US v. Samuel Conrad, III

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:06-cr-00040-JPJ-PMS-1. [999509451]. [13-7384]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-7384

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SAMUEL ROBERT CONRAD, III,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon.
James P. Jones, District
Judge. (1:06-cr-00040-JPJ-PMS-1)

Argued:

October 30, 2014

Decided:

January 13, 2015

Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Duncan wrote the opinion,
in which Judge Keenan and Judge Diaz joined.

ARGUED: Brian Jackson Beck, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellant.
Jean Barrett
Hudson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlottesville,
Virginia, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Larry W. Shelton, Federal
Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Roanoke,
Virginia, for Appellant.
Timothy J. Heaphy, United States
Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, Zachary T. Lee, Assistant United
States Attorney, Anne H. Lippitt, Third Year Law Student, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.

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DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:
Defendant-Appellant Samuel Robert Conrad III is currently
serving

an

eight-year

conviction.

He

term

appeals

of

the

imprisonment

district

court’s

for

a

denial

2013

of

his

motion to dismiss commitment proceedings arising from a 2007
insanity acquittal of a separate set of offenses, as well as the
district court’s order to delay those proceedings until he is
released from prison.

The district court held that the purposes

of the commitment statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4243--which provides for
commitment

or

release

dangerousness--would

based

best

on

be

an

served

insanity
“by

acquittee’s

delaying

hearing until the end of his term of imprisonment.”

Conrad’s
J.A. 164.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.
In

2006,

a

federal

grand

jury

indicted

Appellant

for

possessing several firearms as a convicted felon and unlawful
user of a controlled substance, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and
(3),

and

for

possessing

an

unregistered,

sawed-off

under 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(b), 5861(i), and 5871.

shotgun,
Pursuant

to a plea agreement executed in January 2007, the court found
Appellant not guilty only by reason of insanity (“NGI”) and,
under

18

U.S.C.

§ 4243(a),

eligible for release.

ordered

Appellant

committed

until

Following a psychological examination,
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the court held a hearing to determine Appellant’s dangerousness
and ordered him released subject to various conditions.
that

determination

serves

as

the

basis

for

this

Because
dispute’s

procedural posture on appeal, we first provide an overview of
the relevant statutory framework as context before discussing it
further.
A.
The

statute

provides

a

commitment

at

issue

procedural
of

in

this

framework

defendants

appeal,
for

adjudicated

18

the

NGI. 1

U.S.C.

§ 4243,

evaluation
An

NGI

and

verdict

renders a defendant an “acquitted person” under the statute, who
“shall be committed” until “eligible for release pursuant to
subsection

(e).”

psychological

18

U.S.C.

examination

§ 4243(a).

ordered

under

Following

subsection

(b),

a
a

hearing to determine commitment or release “shall be conducted”
within

forty

days

of

the

NGI

verdict.

Id.

§ 4243(c).

Subsection (d) places the burden of proof at the hearing on the
acquittee.
injury,”

When
“serious

the

underlying

damage”

to

offense

another’s

involves
property,

“bodily
or

a

“substantial risk of such injury or damage,” the acquittee must
show by clear and convincing evidence that his release “would
1

The parties’ plea agreement also stipulated that § 4243 et
seq. would govern “all further proceedings” in the case.
J.A.
16.

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not create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person
or serious damage of property of another due to a present mental
disease or defect.” 2

Id. § 4243(d).

If the court finds that the acquittee failed to prove by
the

appropriate

standard

that

his

release

will

not

pose

a

substantial risk to the public, subsection (e) provides for the
acquittee’s indefinite commitment; if the court finds that the
acquittee

met

unconditional
Baker,

155

his

burden,

release.

F.3d

392,

the

See
395

subsection
§ 4243(e);

id.

(4th

allows
United

Cir.

1998).

