Samuel Jackson v. Joseph Lightsey
Filing
PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:11-ct-03221-F. [999496005]. [13-7291]
Appeal: 13-7291
Doc: 45
Filed: 12/18/2014
Pg: 1 of 19
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-7291
SAMUEL JUNIOR JACKSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
DR. JOSEPH LIGHTSEY; DR. SHER GULERIA,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
N.C. D.O.C. MEDICAL STAFF,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:11-ct-03221-F)
Argued:
October 28, 2014
Decided:
December 18, 2014
Before MOTZ, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part by published
opinion.
Judge Harris wrote the opinion, in which Judge Motz
and Judge Wynn joined.
ARGUED:
Daniel Scott Harawa, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
Kelly Street Brown, YOUNG
MOORE AND HENDERSON, P.A., Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellees.
ON BRIEF:
Elliott Schulder, COVINGTON & BURLING
Appeal: 13-7291
Doc: 45
Filed: 12/18/2014
Pg: 2 of 19
LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
Elizabeth P. McCullough,
YOUNG MOORE AND HENDERSON, P.A., Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellees.
2
Appeal: 13-7291
Doc: 45
Filed: 12/18/2014
Pg: 3 of 19
PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge:
Samuel Junior Jackson (“Jackson”) is an inmate in the care
of
the
North
Carolina
Department
of
Corrections.
Since
his
incarceration, Jackson alleges, his chronic heart condition has
deteriorated, and he has suffered both a heart attack and a host
of other maladies that severely compromise his quality of life.
Jackson filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the
Eighth Amendment and naming as defendants two prison doctors,
Joseph Lightsey (“Lightsey”) and Sher Guleria (“Guleria”), and
the
medical
“Staff”).
staff
of
the
Department
of
Corrections
(the
The district court dismissed all of Jackson’s claims
at the pleading stage, ruling first that the Staff should be
dismissed
as
a
party
and
then,
in
a
subsequent
order,
that
Jackson had failed to state a claim against the doctors under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The
principal
question
before
us
is
whether
Jackson’s
complaint sets forth plausible claims of deliberate indifference
that should survive a motion to dismiss.
reach
that
issue,
we
must
consider
But before we can
whether
this
appeal
is
properly before us, in whole or in part, in light of certain
omissions in Jackson’s notice of appeal.
We conclude that Jackson did not appeal from the district
court
order
dismissing
the
Staff
3
as
a
party
to
this
case,
Appeal: 13-7291
Doc: 45
Filed: 12/18/2014
depriving
us
of
however,
have
jurisdiction
jurisdiction
Pg: 4 of 19
to
over
review
the
that
order.
dismissal
of
We
do,
Jackson’s
claims against the doctors, and we hold that while the claim
against
Lightsey
Jackson
has
was
alleged
properly
facts
dismissed
supporting
under
a
deliberate indifference against Guleria.
the
district
court’s
dismissal
of
Rule
plausible
12(b)(6),
claim
of
We therefore vacate
Jackson’s
claim
against
Guleria and remand for further proceedings.
I.
A.
Because Jackson appeals from an order granting a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), we recount the facts as alleged by
Jackson, accepting them as true for purposes of this appeal.
See
Summers
v.
Altarum
Inst.,
Corp.,
740
F.3d
325,
327–28
(4th Cir. 2014).
Jackson has been an inmate in North Carolina’s state prison
system since 2008.
In 2003, before he was incarcerated, Jackson
was diagnosed with congestive heart failure by Dr. Lindsey White
(“White”), a cardiologist.
six
medications
that
proved
White prescribed Jackson a set of
effective
in
managing
Jackson’s
heart condition.
Upon
his
incarceration
at
Central
Prison
in
Raleigh
in
2008, Jackson met with Lightsey, who is not a cardiologist, for
4
Appeal: 13-7291
Doc: 45
Filed: 12/18/2014
a screening appointment.
presented
Lightsey
cardiologist’s
During this session, Jackson either
with
diagnosis
Pg: 5 of 19
medical
of
records
congestive
documenting
heart
his
failure
his
and
prescriptions, or notified Lightsey that White would be sending
the records to him separately. 1
Lightsey proceeded to diagnose
Jackson with a heart arrhythmia, a comparatively less serious
condition, and to alter Jackson’s medication regimen.
