonable inferences in
his favor.
2009).

Pueschel v. Peters, 577 F.3d 558, 563 (4th Cir.

On June 21, 2007, Ross and Lieutenant James Madigan

approached Blake’s cell at the Maryland Reception Diagnostic and
Classification

Center.

Madigan

ordered

Blake

to

gather

his

possessions so that he could be moved to another cell block.
When Blake asked why he was being moved, Madigan called him a
“bad ass” and a “tough guy” and accused him of trying to take
over the housing unit.
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Ross entered the cell and handcuffed Blake’s hands behind
his back.

When Ross escorted Blake out of the cell and towards

the top of the stairs, Madigan reached out and grabbed Blake’s
arm.
the

Blake told Madigan to “[g]et the fuck off” him.
impression

that

there

might

have

been

some

Ross got

preexisting

tension between Blake and Madigan.
Ross, still holding Blake in an escort grip, led Blake down
the concrete stairs with Madigan following closely.
so, Madigan suddenly shoved Blake from behind.

As he did

Blake had to

push against the railing with his elbow to keep himself from
falling down the stairs.
Ross

assured

Madigan

Blake told Madigan not to push him.

that

he

had

Blake

under

control

and

continued walking down the stairs.
At the bottom of the stairs, Madigan shoved Blake again.
Blake told Madigan, “Don’t fucking push me no more.”

When they

reached the pod door, Madigan ordered Blake to stand against the
wall of the corridor.
with

the

corridor

He then stepped into the pod and spoke

officer

inside.

When

he

returned

he

was

“agitated,” and he began “yelling and screaming and pointing in
[Blake’s] face.”

J.A. 522-23.

With Ross still holding Blake

against the wall, Madigan wrapped a key ring around his fingers
and then punched Blake at least four times in the face in quick
succession.

Madigan paused briefly, then punched Blake in the

face again.
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While Ross continued to hold Blake, Madigan ordered Latia
Woodard,

a

nearby

officer,

to

mace

Blake.

Woodard

refused.

Ross told Woodard to radio a “Signal 13” - a code to summon
other officers for assistance.

He and Madigan then took Blake

to the ground by lifting him up and dropping him.

Ross dropped

his knee onto Blake’s chest, and he and Madigan restrained Blake
until other officers arrived.
The responding officers took Blake to the medical unit;
Blake, surrounded by guards and fearful of being attacked again,
declined treatment even though he was in pain.

He was later

diagnosed with nerve damage.
That

same

corrections

day,

Blake

officers

and

reported
provided

the
a

incident

written

to

senior

account.

The

Internal Investigative Unit (“IIU”) of the Maryland Department
of

Public

Safety

and

Correctional

Services

(“Department”)

undertook a year-long investigation and issued a formal report.
The

report

against

confirmed

Blake

handcuffed.

by

that

striking

Madigan
him

in

had
the

used

excessive

face

while

he

force
was

The report did not assign any fault to Blake and

did not recommend any disciplinary action against him.
B.
Blake filed a pro se § 1983 complaint on September 8, 2009
against

Ross,

entities.

Madigan,

two

supervisors,

and

three

government

The district court dismissed sua sponte the claims
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against the government entities.

Ross and the two supervisors

filed an answer on November 19, 2009, and moved to dismiss or
for

summary

judgment

on

February

4,

2010. 1

None

of

the

defendants asserted an exhaustion defense in either the answer
or the motion.

The district court granted summary judgment as

to the supervisors but denied it as to Ross, finding that Blake
had presented genuine issues of material fact regarding whether
Ross committed a constitutional violation.

The court ordered

that counsel be appointed to represent Blake.
On August 2, 2011 - nearly two years after filing Ross’s
answer to Blake’s complaint – Ross’s counsel contacted counsel
for Blake and Madigan and requested consent to file an amended
answer.

Blake’s counsel agreed on the condition that Ross’s

counsel consent to the filing of an amended complaint at a later
date.

The parties did not discuss the specific contents of the

amended answer, which Blake became aware of for the first time
that afternoon when Ross filed his motion to amend.

The amended

answer included a new affirmative defense alleging that Blake
had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by
the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

1

Less than a day later, without

Blake did not successfully serve Madigan until January 26,

2011.

6

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giving

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Blake

any

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opportunity

to

object,

the

district

court

granted the motion to amend.
Blake

moved

to

strike

Ross’s

ground that it had been waived.
Blake

filed

an

amended

exhaustion

on

the

While that motion was pending,

complaint,

exhaustion defense in his answer.
Ross’s exhaustion defense.

defense

and

Ross

reasserted

his

Blake again moved to strike

On January 9, 2012, Ross moved for

summary judgment on the ground that Blake had failed to exhaust
his

administrative

court

denied

judgment

to

Blake’s
Ross

reconsideration,
Blake’s

remedies.

claim

motion

and
in

On

May

to

strike

Madigan.

response

against

which
(who

2012,

and

Blake

to

Madigan

10,

had

district

granted

filed
the

the

a

court

not

summary

motion

reinstated

joined

Ross’s

motion), but refused to reinstate his claim against Ross.
ultimately prevailed against Madigan at trial.

for

Blake

On August 9,

2013, Blake timely appealed the dismissal of his claim against
Ross.

