Jesus Jehovah v. Commonwealth of Virginia

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:12-cv-00087-JCC-IDD. [999617460]. [13-7529]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-7529

JESUS EMMANUEL JEHOVAH, a/k/a Robert Gabriel Love, a/k/a
Gabriel Alexander Antonio,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
HAROLD W.
Director,

CLARKE,

Director;

A.

DAVID

ROBINSON,

Deputy

Defendants – Appellees,
and
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; LORETTA K. KELLY, Warden, Sussex I
State Prison; ALL EMPLOYEES OF THE VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, in their official, individual, and private
capacities, jointly and severally; EDDIE L. PEARSON, Warden;
KEISHA FOWLKES, Unit Manager; MS. EVANS, Records Officer; MS.
ANSAH, Corporal; ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC.;
ANTHONY KING, Dr.; MESELE GEBREYES, Dr.; BENJAMIN ULEP, Dr.,
Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
district of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior
District Judge. (1:12-cv-00087-JCC-IDD)

Argued:

May 12, 2015

Decided: July 9, 2015

Before TRAXLER, Chief Circuit Judge, GREGORY, and FLOYD, Circuit
Judges.

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Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote
the opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Floyd joined.

ARGUED:
Lola Abbas Kingo, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Trevor Stephen Cox, OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellees.
ON
BRIEF:
Steven
H.
Goldblatt,
Director,
Clay Greenberg, Student Counsel, Elizabeth Purcell, Student
Counsel, Appellate Litigation Program, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW
CENTER, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Mark R. Herring, Attorney
General of Virginia, Cynthia E. Hudson, Chief Deputy Attorney
General, Linda L. Bryant, Deputy Attorney General, Public Safety
& Enforcement, Richard C. Vorhis, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Kate E. Dwyre, Assistant Attorney General, Stuart A.
Raphael, Solicitor General of Virginia, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

2

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GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
Inmate

Jesus

Emmanuel

Jehovah

appeals

from

the

district

court’s dismissal of his pro se claims against the Commonwealth of
Virginia and various employees and contractors of the Virginia
Department of Corrections (“VDOC”).

Jehovah claims that Appellees

violated his free exercise rights under the First Amendment and
the

Religious

(“RLUIPA”)

by

Land
a)

Use

and

prohibiting

Institutionalized
him

from

consuming

Persons
wine

Act

during

communion, b) requiring him to work on Sabbath days, and c)
assigning him non-Christian cellmates.
Appellees

demonstrated

deliberate

Jehovah also alleges that

indifference

needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

to

his

medical

The district court

dismissed sua sponte Jehovah’s Sabbath claims, cell assignment
claims, and deliberate indifference claim, and granted Appellees
summary judgment on the communion wine claim.

We reverse the

district court’s judgment in its entirety and remand for further
proceedings.

I.
Jehovah is a VDOC inmate who was incarcerated at Sussex I
Prison (“SIP”) in Waverly, Virginia when he filed this lawsuit.
In his pro se complaint, he alleges four courses of action taken
by VDOC employees that he claims violated his rights under RLUIPA
and the First and Eighth Amendments.
3

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First, Jehovah claims that various policies have prevented
him from taking communion in the manner required by his religious
beliefs.

Jehovah’s religion 1 mandates that he take communion by

drinking red wine and consuming bread dipped in honey, olive oil,
sugar, cinnamon, and water.

While he was incarcerated at Nottoway

Correctional Center (“NCC”) from September 2009 to March 2010,
Jehovah was not permitted to take communion at all pursuant to a
memorandum prohibiting the practice for inmates in segregation.
In April 2010, Jehovah was transferred to SIP and placed in the
general population.

Jehovah requested permission from the warden

to take communion but did not receive a response, so he filed a
grievance. In January 2011, while Jehovah’s grievance was pending,
VDOC issued a new policy prohibiting all inmates from consuming
wine during communion.
VDOC denied.