If

for

only

States

v.

indefinitely

committed, the acquittee may later be released--conditionally or
unconditionally--under

subsection

(f),

but

only

upon

a

recommendation by the director of the commitment facility. 3
B.
1.
Against this statutory background, we turn to the hearing
required by subsection (c) and conducted by the district court

2

“With respect to any other offense,” the defendant bears
the burden of proof by a “preponderance of the evidence.”
18
U.S.C. § 4243(d).
3

If the director determines that the acquittee would no
longer pose a substantial risk to the public if released, she
“shall promptly file” her recommendation with the court.
The
court “shall [then] order the discharge of the acquitted person
or . . . hold a hearing . . . to determine whether [the
acquittee] should be released.” 18 U.S.C. § 4243(f).

4

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following

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Appellant’s

2007

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NGI

determination.

The

court

determined that Appellant would not pose a substantial risk to
the

public

released.

due

to

a

present

mental

disease

or

defect

if

But instead of unconditionally releasing Appellant as

subsection (e) countenances, see Baker, 155 F.3d at 395, the
court ordered him released subject to various conditions. 4
In

August

2008,

the

Commonwealth

of

Virginia

charged

Appellant with murder for the beating death of his sister-inlaw.

For this and other reasons, the district court revoked

Appellant’s

conditional

release

in

July

recommendation of the U.S. Probation Officer.

2010

on

the

In February 2010,

Appellant pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter for the 2008

4

These conditions included that defendant receive approval
from his probation officer for any changes in residence or
employment; “maintain active participation in a regiment of
outpatient mental health care”; take prescribed medication and
comply with requirements of his medical providers; submit to
drug testing; refrain from “frequent[ing] places where alcohol
or
illegal
drugs
are
sold,
possessed,
manufactured,
or
distributed”; “not have in his possession . . . any actual or
imitation firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous
weapon”; submit to warrantless searches of his “person or
property . . . for the purposes of determining compliance with
his conditions of release”; “not travel outside the local area”
without approval from the probation officer; “not commit a
federal, state, or local crime” and “immediately notify” the
probation officer if he is arrested or questioned by law
enforcement; “not associate with any persons engaged in criminal
activity” or “convicted of a felony” without permission from the
probation officer; and “not operate a motor vehicle or obtain a
driver’s license” without approval from the probation officer.
J.A. 20–22.

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murder charge and received a sentence of four years and seven
months’ imprisonment with five years of supervised release.
Appellant timely appealed the revocation of his conditional
release to this court.

We vacated that revocation as well as

the original grant of conditional release because the district
court lacked authority under the applicable provision to impose
the conditions.
Jan.

5,

United States v. Conrad, No. 10-6962 (4th Cir.

2012).

While

subsection

(e)

authorizes

courts

to

determine dangerousness through a hearing, it allows only two
forms

of

disposition--unconditional

release

or

indefinite

commitment; it does not authorize conditional release.
provision

of

inapplicable

the

statute

because

it

that

applies

does,
only

subsection
if

The only
was

acquittee

the

(f),

was

previously indefinitely committed, which Appellant was not, and
only upon recommendation by the commitment facility director.
This error only came to our attention in 2010 when Appellant
appealed the revocation of his conditional release.
The effect of the order vacating both the revocation and
the

original

grant

of

conditional

release

was

to

revert

the

status of Appellant’s § 4243 proceedings to the point prior to
his conditional release.

Therefore, it required a new hearing

under § 4243(e) to determine Appellant’s dangerousness--and thus
whether he should be unconditionally released or indefinitely
committed.

That new hearing is the subject of this appeal.
6

It

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has yet to take place, however, because of events surrounding
Appellant’s 2013 conviction and present incarceration, to which
we now turn.
2.
In 2012, prior to our ordered remand, the government filed
charges

against

convicted

Appellant

felon

substances--charges

and

for

possession

conspiracy

similar

to

to

those

result

in

Appellant’s

a

firearm

distribute
brought

resulted in the 2007 NGI adjudication.
ultimately

of

2013

in

by

a

controlled
2006,

which

These 2012 charges would
conviction

and

current

imprisonment.
In the 2012-2013 case, the district court initially found
Appellant

incompetent

to

stand

trial.

It

therefore

stayed

further action in the case before us--arising from the 2007 NGI
adjudication--until Appellant became competent.

The court found

Appellant’s competency restored several months later, in late
2012.

At that point, Appellant was taken into custody to await

trial on the 2012 charges.