II.
On appeal, Blake argues that 1) Ross waived his exhaustion
affirmative

defense

by

failing

to

assert

it

in

his

initial

answer or motion for summary judgment, and 2) even if Ross did
not

waive

remedies

as

the

defense,

required

by

Blake
the

exhausted

PLRA
7

by

his

complying

administrative
with

the

IIU

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investigation.

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Because we find that Ross’s exhaustion defense

is without merit, we do not reach the issue of whether he waived
the defense.
A.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, viewing all facts in the light most favorable to the
non-movant and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in
his favor.
failure

Pueschel, 577 F.3d at 563.

to

defense,

exhaust

Ross

administrative

bears

the

burden

Because an inmate’s

remedies
of

is

proving

an

affirmative

that

Blake

had

remedies available to him of which he failed to take advantage.
Jones

v.

Bock,

549

U.S.

199,

211-12,

216

(2007);

Moore

v.

Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008).
B.
The PLRA requires an inmate to exhaust “such administrative
remedies as are available” before filing an action.
§ 1997e(a).
inmate

is

42 U.S.C.

This requirement is one of “proper exhaustion”:
not

excused

from

the

requirement

available

available.

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006).

administrative

available

if

a

remedy

prisoner,

is

not

through

remedy

considered
no

prevented from availing himself of it.”

8

is

because

previously

“an

administrative

simply

fault

of

an

no

to
his

a

longer
However,

have
own,

been
was

Moore, 517 F.3d at 725.

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The

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Department

Pg: 9 of 34

provides

inmates

with

a

number

of

administrative avenues for addressing complaints and problems.
At issue here is the interaction between two of those processes:
the Administrative Remedy Procedure (“ARP”), 2 and the IIU.
The ARP is available for “all types of complaints” except
“case

management

Parole

recommendations

Commission

procedures

and

and

decisions,”

decisions,”

“Maryland

“disciplinary

hearing procedures and decisions,” and “appeals of decisions to
withhold

mail.”

Maryland

Division

of

Correction,

Handbook 30 (2007) (hereinafter “Handbook”).
three-step process:
the

warden,

then

Inmate

The ARP involves a

the inmate files a request for remedy with
appeals

a

denial

to

the

Commissioner

of

Corrections, and finally appeals any subsequent denial to the
Inmate Grievance Office (“IGO”).

See id. at 30-31; Md. Code

Regs. § 12.07.01.05(B); Chase v. Peay, 286 F. Supp. 2d 523, 529
(D. Md. 2003) (describing the process); Thomas v. Middleton, No.
AW-10-1478,

2010

WL

4781360,

addition

to

the

at

*3

(D.

Md.

Nov.

16,

2010)

(same).
In

ARP,

the

Internal Investigative Unit, or IIU.

Department

administers

the

The IIU is responsible for

investigating, among other things, “allegation[s] of excessive
2

We also briefly discuss the Inmate Grievance Office, which
hears appeals from the ARP and rules in the first instance on
other grievances, supra.

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force by an employee or nonagency employee.”
§ 12.11.01.05(A)(3).

Md. Code Regs.

Any employee with knowledge of an alleged

violation within the scope of the IIU’s investigative authority
must file a complaint.

Id. § 12.11.01.09(A).

inmate may file a complaint directly.

Alternatively, an

Id. § 12.11.01.09(E).

Blake’s encounter with Madigan and Ross was investigated by
the IIU after Blake immediately reported the incident to senior
corrections
grievance

officers;

through

the

Blake

never

ARP.

Ross

filed
contends

an

administrative

that

the

ARP

available to Blake despite his ongoing IIU investigation.

was

Blake

argues that the investigation removed his grievance from the ARP
process.

To resolve this issue, we first examine in greater

detail the legal standard Ross must meet to prove his exhaustion
defense, and then apply that standard to Blake’s situation.
i.
The Supreme Court has identified three primary purposes of
the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement:

1) “allowing a prison to

address complaints about the program it administers before being
subjected
complaints

to

suit,”

are

2)

“reducing

satisfactorily

litigation

resolved,”

and

to

the

3)

extent

“improving

litigation that does occur by leading to the preparation of a
useful record.”
the

Court

has

Jones, 549 U.S. at 219.
interpreted

require “proper exhaustion.”

the

To serve these ends,

requirement

quite

strictly

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93.
10

to

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Still, the exhaustion requirement is not absolute.
Moore,

517

F.3d

at

725.

concurrence

in

Woodford,

established

exceptions

holding

in

Justice

Breyer

noted

in

his

administrative

law

contains

“well-

exhaustion.”

548

U.S.

103-04

to

(Breyer, J., concurring).
Circuit’s

As

See

at

Justice Breyer pointed to the Second

Giano

v.

Goord,

380

F.3d

670

(2d

Cir.

2004), which applied these well-settled exceptions to the PLRA:
[T]here are certain “special circumstances” in which,
though administrative remedies may have been available
and though the government may not have been estopped
from
asserting
the
affirmative
defense
of
nonexhaustion, the prisoner’s failure to comply with
administrative
procedural
requirements
may
nevertheless have been justified.
380 F.3d at 676.
failure

to

The court went on to find that the inmate’s

exhaust

available

remedies

“was

justified

by

his

reasonable belief” that no further remedies were available.