Jehovah filed another grievance, which

VDOC revised its policy in January 2012 to allow

inmates to consume bread dipped in wine but not to drink wine.
Jehovah filed a third grievance, which was also denied.

1

In

Jehovah appears to adhere to his own particular brand of
Christianity, citing to a version of the Bible written by himself.
See J.A. 23 (Compl. n.1). Appellees do not challenge the sincerity
of his beliefs, and it is not within the courts’ purview to
“question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a
faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of
those creeds.” Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S.
680, 699 (1989).

4

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December 2012, VDOC changed its policy yet again to ban inmates
from consuming communion wine by any method. 2
Second, Jehovah asserts that he has been unable to secure a
job that will allow him to observe his Sabbaths.

Jehovah’s faith

prohibits him from working during the “Old Jewish Sabbath” (Friday
sundown to Saturday sundown) or the “New Christic Sabbath” (Sunday
at sunset to Monday at sunrise). 3
participate

in

programming

–-

VDOC requires inmates to

including

work

and

educational

activities -- for a certain number of hours per week in order to
be

eligible

credits.

for

good

conduct

allowances

See Va. Code § 53.1-32.1.

and

earned

sentence

In February 2011 Jehovah was

assigned to a cleaning position, and his supervisor required him
to work seven days a week. Jehovah requested that VDOC accommodate
his observance of the Sabbaths, but VDOC refused, informing him
that his failure to work could lead to sanctions.
grievance, which VDOC denied.

He filed a

VDOC staff has not approved him for

any job for which he has applied since December 2011, including
jobs for which they had previously approved him. 4

According to

2

This policy, like the January 2011 policy, allows clergy to
consume wine during services but permits inmates to drink only
wine substitutes such as grape juice.
3

Jehovah is required to devote these days to religious
observance and instruction.
4

Jehovah lost his cleaning job on May 17, 2011 after being
placed in segregation.
5

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Jehovah, “there are few prison jobs available to him at SIP and
other prisons which he can work and keep observing the Sabbaths.”
J.A. 27 (Compl. ¶ 32).
Third, Jehovah states that VDOC has housed him with “people
who are anti-Christian and unbelievers,” contrary to his religious
beliefs.

J.A. 28 (Compl. ¶ 34).

to be yoked to unbelievers.”

Jehovah “is directed by God not

J.A. 28 (Compl. ¶ 34).

At one point

Jehovah was housed with a “self-proclaimed Satanist and antiChristian,” even though VDOC knew of Jehovah’s religious views.
J.A. 28 (Compl. ¶ 35).

This inmate harassed Jehovah and subjected

him to “anti-Christian, anti-Jewish, anti-God . . . rhetoric.”
J.A. 28 (Compl. ¶ 35).

After several requests to be reassigned,

Jehovah filed a grievance to which VDOC never responded.

Since

July 2011, Jehovah has been assigned to live with “an atheist, an
agnostic,

a

Christian,

worldly
a

racist

Muslim,
black

a

false/non-practicing

anti-Christian

atheist,

insincere
a

self-

proclaimed ‘Hell’s Angel’ biker, and a black anti-Christian from
an anti-white gang.”

J.A. 29 (Compl. n.18).

Other VDOC prisons

had been able to accommodate Jehovah’s requests to be housed only
with Christians.
Finally, Jehovah alleges that he has suffered various medical
ailments that VDOC medical staff have deliberately ignored.

In

2009 while incarcerated at NCC, Jehovah experienced, among other
things,

tongue

lesions,

chest
6

and

throat

pain,

difficulty

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swallowing, coughing, nausea, lethargy, and unexplained weight
loss.

After medical staff at NCC “detected and acknowledged”

Jehovah’s symptoms but before they could diagnose them, Jehovah
was transferred to SIP on March 26, 2010.

J.A. 30 (Compl. ¶ 43).

Jehovah developed further symptoms after arriving at SIP, and after
testing negative for strep throat he was referred to Dr. King.