Jackson
alleges
that
his
health
went
into
a
tailspin
following Lightsey’s intervention.
He began to experience a
number
symptoms,
pains
of
and
Fearing
unpleasant
burning
that
the
and
alarming
sensations
changes
to
in
his
several
including
parts
medication
of
were
chest
his
to
body.
blame,
Jackson made multiple requests to the Staff to be seen by a
cardiologist,
all
of
which
were
denied.
This
deterioration
culminated in Jackson suffering a heart attack, for which he
received treatment at Rex Hospital in Raleigh.
Jackson
Institution
was
in
later
Nashville,
transferred
North
to
Carolina.
Nash
Correctional
There,
he
saw
Guleria, who told Jackson that he would order additional tests
and
treatments,
monitoring,
and
including
a
special
an
electrocardiogram,
diet.
Several
months
heart
rate
after
this
visit, having never received any of the tests or treatments and
1
Jackson’s complaint, informal brief, and counseled briefs
are inconsistent on this point.
5
Appeal: 13-7291
Doc: 45
Filed: 12/18/2014
Pg: 6 of 19
having made numerous sick call requests, Jackson was informed by
members of the Staff that they had no record of Guleria entering
any orders.
As a result of substandard care provided by the
defendants, Jackson suffers from chronic and extreme pain, and
is unable even to walk to the prison dining hall to eat.
B.
On November 2, 2011, Jackson filed his § 1983 complaint in
the District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina,
naming
Lightsey,
Guleria,
and
the
Staff
as
defendants
and
alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.
J.A. at 6.
In response to
an order from the district court identifying an omission in his
original complaint, Jackson filed an amended complaint on April
27, 2012.
J.A. at 19.
The district court reviewed that complaint for frivolity
under
28
U.S.C.
§
1915A(a).
Finding
that
the
complaint’s
allegations pertained only to Lightsey and Guleria, in an order
dated
July
6,
2012
(the
“2012
Order”)
the
district
court
dismissed all claims against the Staff and dismissed the Staff
as
a
party
to
the
case.
Jackson
v.
Lightsey,
No. 5:11-ct-03221-F (E.D.N.C. July 6, 2012), ECF No. 9.
The remaining defendants, Lightsey and Guleria, then moved
to
dismiss
Jackson’s
complaint
under
Rule
12(b)(6).
The
district court granted their motion in a July 31, 2013 order
6
Appeal: 13-7291
Doc: 45
Filed: 12/18/2014
Pg: 7 of 19
(the “2013 Order”), holding that Jackson’s allegations described
only a medical disagreement over proper diagnosis and care and
thus
failed
Jackson
to
state
claim
Lightsey,
v.
a
No.
July 31, 2013), ECF No. 41.
for
deliberate
indifference.
5:11-ct-03221-F
(E.D.N.C.
On the same day, the clerk of the
district court entered a final judgment in the case, dismissing
Jackson’s
action
in
its
entirety.
Jackson
v.
Lightsey,
No. 5:11-ct-03221-F (E.D.N.C. July 31, 2013), ECF No. 42.
On August 12, 2013, Jackson filed a handwritten document
with the clerk of the district court stating his intention to
“[a]ppeal the Order of the United States District Court [for
the] Eastern District of North Carolina [] on this the 31st day
of
July,
2013
by
District Judge.”
James
C.
Foxx
J.A. at 62.
[sic],
Senior
United
States
The document did not name the
court to which Jackson intended to appeal.
However, the clerk
for the Fourth Circuit, following standard procedure for pro se
appeals, promptly issued an informal briefing order to Jackson
as
well
as
to
the
lawyers
who
Guleria in the district court.
(4th
Cir.
Aug.
13,
2013),
had
represented
Lightsey
and
Jackson v. Lightsey, No. 13-7291
ECF
No.
5.
After
Jackson
and
appellees Lightsey and Guleria filed their informal briefs, the
clerk appointed appellate counsel for Jackson to facilitate this
appeal.
Jackson v. Lightsey, No. 13-7291 (4th Cir. Apr. 28,
2014), ECF No. 25.
7
Appeal: 13-7291
Doc: 45
Filed: 12/18/2014
Pg: 8 of 19
II.