Id.

at 678.
Of

course,

in

reading

longstanding

administrative

law

exceptions into the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, the Second
Circuit was mindful of the purposes of the PLRA.
developed a two-pronged inquiry:
was

justified

disciplinary

in

appeal

believing

first, whether “the prisoner

that

procedurally

It therefore

his

complaints

exhausted

his

in

the

administrative

remedies because the prison’s remedial system was confusing,”
and

second,

disciplinary

“whether
appeals

the
process

prisoner’s
exhausted
11

submissions
his

remedies

in

the
in

a

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substantive sense by affording corrections officials time and
opportunity to address complaints internally.”
495

F.3d

37,

(alterations

43

and

(2d

Cir.

internal

2007)

quotation

Macias v. Zenk,

(emphasis
marks

in

omitted);

original)
see

also

Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 696-97 (2d Cir. 2004).

By

requiring both a procedural and a substantive component, the
Second

Circuit

has

implemented

traditional

principles

of

administrative law in a manner consistent with the purposes of
the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.

The procedural prong ensures

that an uncounseled inmate attempting to navigate the grievance
system will not be penalized for making a reasonable, albeit
flawed,

attempt

procedures.
prison

from

to

comply

with

Meanwhile,

the

unnecessary

and

the

relevant

substantive
unexpected

prong

administrative
safeguards

litigation.

We

a

are

persuaded that this formulation strikes the appropriate balance
between statutory purpose and our administrative jurisprudence.
We therefore adopt the Second Circuit’s exception to the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement as articulated in Macias and Giano.
ii.
Clearly Blake’s IIU investigation satisfied the substantive
component of the exception to exhaustion discussed above.
Department

conducted

a

one-year

investigation

into

The

Blake’s

violent encounter with Madigan and Ross, at the conclusion of
which it issued Madigan an Unsatisfactory Report of Service and
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relieved him of his duties as a corrections officer. 3
77.

As

the

dissent

notes,

post

at

26,

the

J.A. 375-

investigation

“examine[d] employee conduct,” which forms the core of Blake’s
claim under § 1983.

Furthermore, the dissent’s fears that the

Department did not have an adequate chance to address potential
complaints against Ross, as opposed to Madigan, are unfounded.
Blake did not file a targeted complaint against Madigan, but
rather reported the incident as a whole, naming both Madigan and
Ross in his account.

J.A. 329-33.

Investigating officers were

well aware of Ross’s involvement, and they collected testimony
regarding his role in the incident from a number of sources,
including a statement from Ross himself.
91, 299-300, 305, 307-11.

See, e.g., J.A. 289-

The Department certainly had notice

of Blake’s complaint, as well as an opportunity to develop an
extensive record and address the issue internally.
The question remains whether Blake’s interpretation of the
relevant regulations was reasonable.
sources

of

information

process available to him:

about

the

Blake had three formal
administrative

grievance

the Handbook, the Maryland Code of

Regulations (“the Regulations”), and the Maryland Department of

3

Rather than facing dismissal, Madigan chose to resign.
J.A. 566.

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Correction Directives (“the Directives”). 4
the

Handbook

contains

approximately

about the ARP and the IGO.

one

The 2007 version of
page

Handbook 30-31.

of

information

This page lists

“types of complaints” for which the ARP is not available:
management

recommendations

and

Commission

procedures

decisions,”

and

decisions,”

“Maryland

“disciplinary

“case
Parole
hearing

procedures and decisions,” and “appeals of decisions to withhold
mail.”

Id.

at

30.

Although

this

list

does

not

include

complaints undergoing internal investigation, it is reasonable
to read it as a list of content-based rather than procedural
exemptions.

Indeed, the Handbook makes no mention of the IIU or

the internal investigation process whatsoever; there is no basis
for an inmate to conclude that the ARP and IIU processes would
be permitted to proceed concurrently.
The Regulations and the Directives are similarly ambiguous.
Only one provision of the Regulations mentions both the ARP and
the

IIU.

addresses

Md.
when

Code
an

Regs.

employee

§ 12.11.01.05(B).
involved

4

in

the

That
ARP

provision

process

must

Blake testified that he did not read all of the relevant
directives. See J.A. 162-63. We agree with the dissent that an
inmate’s ignorance of available procedures is not sufficient to
excuse a failure to exhaust remedies.
That is why, for the
purposes of the exception we adopt today, we assume that the
inmate
possessed
all
available
relevant
information
when
determining whether he held an objectively reasonable belief
that he had exhausted all available avenues for relief.

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report an allegation to the IIU, but it says nothing about the
disposition

of

investigation.
mentions
effect

both
until

the

ARP

And

complaint

the

processes
after

only
is

the

IIU

initiate

directive

cited

by

185-003,

which

did

DCD

Blake’s

should

encounter

with

the

an

Ross

that

not

take

officers. 5

Therefore, Ross has proffered no evidence that would contradict
Blake’s

belief

that

the

IIU’s

investigation

removed

his

complaint from the typical ARP process. 6

5

DCD 185-003, which went into effect on August 27, 2008,
makes clear that an ARP complaint will be dismissed for
procedural reasons “when it has been determined that the basis
of the complaint is the same basis of an investigation under the
authority of the Internal Investigative Unit (IIU),” and allows
an inmate to appeal that dismissal.
Ross argues that this
directive proves that Blake could have filed an ARP complaint at
the time of the incident. Blake counters that the directive is
the first contemplation of a coexistence between the ARP and IIU
investigations. Regardless, DCD 185-003 did not exist when the
IIU began investigating Blake’s complaint, and therefore it is
at best tangentially related to whether his belief that he could
not pursue an ARP claim was reasonable.
6