Because Appellant was in custody and

therefore could not be released through a § 4243 hearing, the
district court opted to await the outcome of the 2012-2013 case
before conducting the § 4243 hearing yet to be held in the case
before us.

In 2013, Appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon and was sentenced to eight years’

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imprisonment and three years’ supervised release.
from prison is scheduled for 2019.
Appellant
§ 4243

then

commitment

moved

the

See Appellant’s Br. at 2.

district

proceedings

His release

in

the

court

case

to

dismiss

below.

He

the

argued

that, due to his imprisonment for the 2013 conviction, he could
not create the “substantial risk of harm” to the public that
§ 4243(e) seeks to prevent through commitment.

J.A. 139.

He

claimed that, therefore, § 4243 was no longer applicable to him.
Alternatively, he argued that the district court did not have
the

authority

imprisonment

to

delay

because

the

the

hearing
statute

until

after

imposes

his

term

specific

of

timing

provisions that do not contemplate such a delay.
The government, on the other hand, argued that Appellant’s
§ 4243

hearing

should

be

delayed

until

his

release

from

incarceration because the purpose of § 4243 is to “ensure[] that
a

federal

insanity

criminal

will

not

defendant
be

found

not

guilty

onto

the

streets.”

released

by

reason

of

J.A.

148

(alteration in original) (quoting Frank v. United States, 506
U.S. 932, 932 (1992) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of the
petition

for

writ

of

omitted).

Once

government

argued,

appropriate

to

commitment.”

certiorari))

Appellant

J.A. 148.

“a

becomes

hearing

determine

(internal
eligible

pursuant

his

8

to

quotation
for

release,

§ 4243

suitability

marks

for

would

the
be

further

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The district court denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss the
commitment proceedings and ordered a delay of the proceedings
until

Appellant

finding

that

purposes.

completes

such

a

his

delay

current

would

term

best

of

imprisonment,

serve

the

statute’s

This appeal followed.

II.
Although the statutory blueprint of § 4243 is relatively
straightforward, its applicability to Appellant is complicated
by

the

fact

unrelated

that

he

the

one

to

circumstance

that

is

currently

for

§ 4243

which
does

incarcerated
he

not

was

for

adjudicated

expressly

a

crime
NGI--a

contemplate.

Indeed, Appellant first argues on appeal that his incarceration
negates the statute’s applicability to him.
status

as

an

inmate

prevents

him

from

He reasons that his
qualifying

as

an

“acquitted” person under subsection (a), posing a danger to the
public under subsections (d) or (e), or being released under
subsections (e) or (f).
court erred
proceedings.

by

denying

Therefore, he maintains, the district
his

motion

to

dismiss

the

commitment

Alternatively, Appellant claims that, under the

statute’s specific timing provisions as well as its underlying

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purposes, the district court lacked the authority to delay the
hearing until he completes his term of incarceration. 5
By contrast, the government contends that, while Appellant
may not pose a current threat to the public, his dangerousness
is irrelevant to whether to hold a § 4243(e) hearing.

Rather,

determining his dangerousness is the purpose of the hearing, and
thus Appellant’s incarceration does not bear on the statute’s
applicability to him.

Moreover, the government argues, allowing

a defendant to extricate himself from the requirements of § 4243
by committing subsequent offenses would perversely incentivize
crime

commission.

With

respect

to

the

hearing’s

delay,

the

government argues that reasonable delay is permissible and that
Congress

did

not

intend

strict

enforcement

of

the

forty-day

hearing deadline imposed by § 4243(c). 6

5

Appellant also argues that holding the hearing while he is
in prison would deprive him of due process.
He reasons that
because his incarceration prevents a showing that he poses a
substantial risk to the public, there is no basis upon which he
could be committed, and therefore that commitment could not bear
a “reasonable relation to the purpose for which [he would be]
committed,” as required under Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71,
79 (1992).
Appellant’s Br. at 11–12; Reply Br. at 4–5.
This
reasoning attempts to couch what is essentially a statutory
argument in due process terms.
It merely reiterates the
difficulty that would arise were Appellant’s hearing not
delayed.
Because we affirm the district court’s decision to
delay the hearing until Appellant is released on other grounds,
we need not address this argument further.
6

The parties also assert that they disagree on the effect
of their plea agreement. As noted above, see supra note 1, the
(Continued)
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We
whether

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address
§ 4243

these

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arguments

remains

in

applicable

turn,

to

determining

Appellant,

and

first
second,

whether the statute authorizes the district court to delay the
§ 4243 hearing until Appellant is released.