Before reaching Jackson’s deliberate indifference claims,
we must address whether Jackson has brought those claims before
us consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c).
Because “Rule 3’s dictates are jurisdictional in nature, and
their satisfaction is a prerequisite to appellate review,” Smith
v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992), this analysis determines
whether
we
have
jurisdiction
over
this
appeal,
and
if
so,
whether it extends to all of Jackson’s claims.
A.
Appellees
decide
this
contend
case
that
because
we
are
Jackson
without
failed
to
jurisdiction
name
the
to
Fourth
Circuit as the court to which he intended to appeal an order of
a
federal
district
court
within
that
circuit.
Pointing
to
Rule 3(c)(1)(C)’s requirement that a notice of appeal “name the
court to which the appeal is taken,” they argue that although
there is no court other than the Fourth Circuit to which Jackson
could have appealed, this defect in Jackson’s notice is fatal to
our jurisdiction.
We disagree.
Our approach to Rule 3 is not so formalistic.
Instead,
following
construe
Rule
3
the
instruction
liberally,
and
of
measure
the
Supreme
compliance
Court,
by
we
asking
whether “the litigant’s action is the functional equivalent of
what the rule requires.”
Smith, 502 U.S. at 248 (quoting Torres
8
Appeal: 13-7291
Doc: 45
Filed: 12/18/2014
Pg: 9 of 19
v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 317 (1988)); see In re
Spence, 541 F.3d 538, 543 (4th Cir. 2008).
Where a challenged
notice of appeal has provided adequate notice and caused the
complaining party no prejudice, there is no reason to allow a
“technical impediment[]” to foreclose appellate review.
In re
Spence, 541 F.3d at 543 (quoting Bogart v. Chapell, 396 F.3d
548, 555 (4th Cir. 2005)); see Smith, 502 U.S. at 248 (notice
afforded by a document determines the document’s sufficiency as
a notice of appeal); Canady v. Crestar Mortg. Corp., 109 F.3d
969, 974–75 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding compliance with Rule 3 in
light of adequate notice and lack of prejudice to the appellee).
Applying those principles, we have no difficulty concluding
that Jackson’s failure to add the words “Fourth Circuit” to his
notice of appeal did not bring him out of compliance with Rule
3.
Where, as in this case, there is only one possible appellate
forum, the filing of an otherwise proper notice of appeal may
itself be the “functional equivalent” of naming that court under
Rule
3(c)(1)(C).
287 F.3d 1000,
See
1002
n.1
United
(10th
States
Cir.
v.
2002)
(Rule
Treto-Haro,
3(c)(1)(C)
satisfied despite failure to name appellate forum); Dillon v.
United
(same).
States,
The
Notwithstanding
184
F.3d
facts
of
omission
556,
558
this
(6th
of
case
the
Cir.
1999)
illustrate
words
“Fourth
(en
the
banc)
point:
Circuit,”
Jackson’s intent to appeal to this court was sufficiently clear
9
Appeal: 13-7291
Doc: 45
Filed: 12/18/2014
Pg: 10 of 19
that the district court clerk immediately transferred Jackson’s
notice to our clerk, who in turn issued an informal briefing
order
to
Appellees
Jackson
and
concede,
to
as
the
they
appellees
must,
that
the
they
very
next
received
day.
prompt
notice of Jackson’s appeal to the Fourth Circuit and suffered no
prejudice as a result of the claimed deficiency in Jackson’s
notice.
Under
these
circumstances,
we
hold,
Jackson
has
complied with Rule 3(c)(1)(C), and we may proceed to consider
his appeal. 2
B.
Though we have confirmed our jurisdiction over Jackson’s
appeal
as
a
jurisdiction
claim
against
whole,
extends
the
we
to
must
the
Staff.
also
2012
In
his
consider
Order
whether
dismissing
notice
of
that
Jackson’s
appeal,
Jackson
specified that he sought review of one order: “the Order of the
[district court] on this the 31st day of July, 2013 by James C.
Foxx [sic], Senior United States District Judge,” considering
and
granting
Guleria.
the
motions
Consistent
with
to
dismiss
his
of
notice,
2
doctors
Jackson
Lightsey
then
filed
and
an
Jackson’s pro se status, of course, also favors a liberal
construction of his notice of appeal.