Ross also contends that Blake could have filed a complaint
with the IGO in the first instance.
The Handbook states that
“[t]he IGO reviews grievances and complaints of inmates against
the Division of Correction . . . after the inmate has exhausted
institutional complaint procedures, such as the Administrative
Remedy Procedure.”
Handbook at 30 (emphasis added).
And the
Regulations provide that an inmate must file a grievance with
the IGO within 30 days of the date that the “[s]ituation or
occurrence that is the subject of the grievance took place,”
unless the grievance is based on an appeal from the ARP or a
disciplinary proceeding.
Md. Code Regs. §§ 12.07.01.05(A)-(C).
Clearly Blake could not appeal from an ARP or disciplinary
proceeding; the only complaint he lodged was a report to
corrections officers that initiated an IIU investigation. Given
that the IIU investigation of Blake’s complaint lasted for a
(Continued)
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Ross argues that the lack of information in the Handbook,
Regulations, and Directives should be read to mean Blake had no
reason to believe he could not file an ARP request once the IIU
had initiated its investigation. 7

But construing the ambiguities

against Blake improperly relieves Ross of his burden of proving
his affirmative defense.
Furthermore,

at

the

See Jones, 549 U.S. at 211-12, 216.

summary

judgment

stage

we

must

draw

all

reasonable inferences in favor of Blake, the non-movant.

See

Pueschel,

and

Directives

577

F.3d

do

not

at

563.

The

contradict

Handbook,

Blake’s

Regulations,

belief

that

he

had

exhausted his administrative remedies by reporting the incident
to

senior

corrections

investigation. 8

officers,

Furthermore,

Ross

thereby
has

initiating

provided

no

an

IIU

practical

year and was therefore not “exhausted” within 30 days of his
encounter, it was certainly reasonable for Blake to believe he
could not file a grievance with the IGO.
7

Alternatively, Ross urges us to affirm the district court
on the ground that Ross prevails on the merits. As Blake notes,
however, it is typically “more appropriate to allow the district
court to consider [alternative grounds for affirmance] in the
first instance on remand.” Q Int’l Courier, Inc. v. Smoak, 441
F.3d 214, 220 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006); see also McBurney v.
Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 404 (4th Cir. 2010) (declining to
address merits of § 1983 claim in the first instance).
Therefore,
we
remand
to
afford
the
district
court
the
opportunity to address the merits of Blake’s claims.
8

Blake is not alone in his understanding of the interaction
between the ARP and the IIU. In Giano, the Second Circuit found
it relevant that “a learned federal district court judge [had]
(Continued)
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examples

of

grievance

an

Filed: 05/21/2015

inmate

during

or

reasonably

interpreted

procedures,

and

the

being
after

Pg: 17 of 34

allowed
an

IIU

Maryland’s
IIU

to

file

an

ARP

investigation.
murky

investigation

inmate
into

his

or

IGO

Blake
grievance
complaint

provided the Department with ample notice and opportunity to
address internally the issues raised.

We therefore hold that

not long ago endorsed an interpretation of DOCS regulations
nearly identical to Giano’s.” 380 F.3d at 679. Here, at least
three district court judges have found that an internal
investigation removes an inmate’s complaint from the ARP
process.
See Thomas v. Bell, No. AW-08-2156, 2010 WL 2779308,
at *4 & n.2 (D. Md. July 7, 2010); Williams v. Shearin, No. L10-1479, 2010 WL 5137820, at *2 n.2 (D. Md. Dec. 10, 2010);
Bogues v. McAlpine, No. CCB-11-463, 2011 WL 5974634, at *4 (D.
Md. Nov. 28, 2011).
Ross argues that these cases are inapposite because they
relied on DCD 185-003, which requires dismissal of an ARP
complaint if it shares its basis with an IIU investigation. But
at least one of these cases was filed before that directive
issued.
Thomas, 2010 WL 2779308, at *1 (noting that Thomas
filed his complaint on August 18, 2008); see also DCD 185-003
(issued and effective on August 27, 2008). Of the remaining two
opinions, only one refers (opaquely) to a dismissal under DCD
185-003. See Bogues, 2011 WL 5974634, at *4 (citing an exhibit
to the officer’s motion to dismiss).
The second such opinion
reasons that, although the inmate did not file an ARP complaint,
the fact that “prison officials were aware of his concerns,
convened an internal investigation, and regularly met to review
[the
inmate’s]
classification
and
security
status”
was
sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.
Williams,
2010 WL 5137820, at *2 n.2. Therefore, even if Ross is correct
that Blake could have filed a complaint through the ARP while
his IIU investigation was pending, the grievance system is
confusing enough that at least two learned judges have reached
the opposite conclusion.

17

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the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Ross on
the basis of his exhaustion defense.

III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court

is

reversed,

and

the

case

is

remanded

for

further

proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED

18

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AGEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
If a prisoner wishes to bring a suit touching on any aspect
of

“prison

life,”

then

he

administrative remedies.

must

first

exhaust

his

available

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532

(2002); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

Although all parties

agree that Shaidon Blake’s suit concerns prison life, Blake did
not

avail

himself

of

the

very

administrative

remedy

that

Maryland designed for this sort of claim -- the Administrative
Remedy Procedure (“ARP”).
holds

that

federal

Blake

court.