On

April 15, 2010, Dr. King examined Jehovah for the first time.

He

found holes in Jehovah’s tonsils but “did not acknowledge” any of
Jehovah’s other symptoms; he ordered a test for HIV, which was
negative, and then did not provide any further care.
(Compl.

¶

45).

Jehovah’s

symptoms

worsened,

and

J.A. 30
he

additional treatment from Dr. King on June 17, 2010.

sought

Dr. King

ignored all of Jehovah’s symptoms except his coughing, neck lesion,
and nasal drip. 5
blood tests:

Dr. King ordered a chest x-ray and urine and

the x-ray appeared normal but the urine and blood

tests revealed abnormalities consistent with infection.

Jehovah

maintains Dr. King ignored these results and provided no further
treatment.

Jehovah saw Dr. King again on July 30, 2010, and

5

At this point in time, Jehovah’s alleged symptoms included:
“coughing with unusual whitish phlegm, [a] patch of hair loss and
neck lesion on His neck, fatigue, dizziness, night sweats, nasal
drip, weight loss, a lump under [h]is left ear, chest pains, chest
burning sensations, involuntary muscle spasms throughout [h]is
body, headaches, difficulty sleeping, swollen lymph nodes, and
other symptoms.” J.A. 30 (Compl. ¶ 46).

7

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Dr. King referred him to mental health staff, who ultimately
determined that he had no psychological problems.
condition

continued

to

deteriorate. 6

When

Jehovah

Jehovah’s
next

saw

Dr. King on August 30, 2010, Dr. King “disregarded most” of his
symptoms and treated him for gastroesophageal reflux disease with
Prilosec, which made many of Jehovah’s symptoms worse.
(Compl. ¶ 48).

J.A. 31

Dr. King also referred Jehovah to mental health

staff again to be evaluated for bipolar disorder, of which staff
found no symptoms.

This pattern continued into 2012, with Dr.

King and other VDOC doctors allegedly acknowledging only some of
Jehovah’s symptoms, ignoring test results indicating infection,
and failing to improve Jehovah’s condition. 7

6

Additional symptoms included “tinnitus/ringing sensations
in [h]is hearing/ears, popping and bubbling sounds and sensations
and pains in [h]is ears and ear canals; episodic problems
concentrating,
slowed
cognitive
functioning,
malaise,
and
dizziness; abdominal pains, abnormal stools, and rapidly passing
consumed meals; more difficulty swallowing and persistent
sensations of something being caught in [h]is throat, neck pain,
and sore and tender swollen nodes and tissues in his neck; more
chest pains and of greater intensity, and bones in [h]is sternum
area slightly, audibly, and painfully popping and moving out of
place; worsening muscle spasms, and spontaneous irregular and
painful heartbeats.” J.A. 31 (Compl. ¶ 47).
7

In 2013, Jehovah filed a notice with the district court
stating that an ultrasound electrocardiogram had revealed that for
two years he had been suffering from pulmonary hypertension with
right ventricle hypertrophy, an irreversible and often fatal
condition.
8

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Jehovah

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filed

this

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lawsuit

on

July

11,

2012,

seeking

compensatory and injunctive relief for these alleged violations of
RLUIPA,

the

First

Amendment,

and

the

Eighth

Amendment.

On

September 27, 2012, the district court sua sponte dismissed all of
Jehovah’s claims except his communion claim pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Appellees moved
to dismiss the remaining claim on December 21, 2012.

In support

of their motion they submitted a declaration from VDOC Chief of
Corrections Operations A. David Robinson discussing the purposes
of

the

wine

ban.

Jehovah

to

which

Appellees

requests
objected.

responded
responded

with
in

numerous
part

and

discovery
otherwise

He then filed a motion to compel discovery and to hold

an evidentiary hearing, which the district court denied on May 17,
2013.