See United States v.
Garcia, 65 F.3d 17, 19 (4th Cir. 1995).
But our holding, like
those of the other circuits to address the question, is not
restricted to pro se litigants.
See Treto-Haro, 287 F.3d at
1002 n.1 (omission by the federal government); Dillon, 184 F.3d
at 558.
10
Appeal: 13-7291
Doc: 45
informal
brief
Filed: 12/18/2014
addressing
Pg: 11 of 19
only
against Lightsey and Guleria.
the
dismissal
of
his
claims
In his counseled briefs and at
oral argument, however, Jackson renewed his claim against the
Staff, so we must now decide whether we may review the district
court’s 2012 dismissal of that claim.
We conclude that we may
not.
Rule
3(c)(1)(B)
requires
that
a
notice
of
appeal
“designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed.”
Fed.
R.
App.
P.
3(c)(1)(B).
Again,
we
construe
the
rule
liberally and take a functional approach to compliance, asking
whether
the
putative
appellant
has
manifested
the
intent
to
appeal a specific judgment or order and whether the affected
party had notice and an opportunity fully to brief the issue.
See In re Spence, 541 F.3d at 543; Bogart, 396 F.3d at 555.
Here, we answer both those questions in the negative, leading to
the conclusion that Jackson did not properly designate the 2012
Order for appeal.
First,
there
is
no
indication
that
Jackson
intended
appeal the 2012 Order when he filed his notice of appeal.
to
This
is not a simple problem of omission, as with Jackson’s failure
to name the Fourth Circuit as the forum for his appeal.
The
problem here is that Jackson did name the order he wished to
appeal, and that order was the 2013 Order dismissing his claims
against the prison doctors.
Given Jackson’s express designation
11
Appeal: 13-7291
Doc: 45
Filed: 12/18/2014
Pg: 12 of 19
of one particular order, the fairest inference is that Jackson
did
not
intend
to
appeal
the
other.
See
Smith
v.
Barry,
985 F.2d 180, 184 (4th Cir. 1993) (where “all issues triable by
Jury” are designated for appeal, court may not hear appeal as to
issues that are not triable by jury); see also Osterneck v. E.T.
Barwick
Indus.,
(“[W]here
some
Inc.,
825
portions
of
F.2d
1521,
a
judgment
1529
and
(11th
some
Cir.
1987)
orders
are
expressly made a part of the appeal, we must infer that the
appellant did not intend to appeal other unmentioned orders or
judgments.”); Caldwell v. Moore, 968 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir.
1992) (same). 3
That inference is confirmed by the informal brief Jackson
subsequently filed with this court, which fails even to mention
the
Staff
and
is
instead
addressed
exclusively
allegations against Lightsey and Guleria.
to
Jackson’s
The informal brief is
an important document; under Fourth Circuit rules, our review is
limited to issues preserved in that brief.
34(b).
See 4th Cir. R.
Jackson’s decision to confine his brief to his claims
3
At oral argument, Jackson’s counsel suggested that the
2012 Order was incorporated by reference into the designated
2013 Order, and hence properly before us.
That is incorrect.
It is a separate document – the final judgment issued by the
district court clerk dismissing Jackson’s action in its entirety
– that includes a reference to the 2012 Order.
J.A. at 61.
Whether designation of that final judgment in the notice of
appeal might have evinced the requisite intent to appeal the
2012 Order is not relevant here, because Jackson’s notice
designates only the 2013 Order.
12
Appeal: 13-7291
Doc: 45
against
Filed: 12/18/2014
doctors
designation
claims.
for
Lightsey
appeal
of
and
Pg: 13 of 19
Guleria
the
2013
mirrors
Order
his
specific
dismissing
those
Taken together, the plainest inference is that Jackson
intended to appeal only the dismissal of his claims against his
treating physicians.
Second, and relatedly, there is a very substantial notice
problem in this case.
that
Jackson
intended
Precisely because there was no indication
to
appeal
the
2012
Order,
the
Staff,
having been dismissed as a party to the action for more than a
year, was never notified of Jackson’s appeal or asked to file an
informal brief.
As a result, the Staff was not represented in
this appeal, on briefs or at oral argument, and has had no
opportunity to defend the 2012 Order.