Litigation

may

proceed

Because

Reform

Despite that failure, the majority
with

that

Act’s

his

holding

(“PLRA”)

unexhausted
undermines

claim

the

“mandatory”

in

Prison

exhaustion

requirement, Porter, 534 U.S. at 524, I respectfully dissent,
preferring instead to affirm the judgment of the district court
dismissing Blake’s claim.

I.
Exhaustion is a vital prescription.
needs,

Congress

suits.”

[has]

decided,

is

fewer

“What this country
and

better

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007).

prisoner
Congress

designed an “invigorated” exhaustion requirement to achieve that
goal.
one,

Porter, 534 U.S. at 524.
King

compelling

v.

McCarty,

781

a

prisoner

to

This requirement is a “strict”

F.3d
use
19

889,
“all

893

(7th

available

Cir.

2015),

remedies

in

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accordance
Bennette,
internal

Filed: 05/21/2015

with
517

the

F.3d

quotation

Pg: 20 of 34

applicable
717,

725

marks

procedural

(4th

rules,”

Cir.
A

omitted).

2008)
prisoner

Moore

(citation
must

v.
and

proceed

through the administrative process even if, for instance, he
seeks some relief that the process has no power to afford.

See

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740-41 (2001).
Blake did not exhaust his available administrative remedies
before

filing

administrative
statutes,

suit.

As

processes

regulations,

Correctional

Services

in
and

the

majority

Maryland

are

Department

directives.

notes,

of

set

the

out

Public

According

relevant

in

various

Safety

to

one

and
such

directive, DCD 185-002, inmates housed in Division of Correction
facilities

must

seek

relief

for

complaints through an ARP complaint.

“institutionally
J.A. 405.

related”

“Every inmate”

may submit a request for an administrative remedy.

J.A. 406.

Consistent with the directive, the prisoner handbook explains
that the process applies to “all types of complaints” that might
arise within the prisons, save four categories of claims.
403.
as

J.A.

All parties agree that those categories do not apply here,
they

discipline,

concern
and

inmate

classification,

withholding

of

mail.

parole,

inmate

J.A.

405-06.

Furthermore, DCD 185-002 separately and specifically instructs
prisoners to use the ARP to “seek relief . . . for issues that
include . . . [u]se of force.”
20

J.A. 405.

One can hardly

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imagine

a

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plainer

provision

Pg: 21 of 34

that

more

directly

applies

to

Blake’s present claim.
Blake must have been aware of these remedies -- he never
even hints that he was not.
in

May

system

2007,
for

matters.”

along

with

processing

J.A. 168, 170.

He received the prisoner handbook

later

“oral

complaints

communication”
regarding

on

“the

institutional

See Wright v. Langford, 562 F. App’x

769, 776 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that it was reasonable to
presume prisoner’s awareness of procedures where he received a
handbook

spelling

out

those

procedures).

The

same

prisoner

handbook indicates that full descriptions of the processes were
available in the library.

J.A. 403.

An administrative remedy

coordinator was also available to help.

J.A. 409.

That is not to say that it would matter whether Blake was
ignorant of the procedures.
the

exhaustion

“[An inmate]’s alleged ignorance of

requirement,

or

the

fact

that

he

might

have

misconstrued the language in the handbook, does not excuse his
failure to exhaust.”

Gonzalez v. Crawford, 419 F. App’x 522,

523 (5th Cir. 2011); accord Brock v. Kenton Cnty., Ky., 93 F.
App’x 793, 797-98 (6th Cir. 2004).

After all, we usually do not

accept an inmate’s “ignorance of the law” as an excuse for noncompliance in other contexts.

United States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d

507, 512 (4th Cir. 2004) (equitable tolling).

21

Even so, the

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point warrants emphasis because it gives Blake even less reason
to complain of any unfairness here.
Blake

mistakenly

maintains

that

he

was

precluded

from

seeking relief through the ARP simply because a separate unit of
the

Department

of

Corrections

conducted

an

internal

investigation into another officer involved in the incident that
led to this suit.
himself.

Blake did not initiate that investigation

See J.A. 287.

Nor did he believe that he was entitled

to learn the investigation’s results.

See J.A. 161.

Even so,

Blake somehow decided that the investigation and the ARP were
effectively

one

and

the

same.

He

never

hints

that

officials actively misled him into this understanding.

prison

Instead,

he came to his conclusion all on his own, having never read the
directives explaining the ARP.
Had

Blake

proceeded

much

read

those

See J.A. 162-63.

directives,

differently.

For

this

nothing

case
in

might

the

have

relevant

guidance -- in the prisoner handbook, directives, regulations,
statutes,

or

otherwise

--

suggests

that

an

internal

investigation bars or replaces an inmate complaint through the
ARP.

“[T]he

unjustified
exhaustion.”

prison’s

speculations,

requirements,”
“define

the

Jones, 549 U.S. at 218.

not

the

boundaries

prisoner’s
of

proper

Because the relevant

regulations never mention internal investigations, Blake should
not have assumed that such an investigation changed any of the
22

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normal rules.