On August 20, 2013, the court granted Appellees’ summary

judgment motion and dismissed Jehovah’s RLUIPA and First Amendment
claims regarding the communion wine ban.

Jehovah timely appealed

the dismissal of all his claims.
II.
On appeal, Jehovah argues that the district court erred in 1)
dismissing

his

Sabbath,

cell

assignment,

and

deliberate

indifference claims under § 1915A, and 2) granting Appellees
summary judgment on his communion wine claim.

9

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We review de novo a § 1915A dismissal for failure to state a
claim.

Slade v. Hampton Roads Reg’l Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 248 (4th

Cir. 2005).

Dismissal is proper only if the plaintiff has failed

to “present factual allegations that ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’”
178 (4th Cir. 2014).
summary judgment.

Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170,

Similarly, we review de novo a grant of

Seabulk Offshore, Ltd. v. Am. Home Assur. Co.,

377 F.3d 408, 418 (4th Cir. 2004).

We must “view[] the facts and

inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”

Id.

Summary judgment is inappropriate if “the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986).
We must construe pro se complaints liberally, Jackson, 775
F.3d at 178, and “[l]iberal construction of the pleadings is
particularly

appropriate

where,

as

here,

there

is

a

pro

se

complaint raising civil rights issues,” Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d
736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original).

III.
The First Amendment’s protection of the right to exercise
religious beliefs extends to all citizens, including inmates.
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).

In Turner

v. Safley, the Supreme Court held that “when a prison regulation
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impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is
valid

if

it

interests.”

is

reasonably

related

to

482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).

legitimate

penological

The Turner Court laid out a

four-factor test for determining whether a prison regulation that
infringes on an inmate’s First Amendment rights is nonetheless
reasonable and therefore constitutionally valid.

First, is there

“a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and
the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it[?]”
Id.

Second, are there “alternative means of exercising the right

that remain open to prison inmates[?]”

Id. at 90.

Third, what is

“the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right
will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of
prison resources generally[?]”

Id.

And finally, do there exist

“obvious, easy alternatives” suggesting that the regulation is “an
‘exaggerated response’ to prison concerns[?]”

Id.

Under this

framework, “[t]he burden . . . is not on the State to prove the
validity of prison regulations but on the prisoner to disprove
it.”

Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003).
RLUIPA provides more stringent protection of prisoners’ free

exercise rights than does the First Amendment, applying “strict
scrutiny instead of reasonableness.”
174, 186 (4th Cir. 2006).

Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d

It prohibits any government entity from

imposing a “substantial burden” on an inmate’s religious exercise
unless the burden “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
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interest”

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and

“is

the

that . . . interest.”

least

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restrictive

means

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).

of

furthering

The inmate bears

the initial burden of showing a substantial burden on her religious
exercise, but the government must establish that the burden is the
least

restrictive

interest.
standard

Id.
is

§

way

to

further

2000cc-2(b).

exceptionally

a

compelling

“The

demanding,

governmental

least-restrictive-means
and

it

requires

the

government to show that it lacks other means of achieving its
desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise
of religion by the objecting party.”
853,

864

(2015)

(internal

Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct.

quotation

marks

and

alterations

omitted).
A.
Jehovah

and

Appellees

agree

that

summary

judgment

of

Jehovah’s RLUIPA claim regarding VDOC’s wine ban was improper for
two reasons.

First, Jehovah did not have the opportunity to brief

the issue of whether the wine ban substantially burdened his
religious exercise.

The district court held that Jehovah had not

demonstrated a substantial burden.

But the court had previously

found, during the motion-to-dismiss stage, that “[p]rohibiting
plaintiff from taking wine with communion burdens the exercise of
his religion.”

J.A. 55.

Because of this, the parties did not

address the substantial burden prong of RLUIPA in their summary
judgment briefing.

A district court may resolve a motion for
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summary judgment on grounds not raised by a party, but it must
first provide notice and a reasonable time to respond.

Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(f); see also Coward v. Jabe, 532 F. App’x 328, 329 (4th
Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (“After giving notice and a reasonable
time to respond, the district court may grant a motion for summary
judgment on grounds not raised by a party.”).

Jehovah was not

afforded the requisite opportunity to demonstrate an issue of
material fact regarding the burden imposed by the wine ban.
Second, the parties agree that the record is insufficient to
support the conclusion that the wine ban is the least restrictive
means to address the government’s purported security interest. 8
The Robinson Affidavit, which Appellees proffered in support of
their summary judgment motion, does not even attempt to explain
why an absolute ban is the least restrictive measure available.
At the very least, the government must “acknowledge and give some
consideration to less restrictive alternatives.”
679 F.3d 197, 203 (4th Cir. 2012). 9

Couch v. Jabe,

Both Jehovah and Appellees

8

Jehovah also argues that a genuine issue of material fact
exists as to whether the government’s security interest is
compelling. Appellant’s Br. 38-40.
9

Jehovah has put forth a number of less restrictive
alternatives, including: 1) to apply the same security measures
used for medication to wine, 2) to allow Jehovah an accommodation
to drink wine, and 3) to exclude inmates who have been convicted
of infractions involving stealing or alcohol and inmates with a
history of alcoholism.
13

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agree that this burden has not yet been satisfied, and we agree.
Therefore, we reverse the district court’s summary dismissal of
Jehovah’s RLUIPA wine ban claim and remand for further proceedings.
Although we must subject Jehovah’s First Amendment claim to
a standard more deferential to VDOC, we find that a reasonable
jury could rule in Jehovah’s favor.

Under Turner, Jehovah bears

the burden of showing not only that his religious exercise was
substantially

burdened,

but

also

that

the

wine

ban

is

“reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
U.S. at 89; see also Overton, 539 U.S. at 132.

not
482

The district court

based its First Amendment holding on its finding that Jehovah
failed

to

exercise.

demonstrate

a

substantial

burden

on

his

religious

As with the RLUIPA claim, the court failed to provide

notice that it would be considering this alternative ground for
summary judgment.

However, we may affirm the district court’s

grant of summary judgment on any ground in the record.

Bryant v.

Bell Atlantic Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 132 (4th Cir. 2002).
Therefore, we must determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists regarding whether the wine ban is unreasonable under
Turner.
Turner’s
connection

first

between

prong
a

asks

legitimate

whether

there

penological

policy infringing on an inmate’s free exercise.

is

a

interest

rational
and

the

482 U.S. at 89.

The Robinson Affidavit attests that the communion wine policy is
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motivated by “safety and security concerns,” specifically intended
to avoid the mishandling of alcohol and to prevent inmates who
have

struggled

behavior.

with

alcoholism

J.A. 81-82.

from

engaging

in

unhealthy

Promoting the inmates’ safety and health

is a legitimate concern.

See McRae v. Johnson, 261 F. App’x 554,

558 (4th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (finding that “in the prison
setting, suppression of contraband . . . [and] maintaining the
health and safety of inmates and staff . . . constitute compelling
governmental

interests.”

(emphasis

added)

Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005)).

(citing

Cutter

v.

It also seems clear that

the communion wine ban is, in the most general sense, logically
connected

to

its

asserted

goal:

restricting

inmate

wine

consumption is a rational approach to preventing alcohol misuse
and abuse.

What is unclear, however, is whether the other Turner

prongs – the availability of alternative means of exercising the
right,

the

alternatives

impact
--

of

support

accommodation,
the

and

the

conclusion

that

context,

“the

the

existence
wine

of

ban

is

availability

of

reasonable.
In

the

alternative

First
means

consideration.”

Amendment
of

practicing

religion

is

a

relevant

Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 862; see also O’Lone, 482

U.S. at 351-52 (analyzing an absolute ban on attending Jumu’ah and
addressing whether inmates “retain the ability to participate in
other Muslim ceremonies” (emphasis added)).
15

Although the ban at

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issue prohibits drinking wine at communion, it does not prevent
inmates from engaging in other aspects of communion, nor does it
affect other religious practices.