This is a far cry from
cases in which we have found compliance with Rule 3(c)(1)(B)
despite an ambiguous designation because no harm was done – the
affected parties were before the court and fully briefed the
relevant issues, nobody was taken by surprise, and no prejudice
resulted.
See, e.g., Canady, 109 F.3d at 974–75; In re Spence,
541 F.3d at 543.
Jackson urges us to look past his omission because he was
appearing pro se when he filed his notice of appeal and informal
brief.
Although we do liberally construe pro se pleadings, we
cannot excuse defects that, as here, deprive other parties of
the fair notice to which they are entitled.
13
Because Jackson’s
Appeal: 13-7291
Doc: 45
Filed: 12/18/2014
Pg: 14 of 19
notice of appeal did not evince an intent to appeal the 2012
Order and because of the resulting failure of notice to the
Staff, we hold that under Rule 3(c)(1)(B), we lack jurisdiction
to review the 2012 Order dismissing the Staff as a party to this
case. 4
III.
We now consider whether Jackson’s amended complaint raises
plausible claims of deliberate indifference against Lightsey and
Guleria. 5
Our review of the district court’s order granting
appellees’ motion to dismiss is de novo.
328.
Summers, 740 F.3d at
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must present
factual
allegations
that
plausible on its face.”
“state
a
claim
to
relief
that
is
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).
Jackson’s
In
pro
applying
se
that
standard,
complaint,
see
we
liberally
Smith
v.
construe
Smith,
4
In light of our holding that Jackson’s failure to
designate the 2012 Order for appeal deprives us of jurisdiction,
we need not reach questions regarding the timeliness of a
putative appeal from the 2012 Order, nor whether Jackson’s
failure to address the 2012 Order in his informal brief would
have precluded our review under Fourth Circuit Rule 34(b).
5
Jackson originally sought injunctive relief against
Lightsey and Guleria as well as damages.
On appeal, however,
Jackson’s counsel conceded that those claims for injunctive
relief are moot, and only the damages claims are before us now.
14
Appeal: 13-7291
Doc: 45
Filed: 12/18/2014
Pg: 15 of 19
589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009), take all facts pleaded as
true, and draw all reasonable inferences in Jackson’s favor.
Summers, 740 F.3d at 328.
A.
A prison official’s deliberate indifference to an inmate’s
serious medical needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment.
(1976).
A
deliberate
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104
indifference
claim
components, objective and subjective.
medical
condition
must
be
consists
of
two
Objectively, the inmate’s
“serious”
–
“one
that
has
been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is
so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity
for
535 F.3d 225,
a
241
doctor’s
attention.”
(4th Cir. 2008).
Iko
Appellees
do
v.
Shreve,
not
dispute
that Jackson’s chronic heart condition qualifies as objectively
serious.
Where the parties differ is over the subjective component.
An official is deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious
medical needs only when he or she subjectively “knows of and
disregards
an
excessive
risk
to
inmate
health
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
standard
for
culpability
than
mere
or
safety.”
That is a higher
negligence
or
even
civil
recklessness, and as a consequence, many acts or omissions that
would constitute medical malpractice will not rise to the level
15
Appeal: 13-7291
Doc: 45
Filed: 12/18/2014
of deliberate indifference.
Pg: 16 of 19
See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
To
show an Eighth Amendment violation, it is not enough that an
official should have known of a risk; he or she must have had
actual subjective knowledge of both the inmate’s serious medical
condition and the excessive risk posed by the official’s action
or inaction.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837–39; Iko, 535 F.3d at 241.
It is that exacting standard, appellees argue, that Jackson’s
allegations fail to meet.
B.
We
though
agree
that
describing
malpractice
claim,
indifference.
Jackson’s
behavior
do
not
Jackson
allegations
that
make
might
out
contends
a
that
against
Lightsey,
support
a
case
deliberate
of
during
a
medical
screening
appointment, Lightsey, who is not a heart specialist, diagnosed
Jackson
with
a
heart
arrhythmia,
even
though
Jackson
had
produced or offered to produce medical records showing that a
cardiologist had diagnosed and treated him for a more serious
condition.