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Pg: 23 of 34

Even more so because Maryland instructed inmates

to send most “all” of their complaints through the ARP.
Other
PLRA’s

courts

exhaustion

agree

that

an

requirement

internal investigation.

inmate

simply

does

by

not

satisfy

participating

in

the
an

See, e.g., Hubbs v. Cnty. of Suffolk,

No. 11–CV–6353(JS)(WDW), 2014 WL 2573393, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. June
9, 2014).

The Ninth Circuit relied on the “literal command of

the PLRA” in doing so.

Panaro v. City of N. Las Vegas, 432 F.3d

949, 953 (9th Cir. 2005).
See

Thomas

v.

Woolum,

The Sixth Circuit did much the same.

337

F.3d

720,

734

(6th

Cir.

2003),

abrogated on other grounds by Woodford v. Ngo, 58 U.S. 81, 87
(2007).

So too did the Seventh Circuit.

663 F.3d 899, 905 (7th Cir. 2011).
impliedly

recognize

internal

investigations

consistent purposes.

that

prisoner
serve

See Pavey v. Conley,

These cases and others
grievance

different

proceedings

and

not

and

entirely

Perhaps just as importantly, the cases

acknowledge that prisoners are not “permitted to pick and choose
how to present their concerns to prison officials.”

Id.

In sum, Blake failed to exhaust “available” “administrative
remedies” by failing to file a complaint through the ARP.

42

U.S.C.

no

§

1997e(a).

The

internal

difference.

23

investigation

made

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II.
Blake’s failure to exhaust also cannot be overlooked merely
because he is said to have “reasonably interpreted Maryland’s
murky inmate grievance procedures.”

Maj. op. at 16.

How could

Blake have reasonably interpreted procedures that were available
to him but that he never bothered to read?
More to the point, this reasonable-interpretation exception
to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement rests on two unsupportable
ideas.

First, the prisoner’s subjective beliefs largely do not

matter

when

determining

whether

administrative remedies.

the

prisoner

exhausted

his

See Napier v. Laurel Cnty., Ky., 636

F.3d 218, 221 n.2 (6th Cir. 2011); Thomas v. Parker, 609 F.3d
1114, 1119 (10th Cir. 2010); Twitty v. McCoskey, 226 F. App’x
594, 596 (7th Cir. 2007); Lyon v. Vande Krol, 305 F.3d 806, 809
(8th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“[Section] 1997e(a) does not permit
the court to consider an inmate’s merely subjective beliefs,
logical

or

procedures

otherwise,
are

in

determining

‘available.’”).

whether
Yet

administrative

the

reasonable-

interpretation approach makes such belief the lynchpin of the
analysis.

And

second,

substantial

exhaustion are not the same.

compliance

and

proper

See Thomas, 609 F.3d at 1118;

Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 2002); Wright
v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2001).

24

Yet the

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reasonable-exhaustion

Pg: 25 of 34

exception

is

substantial

compliance

by

another name.
The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement may not even be amenable
to any exceptions.
steps

that

the

The Act requires a prisoner to “us[e] all

agency

holds

out[]

and

do[]

so

properly.”

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).

That

rather

restrictive

definition

of

exhaustion

seems inconsistent with ad hoc exceptions like one premised on a
prisoner’s

“reasonable”

mistake,

where

admittedly not used “all steps.”

the

prisoner

has

Judge-made exceptions may be

permissible when interpreting judge-made exhaustion doctrines,
see, e.g., Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 269 (1993), but they
hardly

seem

appropriate

Congressional

as

“Congress

text.

where,

is

here,

we

vested

are

with

dealing
the

with

power

to

prescribe the basic procedural scheme under which claims may be
heard in federal courts,” Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457
U.S.

496,

501

(1982),

and

a

“court

may

not

disregard

these

requirements at its discretion,” Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty.,
493 U.S. 20, 31 (1989).
hoc,

“belief”-focused

And pragmatic reasons suggest that ad

exceptions

should

be

avoided,

as

they

force courts to undertake the “time-consuming task” of probing
“prisoners’ knowledge levels of the grievance process at given
points in time.”

Graham v. Cnty. of Gloucester, Va., 668 F.

Supp. 2d 734, 740 (E.D. Va. 2009).
25

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A reasonable-interpretation exception might trace back to
administrative

law,

maj.

questionable pedigree.
call

for

op.

at

10,

but

that

administrative-law-style

exhaustion,

they

derive

from

exhaustion”

the
onto

have failed.

level,

attempts

“traditional
the

PLRA’s

to

have

not

Margo Schlanger, Inmate

Litigation, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1555, 1652 (2003).
Supreme-Court

a

“[A]lthough courts have read the PLRA to

imported the corresponding exceptions.”

the

offers

engraft

doctrines

statutory

Certainly at

exceptions

of

that

administrative

exhaustion

requirement

Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 n.6; see also Woodford, 548

U.S. at 91 n.2 (rejecting the dissent’s suggestion to apply an
exception

to

administrative

the

PLRA

law).

exhaustion
Justice

requirement

Breyer

once

derived

suggested

a

from
link

between administrative law exceptions and the PLRA, see maj. op.
at 10, but no majority of justices ever sanctioned that view.
Even the Second Circuit, which may have at one time provided
perhaps

the

interpretation

only

precedent

exception,

now

supporting

recognizes

that

a
such

reasonableexceptions

may no longer be viable in light of more recent Supreme Court
decisions.