As the questions

before us concern statutory interpretation, we consider them de
novo.

See United States v. Letterlough, 63 F.3d 332, 334 (4th

Cir. 1995).
acquittee
subsequent
Appellant

We conclude that the statute does not permit an NGI

to

nullify

offenses
is

the

statute’s

and

that

released

from

application

delaying

prison

is

the

by

committing

hearing

consistent

with

until
the

statutory framework of § 4243.
A.
We turn first to Appellant’s argument that the district
court should have dismissed his § 4243 commitment proceedings

parties stipulated in the plea agreement that § 4243 et seq.
would govern “all further proceedings” in the case.
J.A. 16.
The government appears to argue that the parties’ stipulation
answers the question whether § 4243 should apply to Appellant.
See Appellee’s Br. at 8 (stating without analysis that the
parties stipulated to application of § 4243).
Appellant
explains that his argument is not that § 4243 should not govern,
but that under the terms of § 4243 itself, his proceedings
should be dismissed because he does not qualify as an acquittee
and cannot pose a substantial risk to the public due to his
incarceration.
See Reply Br. at 5.
The parties therefore do
not disagree that § 4243 is the statute under which this court
should resolve the dispute.
They appear to differ only on the
effect of § 4243 on the disposition of this case.
Therefore,
the stipulation does not alter our analysis.

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because his incarceration renders the statute inapplicable to
him.

In addition to arguing that he does not qualify as an

“acquitted person” under § 4243(a), cannot pose a “substantial
risk” to the public under § 4243(d) or (e), and is not subject
to

“release”

under

§ 4243(e)

or

(f),

he

offers

for

support

United States v. Kenney, 152 F. Supp. 2d 631 (M.D. Pa. 2001).
In that case, a district court held that a defendant serving a
federal sentence for another crime at the time of the offense
leading to his NGI adjudication was not an “acquitted person”
for purposes of § 4243.
The government responds that § 4243 imposes an “unambiguous
statutory

mandate,”

shall

conducted”

be

§ 4243(c).
the

Appellee’s
after

Br.

an

at

NGI

20,

that

“[a]

adjudication,

hearing

18

U.S.C.

The government also seeks to distinguish Kenney on

ground

that

incarcerated

the

when

he

defendant
committed

in

the

that

case

was

for

which

offense

already
he

was

found NGI.
While

Appellant

specifically
nonetheless

to

his

is

correct

particular

continues

to

that

§ 4243

does

circumstances,

apply.

Appellant

not

the
points

speak

statute
to

no

statutory provision, in § 4243 or elsewhere, that identifies any
circumstance that would render § 4243 inapplicable.
certainly
the

identified

statute’s

no

provision

applicability

permitting

through
12

And he has

nullification

subsequent

commission

of
of

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crime and incarceration.

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Section 4243 applies on its face to

NGI acquittees, and as the government observes, unambiguously
requires a hearing to determine commitment or release.
Kenney does not suggest a contrary conclusion in this case.
The district court’s decision in Kenney does not bind us and, in
any event, is analytically distinguishable.
the

defendant

committed

in

the

that

case

was

crime--assaulting

which he was adjudicated NGI.

already
a

Unlike Appellant,

incarcerated

correctional

when

he

officer--for

Appellant was not incarcerated

when he was charged in 2006 or when he was adjudicated NGI in
2007; he is incarcerated now because he committed additional
offenses subsequent to his NGI acquittal.
on

the

effect

determination,

of
and

crime
thus

commission
provides

Kenney does not bear

subsequent

no

support

to
for

an

NGI

allowing

Appellant to terminate his status as subject to § 4243.
conclude

that

the

district

court

did

not

err

by

We

denying

Appellant’s motion to dismiss the commitment proceedings on that
ground.
B.
We

next

consider

whether

§ 4243

authorizes

the

delay

imposed by the district court and conclude that it does.
consider

first

the

statute’s

specific

second the statute’s general purposes.