It is noteworthy, however, that

a previous version of the ban permitted inmates to consume wafers
dipped in wine. That version, like the current one, allowed clergy
to bring one fluid ounce of wine into the prison.
categorically

prohibits

alcohol

on

the

Neither version

premises.

The

only

difference between the two policies is that inmates used to have
an alternative means of consuming communion wine in a controlled
environment,

whereas

now

they

are

completely

barred

from

participating in that practice.
Regarding the impact of an accommodation on other inmates,
guards,

and

prison

Drawing

reasonable

resources,
inferences

the
in

record

Jehovah’s

is

largely

favor,

silent.

however,

a

reasonable jury could find that exempting Jehovah from the ban
would have a minimal impact on prison resources.

Wine is already

permitted on the premises, and religious services take place in a
controlled

environment

in

which

Jehovah

would

be

supervised.

Furthermore, a jury could find that the prison population would
not be endangered by a single inmate with no history of alcohol
abuse consuming a small amount of wine in this setting.
Finally, Jehovah has proposed several alternatives to the
ban, including:

1) to apply the same security measures used for

medication to wine, 2) to allow Jehovah an accommodation to drink
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wine, and 3) to apply the ban only to inmates who have been
convicted of infractions involving stealing or alcohol and inmates
with a history of alcoholism.

A reasonable jury could find that

at least one of these alternatives is so “obvious” and “easy” as
to suggest that the ban is “an exaggerated response.”
U.S. at 90.

Turner, 482

Therefore, we reverse the district court’s summary

dismissal of Jehovah’s First Amendment wine communion claim.
B.
The district court dismissed Jehovah’s Sabbath work claims
because

“prisoners

have

no

constitutional

opportunities while incarcerated.”

J.A. 56.

right

to

job

As Jehovah rightly

points out, however, this is not the correct focus of the RLUIPA
and

First

Amendment

inquiries.

The

constitutional

right

in

jeopardy is Jehovah’s right to free exercise of his religious
beliefs;

the

unavailability

of

prison

jobs

accommodating

his

Sabbath schedule is the alleged burden on that right.
To state a RLUIPA claim, Jehovah need only plead facts tending
to show a substantial burden on his exercise of sincerely held
religious beliefs.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b); see also Hartmann v.

Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“To survive a motion to dismiss on their RLUIPA claim, plaintiffs
must allege facts plausibly showing that the challenged policy and
the practices it engenders impose a substantial burden on the
exercise of their religious beliefs.”).
17

“[A] substantial burden

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on religious exercise occurs when a state or local government,
through act or omission, puts substantial pressure on an adherent
to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.”

Lovelace, 472

F.3d at 187 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Here, Jehovah has alleged that his religion requires him to
abstain from working during the “Old Jewish” and “New Christic”
Sabbaths.

He has pled that his cleaning job would not accommodate

his Sabbath observances, that his requests for job transfers were
denied, and that VDOC staff has not approved him for any job for
which he has applied since December 2011.

He has further alleged

that he will face sanctions and lose the opportunity to accrue
good conduct allowances and earned sentence credits if he fails to
work for 30-40 hours per week.
Appellees argue that Jehovah simply wishes more jobs would
accommodate his Sabbath schedule, and that therefore he is not
substantially burdened.

They rely on Jehovah’s assertion that

“there are few prison jobs available to him at SIP and other
prisons which he can work and keep observing the Sabbaths.”

See

J.A. 27 (Compl. ¶ 32) (emphasis added). However, viewing the facts
in the light most favorable to Jehovah, and applying the requisite
liberal construction to his pro se pleadings, Jehovah’s assertion
that there are few jobs available to him is not inconsistent with
his having applied for and been rejected from all of those jobs.
As Jehovah puts it, these other jobs are available to him “in
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theory,” but he has “plainly alleged that these jobs were made
unavailable

to

original).