See Amador v. Andrews, 655 F.3d 89, 102-03 (2d Cir.

2011) (questioning whether a reasonable-interpretation exception
survives

Woodford

and

citing

several

opinions doing the same).

26

other

Second

Circuit

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All

Filed: 05/21/2015

that

aside,

Blake

Pg: 27 of 34

does

not

meet

the

standards

that

evidently apply to this new reasonable-interpretation exception.
The

majority

says

that

the

exception

will

apply

when

a

prisoner’s submissions serve the same “substantive” purposes as
proper

exhaustion.

Furthermore,
believing

the

that

he

Maj.

op.

prisoner
was

at

must

following

10-11
have

the

(emphasis
been

proper

omitted).

“justified”
procedures.

in
Id.

Here, neither proves to be the case.
Blake

did

not

fulfill

any

of

the

substantive

purposes

served by proper exhaustion by involving himself in an internal
investigation.

That

investigation

examines

employee

not the merits of the inmate’s specific grievance.

conduct,

It also is

not a means of dispute resolution or settlement, but instead a
simple exercise of the institution’s role as an employer.

And

the inmate plays a limited role in the investigation, providing
only a factual statement.

In contrast, exhaustion is intended

to “allow[] prison officials an opportunity to resolve disputes
concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being
haled into court.”

Jones, 549 U.S. at 204.

It also “reduc[es]

litigation to the extent complaints are satisfactorily resolved,
and

improv[es]

litigation

that

preparation of a useful record.”
The
purposes

internal
for

investigation

several

reasons.

does

by

leading

to

the

Id. at 219.
here
For

27

occur

did
one

not
thing,

fulfill
the

these

internal

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investigation
James

focused

Madigan,

on

who

the

the

Pg: 28 of 34

actions

corrections

of

Department

of

Public

officer

Safety

and

Correctional Services identified as the only relevant “suspect.”
J.A. 287.

It largely did not examine the actions of the only

remaining defendant in this appeal, Michael Ross, and did not
offer any opportunity to “resolve” a dispute about Ross’ acts.
Nor

did

it

internal

produce

a

investigation

peripheral

bystander.

references

to

Blake

“being

was

Ross

useful

administrative

report
See

largely

escorted”

largely

J.A.

by

treats

287-400.

consist

of

Ross.

record,

See,

Ross

Indeed,

passing

as
as
the

mentions

e.g.,

the

J.A.

a
few

that
289.

Moreover, other evidence that would have been useful in this
suit, like a contemporaneous medical examination of Blake, was
not

gathered

during

the

investigation.

Administratively

settling Blake’s claims was also out of the question, as the
internal investigation did not offer direct relief to an inmate.
See Pavey, 663 F.3d at 905 (“An internal-affairs investigation
may

lead

to

disciplinary

proceedings

targeting

the

wayward

employee but ordinarily does not offer a remedy to the prisoner
who was on the receiving end of the employee’s malfeasance.”).
And, at bottom, it should not be forgotten that Blake failed to
file a “targeted complaint,” maj. op. at 12, because he failed
to file any complaint.

He cannot claim credit for “report[ing]

the incident,” id., as another corrections officer -- Captain
28

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James Vincent -- did that.

Pg: 29 of 34

See J.A. 157-58, 287, 291.

In fact,

at one point, Blake actually “request[ed] that no investigation
be conducted . . . and that the matter be considered CLOSED.”
J.A. 398.
It

the

internal

investigation provided “notice of Blake’s complaint.”

Maj. op.

at 12.

overstates

the

facts

to

say

that

The account that Blake provided as part of the internal

investigation focused on Madigan, not Ross.

See J.A. 329-33.

Thus, Blake did not provide relevant notice of the “source of
the

perceived

problem.”

McCollum

v.

Cal.

Rehab., 647 F.3d 870, 876 (9th Cir. 2011).

Dep’t

of

Corr.

&

And prison officials

had no notice that Blake would file a suit premised on anything
Ross did, as Blake disclaimed any intent to sue anyone.
J.A.

332-33

(“I

will

not

be

going

situation outside this institution.”).
“notice” would not be enough.

any

further

with

See
this

In any event, affording

“[N]otice to those who might

later be sued . . . has not been thought to be one of the
leading purposes of the exhaustion requirement.”
U.S. at 219.
much.

See

Jones, 549

Here again, even the Second Circuit recognizes as
Macias

v.

Zenk,

495

F.3d

37,

44

(2d

Cir.

2007)

(“[A]fter Woodford, notice alone is insufficient[.]”).
Nor

did

Blake

satisfy

the

“procedural

prong”

of

the

exception, which apparently requires the inmate to rely on a
“reasonable” “interpretation of the relevant regulations.”
29

Maj.

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op. at 12.

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Pg: 30 of 34

It hardly bears repeating that the regulations were

clear and Blake had no basis to misconstrue them.
not

involve

inmate

classification,

so

from the ARP.

discipline,

Blake’s

claim

parole,
was

not

This case did

mail,

or

explicitly

inmate
excluded

Contrast with Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 679

(2d Cir. 2004) (applying the reasonable-interpretation exception
where the inmate mistakenly but reasonably believed that his
claim fell into a category of claims explicitly excluded from
the

ordinary

grievance

process).