Lightsey also substantially modified the medication
regimen prescribed by Jackson’s cardiologist.
suggests
that
Lightsey’s
treatment
decisions
Though hindsight
may
have
been
mistaken, even gravely so, we agree with the district court that
Jackson’s
claim
against
Lightsey
is
essentially
a
“[d]isagreement[] between an inmate and a physician over the
inmate’s proper medical care,” and we consistently have found
16
Appeal: 13-7291
such
Doc: 45
Filed: 12/18/2014
disagreements
indifference.
to
fall
Pg: 17 of 19
short
of
showing
deliberate
Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir.
1985); see United States v. Clawson, 650 F.3d 530, 538 (4th Cir.
2011).
While
a
serious
heart
condition,
represent
a
non-cardiologist’s
deviation
as
erroneous
alleged
from
the
diagnosis
of
a
by
Jackson,
may
well
accepted
standard
of
care,
standing alone it is insufficient to clear the “high bar” of a
constitutional claim.
Iko, 535 F.3d at 241.
Jackson’s case against Guleria is of a different order.
Jackson
has
no
quarrel
recommendations.
exactly
the
On
testing
with
the
and
Guleria’s
medical
judgment
or
contrary,
what
Jackson
wanted
was
treatment
that
Guleria
prescribed.
Jackson’s objection is that Guleria failed to enter the orders
necessary
resulted
to
in
provide
Jackson
Jackson
going
with
months
the
promised
without
the
care,
which
testing
and
treatment for his serious heart condition that Guleria thought
appropriate.
We have held already that a “[f]ailure to provide the level
of care that a treating physician himself believes is necessary”
may
constitute
deliberate
indifference.
896 F.2d 848, 853 (4th Cir. 1990).
allegations
issue
here:
Miltier
v.
Beorn,
In Miltier, we considered
against
prison
doctors
very
One
doctor
recommended
similar
that
a
to
those
patient,
at
who
ultimately died in prison of a heart attack, be transferred to a
17
Appeal: 13-7291
Doc: 45
Filed: 12/18/2014
Pg: 18 of 19
cardiac unit but failed to follow up on this recommendation; and
another doctor approved the referral but also failed to follow
up and confirm that the transfer had occurred.
Id.
Those
allegations, we concluded, clearly presented a triable claim of
deliberate indifference.
The
same
Supreme
Id.
reasoning
Court’s
applies
decision
in
here.
Miltier
Farmer,
which
predates
the
established
the
requisite subjective mental state for a deliberate indifference
claim.
See Miltier, 896 F.2d at 852 (reciting a test for civil
recklessness).
But the substantive principle we borrow from
Miltier
a
–
that
doctor’s
failure
to
provide
care
that
he
himself deems necessary to treat an inmate’s serious medical
condition
Farmer.
may
constitute
deliberate
indifference
–
survives
At the 12(b)(6) stage, it is fair to infer that when
Guleria prescribed a set of tests and treatments for Jackson’s
unquestionably serious heart condition, he did so because he
subjectively believed they were necessary, and therefore must
have known that failing to provide them would pose an excessive
risk to Jackson’s health.
That is all that Farmer requires, see
511 U.S. at 842 (subjective prong may be met by showing that
risk is sufficiently obvious that official “must have known” of
it),
and
under
Miltier,
it
is
enough
to
deliberate indifference, 896 F.2d at 853.
state
a
claim
of
See also Hudson v.
McHugh, 148 F.3d 859, 863–64 (7th Cir. 1998) (Farmer satisfied
18
Appeal: 13-7291
by
Doc: 45
allegation
condition
and
Filed: 12/18/2014
that
prison
need
for
Pg: 19 of 19
officials
treatment
but
knew
of
serious
nevertheless
medical
failed
to
provide treatment); Miller v. Schoenen, 75 F.3d 1305, 1310–11
(8th Cir. 1996) (same).
Our decision today does not address the ultimate merits of
Jackson’s claim against Guleria, nor express any view about the
likelihood that Jackson will prevail.
We hold only that given
the liberal construction we afford pro se complaints and the
favorable light in which we review them under Rule 12(b)(6),
Jackson’s
allegations
state
indifference as to Guleria.
a
plausible
claim
of
deliberate
Accordingly, we vacate the district
court’s dismissal of Jackson’s claim against Guleria and remand
for further proceedings.
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of
the district court in part and vacate and remand in part.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART
19
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?