13

timing

provisions,

We
and

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1.
Appellant asserts that the delay imposed by the district
court is impermissible because the text of § 4243(c) requires a
hearing

within

40

days

of

the

NGI

verdict,

which,

under

a

separate provision, may be extended only by 30 days, and only by
the director of the facility to which the acquittee has been
committed.
The

See 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b).

government

counters

that

Congress

strict enforcement of the 40-day deadline.

did

not

mandate

Rather, the statute

provides for exceptions, such as the 30-day extension identified
by Appellant, when it is reasonable to delay.

Section 4243(b)

contemplates

a

the

extension

by

requiring

that

psychological

examination and report be ordered by the court “[p]rior to the
date of the hearing,” and “pursuant to the provisions of section
4247(b).”
facility

Under § 4247(b), the “director of the [evaluating]
may

apply

for

a

reasonable

extension

[for

the

evaluation] . . . not to exceed thirty days[7] . . . upon a

7

Section 4247(b) lays out the parameters for conducting
psychological evaluations pursuant to § 4243 as well as to other
sections
governing
defendants
with
mental
disorders
or
competency challenges.
Because it connects to several other
provisions that call for hearings to determine various mental
conditions, and those provisions, unlike § 4243, do not all
impose hearing deadlines, this section does not operate solely
within § 4243’s 40-day timeframe.
Instead, it provides for an
evaluation timeline of 45 days, and allows the 30-day extension
discussed here in addition to those 45 days.

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showing of good cause that the additional time is necessary to
observe and evaluate the defendant.”

The government argues that

because the court may grant an extension for the examination, it
may similarly grant one for the hearing.

Otherwise, the court

would not have the benefit of relying on the examination report
at the hearing.
Significantly, both parties agree that the statute includes
an implicit exception to the 40-day deadline by requiring the
court

to

§ 4247(b),

order
may

a

take

psychological
place

after

because of the 30-day extension.

evaluation,
those

40

which,

days

have

under
passed,

Inherent in their agreement is

the recognition that circumstances outside of the acquittee’s
control--such as a commitment facility’s inadequate resources to
promptly conduct the evaluation--can justify delay beyond the 40
days.

And, indeed, courts have so held.

For example, in United States v. Bohe, No. 04-cr-66, 2005
WL 1026701 (D.N.D. Apr. 28, 2005), the 40-day deadline under
§ 4243(c)

had

passed

psychiatric/psychological
facilities,” id. at *2.

due

to

examinations

a
at

“backlog
federal

of

medical

The defendant argued that the statute

therefore required his release, but the court disagreed.

The

court

the

reasoned

that

the

evaluation

would

be

crucial

to

hearing, and moreover, that releasing the defendant before the
court determined his dangerousness “would compromise the intent
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of the statute.”
“virtually

Id.

impossible

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Therefore, because the backlog made it
to

comply

with

the

forty-day

time

constraint set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 4243(c),” the court delayed
the

hearing

“until

such

examination is completed.”

time

as

the

appropriate . . .

Id.

It would seem even more fitting to recognize that strict
enforcement

is

not

always

possible

in

circumstances within an acquittee’s control.

the

context

of

In United States

v. Tucker, 153 F. App’x 173, 175 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
(unpublished), we affirmed delay of the acquittee’s § 4243(c)
hearing while he served a state sentence.
only

reasonable

discussed

in

one

here,

detail

below,

given
of

the

both

Such a result is the
statute’s

protecting

twin
the

goals,

acquittee

against prolonged unnecessary detention, and the public against
premature release.
Appellant’s
court’s

control,

contention

that

but

an

within

circumstances
acquittee’s

beyond

control--such

the
as

subsequent commission of additional crimes, a guilty plea, and
incarceration--could prevent the court from holding the required
hearing once the 40 days have elapsed is untenable.

Even though

the hearing, if delayed until Appellant completes his sentence,

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will occur approximately 12 years after the NGI adjudication, 8
the delay is attributable to Appellant’s commission of crimes
subsequent to his NGI adjudication.