The

ARP

applied

to

all

inmates, to all claims of use of force, at all relevant times.
Blake

acted

unreasonably

regulations otherwise.

in

purportedly

interpreting

the

Indeed, at least toward the beginning of

this case, even Blake seemed to understand that the internal
investigation
that,

in

and

his

the

view,

ARP

were

the

separate.

internal

unnecessary to resort to the ARP.

He

explained

investigation
See J.A. 162-63.

made

then
it

But he

never once suggested that the investigation precluded him from
filing a complaint.
Furthermore, the relevant procedures were not “ambiguous”
merely

because

they

did

not

specifically

describe

how

an

internal investigation might affect a complaint lodged through
the ARP.

See maj. op. at 13.

When a policy like the ARP

ostensibly reaches “all” complaints, and that same policy says
nothing

about

an

entirely

separate
30

process,

the

obvious

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inference
former.

is

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that

the

latter

Pg: 31 of 34

process

is

untethered

from

the

But the majority puts aside this clear assumption in

favor of an ambiguous approach to prison regulation.

Now, jail

officials must anticipate every potential misunderstanding that
an inmate might have about a prison’s administrative remedies
and then foreclose every imaginable misunderstanding in writing.
That

approach

imposes

corrections officials.

a

substantial

new

burden

on

state

It also finds no support in the law.

To

the contrary, more than one court has held that prison officials
are not responsible for telling prisoners anything about the
available administrative remedies.

See, e.g., Yousef v. Reno,

254 F.3d 1214, 1221 (10th Cir. 2001); cf. Johnson v. Dist. of
Columbia, 869 F. Supp. 2d 34, 41 (D.D.C. 2012) (“[T]he majority
of courts . . . have held that an inmate’s subjective lack of
information about his administrative remedies does not excuse a
failure to exhaust.”).

In addition, prison administrators might

now feel compelled to adopt overly complicated administrative
procedures out of a justifiable fear that any regulatory silence
will be used against them.

That could in turn produce even more

confusion among prisoners.
Prior

district

court

cases

also

supposed misunderstanding “reasonable.”

do

not

render

Blake’s

Maj. op. at 15 n.8.

Certainly Blake did not rely on these opinions directly.

He

could not have, as the opinions do not interpret the policies
31

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that applied to Blake’s present claim.

Rather, all of those

cases were looking to a new department directive that went into
effect on August 27, 2008, long after the time when Blake needed
to file his administrative complaint.

See Williams v. Shearin,

No. L–10–1479, 2010 WL 5137820, at *2 & n.2 (D. Md. Dec. 10,
2010) (addressing events arising in December 2009); Bogues v.
McAlpine, No. CCB-11-463, 2011 WL 5974634, at *4 (D. Md. Nov.
28,

2011)

dismissed

(citing
the

“Ex.

inmate’s

4,”

an

complaint

administrative
under

the

decision

2008

that

directive);

Thomas v. Bell, No. AW–08–2156, 2010 WL 2779308, at *4 n.2 (D.
Md. July 7, 2010) (citing an exhibit in another case that proves
to be an administrative decision dismissing a complaint under
the 2008 policy).

The 2008 directive provides that a complaint

submitted through the ARP must be dismissed when “the basis of
the complaint is the same basis of an investigation under the
Internal

Investigative

Unit.”

J.A.

437.

Of

course,

the

procedure before us here says no such thing, so these district
court cases are irrelevant.
In
excuse

short,
Blake’s

a

reasonable-interpretation
failure

to

exhaust.

exception
The

does

district

not

court

appropriately declined to apply that kind of an exception here.

32

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Pg: 33 of 34

III.
One last matter may be easily resolved: Ross did not waive
his exhaustion defense by waiting to raise it.
exhaustion

is

an

affirmative

defense,

Anderson

Because PLRA
v.

XYZ

Corr.

Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 683 (4th Cir. 2005), it may
be waived by a defendant who fails to timely assert it, see,
e.g., Ga. Pac. Consumer Prods., LP v. Von Drehle Corp., 710 F.3d
527,

533

(4th

Cir.

2013).

Here,

Ross

exhaustion defense in his initial answer.

did

not

include

the

But he did seek and

obtain consent from Blake (through counsel) to file an amended
answer

containing

the

affirmative

defense.

Blake

did

not

condition his consent in any relevant way or even ask to review
the proposed answer before it was filed.

He cannot now complain

about untimeliness when he blindly approved the untimely filing.
See Corwin v. Marney, Orton Inv., 843 F.2d 194, 199 (5th Cir.
1988); cf. Mooney v. City of N.Y., 219 F.3d 123, 127 n.2 (2d
Cir. 2000) (holding that the plaintiff’s implied consent to an
amended answer excused the defendant’s initial failure to raise
an affirmative defense in its answer).
before the amendment was made.

The time to object was

Having failed to do so, Blake

was required to face up to Ross’ defense on its merits.

33

Appeal: 13-7279

Doc: 49

Filed: 05/21/2015

Pg: 34 of 34

IV.
For

these

many

court’s judgment.
did not use it.
to

go

forward.

reasons,

we

should

affirm

the

district

Maryland’s ARP was available to Blake and he
We should not now allow his unexhausted claim
I

respectfully

choice to do otherwise.

34

dissent

from

the

majority’s