Jehovah has alleged facts that support a plausible

claim

to

dismissal

him.”

relief.
of

We

Jehovah’s

Appellant’s

therefore
RLUIPA

Reply

reverse
claim

and

Br.

14

the

(emphasis

district

remand

for

in

court’s
further

proceedings.
The standard for stating a free exercise claim under the First
Amendment is more stringent.

Jehovah bears the burden not only of

demonstrating an infringement of his religious beliefs, but also
of showing that VDOC’s refusal to accommodate his Sabbath work
schedule is not rationally related to a legitimate penological
interest.

Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.

Still, Jehovah’s pro se civil

rights complaint meets the low bar of the motion-to-dismiss stage.
It is difficult to see what interest is served by making it
impossible for Jehovah to perform his required work hours entirely
during the week.
Jehovah

an

One reasonably could determine that granting

individual

alternative[]”

that

accommodation

suggests

VDOC’s

is

an

actions

“obvious,

are

easy

unreasonable.

Drawing all reasonable inferences in Jehovah’s favor, he has set
forth a plausible claim for relief.

See Jackson, 775 F.3d at 178.

Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing Jehovah’s First
Amendment claim.

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C.
The district court dismissed Jehovah’s housing claims because
it found that Jehovah “has no right to choose a cellmate based on
that person’s religious preferences or background.”

J.A. 57.

As

discussed above, however, the proper inquiry is whether and to
what extent VDOC burdened Jehovah’s right to exercise his sincerely
held religious beliefs by assigning him cellmates who did not share
his religious views.
Jehovah’s RLUIPA claim must survive the motion-to-dismiss
stage if he has pled facts tending to show that VDOC’s refusal to
accommodate his housing requests “put[] substantial pressure on
[him]

to

modify

his

behavior

and

to

violate

his

beliefs.”

Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 187 (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted).
cell

or

Jehovah has alleged that VDOC required him to “share a
anything

with

persons

who

are

anti-Christian

unbelievers” in contravention of his religious beliefs.
(Compl. ¶ 34).

and

J.A. 28

This allegation alone does not demonstrate that

being housed with non-Christians has pressured him to change his
religious conduct.

Jehovah takes issue with the exposure to non-

Christians, not with any effect it has on his religious activities.
As Appellees note, the few jurisdictions to address this question
have found that being housed with an inmate who does not share the
plaintiff’s religious beliefs “does not inhibit or constrain [the
p]laintiff’s religious conduct.”
20

Steele v. Guilfoyle, 76 P.3d 99,

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102 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003); see also Rogers v. Hellenbrand, No.
03-C-230-C, 2004 WL 433976, at *6 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 4, 2004) (“There
is no indication in his briefs, evidence or proposed facts that
simply being exposed to the religious views of others hinders [the
plaintiff’s]

ability

to

exercise

his

own

religion

in

any

way . . . .”), aff’d, 118 F. App’x 80 (7th Cir. 2004).
In addition to his general complaints of being assigned nonChristian cellmates, however, Jehovah asserts that he was housed
with a particular inmate who subjected Jehovah to “anti-Christian”
rhetoric.

J.A. 28 (Compl. ¶ 35).

Jehovah states that he was

“burdened, mocked, and harassed on account of [h]is religious views
by being housed in a cell with” this inmate.
¶ 37).

J.A. 28 (Compl.

Construing Jehovah’s pro se complaint liberally, it is

reasonable

to

infer

that

Jehovah’s

religious

practices

chilled by his cellmate’s religiously motivated harassment.

were
At

the motion-to-dismiss stage, this qualifies as a sufficient prima
facie showing under RLUIPA. 10

We therefore reverse the district

court’s dismissal of Jehovah’s RLUIPA cell assignment claim.
For his First Amendment cell assignment claim to survive,
Jehovah must allege sufficient facts showing that VDOC’s refusal

10

Since Jehovah has sufficiently pled that his housing
assignments substantially burdened his religious exercise, the
parties agree that remand is appropriate because the record does
not establish whether VDOC’s housing assignment policy is the least
restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest.
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to assign him a different cellmate was not reasonably related to
a legitimate penological interest. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. Giving
his complaint its due liberal construction, we find that he has
done

so.