Because Appellant has been

the principal architect of the delay he faces, and such delay is
reasonable under the statute when the acquittee is serving a
term of incarceration, we conclude that the district court did
not err in delaying the proceeding here.
2.
We

conclude

district

court’s

that

the

decision

to

statute’s
delay

purposes

the

§ 4243

Appellant’s release from prison as well.

support
hearing

the
until

Appellant contends

that the timing provisions of § 4243 ensure prompt access to
mental

health

care

following

release upon recovery.

an

NGI

verdict

and

immediate

Appellant characterizes the failure to

provide him with prompt rather than delayed access to such care
as a deprivation of liberty without due process. 9

8

As discussed above, Appellant was adjudicated NGI in 2007,
and his release from his current incarceration is scheduled for
2019.
9

The Supreme Court has said that the purposes of commitment
following an insanity acquittal include treatment of the
acquittee’s mental disorder.
See Jones v. United States, 463
U.S. 354, 368 (1983).
As we discuss below, the purposes of a
§ 4243 hearing, by contrast, are to protect (1) an acquittee’s
right to release once he has recovered or become no longer
dangerous, and (2) the public’s right to protection from the
acquittee’s potential dangerousness in the meantime.
Because
this appeal concerns whether and when to hold Appellant’s § 4243
(Continued)
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The government responds that the timing provisions limit
the court’s power to confine an acquittee before the hearing and
ensure that the hearing will be held close in time to when the
acquittee would otherwise be released from confinement.

The

government argues that the former purpose is not implicated when
the acquittee is incarcerated for another offense, and that the
latter purpose counsels in favor of delaying the hearing until
it can be held closer in time to when Appellant would actually
be released.
The purpose of a hearing to determine commitment or release
following

an

insanity

acquittal

is

to

determine

whether

the

acquittee is eligible for release because he has “recovered his
sanity or is no longer dangerous” to the public.

Jones v.

United

4243,

States,

463

U.S.

354,

368

(1983).

Section

in

providing for that hearing, therefore guarantees two concomitant
rights: on the one hand, the right of the acquittee to release
once his mental disorder no longer makes him a danger to the
public; and on the other, the right of the public at large to
protection

from

the

acquittee’s

potential

dangerousness.

We

find that delaying Appellant’s hearing until he completes his
term of incarceration serves both purposes.

hearing, a threshold step to determining whether he should be
committed, this argument is premature.

18

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First,

Filed: 01/13/2015

delay

serves

the

Pg: 19 of 20

purpose

of

ensuring

Appellant’s

right to release once he is found recovered or not dangerous.
Appellant

is

not

eligible

for

release

incarcerated for the 2013 conviction.

while

he

remains

His current incarceration

admits of no flexibility; it would not yield to allow release if
Appellant were now deemed not to pose a danger to the public.
Therefore, the statutory entitlement to release cannot flow to
Appellant

until

delaying

his

he

is

no

hearing

longer

until

he

in

prison.

By

served

his

has

contrast,
term

of

incarceration would allow Appellant’s right to release--again,
if the court determines that he has recovered his sanity or does
not pose a substantial risk to the public--to come to fruition.
Second, delay serves the purpose of protecting the public
from Appellant’s potential dangerousness.

Appellant cannot pose

a danger to the public at large while he remains incarcerated.
The public’s statutory right to protection, therefore, does not
arise until Appellant would otherwise be released from prison.
Moreover, whether Appellant would currently pose a danger to the
public does not relate to the purpose of protecting the public
when

it

will

matter:

in

2019,

current term of incarceration.

when

Appellant

completes

his

Delaying the hearing until then,

therefore, ensures the public’s right to protection.
For

these

reasons,

we

find

that

the

district

court’s

decision to delay the hearing until after Appellant completes
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his prison term does not run counter to the statute’s purposes,
but rather furthers them.

III.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s denial of
Appellant’s motion to dismiss his commitment proceedings under
18 U.S.C. § 4243 and its order that the proceedings be delayed
while Appellant completes his current term of imprisonment are

AFFIRMED.

20