Jehovah

states

that

his

cell

assignments

were

“deliberately done . . . to harass and cause conflict and problems
for [him].”

J.A. 29 (Compl. ¶¶ 38, 41 & n.18).

Furthermore, he

asserts that his cell assignments have contravened a SIP housing
policy

requiring

an

disciplinary records.

equivalence

in

cellmates’

J.A. 29 (Compl. ¶ 41 n. 18).

criminal

and

He filed two

grievances regarding his issues with the inmate who allegedly
harassed him but never received a response. 11
¶ 37).

J.A. 28 (Compl.

Given these allegations suggesting that VDOC was motivated

not by a legitimate penological concern but by animus, Jehovah has
successfully alleged facts supporting a plausible claim to relief.
Therefore, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of Jehovah’s
First Amendment cell assignment claim.

IV.
A claim of deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth
Amendment requires two showings, one objective and one subjective.
First, the inmate must prove that “the deprivation of a basic human

11

Jehovah’s residence with this inmate came to an end when
Jehovah was placed in disciplinary segregation.
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need was objectively sufficiently serious.”

De’Lonta v. Angelone,

330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted, emphasis in original). Second, she must prove
that

“subjectively

culpable

state

of

the

officials

mind.”

Id.

acted

with

(internal

a

sufficiently

quotation

marks

and

satisfy

the

alterations omitted, emphasis in original).
“Only
objective

extreme
component

deprivations
of

an

conditions of confinement.”

are

Eighth
Id.

adequate
Amendment

to

claim

regarding

Therefore, Jehovah must allege

a serious injury or a substantial risk of such.

Id.

Taking the

facts in the light most favorable to Jehovah, they are sufficient
to support such a finding.

Jehovah’s alleged ailments fill two

pages of his complaint and include constant chest pain, chronic
headaches, and diminished hearing and eyesight. J.A. 37-38 (Compl.
¶ 69).

Furthermore, Jehovah asserts that he has since been

diagnosed

with

pulmonary

hypertension

with

right

ventricle

hypertrophy, a serious and sometimes fatal condition.
Appellees do not appear to dispute that Jehovah’s innumerable
alleged symptoms constitute serious health issues.

Rather, they

focus on the subjective component of Jehovah’s claim.

Jehovah

must show that his doctors were deliberately indifferent, or
rather,

that

they

“actually

kn[e]w

of

and

disregard[ed]

an

objectively serious condition, medical need, or risk of harm.”
De’Lonta, 330 F.3d at 634.
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Appellees argue that Jehovah cannot meet this bar because he
received extensive treatment from Dr. King and his other doctors.
But the fact that Jehovah received some treatment is consistent
with the allegation that his doctors ignored and failed to treat
many of his symptoms.

See id. at 635 (finding that the fact that

the plaintiff received some treatment did not mean she received
treatment for a particular ailment or that the treatment was
reasonable).

Jehovah has alleged that his doctors acknowledged

some symptoms but ignored most, disregarded abnormal test results,
and failed to treat any of his symptoms effectively.

In other

words, he has pled facts that, if true, would establish that his
doctors

“actually

kn[e]w

of

and

disregard[ed]

an

serious condition, medical need, or risk of harm.”

objectively
Id. at 634.

Dismissal of Jehovah’s claim is not appropriate unless he has
failed to present factual allegations supporting a plausible claim
to relief.
here.

See Jackson, 775 F.3d at 178.

That is not the case

Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing Jehovah’s

Eighth Amendment claim.

V.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

24